# DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ! v. SKIPPER CONSTRUCTION AND ANR. ETC

- **Citation:** [1995] 1 S.C.R. 1010
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1995-02-08
- **Case number:** I.A. Nos. 3 & 14of1994
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/delhi-development-authority-v-skipper-construction-and-anr-etc-12815
- **Pages:** 182

## Headnote

A
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
!
v.
SKIPPER CONSTRUCTION AND ANR. ETC.
FEBRUARY 8, 1995
B
[P.B. SWANT, S. MOHAN AND B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, Jl]
Constitution of India : Articles 129 and 142-Contempt of Court--
Respondents violating directions of Court-Also filing suit in High Court in
respect of same subject matter regarding which their special leave petition had
C been dismissed-Suo Motu notice to respondents by Court-Contemnors
tendering japology-Held, respondents' actions amounted to Contempt of
Court-Apology is not a weapon to defence forged to purge guilt of offences-Contemnors sentenced to simple imprisonment-However, sentence
defe"ed subject to conditions.
D
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 : ss.2(a) & 2(c)-contempt of
Court-Criminal contempt-Motive-Contemnors filing suit in High Court
after dismissal of special leave petition on same subject matter by Supreme
Court-Held, to file a suit and pray for injunction after dismissal of special
leave petition, would clearly constitute criminal contempt-A wilful action on
E part of contemnor~ to undennine dignity of Supreme Court and the majesty
of law-Conduct of Contemnors tends to bring authority and administration
of law into disrespect or even disregard-It equally tends to interfere with or
prejudice litigants during litigation-In the case of criminal contempt intention
or motive is i"elevant-So called bona fides as filling of suits because of
p
"legally opined" are totally i"elevant.
The petitioner, Dclhi Development Authority held an auction of a
Commercial towers plot on 8.10.1980. The bid of the Respondent-Company
being the highest i.e. Rs.9.82 Crores was accepted and the respondents
G deposited 25% of the bid amount. Th~ DDA confirmed the bid and asked
the respondents to make the balance payment of 75% of the bid amount
within 90 days as per the conditions of the auction. The respondents went
on delaying the payment. In 1987, the parties entered into an agreement
1
~ereunder the respondents agreed to pay the amount in instalments by
15.9.89. However, the respondents did not pay the money and continued to
H delay the payment by approaching the Government for directions to the
1010
~
'
I,
... ~-
D.D.A v. SKIPPER CONSTN.
1011
DDA. The respondents further protracted the delay and filed a suit and A
thereafter a writ petition before the High Court. Inspite of directions of
the High Court, the respondent did not deposit the amount. Ultimately,
the suit and the writ petition were dismissed. The respondent filed a
special leave petition before this Court against the judgment of the High
·Court dismissing the writ petition.
On 29.1.1991 this Court passed an interim order to the effect that the
respondents would deposit the required amount with the DDA and that the
respondents would not induct any person in the property or create any right
B
in favour of any third party. Inspite of this, the respondents issued advertisement in newspapers on 4.2.1991 seeking to create third party rights in C
respect of the said property. The special leave petition was dismissed on
25.1.1993 and the DDA took possession of the property free from all encumbra:ices and the monies paid by the respondents were forfeited.
After dismissal ~f their special leave petition, the respondents once
again filed a suit before the High Court claiming permanent injunction D
restraining the DDA from interfering with the title and possession of the
property and for a declaration that all dues had been paid by the respondents to the DDA. The DDA filed application for rejection of the plaint
contending that the suit was barred by resjudicata. It also issued notice
for auction of the property. The High Court allowed the auction to proceed E
with, but restrained the DDA from accepting or confirming the bid. Ag~
grieved, the DDA filed the Special leave petition.
While disposing of the special leave petition of the DDA, the Court,
exercising suo motu powers, issued notice to the partners of the respon·
dent-Company to show cause as to

## Text

_Characters 0–39,980 of 454,981. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39980 for what follows._

A
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
!
v.
SKIPPER CONSTRUCTION AND ANR. ETC.
FEBRUARY 8, 1995
B
[P.B. SWANT, S. MOHAN AND B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, Jl]
Constitution of India : Articles 129 and 142-Contempt of Court--
Respondents violating directions of Court-Also filing suit in High Court in
respect of same subject matter regarding which their special leave petition had
C been dismissed-Suo Motu notice to respondents by Court-Contemnors
tendering japology-Held, respondents' actions amounted to Contempt of
Court-Apology is not a weapon to defence forged to purge guilt of offences-Contemnors sentenced to simple imprisonment-However, sentence
defe"ed subject to conditions.
D
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 : ss.2(a) & 2(c)-contempt of
Court-Criminal contempt-Motive-Contemnors filing suit in High Court
after dismissal of special leave petition on same subject matter by Supreme
Court-Held, to file a suit and pray for injunction after dismissal of special
leave petition, would clearly constitute criminal contempt-A wilful action on
E part of contemnor~ to undennine dignity of Supreme Court and the majesty
of law-Conduct of Contemnors tends to bring authority and administration
of law into disrespect or even disregard-It equally tends to interfere with or
prejudice litigants during litigation-In the case of criminal contempt intention
or motive is i"elevant-So called bona fides as filling of suits because of
p
"legally opined" are totally i"elevant.
