# DELHI CLOTH & GENERAL MILLS CO v. LUDH BUDH SINGH

- **Citation:** [1972] 3 S.C.R. 29
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1972-01-11
- **Bench:** C. A. Vaid!Alingam, K. K. Mathew
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/delhi-cloth-general-mills-co-v-ludh-budh-singh-5535
- **Pages:** 29

## Headnote

29
J11dusiriul Disputes Act ( 14 of 1947), ss. 10 antl 33-Donze.5lic
en~
quiry by 1na11age111.ent-Jurisdiction of Tribunal to interefere u•ith findings
and con~ider additio11al evjtienc:e.
An inquiry was held into certain allegations of n1isconduct against
the respondent, who was an employee of the appellant, and the Enquiry
Officer made a report holding that the allegations had been proved. The
appellant accepted the report and decided to dismiss him. Since
an
industrial dispute bet\veen the appellant and its workmen was pending
beforo the Industrial Tribunal, an application was made under s .. 33 of
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, to the Tribunal for permission
to
dismiss the respondent.
Before the Tribunal neither party examined witnesses and tho appellant relied only on the enq~iry proceedings.
After
nrguments, the Tribunal reserved judgment. The appellant, then filed
an application praying that if the enquiry proceedings were found to be
defective the appellant should be given an opportunity. to adduce evidence
to justify the action proposed to be taken.
The Tribunal did not deal
with the application but held that the enquiry proceedings had not been
properly conducted and the findings of the Enquiry Officer were not in
accordance . with the evidence before him, and refused permission for
disn1issing the respondent.
Disn1issing the appeal to this Court.
HELD: (1) The Industrial Tribunal had to consider whether the
appcJlant had made out a prilna facie case for the permission asked for,
and for that purpose, it was justified in considering the nature of the
allegations,
the findings,
and the
evidence before
the
Enquiry
Officer. The
jurisdictiol} of
the Tribunal
in such
matters
is
to consider whether the :findi!lgs are such that no reasonable person wou1d
arrive at them on the materials before the Enquiry Officer, or, whether
the findings were not su'pported by any legal evidence at all. If the
Tribunal held that the conclusion arrived at by the Enquiry Officer could
not have been arrived at by a reasona"le person, the Tribunal has jurisdiction to interfere with such a finding, on the ground that it is perverse.
[38 C; 42 E-H; 43 A 1
In the present case, (a) the finding against the respondent was recol'ded by the Enquiry Officer ignori.ng material admissions, bv witnesses.
in favour of the respondent. It is not a question of mere appreciation
of evidence but really recording a finding contrary to evidence, [4J DJ
(b) The Enquiry Officer found the ·respondent guilty of acts of violence from his mere presence in the crowd outside the premises of the
appellant. f43 E-FI
(c) The Enquiry Officer contrary to the rule of burden of proof, held
that since the respondent had not adduced any evidence in his defence
it was not opcll to him to contend that he was not responsible for the acts
of <lestri1ction and damage [43 F-G]
30
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1972) 3 S.C.R.
Therefore, the Industrial Tribunal was justified In concludina that the
appellant had not made out a Prima facle Ctlst. [44 Al
Deihl Cloth & General 'Mills Co. v. Ganesh Dutt and Ors, C.A. No.
982/67 Dt. 17-12-71, Martin Burn Ltd. v. R. N. Banerjee, [19581 S.C.R.
514, Lord Krishna Textile Mills v. Its Workmen, [1961] 3 S.C.R. 204 and
Central Bank of India Ltd., New Delhi v .. Shri Prakash Chand lain, [19691
1. S.C.R. 735, followed.
·
( 2) In proceedings before the Tribunal either on a reference under
s. 10 or by way of an application under s, 33 of the Act, tb6 jurisdiction
of the Ttibunal is as follows :
·
(a) If no domestic inquiry bad been held by the management or if
the management makes it clear that it does not rely upon any domestic
inquiry that may have been held by it, it is entitled straight away to
adduce evidence before the Tribunal and justify its action.The Tribunal
is bound to consider that evidence on merits, and, in such a case it is
not necessary for the Tribunal to consider the validity of the domestic
inquiry, [54 G-Hl
(b) If a domestic inquiry had

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DELHI CLOTH & GENERAL MILLS CO.
v.
LUDH BUDH SINGH
January 11, 1972
[C. A. VAID!ALINGAM AND K. K. MATHEW, JJ.]
29
J11dusiriul Disputes Act ( 14 of 1947), ss. 10 antl 33-Donze.5lic
en~
quiry by 1na11age111.ent-Jurisdiction of Tribunal to interefere u•ith findings
and con~ider additio11al evjtienc:e.
An inquiry was held into certain allegations of n1isconduct against
the respondent, who was an employee of the appellant, and the Enquiry
Officer made a report holding that the allegations had been proved. The
appellant accepted the report and decided to dismiss him. Since
an
industrial dispute bet\veen the appellant and its workmen was pending
beforo the Industrial Tribunal, an application was made under s .. 33 of
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, to the Tribunal for permission
to
dismiss the respondent.
