# DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. GODFREY PHILLIPS (I) LTD AND ORS

- **Citation:** [2022] 19 S.C.R. 1193
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2022-05-06
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 3073 of 2022
- **Bench:** Hemant Gupta, V. Ramasubramanian
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/delhi-development-authority-v-godfrey-phillips-i-ltd-and-ors-36219
- **Pages:** 33

## Headnote

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - s. 6, s.4, 5 - Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation
and Resettlement Act, 2013 - s. 24(2) -Original land owners entered
into agreement to sell with the Respondent No. 1 on 25.9.1990 for
the land measuring 28 Bigha 08 Biswa - The said land was in the
process of acquisition which was started in 1980 vide notification
u/s. 6 and s. 4 of the 1894 Act - The agreement to sell recited that;
'acquisition process was challenged before the High Court, wherein
the entire land was released from the acquisition and the Delhi
Administration has not filed appeal and at present the above lands
are free from acquisition' - Land Acquisition Collector had taken
possession and paid compensation to the owners, then the
compensation has been paid back - The respondent No.1 purchased
the land vide sale deed dated 30.8.1991 and 27.2.1991 - Respondent
No. 1 filed Writ Petition for a declaration that the lands purchased
by them are free from and outside the scope of acquisition
proceedings, which was dismissed - Special Leave Petition was filed
against the order, which was also dismissed - Respondent no.1 filed
another Writ Petition after the commencement of the 2013 Act for
quashing of the notification u/s 4 and 6 of the 1894 Act, and claimed
the Mandamus to handover the peaceful possession of land - In
absence of any proof of encashment of cheque (the paid back
amount of compensation), the High Court directed the purchaser to
pay the amount of Rs. 16,61,774/- and such amount stands paid
and held that proceedings stand lapsed in terms of Section 24(2) of
2013 Act - The Appellant challenged the said order before Supreme
Court - Held: The purchaser has no right to claim lapsing of
acquisition proceedings - Original land owner filed Writ Petition
challenging the notification u/s. 6 of 1894 Act, which was dismissed
- Special Leave Petition was filed challenging the order, which was
[2022] 19 S.C.R. 1193
1193
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withdrawn - It was the conscious decision of land owner not to
continue with SLP - All the objections which were available to the
original land owner including the purchaser up to that stage cannot
be permitted to be raised again - No right confer on the other land
owners who have not disputed the acquisition proceedings on the
ground of lack of effective hearing of objections under Section 5A of the Act - Original land owner never filed any objections under
Section 5-A of the Act, the purchaser cannot seek the relief which
was not available even to the original land owner - The purchaser
had in fact filed a Writ of Mandamus for delivering the possession
of the entire acquired land - Such claim of Mandamus shows that
the purchaser is out of possession -Therefore, the condition in Indore
Development Authority for lapsing of the acquisition is not satisfied
- Appellant directed to refund the amount of Rs.16,61,774/- to the
purchaser, without any interest as such deposit was a voluntary offer
to deposit.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD:
1.1 The purchaser has purchased the property knowing fully
well that the vendor has not disputed the acquisition proceedings.
But on the basis of an order passed in Balbir Singh, it was conveyed
and accepted by the purchaser, that the acquisition stands quashed
and original land owner was in possession of the land. Since Sudan
Singh, affirming the order in Balbir Singh has not been approved
by this Court in the three judgments referred hereinabove (Abhey
Ram, Gurdip Singh Uban-I and Gurdip Singh Uban-II), no right
would accrue to the original land owner or the purchaser. The
High Court in the impugned order has not noticed any of the
three judgments of this Court in Abhey Ram, Gurdip Singh UbanI and Gurdip Singh Uban-II nullifying the effect of Balbir Singh
and instead ordered the purchaser to deposit twice of the amount
paid to the original land owner. The condition of payment of
compen

## Text

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DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
v.
GODFREY PHILLIPS (I) LTD AND ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 3073 of 2022)
MAY 06, 2022
[HEMANT GUPTA AND V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, JJ.]