The petitioner, Dclhi Development Authority held an auction of a
Commercial towers plot on 8.10.1980. The bid of the Respondent-Company
being the highest i.e. Rs.9.82 Crores was accepted and the respondents
G deposited 25% of the bid amount. Th~ DDA confirmed the bid and asked
the respondents to make the balance payment of 75% of the bid amount
within 90 days as per the conditions of the auction. The respondents went
on delaying the payment. In 1987, the parties entered into an agreement
1
~ereunder the respondents agreed to pay the amount in instalments by
15.9.89. However, the respondents did not pay the money and continued to
H delay the payment by approaching the Government for directions to the
1010
~
'
I,
... ~-
D.D.A v. SKIPPER CONSTN.
1011
DDA. The respondents further protracted the delay and filed a suit and A
thereafter a writ petition before the High Court. Inspite of directions of
the High Court, the respondent did not deposit the amount. Ultimately,
the suit and the writ petition were dismissed. The respondent filed a
special leave petition before this Court against the judgment of the High
·Court dismissing the writ petition.
On 29.1.1991 this Court passed an interim order to the effect that the
respondents would deposit the required amount with the DDA and that the
respondents would not induct any person in the property or create any right
B
in favour of any third party. Inspite of this, the respondents issued advertisement in newspapers on 4.2.1991 seeking to create third party rights in C
respect of the said property. The special leave petition was dismissed on
25.1.1993 and the DDA took possession of the property free from all encumbra:ices and the monies paid by the respondents were forfeited.
After dismissal ~f their special leave petition, the respondents once
again filed a suit before the High Court claiming permanent injunction D
restraining the DDA from interfering with the title and possession of the
property and for a declaration that all dues had been paid by the respondents to the DDA. The DDA filed application for rejection of the plaint
contending that the suit was barred by resjudicata. It also issued notice
for auction of the property. The High Court allowed the auction to proceed E
with, but restrained the DDA from accepting or confirming the bid. Ag~
grieved, the DDA filed the Special leave petition.
While disposing of the special leave petition of the DDA, the Court,
exercising suo motu powers, issued notice to the partners of the respon·
dent-Company to show cause as to why they should not be punished for
contempt of Court for their acts of instituting a suit in the High Court in
respect of the same subject matter after this Court confirmed the order of
the High Court, and entering into agreement, handing over possession and
creating interests in third parties in respect of premises in dispute in
defiance of the order of this Court.
·
F
G
Contemner No. 1 filed an affidavit stating that the suit was filed on
legal advice a~d that he did not create any third party interests in the
property himself in an much as on Company's advertisement, the DDA also
advertised in the newspapers about the order of the Court, and the persons'
who entered into agreement with the Company were fully aware of the H
1012
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1995] 1 S.C.R.
A litigation and as such no third party rights were created. The contemnors
also· tendered unconditional and unqualified apology.
I
Disposi~g of the Contempt Petition, this Court
ff.ELD 1:1. Abuse of the process of court calculated to hamper the due
B course of judicial proceeding or the orderly administration of justice is a
contempt of court. Taking into account the entire course of conduct of the
contemners it is clear that their action amounted to contempt of court. The
contemners are guilty of criminal contempt as defined under Section 2(c)
of the Contempt of Court Act, 1971. [1028-F, 1029-F]
\
C
1.2. in a case of contempt of Supreme Court, the Court can issue
I
notice suo motu and initiate contempt proceeding under Article 129 of the
Constitution. [1025-B]
Shri C.K Daphtary v. Shri 0.P. Gupta, [1971) 1 SCC 626 and Sukhdev
D Singh Sodhi v. The Chief Justice and Judges of the Pepsu High Court, [1954)
SCR 454, relied on .
. Advocate-General State of Bihar v. M/s. Madhya Pradesh Khair In-
~r
dustries, [1980) 3 SCC 311; Bloom Dekor v. Subhash Himmatlal Desai,
[1994) 6 SCC 322 and St. James's Evening Post, (1742) 2 Atk. 409, referred
E to.
2.1. After disposal of the special leave petition with regard to property
in dispute when DDA had taken physical possession of the plot, to file a
suit and pray for injunction in respect of the very sa~e subject matter
would clearly constitute criminal contempt. Similarly, the other prayers in
F the suit are aimed at atta~ng directly or indirectly the adverse finding
rendered by the High Court in the writ petition against which the speci?I
·leave petition was med and which was dismissed. [1027-H, 1028-A]
2.2. The filing of the suit in the High Court after dismissal of the
G special leave petition is nothing but a wilful action on the part of the
contemners to undermine the dignity of this Court and the majesty of law.