Before the Tribunal neither party examined witnesses and tho appellant relied only on the enq~iry proceedings.
After
nrguments, the Tribunal reserved judgment. The appellant, then filed
an application praying that if the enquiry proceedings were found to be
defective the appellant should be given an opportunity. to adduce evidence
to justify the action proposed to be taken.
The Tribunal did not deal
with the application but held that the enquiry proceedings had not been
properly conducted and the findings of the Enquiry Officer were not in
accordance . with the evidence before him, and refused permission for
disn1issing the respondent.
Disn1issing the appeal to this Court.
HELD: (1) The Industrial Tribunal had to consider whether the
appcJlant had made out a prilna facie case for the permission asked for,
and for that purpose, it was justified in considering the nature of the
allegations,
the findings,
and the
evidence before
the
Enquiry
Officer. The
jurisdictiol} of
the Tribunal
in such
matters
is
to consider whether the :findi!lgs are such that no reasonable person wou1d
arrive at them on the materials before the Enquiry Officer, or, whether
the findings were not su'pported by any legal evidence at all. If the
Tribunal held that the conclusion arrived at by the Enquiry Officer could
not have been arrived at by a reasona"le person, the Tribunal has jurisdiction to interfere with such a finding, on the ground that it is perverse.
[38 C; 42 E-H; 43 A 1
In the present case, (a) the finding against the respondent was recol'ded by the Enquiry Officer ignori.ng material admissions, bv witnesses.
in favour of the respondent. It is not a question of mere appreciation
of evidence but really recording a finding contrary to evidence, [4J DJ
(b) The Enquiry Officer found the ·respondent guilty of acts of violence from his mere presence in the crowd outside the premises of the
appellant. f43 E-FI
(c) The Enquiry Officer contrary to the rule of burden of proof, held
that since the respondent had not adduced any evidence in his defence
it was not opcll to him to contend that he was not responsible for the acts
of <lestri1ction and damage [43 F-G]
30
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1972) 3 S.C.R.
Therefore, the Industrial Tribunal was justified In concludina that the
appellant had not made out a Prima facle Ctlst. [44 Al
Deihl Cloth & General 'Mills Co. v. Ganesh Dutt and Ors, C.A. No.
982/67 Dt. 17-12-71, Martin Burn Ltd. v. R. N. Banerjee, [19581 S.C.R.
514, Lord Krishna Textile Mills v. Its Workmen, [1961] 3 S.C.R. 204 and
Central Bank of India Ltd., New Delhi v .. Shri Prakash Chand lain, [19691
1. S.C.R. 735, followed.
·
( 2) In proceedings before the Tribunal either on a reference under
s. 10 or by way of an application under s, 33 of the Act, tb6 jurisdiction
of the Ttibunal is as follows :
·
(a) If no domestic inquiry bad been held by the management or if
the management makes it clear that it does not rely upon any domestic
inquiry that may have been held by it, it is entitled straight away to
adduce evidence before the Tribunal and justify its action.The Tribunal
is bound to consider that evidence on merits, and, in such a case it is
not necessary for the Tribunal to consider the validity of the domestic
inquiry, [54 G-Hl
(b) If a domestic inquiry had been held, it is open to the manage·
ment to rely upon it in the first instance, and alternatively, and without
prejudice to its plea that the inquiry was proper, simultaneously adduce
additional evidence before the Tribunal justifying its action. In such
a case no inference can be drawn, without anything more, that the manage.
ment ha& given up the enquiry conducted by it; and it is the duty of the
Tribunal, in the first instance, to consider whether the enquiry proceed·
ings conducted by the management were valid and proper.
If the
Tribunal is satisfied that the enquiry was properly held the question di
considering the evidence adduced before it oil merits. does not arise. U
the Tribunal holds that the enquiry was not properly held then it has
jurisdiction to consider the evidence adduced before it by the management.
[SS A·Dl
(c) When I! domestic inquiry has been held bY the management and
the management relies on it, the management 'may request the Tribunal
to try the validity of the domestic inquiry as a preliminary issue and
also ask for an opportunity to adduce evi&ence before the Tribunal if
the finding on the preliminary issue is against the management. In such
a case if the finding on the preliminary. iss.ue is against the management,
the Tribunal will have to give the employer an opportunity to adduce
additional evidence and also give a similar opportunity to the employee
to lead evidence contra. But the management should avail itself of the
said opportunity by making a suitable request to the Tribunal before the
proceedings are closed. If no such opportunity has been
availed of
before the proceedings were closed, the employer can make no grievance
that the Tribunal did not provide for such an opportunity. [55 D-H; 56 A·Cl
( d) If the employer relies only on the domestic inquiry and does not
sin1ultaneously lead additional evidence, or ask for an opportunity during
the• pend ency of the proceedings to adduce such evidence, the duty of
the Tribunal is only to consider the validity of the domestic inquiry and
the finding recor&ed therein and decide the matter; It is not its function
to suo moto give an opportunity to the management to adduce evidence
before it to justify the action taken. [56 C-El
In the present case, the record of proceedings shows that the appellant
filed the application for adducing further evidence after the proceedin.~s before the Tribunal came to an end and judgment as reserved
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D
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F
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B
-+
D.C.M, v. LUDH BUDH SINGH (Jlaltliali"lllm, /.)