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - s. 6, s.4, 5 - Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation
and Resettlement Act, 2013 - s. 24(2) -Original land owners entered
into agreement to sell with the Respondent No. 1 on 25.9.1990 for
the land measuring 28 Bigha 08 Biswa - The said land was in the
process of acquisition which was started in 1980 vide notification
u/s. 6 and s. 4 of the 1894 Act - The agreement to sell recited that;
'acquisition process was challenged before the High Court, wherein
the entire land was released from the acquisition and the Delhi
Administration has not filed appeal and at present the above lands
are free from acquisition' - Land Acquisition Collector had taken
possession and paid compensation to the owners, then the
compensation has been paid back - The respondent No.1 purchased
the land vide sale deed dated 30.8.1991 and 27.2.1991 - Respondent
No. 1 filed Writ Petition for a declaration that the lands purchased
by them are free from and outside the scope of acquisition
proceedings, which was dismissed - Special Leave Petition was filed
against the order, which was also dismissed - Respondent no.1 filed
another Writ Petition after the commencement of the 2013 Act for
quashing of the notification u/s 4 and 6 of the 1894 Act, and claimed
the Mandamus to handover the peaceful possession of land - In
absence of any proof of encashment of cheque (the paid back
amount of compensation), the High Court directed the purchaser to
pay the amount of Rs. 16,61,774/- and such amount stands paid
and held that proceedings stand lapsed in terms of Section 24(2) of
2013 Act - The Appellant challenged the said order before Supreme
Court - Held: The purchaser has no right to claim lapsing of
acquisition proceedings - Original land owner filed Writ Petition
challenging the notification u/s. 6 of 1894 Act, which was dismissed
- Special Leave Petition was filed challenging the order, which was
[2022] 19 S.C.R. 1193
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withdrawn - It was the conscious decision of land owner not to
continue with SLP - All the objections which were available to the
original land owner including the purchaser up to that stage cannot
be permitted to be raised again - No right confer on the other land
owners who have not disputed the acquisition proceedings on the
ground of lack of effective hearing of objections under Section 5A of the Act - Original land owner never filed any objections under
Section 5-A of the Act, the purchaser cannot seek the relief which
was not available even to the original land owner - The purchaser
had in fact filed a Writ of Mandamus for delivering the possession
of the entire acquired land - Such claim of Mandamus shows that
the purchaser is out of possession -Therefore, the condition in Indore
Development Authority for lapsing of the acquisition is not satisfied
- Appellant directed to refund the amount of Rs.16,61,774/- to the
purchaser, without any interest as such deposit was a voluntary offer
to deposit.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD:
1.1 The purchaser has purchased the property knowing fully
well that the vendor has not disputed the acquisition proceedings.
But on the basis of an order passed in Balbir Singh, it was conveyed
and accepted by the purchaser, that the acquisition stands quashed
and original land owner was in possession of the land. Since Sudan
Singh, affirming the order in Balbir Singh has not been approved
by this Court in the three judgments referred hereinabove (Abhey
Ram, Gurdip Singh Uban-I and Gurdip Singh Uban-II), no right
would accrue to the original land owner or the purchaser. The
High Court in the impugned order has not noticed any of the
three judgments of this Court in Abhey Ram, Gurdip Singh UbanI and Gurdip Singh Uban-II nullifying the effect of Balbir Singh
and instead ordered the purchaser to deposit twice of the amount
paid to the original land owner. The condition of payment of
compensation in Balbir Singh by the land owners does not survive
in view of the fact that such judgment has not been approved by
this Court. [Para 38][1220-G-H; 1221-A-B]
1.2 In the present case, as per the purchaser itself, the
possession of Part A land comprising in Khasra No. 384 (4-6),
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385 (4-6) and 390 (4-6) total measuring 12 Bigha and 18 Biswa
was taken by the Appellant and the compensation was paid. The
argument is that in terms of the impugned orders of the High
Court, the purchaser had deposited Rs.16,61,774/-, therefore,
the acquisition stand lapsed. Such deposit is in turn based on the
order of the High Court in Balbir Singh. The deposit by the
purchaser, either in terms of the impugned order or the order
passed in Balbir Singh, is wholly inconsequential. The amount of
compensation was paid on behalf of the appellant. Therefore, the
compensation of the acquired land paid by the appellant cannot
lead to lapsing of the acquisition in terms of Indore Development
Authority. The purchaser in its written submissions had made no
reference to the later judgments of this Court referred to above.
The deposit in terms of the order of the High Court will not lead
to lapsing of the acquisition proceedings, such orders being
absolutely being illegal. Thus, in respect of Part A land, the
purchaser cannot take shelter of the order, which had no legal
value and stands nullified. Even otherwise, there could not be
any direction to deposit the amount now after more than 25 years.
The right which has been lost due to passage of time cannot be
revived by virtue of deposit of the amount subsequent to orders
of the High Court. [Para 39][1221-C-F]
1.3 The purchaser had in fact filed a Writ of Mandamus for
delivering the possession of the entire acquired land. Such claim
of Mandamus shows that the purchaser is out of possession.
Therefore, the condition in Indore Development Authority for
lapsing of the acquisition is not satisfied. Therefore, as per the
purchaser, the possession has been taken of the part of the land
and compensation has been deposited in respect of the remaining
land. Thus, the twin conditions as laid down by this Court are not
satisfied. [Para 41][1222-D-E]
1.4 Even otherwise, the stand of the appellant is that the
possession of the entire land was taken on 14.7.1987 whereas
possession of land measuring 12 Bigha 18 Biswa was handed
over to it, whereas the possession of the remaining land
measuring 15 Bigha 10 Biswa is with the Government of Delhi.
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. GODFREY PHILLIPS
(I) LTD AND ORS.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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Therefore, the purchaser is not entitled to any declaration of
lapsing of acquisition proceedings inter alia on the ground that it
has purchased the land after vesting of the land with the State
and the possession has been taken of the land measuring 28 Bigha
8 Biswa and the compensation has also been deposited in respect
of entire land, though the compensation in respect of land
admeasuring 12 Bigha 18 Biswa was disbursed. The remaining
amount of compensation was with the Land Acquisition Collector.