The conduct of the contemners tends to bring the authority and admiiiistration of law into disrespect or even disregard. It equally tends to interfere
with or prejudice the litigants during the li!igation. [1028-F]
H
2.3. In the case of a criminal contempt, the intention or motive is
D.D.A v. SKIPPER CONSTN.
1013
irrelevant. Therefore, even assuming bona fi!_ie the contemners thought they A
could file the suit because it was "legally opined" that the writ was not a
substitute, the so- called bona tides are totally irrelevant. [1028-E]
Rachapudi Subba Rao v. Advocate General, Andhra Pradesh, [1981] 2
sec 577, relied on.
Hoshiar Singh v. Gurbachan Singh, AIR (1962) SC 1089, referred to.
B
3.1. The object of the advertisement was noting more than to create
rights in favour of third parties. It is somewhat surprising that the
contemners' ingenuity grows by the passage of time. There was booking for
only 870 flats but later it gets increased and ultimately that figure has C
swollen to 2,750. There are agreements entered into even after the order of
29.1.91 as evidenced by the statement in the additional affidavit filed by the
contemnor. It cannot be said that by merely entering into agreement no
interest is created in the immovable property. or course, this stems from
Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. The agreement holder has a D
right to get another document, namely, the sale deed. Equally, he can
further enforce the agreement and seek specific performance thereof.
[1030-F-H]
3.2. Clause (iv) of the order dated 29.1.1991 has been flouted. This is
not a case of a stray act but deliberate repetitive acts by making hard
bargains by dubious methods. This is an intentional act to cheat the public E
with an evil design. [1031-B]
3.3. The letters written by the contemnor to the different buyers and
the acknowledgment of the money received clearly show that there is a wilful
disobedience of the order dated 29.1.91.
4. No doubt, the contemnors have tendered apology. This apology is
coming forth after sensing that the adventures have turned out to be misadventures realising that the contemners have ended up in cul-de-sac. An
apology is not a weapon of defence forged to purge the guilt of the offences
F
nor is it intended to operate as a universal panacea. It is intended to be G
evidence of real contriteness, the manly consciousness of a wrong done, of
an injury inflicted, and the earnest desire to make such reparation as lies
in the wrong-doer's power. The apology does not seem to be so in this case.
The conduct of contemners is highly reprehensive. [1033-G-H]
5. The second respondent is the wife of the first respondent. She does H
1014
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1995] 1 S.C.R.
A not seem to have played any active role in all these transactions and evens ..
As an Indian wife, dutiful and obedient, she seems to have only followed
the dictates and desires of her husband. In the process she had done no
more than lending her name both as a Directo,r to the Skipper as well as
to the various acts done by him in the name of the company. It will be
B unrealistic to ignore this fact against our social background. A pragmatic
view of the matter is to be taken and her case to be distinguished from
that of her husband as far as punishment to be imposed on them is
concerned. Such a distinction will in no way minimise the gravity of the
contempt that she has committed. [1034-B-C]
C
7.1 Contemner-respondent No. 1, is sentenced to undergo simple
imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 50,000. Contemnerrespondent No. 2 is sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a
period of one month and to pay a fine of Rs. 50,000. [1034-D]
7.2. All the properties and the bank accounts standing in the names
D of the contemners and the Director ofM/s. Skipper Construction Co. (Pvt.)
Ltd. and their wives, sons and unmarried daughters will stand attached.
[1034-F]
8. However, the sentence of imprisonment imposed on both the contemners is deferred subject to the conditions and till the time stated below:
E
[1034-HJ
F
(1) The contemners shall furnish bank guarantee in favour of the
Registrar General of this Court in the amount of Rs. 11 crores on or before
31st M~rch, 1995. The bank guarantee will be given for a period of one year
from the date of furnishing the bank guarantee. [1035~AJ
(2) The contemners shall deposit the entire amount of Rs. 11 crores
by a Bank Draft in the Registry of this Court on or before 30th November,
1995. If they fail to do so the bank guarantee will become encashable and
will be encashed forthwith after 30th November, 1995. [1035-B]
G
(3) If the contcmners fail to give the bank guarantee by 31st March,
1995 as aforesaid, the sentence of imprisonment will become enforceable at
one. [1035-C]
(4) No application for extension of time either to furnish the bank
guarantee or to make the payment will be entertained by this Court.
H
[1035-DJ
D.D.A v. SKIPPER CONSTN.
1015
(5) The contemners shall not leave the country without the express A
,.f
permission of this Court. (1035-E]
(6) The attachment of properties and the bank accounts shall stand
raised on the contemners furnishing the bank guarantee as aforesaid.
[1035-G]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: I.A. Nos. 3 & 14of1994.
IN
S.L.P. (C) No. 21000of1993.
B
From the Judgment and Order dated 9.12.93 of the Delhi High Court C
in Suit No. 770 of 1993.
WITH
Suo Moto Contempt Petition No. 256 of 1994.