31
A The appellant did not ask for an opportunity when the proceedings were
pending and hence, thouah the Tribunal did not deal with the application on merits, it could not be said that the opportunity to which the
appellant was entitled had been denied to the appellant. (57 Bi-OJ
Management of Ritz Theatre (P) Ltd. v. Its Workmen, [19631 3 S.C.R.
461, State Bank of India v. R. K. Jain & Ors., C.A. No. 992/67 di.
17-9-71, M/s. Bharat Sugar Miiis Ltd. v. Shrl Jal Singh & Ors, (1962)
B
3 S.C.R. 684 and Workmen of Motipur Sugar Factory (P) Ltd. v. Motipur Sugar Factory, [1965) 3 S.C.R. 588, followed.
€!VIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : c. A. No. 984 of 1967.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment dated March 22,
1967 of the Delhi Administration Special Industrial Tribunal,
C Delhi in Application No. 1 O of 1967 (Dhanbad).
D
H. L. Anand, D. P. Thadani, S.S. Sharma and M. L. Chhibber,
for the appellant.
M. K. Ramamurthi, Vineet Kumar and S. S. Khunduja, for the
respondtmt.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Vaidialingam, J.-This appeal, by special leave, is directed
against the order dated March 22, 1967 of the Delhi Administration, Special Industrial Tribunal, dismissing application No. 10 of
E 1967 filed by the appellant under s. 33(l)(b) of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter to be referred as the Act).
The appellant is a public limited company owning textile mills
called Delhi Cloth Mills, situated at Bara Hindu Rao, Delhi, and
Swatantra Bharat Mills, situated at Najafgarh, New Delhi.
The
workman Ludh Budh Singh was employed, at the material time, in
F the Spinning Section 'C' of the fonner mill. A dispute about the
payment of bonus for the year 1964-65 arose ~tween the appellant and their workmen some time in the later part of the year
1965.
In pursuance of a settlement dated December 13, 1965,
arrived at between the management and its workmen, the bonus
for the year ending June 30, 1964 was. declared.
Tht said settleG ment also provided that negotiations for settling the rate of bonus
for the year ending June 30 1965 were to be held soon after the
accounts of the mill had been audited and passed at the Annual
General Meeting due to take place on December 14, 1965. The
negotiations in that direction were commenced on or about Decem.
ber 25, 1965, but no settlement could be arrived at between the
n parties and as such the negotiations failed on February 16, 1966.
In order to pay the bonus within the period prescribied in the
Payment of Bonus Act, the appellant declared on February 21.
32
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1972] 3 s.c:R.
A
1966, bonus for the year ending June 30, 1965, at the rate of 6%
of the annual wages. · The workmen being dissatisfied with the
quantum of bonus declared by the Company, the Union called
upon !he workmen not to receive the bonus.
As a protest, tl\e
workmen went on strike on the afternoon of February 23, 1966.
According to the management, this strike took a violent turn resulting in !he workmen indulging in wanton acts of destruction of the
B
property of the mill from February 23, 1966 onwards.
The appelfant, in consequence, declared a lock out.
·
The disputes regarding the bonus as well as the ·legality of the
strike and lock-out were referred for adjudication by the Delhi
Administration by its order dat~d March 4, 1966, to the Special
C.
Industrial Tribunal, which was numbered as Reierence No. 53 of
1966.
Sujan Singh, Security Officer of the mill,' sent a report dated
February 23, 1966 to the management regarding the violent activities of the workmen including Ludh Budh Singh, who belonged
to the Spinning 5ection 'C'. That report is Ex. M. 15.
The subD
stance of the report is as follows : The concerned workman, whose
duty hours on February 23, 1966 were from 6.30 A.M. to 2.30
P.M. did not go out of the mill even after his duty was over and
continued to remain inside the mill premises.
The concerned
workman Ludh Budh Singh stood in front of the office of the Weaving Superintendent and collected workers.
He further stopped the
E
workers of the shiit commencing at 2.30 P.M. ·from going to their
i:lace of work.
He, along with other workers instigated the employees to strike work.
A large number of workmen collected in
front of the office of the Proouction Superintendent with the intention of causing obstruction and creating disorder. Ludh Budh
Singh was a member of this unruly mob which forcibly broke open
gate No. 4 and entered the open space in the mill's premises with
F
a view to create disorder.
The concerned workman along with
the mob broke open the door and windows and destroyed the mill's
property which included furniture, •air-conditioners, iron-safe and
office records.
These acts of violence were witnessed by Sujan
Singh, Security Officer, who made the report as well as by Rampa!,
a Sepoy cl the Watch arid Ward and J;U Prakash, a peon in the G
Weaving Section.
On the basis of this report, charge sheet dated March 30, 1966,
Ex. M., was issued to Ludh Budh Singh alleging that he was guilty
of misconduct under els. (b} (i) and (m) of paragraph 27 of the
Certified Standing Orders of the Mill.