[Para 42][1222-F-H]
1.5 The order passed by the High Court is set aside.
However, the appellant shall refund the amount of Rs.16,61,774/
- to the purchaser, without any interest as such deposit was a
voluntary offer to deposit, in accordance with law. [Para
44][1225-A]
Ishwar Chand Gupta v. Union of India Writ Petition
No. 2736 of 1985 (Delhi HC); Munni Lal v. Lt. Governor
of Delhi 1983 SCC OnLine Del 321; Balak Ram Gupta
v. Union of India AIR 1987 Del 239; Shri B.R. Gupta
v. Union of India & Ors. 1988 SCC OnLine Del 367;
Balbir Singh v. Union of India & Ors. 1989 SCC
OnLine Del 211; Delhi Development Authority v. Sudan
Singh (1997) 5 SCC 430; Abhey Ram & Ors. v. Union
of India &Ors. (1997) 5 SCC 421 : [1997] 3 SCR 931;
Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uban & Ors.
(1999) 7 SCC 44; Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh
Uban & Ors. (2000) 7 SCC 296 : [2000] 2 Suppl. SCR
496; Godfrey Phillips v. Union of India 2005 (125)
Delhi Law Times 207; Om Parkash vs. Union of India
(2010) 4 SCC 17 : [2010] 2 SCR 447; Meera Sahni v.
Lt. Governor of Delhi (2008) 9 SCC 177 : [2008] 10
SCR 1012; M. Venkatesh v. Bangalore Development
Authority (2015) 17 SCC 1 : [2015] 11 SCR 454;
Government (NCT of Delhi) v. Manav Dharam Trust &
Anr (2017) 6 SCC 751 : [2017] 4 SCR 232 - referred
to.
Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal & Ors. 7
(2020) 8 SCC 129 : [2020] 3 SCR 1; Shyam Nandan
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Prasad & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors. (1993) 4 SCC
255 : [1993] 1 Suppl. SCR 533; Chairman and
Managing Director, Tamil Nadu Housing Board & Anr.
v. S. Saraswathy & Ors (2015) 8 SCC 723 : [2015] 6
SCR 331; State of Haryana & Anr. v. Devander Sagar
& Ors. (2016) 14 SCC 746 : [2015] 13 SCR 1057;
Shiv Kumar & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors (2019) 10
SCC 229 - relied on.
Case Law Reference
[1997] 3 SCR 931
referred to
Para 13
[2000] 2 Suppl. SCR 496
referred to
Para 14
[2010] 2 SCR 447
referred to
Para 20
[2008] 10 SCR 1012
referred to
Para 25
[2015] 11 SCR 454
referred to
Para 25
[2017] 4 SCR 232
referred to
Para 27
[2020] 3 SCR 1
relied on
Para 27
[1993] 1 Suppl. SCR 533
relied on
Para 32
[2015] 6 SCR 331
relied on
Para 33
[2015] 13 SCR 1057
relied on
Para 34
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3073
of 2022.
From the Judgment and Order dated 09.12.2016 of the High Court
of Delhi at New Delhi in W.P. (C) No. 6507 of 2014.
Sanjay Poddar, Sr. Adv., Vishnu B. Saharya, Viresh B. Saharya,
Vivek B. Saharya, Gobind Kumar for M/s Saharya & Co., Advs. for the
Appellant.
Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, ASG, Kapil Sibal, Debal Bannerjee, Sr. Advs.,
Merusagar Samantaray, Ms. Ruchi Kohli, Durga Dutt, Aniruddha
Purushotham, Manvendra Singh, Ms. BLN Shivani, Aman Sharma, Ms.
Shreya Jain, Ms. S. Mehta, Amrish K. Sharma, Nizam Pasha, Krishan
Kumar, Pankaj Vivek, Nitin Pal, Ms. Sujeeta Srivastava, Advs. for the
Respondents.
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. GODFREY PHILLIPS
(I) LTD AND ORS.
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[2022] 19 S.C.R.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
HEMANT GUPTA, J.
1. The challenge in the present appeal is to an order dated 9.12.2016
passed by the High Court of Delhi whereby the writ petition filed by
respondent No. 11 was allowed and the proceedings initiated under the
Land Acquisition Act, 18942 were declared to have lapsed in terms of
Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in
Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 20133.
2. The process of acquisition of land admeasuring 50,000 Bighas
situated in 12 villages for the planned development of Delhi started way
back in 1980. The intention to acquire the land was published vide
notification dated 5.11.1980 in respect of land situated in villages of
Tughlakabad, Tigri, Deoli, Khanpur, Said-ul-Ajaib, Neb Sarai, Hauz Khas
and Khirki, and vide notification dated 25.11.1980 in respect of the land
situated in villages Chattarpur, Satbari Maidangarhi, Sayoorpur and Rajpur
Khurd. The declarations under Section 6 of the Act were published on
27.5.1985, 6.6.1985, 7.6.1985 and 26.2.1986 and the award were
announced on 20.5.1987 or thereafter.