Arun Jaitely, G. Ramaswamy, Gopal Subramaiam, V.A. Bobde, Arvind K. Nigam, Ms. K. J aiswa~. Ms. Indra Sawhney, L.K. Gupta, Arun
Khosla, R. Ashok, S. Rajappa, D.D. Sharma, S. Sukuraman, S.D. Singh for
JBD & Co., Ms. Sangeeta Kumar, L.R. Singh, R.S. Suri, K.C.Dua, P.P.
Juneja and Suman J. Khaitan for the Appearing. parties.
The following Order of the Coui:t was delivered :
The facts leading to contempt proceedings are as under :
D
E
On 8.10.1980, an auction was
held by the Delhi Development
Authority (hereinafter referred to as the 'DDA') of the Commercial Tower F
Plot, Jhandewalan, Block E, New Delhi ad measuring about 2540 sq. mtrs.
The first respondent, M/s. Skipper Construction Co. (P) Ltd. (hereinafter
referred to as the 'Skipper') was the highest bidder, its bid being Rs.9.82
crores. As per the conditions of the auction, Skipper deposited 25% of the
bid amount. The ·said bid was confirmed by the ODA on 14.10.1980. G
Skipper was called upon to make the balance of payment of 75% of the
bid amount within 90 days as per the conditions of the a~ction.
The Government of India issued directions to the DDA to accept
the request of Skipper and to grant an indulgence to it and directed the
ODA to reschedule the recovery of 75% of the bid amount with interest H
,
1016
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
· [1995] 1 S.C.R.
A from the Skipper. Consequent to this, DDA called upon the Skipper to
enter into· fresh agreement, licence agreement and furnish bank guarantees
in compliance with the directions of the Central Government.
On 11.8,1987, Skipper entered into a licence agreement, paid 50% of
the original bid and secured payment of the balance 50% of the bid and
B interest at the rate of 18% per. annum thereon by submitting bank guarantee for Rs. 9.28 crores, in terms of which a sum of approximately 1.944
crores was required to be paid as each instalment. A total of 5 instalments
was payable every six months, the first being due on 15.9.1987 and the last
on or about 15.9.1989.
c
Against the first instalment of Rs. 1.944 crores falling due on
15.9.1987, DDA recovered about Rs. 88.76 lacs by encashment of the bank
guarantee on 7.12.1987. Thereafter the first respondent did not pay in
terms of the agreement.
·
D
On 4.10.1988, the Lt. Governor issued a direction at the request of
Skipper, deferring recovery from Skipper of the> 2nd instalment as per the
agreement dated 11.8.1987 till one month after the sanctioning of the
' r
building plans.
In August, 1989, the first respondent filed writ petition in the High
E Court in Delhi, being CWP No. 2371of1989. The principal relief sought
in the writ petition related to sanctioning of building plans and permission
for construction. An interim order was passed directing the Skipper to
furnish fresh bank guarantee since the bank guarantee furnished earlier
had lapsed. The DDA did not encash the fresh bank guarantee which was
F defective. Time and again the DDA represented to the Court that the
-... .
monies were outstanding from the Skipper and no indulgence ought to be
shown to them till the payments were made. The question of payment of
the outstanding amount of over Rs.8 crores under the principal sum itself
was deferred from time to time.
G
On 16.2.1990 the Lt. Governor revoked the order dated 4.10.1988
deferring the payment of instalments. As a result the entire sum became
··payable in one lump sum. However, this order of the U. Governor was
stayed by the Court. Thus, it become necessary for the DDA to grant
conditional and provisional sanction to plans of the building subject to the
H payment of monies due to the DDA. ·
D.D.A v. SKIPPER CONSlN.
1017.
On 19.3.1990, an interim order was passed by the Delhi High Court A
by which Skipper was permitted. t~ commence construction without first
depositing the dues of the ODA.I Against this order an appeal was
preferred. The Division.Bench direct~d the payment of a token sum of Rs.
5 lacs which was offered by the Skipper as a gesture of goodwill within 2
days; a sum of Rs. 15 lacs within 15 days and· Rs. 1.944 crores within oue B
month to the ODA. It was further directed that the quantum of monies
and the mode of payment will be decided at the time of final disposal of
the writ petition.
Even this order was not complied with. Notwithstanding this, the
Skipper approached the Court once ag~n f'Or extension of time to make C
payment and for direction to construct. The Court extended the time by
one month on 16.4.1990, affording liberty to the DOA to encash the bank
guarantee. The bank guarantee could not be encashed because it was
conditional. By then the entire monies had fallen due. Those amounts had
not been paid. The DOA filed SLP (C) Nos. 6338-6339 of 1990 against the D
interim order dated 19.3.1990 and 16.4.1990 passed by the High Court of
Delhi. By an order dated 3.5.1990 this Court stayed further construction
and made it conditional upon payment of Rs. 1.944 crores.
Suit No. 1875 of 1990 was filed by the Skipper for a direction that
the DOA ought not to insist upon payment by cash or draft and ought to E
be directed to cncash bank guarantee. The learned Vacation Judge issued
orders directing the DOA to invoke the bank guarantee. However, the suit
was ultimately dismissed.