The allegations in the
H
charge sheet were more or less on the .Jines of the report Ex. M. 15.
It was specifically alleged that the workman, along with his companions, obstructed the mill workers of the in coming shift from
D.C.M. v. LUDH BUDH SINGH (Vaidialingam, J.)
33
A
proceeding to their place of work and that he and other members
of the mob destroyed the property of the mill, enumerated in the
charge-sheet.
'
The workman sent a reply Ex. M. 2 dated April I, 1966 de,nying the allegations.
He pleaded that the charges levelled against
B him wtre absolutely baseless and that he had no knowledge of the
incident stated th~rein. He denied having been a member of the
mob and that he did not take any part in anr violent activities, c i
alleged in the charge-sheet.
According to htm, after the compk·
tion of his duty on February 23, 1966, at 2.30 P.M. he left the mill
premises and went home.
C
l\ot satisued with the explanation offered by the concernecl
D
workman, the appellant issued notiee dated April 27, 1966, stating
that Shri S. S. Shanna has been appointed as the Enquiry Officer
to hold an enquiry against the workman on May 3, 1966.
The
workman was required to be present, along with any evidence, that
he may like to adduce.
On May 3, 1966, as the notice had not .been served on the
respondent, the enquiry was adjourned to May 6, 1966.
At the
request of another workman Sanwal Singh, against whom also
there were allegations of misconduct, the Enquiry Officer directetl
copies of the complaint and a list of witnesses to ~- furnished to
him.
The Enquiry Officer gave further directions that such
E
copies will also be given to the respondent. After further adjournment, the enquiry as against Sanwal Singh was separated on May
24, 1966 antl it continued only as against the respondent.
On behall of the management, a photographer, who had taken
the photographs of the crowd outside the mill premises on the
day in question, was examined and the respondent IU!mitted that
F
in the said photograph he was also in the crowd. Two other wit·
nesses, namely, Suian Singh, Security Officer, who sent the report
Ex. M. 15 and Rampal, a Sepoy in the Watch and Ward, were
examined and they were also cross-examined by the respondent's
representative appearin~ on behalf ot the respondent.
After ;,
consideration of the evidence, the Enquiry Officer sent his report
G dated August 31, 1966 holding that alJ the charges framed under
sub-clauses (b) (I) and (m) of paragraph 27 of the Standing
Orders of the MiU have been proved against the workman. Accepting the said report, the management of the Delhi Cloth Mills passeLl
an order dated January 5/6, 1967 to the e!Iect that the finding on
each of the charges is sufficient to justify the dismissal of the resH pondent from service. The order further proceeds to state that the
management has decided to dismiss the respondent for misconduct
proved against him under els. (b) (i) and (m) of the Standing
Orders and that the said order has been n._assed after taking into
34
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1972) 3 S.C.R.
account all relevant circumstances including the past record of A
service ot' the respondent. The ord~f. winds up~ saying that as
r~uire4 u~r s. 33(1)(b) of the Act, an application is being
submitted to the Speci_al Industrial Tribunal, Delhi for permission
to pass the order of dismissal against the res~ndent, and that in the
mean time pending the receipt of the permission, the respondent is
suspended without wages.
B
An industrial dispute being Ref. No. 53 of 1966 was pending
before the Special Industrial Tribunal, the appellant filed on January 6, 1967, bef_ore the SQecial Industrial Tribunal application
NQ. 10 of 1967 under s. 33(1) (b) of the Act, requesting the Tribunal to grant permission to dismiss μie respondent. In the appli. C
cation there is a reference to the allegations made against the
respondent, and the enquiry conductt;d against him as well as the
findings recorded therein and to the order of dismissal hieing passed
on· the basis of misconduct proved against the respondent in the
said enquiry, findings in which w~re accepted by the Manager of
the Mill.
The respondent in his written statement of March 20, 1967 ·
contested the application of the appellant on tlie ground
that the enquiry held by the appellant was not in accordance with
D
the principles of natural justice ·and that the findings recorded by
the Enquiry Officer were perverse and sufiered from basic errors of
facts.
He attributed ma/a {ides to the management in initiating
disciplinary proceedings as well as in proposing to pass the order E
of dismissal.
On March 21, 1967, the apeellant filed an application before
the Tribunal that in case the Tnbunal held that the enquiry conducted by it was defective, it should be allowed to adduee evidence
before the Tribunal to justify the action proposed to be · taken F
against the respondent.
Befort; the Trib;.Jnal, it is seen, neither party examined any witnesses:
On behalf of the appellant, the enqwry pr~
consis,ting of the charge-shoe!, ilie reply of the respondent and the
evidence of witnesses as well as the report ol the Enquiry Olliotr
were filed before the Tribunal. Arguments were advanced on G
both sides on the basis of enquiry proceedings.