3. M/s. Satluj Bhatta Co. through its partners4 (1) Shri Ishwar
Chander Gupta; (2) Shri Hari Chand; and (3) Shri Jai Chand were owners
of land admeasuring 58 Bigha 14 Biswa. An agreement to sell was
executed by them on 25.9.1990 for the land measuring 28 Bigha 08
Biswa with the purchaser. Thereafter, the purchaser is said to have
purchased the land in question vide sale deeds dated 30.8.1991 and
27.2.1991.
4. The purchaser for the first time in written synopsis, filed after
the conclusion of the arguments, asserted that the original land owners
in respect of land measuring 58 Bigha 14 Biswa situated in revenue
estate of Village Sayoorpur, had filed a Writ Petition No. 2736 of 1985
titled as Ishwar Chand Gupta v. Union of India before the High Court.
We requisitioned the records of the said writ petition from the High
Court. It transpires that the writ petition was filed on or about 30.10.1985
on the ground that the notification dated 20.5.1985 under Section 6 of
1 For short, the 'purchaser'
2 For short, the 'Act'
3 For short, the '2013 Act'
4 Hereinafter referred to as "Original land owners"
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the Act had been published after a period of more than three years of
the notification under Section 4 of the Act on 25.11.1980. There is no
assertion that the original land owners had filed any objections under
Section 5A of the Act. The said writ petition was dismissed on 2.12.1985
when the following order was passed:
"For the reasons recorded in Civil Writ No. 426 of 1981 titled
Muni Lal & Others Vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi and others decided
on 15th November, 1983 and Civil Writ 2850 of 1985 titled Hemant
Sharma and Others Vs. Union of India and others decided on 25th
November, 1985, the petition is without merit. Dismissed."
5. The Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 4169 of 1986 filed against
the said order was withdrawn on 12.9.1989 with two other petitions.
The order passed by this Court reads as thus:
"These three special leave petitions along with several other cases
were heard together. They are directed against the judgment of
the Delhi High Court rejecting the writ petitions of the present
petitioners challenging a notification issued under Section 4 of the
Land Acquisition Act. It is stated by Mr. Chitale, the learned
counsel for the petitioners in the Special Leave Petition No. 1224
of 1986 that on a subsequent writ petition filed by another interested
party, the High Court has struck down the subsequent notification
issued under Section 6 of the Act and in the circumstances the
present special leave petitions have become infructuous and will
not be pressed. The learned counsel on behalf of the respondents
has refuted the proposition. He says that the subsequent judgment
of the Delhi High Court may be impugned in this Court and if the
challenge is successful, the petitioners who are not parties to that
case will not be in a position to take any advantage out of the
afore-said judgment of the High Court. Alternatively, the learned
counsel for the respondents has contended that even if the said
notification issued under Section 6 finally stands quashed, the
authorities will be entitled to issue a fresh notification under Section
6 on the basis of the Section 4 notification which has been
unsuccessfully challenged by the petitioners in the present case.
We do not consider it necessary to decide the question as to
whether the special leave petitions have become infructuous or
not and whether on their withdrawal by the petitioners they are
going to suffer in the long run as the learned counsel for the
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. GODFREY PHILLIPS
(I) LTD AND ORS. [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]
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[2022] 19 S.C.R.
petitioners, even after we made this position clear to them, stated
that the S.L.Ps. would not be pressed. Since the petitioners are
withdrawing the S.L.Ps. at their own risk, the same are dismissed
as withdrawn. There will be no order as to costs."
6. The process of acquisition was challenged in a number of other
writ petitions before the High Court and stay of dispossession was granted
therein even before the notification under Section 6 of the Act was
published. One of such writ petitions was Munni Lal v. Lt. Governor
of Delhi5. The validity of the declarations under Section 6 of the Act
was challenged inter-alia on the ground that the acquisition proceedings
stood lapsed in view of the Central Act No. 68 of 1984 fixing time limit
for publication of notification under Section 6 of the Act. Such question
was examined by the Full Bench of the High Court in a judgment dated
27.5.1987 reported as Balak Ram Gupta v. Union of India6. The Full
Bench held that the period during which the acquisition proceedings were
stayed should be excluded while determining the validity of the declaration
under Section 6 of the Act. Therefore, it was found that the notification
under Section 6 of the Act was within the time fixed by the statute. The
matter was remitted to the Division Bench as the Full Bench was of the
view that it would not be convenient or possible for the Full Bench to
consider and pronounce the numerous contentions which may be raised
in each one of the 73 petitions.
7. The Division Bench decided all the writ petitions in the judgment
reported as Shri B.R. Gupta v. Union of India & Ors.7 when the
following operative order was passed on 14.10.1988:
"The orders of Land Acquisition Collectors under Section 5A and
the notifications issued by the Lt. Governor under Section 6 of the
Land Acquisition Act together with further land acquisition
proceedings in all the above writ petition are quashed and set
aside with cost. There shall be two set of counsel's fees at Rs.