On 21.12.1990, a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court dismissed
-""r
CWP No. 2371 of 1989 directing Skipper to pay the DOA by cash or F
demand draft a sum of Rs. 8,12,68,789 within 30 days; to stop construction
till payment is made; and in the event of non-payment by the Skipper DOA
would be entitled to enter upon the property and forfeit the monies
received by the ODA.
On 14.1.1971, detailed reasons for its operative order came to be
rendered by the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court with further
direction given effect to clause 15 of the licence agreement dated 11.8.1987
that in the event of non-compliance of the payment by the Skipper the
property shall stand vested in the ODA, free from all encumbrances, in
G
addition to the. forfeiture of the monies.
. H
1018
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1995] 1 S.C.R.
A
Against the dismissal of CWP No. 2371 of 1989 Skipper filed SLP
B
c
D
E
(C) No. 186 of 1991 before this Court.
·
.
On 29.1.1991, a Division Bench of this Court passed an interim order
(in which one of us, P.B. Swant, J., was a party). It inter alia reads as under:
"(i) That the petitioners herein shall deposit a sum of Rs. 2.5
crores (Rupees two crores and fifty lacs only) in cash/bank draft
with the Delhi Development Authority within one month from
today and the petitioners will further deposit similar amount by
cash/bank draft by 8th April, 1991.
(ii) That the petitioners shall be permitted to resume the
construction of the building in question only after making the first
deposit as stated in clause (1) above.
(iii) That if the petitioners fail to deposit the amounts as
aforesaid, the Delhi Development Authority will be free to act in
accordance with the impugned order dated 21st December, 1990
of High Court in CWP No. 2371 of 1980.
(iv) That the petitioners shall not induct any person in the
building or create any right in favour of any third party.
(v) That the matter be listed for further orders before this Court
on 9th April, 1991."
On 4.2.1991, in violation of the agreement and ·in gross contempt of
the above order, the Skipper issued advertisement in the leading
F newspapers seeking to create 3rd party rights.
-+-
On 25.1.1993, SLP(C) No. 186 of 1991 was dismissed by this Court.
By virtue of the above order, the DOA on 10.2.1993 re-entered and took
physical possession of the said property, free from all encumbrances;
G monies paid by the Skipper were forfeited.
Notwithstanding all these, Skipper filed yet another suit on the
original side of the High Court of Delhi, being Suit No. 770 of 1993 for the
reliefs of:
H
(i) permanent injunction restraining the DOA from interfering with
D.D.A. v. SKIPPER CONSTN.
1019
the title and possession of the property;
A
,)f
(ii) for mandatory injunction directing the DDA to recompute the
principal amount and interest payable by Skipper;
(iii) for a declaration that the present calculations are wrong;
B
(iv) for a declaration that re-entry/re-possession and determination
of the rights of Skipper are bad in law and.non-est;
-~
(v) for a declaration that all dues have been paid by skipper to the
ODA; and
c
(vi) a declaration that clause 15 of the Licence Agreement dated
11.8.1987 is non-est andbad in law.
On service of notice, DDA filed _application, I.A. No. 8500 of 1993
in Suit No. 770 of 1993, for rejection of the plaint as all the issues raised D
by Skipper were res judicata and even otherwise the plaint was barred by
law. The said application is pending disposal.
,
On 8.11.93, DOA issued notices for auction of the said property. The
2nd respondent sought to implead itself in the suit and on 1.12.1993 filed
an application for stay of auction which was opposed by ·the DDA.
E
On 9.12.1993, a learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court allowed the auction to proceed with and restrained the ODA from accepting
or confirming. the bid at the auction scheduled for 10.12.1993. Aggrieved
by this Order DOA filed SLP (C) No. 21000 of 1993 against the interim
_..;.,...
order of the Delhi High Court.
F
I.A. 3 of 1994 is an application for intervention filed on behalf 'Jf
DOA. While disposing of SLP (C) No.21000of1993 and the said I.A. No.3
of 1994 we issued notice on 29.11.94 by exercise of our Suo Moto powers
directing Tejwant Singh and Mrs. Surinder Kaur to show cause as to why G
should not be punished for contempt of court for their following acts :
......
"(a) Instituting suit being Suit No. 770 of 1993 in the Delhi High
Court in respect of the same subject matter after this Court confirmed the
orders of the said High Court dated 21.12.1990 and 14.1.1991, by its order
dated 23.1.1993.
H
1020
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1995) 1 S.C.R.
A
(b) Entering into agreements for and handing over possession of and
receiving monies and creating interests in the premises in the building
under construction in the suit property, viz., the Commercial Tower Plot,
Jhandewalan Block C, New Delhi, admeasuring about 2540 sq. mtrs. with
constructions thereon which are already made, in defiance of the order of
this Court passed on 29th January, !991. Notice returnable on 3rd January,
B 1993."