· The Tribunal by its order dated March 22, 1967 hold that the
enquiry proceedings had not been conducted against the respondent in accordance with the principles of natural justice and that
the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer were not in accordance H
with the evidence adduced before him. The Triburuil held that
a copy of the report Ex. M .. 15 was not furnished to the ~D·
dent so as to enable him to effectively cross-examine Sujan Singk,
D.C.M. v. LUDH BUDH SINGH (Vaidiallngam, /,)
35
A who had made the said report.
The Tribunal is of the view that
the Enquiry Officer committed a very serious mistake in casti,ng
the ~urden Of proving his innocen£C on the reBJ?ODdent instea~ of
casting the burden on the manageinent of proving the allegations
of mis-conduct made against the workman. The Tri!J.unal is also
oi the -tiew that though very serious allegations of misconduct,
B namely, of inciting other wi>rkmon to strike work unlawfully. and
of riotous and disorderly behaviour were made againsf the workman, the Enquiry Officer has found the respondtllllt guilty of those
allegations merely on the basis that he was found in a crowd of
workmen outside the mill premises and that bis mere presence
established the charges levelled against him. The Tribunal is of the
C view that the evidence adduced before the Enquiry Officer does not
justify the recording of findings of misconduct against, the respondent.
On these grounds the Tribunal held that the enquiry proceedings suffered from very serious defects.
Regardip.g the application dated March 21, 1967 seeking permission to adduce evidence before the Tribunal, in case the domesD
tic enquiry was held to be defective, the Tribunal in its order has
merely referred to the filing of such a,n application, but has not
dealt with it as such and there is no further ret'erence to the said
application in the order. Ultimately, the Tribunal has held that
the appellant has not made out a prima facie case so as to justify
the grant oi permission asked for dismiss~g the respondent and in
E this view the permission asked for was refused and in consequence
application No. I 0 of 1967 stood dismissed.
Mr. H. L. Anand, learned co11;nsel for the appellant, bas raised
two contentions : ( 1) The enquiry proceedings held by the appellant were legal and valid and that the Trib1'181 has exceeded its
F jurisdiction under s. 33 ( 1) (1;.) of the Act in holding that the said
proceedings were defective; and
(ii)
Even assuming that the
einquiiy proceedings were defective for any reason, the Tribunal
has committed an error in law in not dealing with and allowing the
application filed by the appellant, which was one for giving the
appellant an opportunity, which he has in law, of, adducing evidence before the Tribunal to justify the action taken by' it.
G
Mr. Ramamurthy, learned counsel for the respondent, has taken
us through the enquiry proceedings cQDducted by the management
and pointed out that the View taken by the Tn'bunal that the enquiry
proceedings were held in violation of tlie principles of 111atural
justice is justified. He urged that the findings recorded by the
H Enquiry Officer were perverse as no such findings could be recorded
on the evidtllllce adduced by the management. Under these circumstances, he pointed out that it was within the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal to consider whether the finding! recorded by the Enquiry
36
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1972] 3 S.C.R.
A
Officer were supported by the evidence on record. It is on such
an examination of the evidence that the Tribnnal has come to the
conclusion that the findings recorded qy the Enquiry Officer ca.nnot
be sustained, as material evidence in favour of the workman has ·
been ignored and there has been a gross-misunderstanding of the
evidence by the Enquiry Officer.
The counsel also pointed out
that the application filed by the appellant for permission to adduce
B
evidence was highly belated inasmuch as it was filed after the
proceedings had closed and the Tribunal had reserved judgment.
He further pointed out that the Tribunal obviously thought that no
order need be passed on the said application as the proceedings had
come to an end and no request was made by the management during
the pendency of the proceedings.
C
In support of his first contention Mr. A,nand urged that the
appreciation o.f the evidence adduced in a domestic enquiry, as well
as the weight to be given to that evidence are all matters failing
primarily within the jurisdiction of the Enquiry Officer, over which
the Industrial Tribunal has no right to sit in appeal.
The counsel
further urged that the conclusion arrived at by the Enquiry Officer
D
is a possible view, which could be taken on the evidence on record.
The Industrial Tribunal has no jurisdiction to consider whether the
evidence available before the Enquiry Officer was adequate or
sufficient or of a satisfactory character.
Mr. Anand pointed out
that these are matters that an appellate court may be entitled to
consider, but not an Industrial Tribu,nal, whose jurisdiction is very E
limited.
He further pointed out that the fi,ndings recorded by the
Enquiry Officer cannot be considered to be perverse, as characterised by the ~ndustrial Tribunal, in the sense that it is not justified
by any legal evidence.
The counsel further contended that the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal, as laid down tw this Court in several decisions, was only
F
to satisfy itself whether a prima facie case has be(ln made out by
the employer and that the employer has not acted ma/a fide and
that the enq.uiry has been held in accordance with the principles of
natural justice and the procedure indicated in the Standing Orders,
if any. If once· the Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the
management has not acted ma/a fide aind that there has been a
proper enquiry and that the conclusion arrived at by the Enquiry
G
Officer is a possible one on the evidence led before it, the Tribunal
<:annot substitute its own judgment for the judgment of the Enquiry
Officer, though it may have come to a different conclusion on the
evidence adduced before the Enquiry Officer.
