# DELHI TRANSPORT CORPORATION v. D.T.C. MAZDOORCONGRESS

- **Citation:** [1990] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 142
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1990-09-04
- **Bench:** Sabyasachi Mukharji, B.C. Ray, Lalit Mohan Sharma, P.B. Sawant, K. Ramaswamy
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/delhi-transport-corporation-v-d-t-c-mazdoorcongress-10970
- **Pages:** 190

## Headnote

Service Law: Delhi Road Transport Act, 1950: Section 53/Delhi
Road Transport Authority (Conditions of Appointment and Service)
Regulations, 1952-Regulation 9(b )/Shastri Award-Para 522/ District
Board Rules, 1926, Part V-Rule 1(1)/Indian Airlines Employees'
Regulations-Regulation JJ/Air India Employees' Regulations-Regulation 48-Validity of-Termination of service of permanent employee without assigning any reasons and holding enquiry-Whether
arbitrary, unfair, unjust, unreasonable and opposed to public policyWhether violative of Articles 12, 14, 16, 19, 31 and 311(2) of the
Constitution of India, principles of natural justice arrd Section 23 of
Contract Act, 1872-Statutory corporations-Power to terminate services of employees without holding enquiry-Validity of.
Contract Act, 1872: Section 23-Contract providing for termination of service without notice and holding of enquiry-Whether
enforceable.
Constitution of India, 1950: Articles 14, 16, 19( l) (g), 21 and
3l1(2)-Termination of service of an employee without assigning
reasons and holding enquiry-Whether violative of Fundamental Rights
and principles of natural justice-Regulations/Rules-Validity of.
Article 141: Expressions "declared" and "found or made"-Scope
and ambit of.
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Interpretation of Statutes: Internal aid to construction-Doctrine
of reading down-Scope and Applicability of-Provision illegal and
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invalid-Whether could be validated by reading down-Where provision clear and unambiguous-Whether permissible to read down into the
provision something which was not intended.
Public Policy vis-a-vis constitutionality of statute-Whether public
policy can. be drawn from the Constitution-Whether constitutional
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policy provides an aid-Role and purpose of constitutional interpretation by apex i:ourt.
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D.T.C. v. D.T.C. MAZDOOR CONGRESS
143
Administrative Law-Discretionary power-Exercise of-Limitations-Absence of arbitrary power-Fi;st essential of Rule of Law.
Respondents No. 2 to 4, regular employees of the appellant Delhi
Transpori Corporation, were served with termination notices under
Regulation 9(b) of the Delhi Road Transport Authority (Conditions of
Appointment & Service) Regulations, 1952 by the appellant Corporation on the ground that they became inefficient in their work and
started inciting other members not to perform their duties.
The three respondents and their Union, respondent No. 1 filed
writ petition in High Court, challenging the constitutional validity of
Regulation 9(b), which gave the management right to terminate the
services of an employee by giving one month's notice or pay in lieu
thereof. The Division Bench of the High Court struck down the Regulation, holding that the Regulation gave absolute, unbridled and arbitrary powers to the management to terminate the .services of any permanent or temporary employee, and •uch power was violative of Article
14 of the Constituiion. Hence, the Corporation filed ihe appeal before
this Court, by special leave.
The validity of similar provmons in Para 522 of the Shastri
Award, rule l(i) of the District Board Rules 1926, Part V, Regulation 13
of Indian Airlines Employees' Service Regulations, Regulation 48 of Air
India Employees' Service Regulations and also the clause in the contract of appointment in -respect of employees of Zilla Parishad and the
New India Assurance Co1npany) also came up f~r consideration in the
connected appeals and applications filed before this Court.
It was contended on behalf of the Delhi Transport Corporation
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that there was sufficient guideline in Regulation 9(b) and the power of
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termination, properly read, would not be arbitrary or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, that the Court would be entitled to obtain
guidance from the preamble, the policy and the purpose of the Act and
the power conferred under it and to see that the power was exercised
only for that purpose, that even a term like 'public interest' could be
sufficient guidance in the matter of retireme

## Text

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DELHI TRANSPORT CORPORATION
v.
D.T.C. MAZDOORCONGRESS
SEPTEMBER 4, 1990
[SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, CJ., B.C. RAY, LALIT MOHAN
SHARMA, P.B. SAWANT AND K. RAMASWAMY, JJ.]