In response to this notice, Tejwant Singh Contemner No. 1, filed an
affidavit expressing unconditional and unqualified apology. After so expressing, he sets out several facts to offer an explanation and not a
C justification for the steps which were taken by him. According to him, the
purpose of filing Suit No. 770 of 1993 in the Delhi High Court was to make
payment of reasonable amount. Although the prayers given an impression
that there could be no bar in filing of a suit in civil court, he would add
that the intention of the deponent was not to indulge in litigation which
was already concluded by the Supreme Court. The intention was to see that
D as far as the quantum of interest was concerned that can be scaled down
and the DOA could be persuaded to realise reasonable interest instead of
exorbitant interest.
The deponent, on legal advice and in order to protect the property
E by making the payments in instalments, instructed his counsel to file suit
in the High Court of Del!ii for mandatory injunction and declarations. An
application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of Civil Procedure Code was
also filed in the suit under the bona fide belief that the same could be filed
under law in order to ensure that during the pendency of the suit also
efforts should continuously be made to settle the matter ·amicably. The
F deponent instructed the counsel to make averment that the company is
ready and willing to make the payment. The counsel has cat~gorically
stated in the application that the company is ready and willing to pay the
amount to DOA as demanded by them in instalments.
G
The company also wrote a letter dated 10th July, 1993 to all its valued
customers apprising them about the dispute with DOA. In the letter also
the company made it amply clear that the matter can be resolved amicably
and for that purpose funds are required. It was requested that the valued
customers shall make the payment of amounts due against them. The bank
i \ ( , draft/cash order be sent to the company in the name of DDA. The
H company wanted to hand over the drafts to DDA.
-
D.D.A v. SKIPPER CONSTN.
_1021
On this explanation, it is urged that there is no intentional or A
deliberate flouting of the order dated 29.1.1991 passed by this Court.
The order by 29.1.1991 was passed after the counsel for Delhi
Development Authority expressed an apprehension that the answering
respondent would sell away or otherwise dispose of the plot to a third party
and abscond. The answering respondent-· deponent was personally present B
in the Court on 29.1.1991. On that date, permission to construct had been
with them barely for less than a year (w.e.f. 19.3.1990) from this Court. It
was in that context that the injunction was interpreted. He did not create
any third party right himself. However, he noticed that in respect of one
Khosla, the papers annexed to I.A. No. 3 show that his son had signed some C
documents evidencing induction of Khosla. He says that there is no other
case in relation to which any such impropriety has been committed.
Surinder Kaur, wife of Tejwant Singh, Contemner No. 2, would urge
that she has nothing to do with the day to day running of the company nor
has she ever acted or represented anywhere in regard thereto. She has not D
signed any paper or document in relation to the transactions connected
with the present proceedings.
An Additional Affidavit was filed on 27.1.1995 by Tejwant Singh,
Contemner No. 1. Paragraph 3 of the said additional affidavit states :
"With respect to the act of entering ·into agreements for and
handing over possession of and receiving monies and creating
interests in the premises in the building under construction in the
suit property viz., the Commercial Tower Plot, Jhandewalan, Block
E
E, New Delhi, admeasuring about 2540 sq. meters with construeF
tions thereon which are already made in defiance of the order of
Hon'ble Supreme Court passed on 29.1.1991 it is respectfully
necessary at this stage to explain the context in which the order
dated 29.1.1991 was passed, understood and acted upon by the
answering respondent. The answering respondent is explaining the
collective contemporaneous understanding of both the parties and G
respectfully submitted to this Hon'ble Court that there was no
intentional or deliberate flouting of the order. The order of
29.1.1991 was passed after the counsel for Delhi Development
Authority expressed an apprehension that the answering respondent would sell away or otherwise disposed of the plot to a third H
1022
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1995] 1 S.C.R.
party and abscond. The answering respondent/deponent was per- .
sonally present in the court on 29.1.1991. On that date permission
to construct had been with them barely for less than a year (w.e.f.
19.3.1990) from the Hon'ble Delhi High Court. As on 29.1.1991,
the construction on the plot has barely commenced and only a part
of the basement had been done. No building was in existence. To
preclude the answering respondent from in any manner giving away
ph_ysical possession of either the plot or the proposed building (yet
to come up) the order of 29.1.1991 was passed.
It is most respectfully submitted that at no time during the
proceedings, was any reference made or intended to prohibit or
in any manner fetter the booking of space in the building or
collecting money in respect thereof. The fact was that this was the
common collective and collided understanding of all the parties
including the Delhi Development Authority is evident from the
fact that the bookings were done before January, 1991 and after
January, 1991 to the knowledge of everyone without any objection,
protest and demur. Indeed in the numerous court proceedings in
different courts including the Hon'ble Supreme Court after 1991
not the slightest grievance was made and no contempt petition was
ever moved by Delhi Development Authority (till the present last
round of proceedings). Indeed; it is most respectfully submitted
that had answering respondent known or remotely contemplated
that even booking sought to be fettered, it would have either moved
the . Hon'ble Court for clarification or would have immediately
desisted."