We do agree, as abstract propositions of Jaw, the contentions
of the.learned counsel rgarding the scope of a Tribunal's jurisdic· H
tion, in such matters, are correct. But the question for considera·
tion by us is whether the Industrial Tribunal, when it declined to
\
D.C.M. v. LUDH BUDH SINGH ( Vaidialingam, J.)
3 7
A.
grant the permission asked for by the appellant, has in ·any manner
acted CC\lltrary to the principles referred to by Mr. Anand and set
out above.
Before we proceed to deal-with the contentions of Mr. Anand,
it is necessary to state the law regarding the nature of the jurisdicB tion exercised by a Tribunal in deaUng with an application under
s. 33 of the Act.
We had occasion to deal with a similar aspect
in Delhi GJoth & General Mills Co. v. Ganesh Dutt and others(1)
It was observed therein :
c
D
"The nature of the jurisdiction exercised by
an
Industrial Tribunal in such circumstances is a very limited
one and it bas been laid down by several decisions of
this Court. The legal position is that where a proper
enquiry has been held by the management, the Tribunal
has to accept the finding arrived at in that enquiry unless
it is perverse or unreaso..11able and should give the permission asked for unless it has reason to ~lieve that the
management is guilty of victimisation or has been guilty
of unfair Jabour practice or is acting ma/a fide.
(Vide
Punjab National Bank, Ltd. v. Its Workme11( 2 ), Bharat
Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Jai Singh('), Management of Ritz
Theatre (P) Ltd. v. Its Workmen('), and Mysore Steel
Works v. !itender Chandra Kar and others(")"
In Martin Bum Ltd. v. R. N. Banerjee(•), it has been laid
E
down that once an Industrial Tribunal is satisfied that the conclusion arrived at by the Enquiry Officer, on the evidQnce led before
it, is a possible one, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to substitute
its own judgment for the judgment of the Enquiry Officer, though
the Tribunal may itself have arrived at a different conclusion on
F the same materials.
It has been further laid down in The Lord Krishna Textile Mills
v. Its Workmen(') as follows:
"It is well known that the question about the adequacy of evidence or its sufficiency or satisfactory character can be raised i,n a court of tacts and may fall to
G
be considered biy an appellate court which is entitled to
consider facts;
but these considerations ·are irrelevant
where the jurisdiction of the court is limited as under
s. 33{2){b). It is conceivable that ev~ in holding
an enquiry under s. 33{2){b) if the authority is satisfied that the finding recorded at the domestic enquiry is
H
(I) C.A. No. 982 of 1967 decided on 17·12-71
(2) (1960] 1 S.<;.R. 806.
(3) [1961] ll L.L.J. 644.
(4) (1963] 3 S.C.R. 461.
(5) (1971] I LL.J. 543,
(6) (1958] S.C.R. 514.
(7) 1)961] 3 S.C.R. 204.
38
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1972] 3 s.c Jl,
perverse in the sense that it is not justified by any legal
evidence whatever, oatly in such a case it may be entitled
to consider whether approval should be accorded to the
employer or not but it is essential to bear in mind the
difference between a finding· which is not supported by
any legal evidence and a finding which may appear to
bt~ not supported by sufficient or adequate or satisfactory
evidence.''
A
B
We may a.Jso refer to the decision in Central Bank of India Ltd.,
New Delhi v. Shri Prakash Chand Jain(') where after a refere,nce
to the principles laid down in The Lord Krishna Textile Mills v.
Its Workmen( 2 ), it has been pointed out that the test of perversity c
of a finding recorded biy a Tribu111al or an Enquiry Officer will be
that the said finding is not supported by any legal evidence at all.
It has been further pointed out that a finding recorded by a domestic Tribu.nal like an Enquiry Officer will also be held to be perverse
in those cases where the finding arrived at by the domestic Tribunal
is one, which no reasonable person could have arrived at on the
0
material before it.
The position was summed up by this Court in
the said decisioo as follows :
"Thus, there are two cases. where the findings of a
domestic tribunal like the Enquiry Officer dealing with
disciplinary proceedings against a workman can be interfered with, a.nd these two are cases in which the findings
E
are not based on legal evidence or are such as no reasonable person could have arrived 'at on the basis of the
material before the Tribunal.
In each ol these cases, the
findings are treated as perverse.
Bearii!lg in mind the abQve principles, we will now consider
whether the Industrial Tribunal, in the case before us, was' justified
F
in refusing to grant permission to the appellant to dismiss the respondent on the basis of the evid~nce recorded by the Enquiry
Officer Shri S. S. Shann11.
We have already extracted earlier the substance of the report
Ex. M. 15, sent by Sujan Singh, Security Officer.
From those G
allegation.~ it will be seen that the respondent was alleged to have
stopped the woi'kmein from goini to their place of duty and also:
along with other workmen, instigating the employees of the mill
to strike work. It is also alleged that the respondent a.long with
the mob of workmen broke open the door and windows a.nd also
destroyed the mill's property, which included iron-safe, office fumiH
ture and record etc.