1,500/- each as the group of petitions were heard mainly in the
two writ petitions. The respondents have also not filed the counter
affidavits in all the petitions as it was agreed to complete two sets
of petitions with counter affidavits. The rule is made absolute.
'Reasons to follow''.
5 1983 SCC OnLine Del 321
6 For short, the 'Balak Ram-I', 1987 SCC OnLine Del 227 : AIR 1987 Del 239
7 For short, the 'Balak Ram-II', 1988 SCC OnLine Del 367 : (1989) 37 DLT 150 (DB)
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8. The High Court upon recording the reasons on 18.11.1988 set
aside the notification issued under Section 6 of the Act as the writ petitioner
was neither given an opportunity of personal hearing, nor was he actually
heard in the objections filed by the landowners under Section 5A of the
Act and since there was no record maintained for consideration of large
number of objections filed by the writ petitioners/landowners. It was
held that the writ petitioner whose land is being taken by the Government
without his consent has a right to know the reasons as to why his claim
for exemption was being declined. It was held as under:
"16. We may note that there are number of other contentions
raised by the petitioner in the writ petition apart from the ones
that are mentioned and considered above. We need not go into all
of them and given any finding, since we have already come to the
conclusion that reports under Section 5A and orders under Section
6 cannot be sustained in law on the basis of the contentions already
noted by us."
9. Many landowners filed writ petitions before the High Court
challenging the action of the Delhi Administration to take possession
from them even though the declaration under Section 6 of the Act stood
quashed in its entirety in Balak Ram-II. The High Courtin a judgment
reported as Balbir Singh v. Union of India & Ors.8 held on 15.5.1989
that the action of the respondents to take the possession from the
landowners was not sustainable. Thus, the benefit of the judgment was
extended to all the landowners as the entire notification under Section 6
of the Act was found to be quashed. The Court passed the following
order:
"This order will dispose of CW 1373-75/89.............illegible.
Proceedings u/s 5A of the Land Acquisition Act right upto the
stage of Award relating to villages, namely, Khan Pur Deoli @
Devli, Tughlakabad, Khirkee, Neb Sarai, Said-ul-Ajaib, Tigri,
Shayoor Pur, Satbari, Chattar Pur, Raj Pur Khurd, Maidan Ghari,
have been quashed by a Division Bench of this Court in Balak
Ram Gupta vs. U.O.I. C.W.P. 1639/85 decided on 14th October,
1988/18th November, 1988. The prayer of the petitioners is that
in spite of that Judgment, the respondents are trying to take
possession of the land.
8 1989 SCC OnLine Del 211 : (1989) 39 DLT 233 (DB)
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. GODFREY PHILLIPS
(I) LTD AND ORS. [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]
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2. The Delhi Administration as also the Delhi Development
Authority have taken up a very fair stand before us. Their
contention is that certain land owners have received compensation
and as such they should not be allowed to deal with the land till
the compensation is paid back to the Delhi Administration with
interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date they received
the payment till the date they have refunded the amount. The
contention raised is quite fair and is accepted. It is further stated
by learned counsel for the respondents that no effort would be
made to take possession of any land from anybody and the
possession already taken of these lands will be restored back to
the land owners on receipt of the refund of compensation, if made
with interest. It is further con-tended that in certain cases, the
land owners have been allotted alternate plots in leiu of their land
having been acquired and in those cases the alternate plots must
be surrendered before the land owners can take advantage of the
quashing of the notifications. The counsel for the petitioner accepts
this suggestion of the respondents. Consequently, we direct that
the possession of the petitioners will not be disturbed except in
cases where the compensation has been received by the land
owners or alternate plots have been allotted until the compensation
amount and the alternate plot is surrendered. Counsel for the
petitioners agree that the land owners who have received
compensation or have been allotted alternate plots would surrender
the same as indicated above within two months from today. All
other land owners who have neither received compensation nor
any alternate plot are free to deal with their lands the way they
like and their possession will not be disturbed by the respondents.
Delhi Administration will see to it that the Revenue records are
amended accordingly. The proper authority i.e. the Land
Acquisition Collector will receive the refund of compensation with
12 per cent interest per annum as well as the surrender of the
alternate plots when and if offered. The writ petitions are disposed
of in these terms."
10. The Union of India sought review of the order passed (RA
No. 2766 of 1989) in the all the matters. The review was dismissed on
6.7.1990 on the ground that since the entire notification stands quashed,
therefore, Union cannot keep the possession.
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11. The said judgment and order of the Division Bench in Balbir
Singh came up for consideration before this Court in a judgment reported
as Delhi Development Authority v. Sudan Singh in Civil Appeal No.
3847 of 1991 and Civil Appeal Nos. 3801-3847/19919. This Court
dismissed the appeals filed by the Union of India or by the Delhi
Development Authority on 20.9.1991 except to the extent that the land
of Village Saidul Azab was not part of the writ petitions which were
decided in Balak Ram-II.