Paragraph (k) reads thus :
"After 29.1.1991 the company entered into agreement with
various persons/parties. The copies of the agreements entered into
with them are annexed herewith and are collectively marked as
Annexures 'A' and 'B'. It is pertinent to mention that the company
openly advertised in the Newspapers and the next day DDA also
advertised in the Newspapers about the Court's order dated
29.1.1991. It is only after seeing both the advertisements the
speculative buyers came forward to book the flats and each and
every person who entered into the agreements with the company
D.D.A. v. SKIPPER CONSTN.
1023
were fully aware of the pendency of the litigation and hence no A
third party rights were created." ·
Mr. G. Ramaswamy, learned senior counsel for the contemners
submits, before filing Suit No. 770 of 1993, the contemners took legal
advice. It was opined that the Civil Writ Petition No. 2371 of 1989 filed
before the High Court was not a substitute for suit. The fact that writ B
petition was dismissed and the SLP thereon was also dismissed will not
take away the right to file an independent suit. It was only because of that
the contemners filed the suit. There was no deliberate intention to obstruct
the course of justice. May be, the contemners were misguided. Whatever
might have been the conduct of the contemners they had offered unC
qualified apology in both the affidavits.
Actually, the contemners do not want the learned counsel to advance
arguments in defence of their conduct. They are only kneeling before the
Court and praying for mercy.
As regards the alleged flouting of the order dated 29.1.1991, three
questions would arise :
(1) Whether there is disobedience of the order dated 29.1.91?
D
(2) If it is answered in the affirmative, whether the disobedience is E
wilful?
(3) If wilful, what is the consequence?
In his submission, legal advice is a factor to decide whether a
disobedience is wilful or not. He is prepared to disclose even the name of F
the senior counsel who had given the opinion. As a matter of fact, in
Hoshiar Singh v. Gurbachan Singh, AIR 1962 SC 1089 this Court found
fault with the contemners therein for not disclosing the name of the counsel
who gave the legal opinion. It could never have been the intention of the
contemners to openly flout the order dated 29.1.1991: By entering into
agreements contemners were not creating rights in favour of third parties. G
The speculative purchasers being fully aware of the legal proceedings yet
chose to purchase the property which agreements, if ultimately, did not
fructify into sale, they would be entitled to only refund. Before 29.1.1991
1,000 agreements were entered into and after 29.1.1991 1,750 agreements
were entered into. Out of these 1,750 agreements, the agreements in H
1024
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1995] 1 S.C.R.
A respect of 835 cases were executed while in the case of remaining 915, th.e.
agreements have not been executed. This is the factual position. Since the1
ODA did not take out the contempt application, the contemners were
lulled into the belief that what they were doing was right. Further, the exact
scope of the order that the contemners should not even enter into contract
B was not understood by the contemners properly. Creation of right could
only mean, in the context, an obligation to refund.
The notice for contempt has been issued practically after nearly three
years. if such a notice had been issued by the High Court he could have
pleaded limitation contained under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts
C Act, 1971, as a defence. However, as regards exercise of suo moto powers
of this Court under Article 129 of the Constitution of India the contemners
\ are not raising any such plea.
I
Mr. Arun Jaitley, learned counsel for the DOA would submit that
the filing of suit No. 770/93 is nothing but an abuse of process of court.
D The matter had reached finality by orders of this Court. Yet to say the suit
was filed to protect the rights of the contemners is ingenious. By filing a
suit (No. 770 of 1993) and obstructing the course of justice after this Court
dismissed SLP (C) No. 186 of 1991, is a clear case of criminal contempt as
laid down in Advocate-General, State of Bihar v. M/s. Madhya Pradesh Khair
Industries, (1980] 3 SCC 311 at 315. This Court had come down heavily
E upon persons who indulged in obstructionist methods to defeat or delay
justice as laid down in Bloom Dekor v. Subhash Himmatlal Desai, [1994] 6
sec 322 at page 327.
In this case, there is a deliberate disobedience of the order dated
29.1.1991. The agreement dated 11th August, 1987 between contemners
F and ODA clearly postulates that legal possession and ownership shall
remain with the licensor until full payment of the bid amount along· with
interest payable thereon has been made by the licensee. Therefore, the
creation of rights in favour of third parties was never contemplated. and
there was no scope for misunderstanding the order dated 29.1.1991. During
G the state of CWP No. 2371 of 1989 before the High Court the contemners
came forward with a plea that there were 870 buyers of flats but this figure
goes on increasing from time to time.
Ultimately, at the stage of Suit No. 770 of 1993 the number of buyers
came to 2,700 .. In the agreements entered into after the order dated 29.1.91
H there is a clear recital that possession is delivered. If this cannot amount
(
. -..\...
-"'-
" ....
·-
D.D.A. v. SKIPPER CONSTN.
1025
to creating rights in favour of third parties nothing else would.
We will now proceed to consider the merits of the above contentions.
The contempt proceedings in this case have been initiated under
Article 129 of the Constitution of India. The said Article reads as follows:
"Supreme Court to be a court of record. The Supreme Court
shall be a court of record and shall have all powers of such a court
including the power to punish for contempt of itself."