Therefore, it will be seen that definite individual acts ol violeince in destroyinJ? the mill's property and also of
II) [1969] I S.C.R. 7JS.
(2) [1961) J S.C.R. '04,
D.C.M. v. LUDH BUDH SINGH (Vaidialingam, J.)
39
A instigating the other workmen to strike work have been alleged
against the respondent.
Those individual acts of the respondent of
destroying the mill's property ~d inciting other workmen not to
go to work as also of ob~tructing the employees from going to their
place of work are again the subject of the charge sheet Ex. M.
These allegations of misconduct were the subject of enquiry before
B the Enquiry Officer.
Now, we will advert to the enquiry proceedings.
At this stage
it may be mentiQlled that though the Tribunal has held that the
respondent was not furnished with a copy of the report Ex. M. 15,
and though this aspect has also been stressed before us by Mr.
Ramamurthy, on behalf of the workman, we are not inclined to
C agree with this finding of the Tribunal.
No doubt, this is one of.
the circumstances pointed out by the Tribunal in sup~rt of its view
that the enquiry proceedings were conducted in violation of the
principles of natural justice as the workman hadjllO effective opportunity of cross-examming SuJan Singh, who made the report
Ex. M. 15. When the enquiry proceedings cOmmf!llced on May 3,
D
1966, the record shows, that the enquiry proceedings were adjourned to May 6, 1966 because the respondent bad not been ~rved.
But it is significant to note that on the same date, the :J:!nquiry
Officer bad furnished to another workman, Sanwal Singh; -copies
of the report Ex. M. 1 S, as well as a list of witnesses proposed to
1*' examined by the management.
We have already referfed to the
E
fact that originally the eμquiry was proposed to be held jointly,
both against the respondent and Sanwal Singh, and it was only at
a later stage that the enquiry as against Sanwal Singh was separated.
After furnishing copies to Sanwa.J Singh, the Enquiry
Officer had passed an order on the same date that similar copies
will be sent to the respondQ!lt along with the date to which the
proceedin~s were being adjourned.
When the enquiry proceedings
F were continued later on, there is noth¥1g on record to show that the
respondent had not been furnished with the copy of Ex. M. 15, as
well as the list of witnesses, as directed by the Enquiry Olllcer on
May 3, 1966.
That shows that the respo,ndent must have .been
furnished with those copies.
This conclusion gains further support
from the fact that during the proceedings, the respondent never
G made any request for those copies.
'
It is also seen that Sujan Singh, after giving evidence in the
presence of the respondent before the Enquiry Officer, finally proved
the report Ex. M. 15 as having been made by him and this document, when it was so proved, was read over to the respQlldent and
H he never took any objection to the same.
On the other hand, on
behall of the respondent, the witness was cross-examined and the
nature of the cross-examination also shows that the workman was
fully aware of what was stated in Ex. M. 15.
Therefore, it cannot
40
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1972] 3 S.C.R.
be said that the enquiry proceeilings were vitiated, as erroneously
A
lleld by the Tribunal on the ground that the -respondent was not
furnished with a copy of Ex. M. 15.
No doubt, the witnesses were examined in the pres<mce of the
respondent and they were also cross-examined by his representative,
but, the question is whether the view of the Tribunal that the findB
ings recorded by the Enquiry Officer are not supported by the
evidence or in other words that the findings are perverse, is
justified.
Sujan Singh, Security Officer, who sent the report Ex. M. 15,
both in the report as well as in the evidence before the Enquiry c
Officer has referred to the incident as having taken place outside
the mill at about 2-15 or 2-30 p.m.
There is no controversy that
the respondent was on duty in the Spinning Section till 2. 30 p.m.
on February 23, 1966. It is :not the case of the management that
he had surreptitiously left his place of work earlier than 2.30 p.m.
Though Sujan Singh in chief examination has spoken to the part
alleged to have been played by the respondent, while being crossD
eK.alllined he has stated that the respondent was amongst the slogan
shouters. He has also stated that he cannot say if the respond~t
had any weapon or tools in his hand.
He has further admitted
that he did not see the respondent destroying any property of the
mills or obstructing any workman from going to his place of work.
In fact, in his cross-examination the entire activity relating to
E
destruction of mill's property and obstructing the workmen, is
attributed !fy him to a crowd of workmen.
These significant
answers given by the witness in cross-examination have not at all
been properly adverted to by th~ Enquiry Officer.
On the other hand, the enquiry report shows that the Enquiry
F
Officer has thoroughly mis-understood and
mis-in~reted the
nature of the evideirice given by Sujan Singh.
It is stated in the
said report that Sujan Singh has deposed that as the crowd was
very large, it was difficult for him to state precisely as to what
items of the mill were destroyed by the respondent. We have
already referred to the answers given by the said witness in the
cross-examination· that the respqndent was only a slogan shouter
G
and that he had not seen any tools or weapons in the hands of the
respondent.
But the more significant admission made by him and
which has not at all been adverted to or considered by the Enquiry
Officer is his categorical answer that he did not see the respondent
personally breaking or destroying any of the articles of the mill.