Service Law: Delhi Road Transport Act, 1950: Section 53/Delhi
Road Transport Authority (Conditions of Appointment and Service)
Regulations, 1952-Regulation 9(b )/Shastri Award-Para 522/ District
Board Rules, 1926, Part V-Rule 1(1)/Indian Airlines Employees'
Regulations-Regulation JJ/Air India Employees' Regulations-Regulation 48-Validity of-Termination of service of permanent employee without assigning any reasons and holding enquiry-Whether
arbitrary, unfair, unjust, unreasonable and opposed to public policyWhether violative of Articles 12, 14, 16, 19, 31 and 311(2) of the
Constitution of India, principles of natural justice arrd Section 23 of
Contract Act, 1872-Statutory corporations-Power to terminate services of employees without holding enquiry-Validity of.
Contract Act, 1872: Section 23-Contract providing for termination of service without notice and holding of enquiry-Whether
enforceable.
Constitution of India, 1950: Articles 14, 16, 19( l) (g), 21 and
3l1(2)-Termination of service of an employee without assigning
reasons and holding enquiry-Whether violative of Fundamental Rights
and principles of natural justice-Regulations/Rules-Validity of.
Article 141: Expressions "declared" and "found or made"-Scope
and ambit of.
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Interpretation of Statutes: Internal aid to construction-Doctrine
of reading down-Scope and Applicability of-Provision illegal and
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invalid-Whether could be validated by reading down-Where provision clear and unambiguous-Whether permissible to read down into the
provision something which was not intended.
Public Policy vis-a-vis constitutionality of statute-Whether public
policy can. be drawn from the Constitution-Whether constitutional
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policy provides an aid-Role and purpose of constitutional interpretation by apex i:ourt.
142
D.T.C. v. D.T.C. MAZDOOR CONGRESS
143
Administrative Law-Discretionary power-Exercise of-Limitations-Absence of arbitrary power-Fi;st essential of Rule of Law.
Respondents No. 2 to 4, regular employees of the appellant Delhi
Transpori Corporation, were served with termination notices under
Regulation 9(b) of the Delhi Road Transport Authority (Conditions of
Appointment & Service) Regulations, 1952 by the appellant Corporation on the ground that they became inefficient in their work and
started inciting other members not to perform their duties.
The three respondents and their Union, respondent No. 1 filed
writ petition in High Court, challenging the constitutional validity of
Regulation 9(b), which gave the management right to terminate the
services of an employee by giving one month's notice or pay in lieu
thereof. The Division Bench of the High Court struck down the Regulation, holding that the Regulation gave absolute, unbridled and arbitrary powers to the management to terminate the .services of any permanent or temporary employee, and •uch power was violative of Article
14 of the Constituiion. Hence, the Corporation filed ihe appeal before
this Court, by special leave.
The validity of similar provmons in Para 522 of the Shastri
Award, rule l(i) of the District Board Rules 1926, Part V, Regulation 13
of Indian Airlines Employees' Service Regulations, Regulation 48 of Air
India Employees' Service Regulations and also the clause in the contract of appointment in -respect of employees of Zilla Parishad and the
New India Assurance Co1npany) also came up f~r consideration in the
connected appeals and applications filed before this Court.
It was contended on behalf of the Delhi Transport Corporation
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that there was sufficient guideline in Regulation 9(b) and the power of
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termination, properly read, would not be arbitrary or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, that the Court would be entitled to obtain
guidance from the preamble, the policy and the purpose of the Act and
the power conferred under it and to see that the power was exercised
only for that purpose, that even a term like 'public interest' could be
sufficient guidance in the matter of retirement of a government
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employee, and such a provision could be read into a statute even when it
was not otherwise expressly there, that it was well-settled that the Court
would sustain the presumption of constitutionality by considering
matters of common knowledge and to assume every slate of facts which
could be ronceived and could even read down the section, if it became
necessary to uphold the validity of the provision, that the underlying
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rationale of this rule of interpretation, or th~ doctrine of reading down
of a staiilte being that when a legislature, whose powers were not
unlimited, enacted a statute, it was aware of its limitations, and in the
absence of express intention or clear language to the contrary, it must
be presumed to have implied into the statute the requisite limitations
and conditions to immunise it from the virus of unconstitutionality, that
B · since every legislature intended to act within its powers, in a limited
Government, the legislature would attempt to function within its
limited powers and it would not be expected to have intended to transgress its limits, that the guidelines for the exercise of the power of
termination simpliciter under Regulation 9(b) could be found in the
statutory provisions of the 1950 Act under which the regulations had
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been framed. the preamble; Sections 19, 20 and 53, the context of Regulation 9(b) read with Regulations 9(a) and 15, that even for the exercise of this
power, reasons could be recorded although they need not he communicated which would ensure a check on the arbitrary exercise of power