This Court in Shri C.K. Daphtary v. Shri O.P. Gupta, [1971) 1 SCR
A
B
626 pointed out that it cannot be disputed that in a case of contempt of C
Supreme Court, the Court issued notice suo moto.
About the nature of power, this Court referring to the Privy Council
ruling in Sukhdev Singh Sodhi v. The Chief Justice and Judges of the Pepsu
High Court , [1954) SCR 454 at page 461, held :
"Finally, in Parashuram Detaram v. Emperor, AIR 1945 PC 134
at 136 the Privy Council said that "this summary power of punishing
for contempt..... is a power which a court must of necessity possess."
D
In this case, as the notice dated 29.11.1994 indicates, it consists of: E
(1) Civil Contempt and
(2) Criminal Contempt.
Civil contempt is defined under Section 2(b) of the Act. Thus, any F
wilful disobedience to the order of the court to do. or abstain from doing
any act is prima facie a civil contempt. Civil Contempt arises where the
power of the Court is invoked and exercised to enforce obedience to orders
of the Court.
On the contrary, criminal contempts are criminal in nature. It may G
include outrages on the Judges in open Court, defiant disobedience to the
Judges in Court, libels on Judges or Courts or interfering with the courts
of justice or any act which tends to prejudice the courts of justice.
Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter
referred to as the Act) posits criminal contempt to mean:
H
1026
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1995) 1 S.C.R.
A
Publication (a) by words spoken or written ;
(b) or written or by signs;
( c) or by visible representations or otherwise or any matter;
B
( d) or any other act whatsoever which
(i) (a) scandalizes or tends to scandalize,
(b) or lowers or tends to lower the authority of any court; or
C
(ii) prejudices or interferes or tends to interfere with the due course
of any judicial proceedings; or
(iii) (a) interferes or tends to interfere with,
(b) or obstructs or tends to obstruct the administration of justice in
D any other manner.
It can be categorically stated that the power as a court of record to
punish for contempt is beyond dispute.
In dealing with the scope of the said Section this Court observed in
E Rachapudi Subba Rao v. Advocate General, Andhra Pradesh, [1981] 2 SCC
' . 577 at 583 as follows :
·
F
G
H
"It is noteworthy, that in the categorisation of contempt in three
sub-clauses (i) to (iii), only category (ii) refers to 'judicial
proceedings'. Scandalising of court in its administrative capacity
will also be coYered by sub-clauses (i) and (iii). The phrase "administration of justice" in sub-clause (iii) is far wider in scope than
"course of any judicial proceeding''. The last words "in any other
manner" of sub-clause (iii) further extend its ambit and give it a
residuary character. Although sub-clauses (i) and (iii) describe
three distinct species of "criminal contempt" they are not always
mutually exclusive. Interference or tendency to interfere with any
judicial proceeding or administration or justice is a common element of sub-clauses (ii) and (iii). This element is not required to
be established for a criminal contempt of the kind falling under
sub-clause (i)."
~-
..
D.D.A. v. SKIPPER CONSTN.
1027
In a case of criminal contempt, intention or motive is not the A
criterion. Of course, they may be considered for a mitigation or aggravation
of sentence as the case may be.
From the narration of the above, it is clear that on 25.1.1993, SLP
(C) No. 186 of 1991 was dismissed thereby confirming the judgment of the
Delhi High Court rendered in CPW No. 2371 of 1989 dated 14.1.1991 B
reported in Skipper Constitution Co. (P) Ltd. & Anr. v. D.DA. & Ors.,
43(1991) Delhi Law Times 636. Thereafter, Suit No. 770 of 1993 was filed
practically for the same relief which formed the subject-matter of the
earlier writ petition, CWP No. 2371 of 1989.
After the dismissal of SLP (C) 186of1991, the DDA re-entered and
took physical possession of the property on 10.2.1993, free from all encumbrances, forfeiting the monies paid by the contemners. Yet prayer No.
1 in the suit is for injunction restraining the DDA from interfering with
title and possession.
Under the terms of the licence deed dated 11th August, 1987 entered
into between (the licensor) and the contemners (licensee), it was clearly
stipulated at paragraphs 1 and 2 as under :
c
D
"1. That the licensee shall have.licence to enter upon the plot
described hereinabove for a period of two and half years from the E
date of execution of this licence only for purposes of starting
construction of the building in accordance with the sanctioned
buildipg plans.
2. That the licencee shall not be deemed to have any right, title
or interest in the said plot nor shall be have any right to grant such
a right in favour of any persons. Legal possession and ownership
of the said plot shall remain with the licensor until full payment of
the bid amount alongwith interest payable thereon has been made
by the licensee."
Of course, in this case, possession was handed over to the contemners when they had not even cleared the first instalment. That itself had
been criticised by us and relegated to an enquiry. But, in this case, after
disposal of SLP(C) 186 of 1991 when DDA has taken physical possession
F
G
of the plot, to file a suit and pray for injunction, as stated above, would H
1028
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1995) 1 S.C.R.
A clearly constitute criminal contempt.