H
Coming to the second witness Rampa!, a sepoy ~n the Watch
:llld Ward, it is seen from the enquiry proceedings that on June 13.
1966, J. C. Bose, the represfltltative of the management mentioned
D.C.M. \', LUDH BUDH SINGH (Vaidialingam, J.)
41
A· to the Enquiry Officer that this witness "has refμsed
to
tender
evidence because he has no knowledge of this occurrence." This
has been recorded biy the Epquiry Officer.
But the said witness
gave evidence on June 21, 1966 to the effect at about 2 or 2.30
p.m. on Fejjruary 23, 1966 the Security Officer, Sujan Singh asked
him to accompany him to gate No. 4 of the mill.
He has further
B
deposed that even before he reached the crowd, which had already
collected outside the mills had broken open the gate.
He has further stated· that he saw the respondent in the crowd.
He WOlltlld'
up his chiei examination by saying that he has nothing further td
add to what has been stated above.
It is significant to iil.Ote that
this witness even in the chief-examination has not spoken to any'
c acts of violeince committed by the respondent, nor has he referred
to the respondent behaving in a disorderly manner or of having
obstructed any workman from proceeding to his place of work.
When this witiness was cross-examined by the respondent on
June 22, 1966, he started by saying that he never mentioned earlier
to anybody that he had no knowledge about the occurrence in resD
pect of which he had come to give evideince before the' Enquiry
Officer.
But when he was confronted with the record made by the
Enquiry Officer on June 13, 1966 on the representation of J. C.
Bose that this witness has refused to tender evidence because he has
no knowledge of the occurrence, he admitted .that he had so repre·
sented to J. C. Bose. From this, it is clear that this witness, even
E
according to his own admission, has oo knowledge about the occurrence about which he had come to give evidence. It is rather strange
that nevertheless he appeared before the Enquiry Officer on a later
date to give evidence.
But, as we have alrady pointed out. even
in the chief examination he has not attributed any overt act to the
respondent.
F
To resume the further answers given by this wit.ness in crossexamination, he admitted that before he reached gate No. 4. it had
already been broken and that he did not inform anybody about
the same.
He has also admitted that he did not Worm Sujan
Singh about having seen the respondent near the gate.
He has
admitted that Sujan Singh also did not mentioin to him about the
G presence of the respondent in the crowd.
He has also admitted
that he did not see any arms or weapons iin. the hands of any membe( of the crowd.
The photoqaph that appears to have been taken
of the crowd was shown to this witness and he admitted on seeing
the same that nobody in the crowd was carrying any weapons or
arms.
H
There was, no doubt, the evidence of the photographer MangaI
Das, Witness No. 3. He has referred to the fact that he took the
photos of the crowd outside the mill, which num\jered about 3000
4-L864Su~Cl/72
42
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[l 972] 3 S.C.R.
workers of the mill.
He has also stated that he took photos at A
about 3 P.M. on February 23, 1966.
He does not refer to any
further events relating to the incident of destruction of property or
obstruction of workmen.
It is no doubt true that when the photograph Ex. M.I. was shown to the respondent, the latter admitted
that he was in the crowd.
This admission, at the most, is only to
the effect that at about 3 P .M. when a large number of mill workers
B
were outside the mill premises, the respondent was also in that
crowd.
But the material evidence relating to the incident and relied on
by the management is that of Sujan Singh and Rampa! and we have
already referred to the nature of their evide,nce.
The Enquiry;
Officer, in the state of the evidence give~ by the two witnesses and
C
referred to by us earlier, has recorded a finding to the effect that
as the respondent was in the crowd, that by itself is einou~h for
proving the charges levelled against him.
In fact, the findmg of
the Enquiry Officer is :
"The admission on the part of the workmili!l about
his presence in the mob as shown in the photograph Ex.
D
M. l is sufficient to hold him guilty of charges."
Another statement made by the Enquiry Officer is :
"It does not lie i,n the mouth of the workman once
having chosen not to produce evidence in his defence to
state that he was not responsible for the acts of destruc-
.&
tion and damages.
He is estopped from dQnying his
presence fn the mob because of Ex. M. 1.
The Industrial Tribunal had to consider whether the appellant
has made out a prima facie case for permission being granted for
the action proposed to be taken against the workman.
For that
purpose the Tribunal was jusl'ified in considering the natur~ of the
F
allegations made against the workman, the findings recorded by the
Enquiry Officer and the materials that were available before the
Enquiry Officer, on the basis of which such findings had been
recorded.
Accepting the contention of Mr. Ana,nd that it was
within the jurisdiction of the Enquiry Officer to accept the evidence
of Sujan Singh and Rampa! will be over-simplifying the malt4r. c
and denying the legitimate jurisdiction of the Tribunal in sl!dla
matters to consider whether the findings are such as no reasonab!41i
person could have arrived at on the basis of the materials before
the Enquiry Officer. Ii the materials biefore the Enquiry Olli.cot
are such, from which the conclusion arrived at by the Enquiry
Officer could not have been arrived at by a reasonable person, then
it is needless to state, as laid down by this Court in Celllral Bank B
of India Ltd., New Delhi v.