12. The order of the High Court in C.W.P. No. 2657/85 Abhey
Ram vs. Union of India dated 2.9.1987 was passed in the writ petition
filed by the land owners of Village Khirkee on the ground that the
notification dated 7.6.1985 under Section 6 of the Act has been issued
after three years of the publication of the notification under Section 4 of
the Act on 5.11.1980. In the said case also, the land owners had not filed
any objections under Section 5A of the Act. The writ petition was
dismissed. The order of the High Court reads thus:-
"It transpires that this petition challenges the Notification under
Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act dated 7th June, 1985. The
validity of this Notification has already been upheld by a Full Bench
of this Court in the case of Balak Ram Gupta Vs. Union of India,
CWP No. 1639/85 decided on 27th May, 1987. No other point is
pressed. The writ petition is consequently dismissed".
13. The said order was the subject matter of appeal before this
Courtin a judgment reported as Abhey Ram & Ors. v. Union of India
& Ors.10. A three judge Bench in the said judgment inter-alia examined
an argument raised that the benefit of quashing of the declaration under
Section 6 of the Act by the High Court in Balak Ram-II should be
extended to the appellants, though the notification had been quashed qua
the writ petitioners before the High Court. This Court examined the
question as to whether a declaration under Section 6 of the Act in its
entirety stands quashed even when the Court had quashed the declaration
in the case of the land owners who had filed writ petitions after their
objections were not considered under Section 5-A of the Act. This Court
noticed that unfortunately, the operative part of the judgment (as
reproduced in para 7 of this judgment) in Balak Ram-II had not been
9 (1997) 5 SCC 430
10 (1997) 5 SCC 421
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brought to the notice of this Court in Sudan Singh. It was held that such
judgment of the High Court has no application to the facts of the case as
unless the declaration under Section 6 is quashed in its entirety specifically,
it does not mean that the entire declaration has been quashed. It was
noticed that the appellants had not filed any objections to the notice
issued under Section 5-A. This Court held as under:
"9. Therefore, the reasons given in B.R. Gupta v. UOI and others,
37(1989) Delhi Law Times 150are obvious with reference to
the quashing of the publication of the, declaration under Section 6
vis-a-vis the writ petitioners therein....
10. The question then arises is: whether the quashing of the
declaration by the Division Bench in respect of the other matters
would enure the benefit to the appellants also ? Though, prima
facie, the argument of the learned counsel is attractive, on deeper
consideration, it is difficult to give acceptance to the contention of
Mr. Sachhar. When the Division Bench expressly limited the
controversy to the quashing of the declaration qua the writ
petitioners before the Bench, necessary consequences would be
that the declaration published under Section 6should stand upheld.
11. It is seen that before the Division Bench judgment was rendered,
the petition of the appellants stood dismissed and the appellants
had filed the special leave petition in this Court. If it were a case
entirely relating to Section 6 declaration as has been quashed by
the High Court, necessarily that would enure the benefit to others
also, though they did not file any petition, except to those whose
lands were taken possession of and were vested in the State under
Sections 16 and 17(2) of the Act free from all encumbrances. But
it is seen that the Division Bench confined the controversy to the
quashing of the declaration under Section 6 in respect of the persons
qua the writ petitioners before the Division Bench. Therefore, the
benefit of the quashing of the declaration under Section 6 by the
Division Bench does not enure to the appellants.
12. It is true that a Bench of this Court has considered the effect
of such a quashing in Delhi Development Authority v. Sudan
Singh [(1997) 5 SCC 430 : (1991) 45 DLT 602] . But, unfortunately,
in that case the operative part of the judgment referred to earlier
has not been brought to the notice of this Court. Therefore, the
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ratio therein has no application to the facts in this case. It is also
true that in Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nendoliya case [(1991) 4
SCC 531] this Court had also observed that it would enure the
benefit to those petitioners. In view of the fact that the notification
under Section 4(1) is a composite one and equally the declaration
under Section 6 is also a composite one, unless the declaration
under Section 6 is quashed in toto, it does not operate as if the
entire declaration requires to be quashed. It is seen that the
appellants had not filed any objections to the notice issued under
Section 5-A."
14. In Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uban & Ors.11,
this Court held that the three-Judge Bench judgment in Abhey Ram is
binding in preference to the judgment of the two Judges in Sudan Singh.
This Court held as under:
"7. We may state that it is true that in Sudan Singh case [(1997)
5 SCC 430 : 45 (1991) DLT 602] a two-Judge Bench of this Court
confirmed another judgment of the Delhi High Court wherein the
High Court had allowed the writ petition on the basis that the
judgment of the Division Bench dated 18-11-1988 had quashed
the Section 6 declaration wholly. It is also true that in Sudan Singh
case [(1997) 5 SCC 430 : 45 (1991) DLT 602] too no objections
were filed by the owners under Section 5-A. But, we are governed
by the judgment of the three-Judge Bench in Abhey Ram
case [(1997) 5 SCC 421 : JT (1997) 5 SC 354] where the said
Bench not only referred to the effect of the Division Bench
judgment of the High Court dated 18-11-1988 but also referred to
the judgment of the two-Judge Bench of this Court in Sudan Singh
case [(1997) 5 SCC 430 : 45 (1991) DLT 602] . The three-Judge
Bench in Abhey Ram [(1997) 5 SCC 421 : JT (1997) 5 SC 354] is
binding on us in preference to the judgment of the two Judges
in Sudan Singh [(1997) 5 SCC 430 : 45 (1991) DLT 602].