and effective judicial review in a given case. ensuring efficient running
of services and in public interest and the regulations in question were
parallel to, but not identical with, the exceptions carved out under proviso
to Article 311(2), that even the power of termination simipliciter under
Regulation 9(b) could only be exercised in circumstances other than
those in Regulation 9(a), i.e. not where the foundation of the order was
"misconduct', the exercise of such power could only be for purposes
germane and relevant to the statute, that the principles of natural justice
or holding of an enquiry is neither a universal principle of justice nor
inOexiable dogma and the principles of natural justice were not incapable of exclusion in a given situation, if importing the right to be heard
has the effect of paralysing the administrative process or the need for
promptitude or the urgency of the situation so demands, natural justice
could he avoided; that the words "where it is not reasonably practicable
to hold an enquiry" may be imported into the regulation, that where
termination took place by the exclusion of audi alteram partem rule in
circumstances which were circumscribed and coupled with the safeguard of recording of reasons which were germane and relevant, then
the termination would not render the regulation unreasonable or
arbitrary, and if the regulation was read in this manner it could not be
said that the power was uncanalised or unguided, that under ordinary
law of "master and servant" the Corporation was empowered by the
Contract of Service to terminate the services of its employees. in terms
thereof; the Declaration in Brojo Nath's case that such a contract was
void under section 23 of the Indian Contract Act or opposed to public
policy offending the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles
was not.sound in law: as a master, the t:orporation had unbridled right
D.T.C. v. D.T.C. MAZDOOR CONGRESS
145
to terminate the contract in the interests of efficient functioning of the
Corporation or to maintain discipline among its employees, and if the
termination, was found to be wrongful, the only remedy available to the
employees was to claim damages for wrongful termination but not a
declaration as was granted in Brojo Nath's case.
On behalf. of "the workmen/intervenors, it was submitted that
provision of any rule that service would be liable to termination on
. notice for the period prescribed therein contravened Article 14 of the
Constitution, as arbitrary and uncontrolled power was left in the
authority to select at its will any person against whom action would he
taken; that Articles 14, 19 and 21 were inter-related and Article 21 did
not exclude Article 19 and even if there was a law providing a procedure
for depriving a person of personal liberty and there was, consequently.
no infringement of fundamental right conferred by Article 21, such law
in so far as it abridged or took away any fundamental right under
Article 19 would have to meet the challenge of that Article, that violation
Of principle of natural justice by State action was violation of Article
14 which could be excluded only in exceptional circumstances, and.
therefore, a clause which authorised the employer to terminate the
services of an employee, whose contract of service was for indefinite
period or till the age of retirement, by serving notice, and which did not
contain any guidance for the exercise of the power and without recording reasons for such termination, violated the fundamental rights
guaranteed under Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 and principles of natural
justice and wa• void under Section 2(g) of the Indian Contract Act,
1872, and unforceahle under Section 2(h); that since audi alteram
partem was a requirement of Article 14, and conferment of arbitrary
power itself was contrary to Article 14, the rule in question could not be
sustained as valid; that the Constitutional guarantees under Articles 14
and 21 were for all persons and there could be no basis for making a
distinction between 'workmen' to whom the Industrial Disputes Act
and other industrial laws applied and those who were outside their
purview, and the law applicable to the former could only add to and not
detract from the rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution; that
the power to terminate the services of a person employed to serve indefinitely or till the age of retirement could be exercised only in cases of
proved misconduct or exceptional circumstances having regard to the
Constitutional guarantee available under Article 14, 19(l)(g) and 21
and unless the exceptional circumstances were spelt out, the power to
terminate the services would cover both permissible and impermissible
grounds rendering it wholly invaiid, particularly because, the requirement of audi alteram partem which was a part of the gliaraiitee of
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Article 14 was sought to be excluded, and there could be no guidance
available in the body of the law itself, since the purpose for which an
undertaking was established and the provisions dealing with the same in
the law could provide no guidance regarding exceptional circumstnaces
under which alone the power could be exercised, that the question
involved, in the instant cases was not the exercise of power which an
employer possessed to terminate the services of his employee, but the
extent of that power; that provisions of Regulation 9(b) of the Delhi
Road Transport Authority (Conditions of Appointment and Service)
Regulations, 1952, could not be rendered constitutional by reading the
requirement of recording reasons and confining it to cases where it was
not reasonably practicable to hold an enquiry and reading it down
further as being applicable to only exceptional cases would not be