8. In connection with owners or persons interested who have not
filed objections under Section 5-A, in principle, it must be accepted
that they had no objection to the Section 4 notification operating in
respect of their property. On the other hand, in respect of those
who filed objections, they might have locus standi to contend that
11 For short, the 'Gurdip Singh Uban-I' (1999) 7 SCC 44
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. GODFREY PHILLIPS
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the Section 5-A enquiry was not conducted properly. We, therefore,
agree in principle with the view of the three-Judge Bench in Abhey
Ram case [(1997) 5 SCC 421 : JT (1997) 5 SC 354] that those
who have not filed objections under Section 5-A, could not be
allowed to contend that the Section 5-A enquiry was bad and that
consequently the Section 6 declaration must be struck down and
that then the Section 4 notification would lapse. If, therefore, no
objections were filed by the respondents, logically the Section 6
declaration must be deemed to be in force so far as they are
concerned.
9. But learned Senior Counsel for the respondents contends that
the judgment of the Division Bench dated 18-11-1988 in B.R. Gupta
case [(1989) 37 DLT 150 (DB)] had quashed the entire Section
5-A proceedings and that even in case the respondents had filed
objections, the position would not have been different. We cannot
accept this contention. We are of the view that in respect of those
who did not object to the Section 4(1) notification by filing objections
under Section 5-A, the said notification must be treated as being
in force. The writ petitioners cannot be permitted to contend that
in some other cases, the notification was quashed and that such
quashing would also enure to their benefit.
10. Then coming to the effect of the judgment of the Division
Bench dated 18-11-1988 of the High Court, we are of the view
that the three-Judge Bench judgment in Abhey Ram case [(1997)
5 SCC 421 : JT (1997) 5 SC 354] has interpreted or declared the
effect of the said High Court judgment dated 18-11-1988. That
judgment is binding on us. We cannot go by the two-Judge Bench
judgment in Sudan Singh case [(1997) 5 SCC 430 : 45 (1991)
DLT 602] because we are bound by the judgment of the threeJudge Bench in Abhey Ram case [(1997) 5 SCC 421 : JT (1997)
5 SC 354] . Further, the judgment in Abhey Ram case [(1997) 5
SCC 421 : JT (1997) 5 SC 354] takes notice of Sudan Singh
case [(1997) 5 SCC 430 : 45 (1991) DLT 602] and it cannot be
contended that they have not looked fully into the judgment
in Sudan Singh case [(1997) 5 SCC 430 : 45 (1991) DLT 602]
or fully into the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court
dated 18-11-1988 in B.R. Gupta case [(1989) 37 DLT 150 (DB)].
Nor is the dismissal of the special leave petition in B.L. Sharma
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case a precedent which can outweigh Abhey Ram [(1997) 5 SCC
421 : JT (1997) 5 SC 354] . The opinion of the legal department of
the Government or the Delhi Development Authority which is
relied upon - apart from not having binding force, cannot
override Abhey Ram case [(1997) 5 SCC 421 : JT (1997) 5 SC
354]."
15. In another judgment reported as Delhi Administration v.
Gurdip Singh Uban & Ors.12, this Court considered the Interlocutory
Applications filed by the landowners in Gurdip Singh Uban-I after the
dismissal of review petition on 24-11-1999. This Court, while deciding
such applications noticed that the brief operative order in Balak RamII in each of the 73 writ petitions was not noticed in Sudan Singh. It
was held as under:
"42. On fresh consideration of the matter, we are of the opinion
that Abhey Ram [(1997) 5 SCC 421] was decided correctly - if
we may say so with great respect - and that the latter order of
the Division Bench in the writ petitions in the batch in Balak Ram
Gupta [B.R. Gupta v. Union of India, (1989) 37 DLT 150 (DB)
(order dated 14-10-1988)] must be confined to the writ absolute
orders dated 14-10-1988 in each of those 73 writ petitions and to
the land covered thereby, because the objections filed were personal
to each case and there was no argument before the Division Bench
or even before us that there was no public purpose or that there
was colourable exercise of power. We are of the view that the
Division Bench of the High Court in its latter order dated 18-111988 containing reasons could not in law have quashed the Section
5-A inquiry and Section 6 declaration covering all other cases not
before the Division Bench when no question going to the root and
covering all cases arose, and contrary to the writ absolute issued
in each case. The order dated 14-10-1988, in our view, would
control the order dated 18-11-1988 and would restrict the same."
16. With this background, the facts of the present case need to be
examined. The original land owners entered into agreement to sell on
25.9.1990 for the land measuring 28 Bigha 08 Biswa comprising in Khasra
No. 376 (4-6), 377 (4-16),381 (1-2), 383 (4-16), 384 (4-6), 385 (4-6),
386/1 (1-18), 386/2 (2-18), 389 (4-16), 390 (4-6), 391 (4-6), 392/1 (1-0),
12 For short, the 'Gurdip Singh Uban-II', (2000) 7 SCC 296
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. GODFREY PHILLIPS
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392/2 (3-16), 394 (4-16), 395/1 (0-04), 395/2 (3-0), 396 (4-6) with the
purchaser. The agreement to sell inter-alia recites as under:
"AND WHEREAS some of the owners of the land of the above
village challenged the acquisition proceedings in the High Court
of Delhi. The Hon'ble Court was pleased to release the entire
above lands from acquisition, the main judgment being passed in
Civil Writ 1639/85 decided on 14-10/18-11-1988 titled "Balak Ram
Gupta Vs. UOI", Delhi Administration has not filed any appeal
and at present the above lands are free from acquisition."
17. The agreement further states that the Land Acquisition
Collector had taken possession and paid compensation to the owners of
Khasra No. 384 (4-6), 385 (4-6) and 390 (4-6) and in terms of the order
passed (though not mentioned specifically but the reference is to the
order passed in Balbir Singh), the compensation has been paid back
and, thus, Khasra Numbers stand released from acquisition.
18. Thereafter, the purchaser is said to have purchased the land
in question vide sale deeds dated 30.8.1991 and 27.2.1991. Though, it is
argued by the appellant that the sale deed was not registered, but Mr.
Kapil Sibal, learned senior counsel for the respondent-purchaser stated
that the sale deeds were registered. However, that is not a relevant
consideration at this stage for the issues arising in the present appeal as
we proceed on the basis that land was purchased by the purchaser.
19. The purchaser filed a writ petition before the High Court
reported as Godfrey Phillips v. Union of India13. The said writ petition
along with the other two writ petitions were dismissed by the Division
Bench of the Delhi High Court on 18.11.2005. The High Court recorded
a finding that the vendors of the writ petitioners including the purchasers
have not filed any writ petition and have thus accepted the acquisition
proceedings. The High Court held as under:
"13. ...The only inference that can be drawn from these facts is
that the predecessors in interest of the petitioners.h1d acquiesced
to the proceedings and the petitioners had remained content with
their acquiescing only a right to claim compensation for the land
purchased by them as they could not acquire by reason of the
said purchase the locus to challenge the proceedings. Even if the
13 2005(125) Delhi Law Times 207
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petitioners could legally maintain petitions to assail the validity of
the proceedings, they did nothing from 1991 till 2005 to agitate the
matter in any forum or Court to have the proceedings quashed.
xx
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xx
24. That apart, the right to challenge the notifications available to
the original land owners having been lost by the original owners
by their acquiescence and silence till the year 1991 when the land
was transferred to the petitioner, there was no question of any
such right being exercised bythe transferees 15 years thereafter.
The inaction and acquiescence of the owners before the sale of
the land in favour of the petitioners would by itself conclude the
controversy. But even if one were to look at the delay from the
point of the petitioners also, there is no explanation whatsoever
for their silence from 1991 when they purchased the land till 2005
when they actually filed the petitions."
20. The Special Leave Petition (c) No. 4642 of 2006 filed against
the said judgment was dismissed on 8.2.2010 along with other Civil
Appeals reported as Om Parkash Vs. Union of India14.
21. It was thereafter that the purchaser filed another writ petition
after the commencement of the 2013 Act for declaring that the acquisition
proceedings stand lapsed under Section 24. The purchaser asserted that
the possession of Khasra Nos. 376 (4-6), 377 (4-16), 381 Min (1-2), 383
(4-16), 386/1 Min (0-4) and 386/2 Min (0-6) were never taken by the
revenue authorities, meaning thereby that the physical possession has
always been retained by the owners of the said land. The prayer in the
writ petition filed was for quashing of the notification under Sections 4
and 6 of the Act, and the award in respect of land measuring 28 Bigha 8
Biswa, forming part of revenue estate of Village Sahoorpur falling in
Tehsil Saket, Delhi. The purchaser also claimed a Mandamus to handover
vacant and peaceful possession of the land measuring 28 Bigha 8 Biswa.
The prayer reads thus:
"(ii) MANDAMUS directing, commanding and requiring' the
Respondents to hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the
agricultural land Khasra Nos. 376 (4·6), 377 (4·16), ,381 Min (1
·2), 383 (4·16), 384 (4·6), 385 (4·6), 386/1 Min (0·4), 386/2 Min
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(O·G) and 390 (4·6) admeasuring 28 Bighas and 8 Biswa forming
part of the revenue estate of Village Sahoorpur falling in Tehsil
Saket, New Delhi since the acquisition proceedings in respect
thereof have lapsed in terms of Section 24 (2) of the Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act."
22. The stand of the appellant in the counter affidavit before the
High Court was that since the acquisition proceedings have attained
finality, there cannot be any lapsing of something which has already
achieved finality under the Act.