permissible construction and proper; that the Regulation conferred
arbitrary power of leaving it to the DTC Management to pick and
choose, either to hold an enquiry or terminate the services for the same
misconduct and there was nothing in the provisions of the Act or the
regulations from which the Management could find any guidance and,
therefore, in order to conform to the constitutional guarantees contained in Articles 14, 19(l)(g) and 21, the regulation would have to
make a distinction between cases where services were sought to be
terminated for misconduct and cases of termination on grounds other
than what would constitute misconduct; that regulation 9(b) deliberately conferred wide power of termination of service without giving
reasonable opportunity to an employee even if he was regular or permanent employee, in addition to regulation 15 which provided for dismissal or removal after a disciplinary enquiry, thus, the intention of the
regulation-making authority was clear and unambiguous; the provision
was not capable of two interpretations, and consequently, the question
of reading down did not arise, and reading down in the instant cases
involved' not interpretation of any single word in regulation 9(b) but
adding a whole clause to it, which amounted to rewriting the provisions,
which courts had refused to make up for the on1ission of the legis.lature,
and would inevitably drain out Article 14 of its vitality, and the right to
equality which was regarded as a basic feature of the Constitution, and
subject permanent employees of the DTC to a tremendous sense of
insecurity which is against the philosophy and scheme of the Constitution, that unless the provision of the Constitution itself excluded the
principles of natural justice, they continued to be applicable as an integral part of the right to equality guaranteed by the Constitution, that as
the employees of the DTC were not Government employees, Article
311(2) was not applicable, and Article 14 fully applied to them, including the principles of natural justice.
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D.T.C. v. D.T.C. MAZDOOR CONGRESS
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On behalf of the Indian Airlines Corporation and the Air India,
which filed intervention applications, it was submitted that there had
been distinction between the discharge simpliciter and dismissal from
service by way of punishment, that the effect of the judgments of this
Court in the Central Inland Water's case and West Bengal's case was to
take away the right of the employer to terminate. the services of an
employee by way of discharge simpliciter, that this Court had recognised the existence of the inherent right of an employer to terminate the
services of an employee in terms of the contract.of employment and also
under the various labour enactments, that a plain reading of the
amended Regulation 13 of the Indian Airlines Employees' Regulations
and a cumulative reading of the amended regulations 48 and 44 of the
Air India Employees Service Regulations clearly established that the
vice, if any, of arbitrariness had been completely removed and that the
power to terminate had been vested with the Board of Directors, and
not with any individual, and sufficient guidelines made available to the
Board to exercise the restricted and limited power available to the
employer under these regulations,
On behalf of another intervenor, New India Assurance Co,, it was
sub1nitted that the Central Inland Water's case was erroneous, insofar
as it made complete negation of power of the employer to terminate and
rendered the termination illegal even where the employer had made all
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the necessary investigation and had given hearing to the employee concerned before making the order, and took in even private employment;
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therefore, the judgment of this Court should be read down and made
applicable prospectively,
In Civil Appeal No, 4073 of 1986 it was contended on behalf of the
Bank employee whose services were terminated under para 522 of the
Shastri Award, that mere failure of the employee to mention the loan
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taken by him from another branch of the Bank, which was repaid
subsequently, had deprived him of his livelihood, and his services were
. terminated without charge of 'misconduct' and without an enquiry, and
paragraph 522 of the. Shastri Award gave no indication as to on what
conditions this arbitrary uncontrolled power .could be used to get rid of
one or more permanent employees for ''efficient management of G
Banks" on subjective opinions or suspicion not tested in enquiry into
facts, and that this provision ,provided for "insecurity of tenure" for
lakhs of permanent employees; Articles 14, l9(l)(g) and 21 and the
integrated protection of these Fundamental Rights excluded the
''doctrine of pleasure" and insisted on security of tenure "during good
behaviour", and the right to livelihood could not be rendered precariH
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ous or reduced to a "glorious uncertainty", that no principle of
interpretation permitted reading down a provision so as to make it into
a different provision altogether different from what was intended by the
legislature or its delegate, and there could not be any reading down
which was contrary to the principles of interpretation; that if two provisi(Jns existed, firstly to remove from service after holding an enquiry on
a charge of 'misconduct' and secondly, without serving a charge-sheet
or holding an enquiry, all provisions for holding enquiry would be
rendered otiose and would be reduced to a mere redundancy, that the
Court had a duty to correct wrongs even if orders had been made which
were later found to be violative of any fnndamental right and to recall
its orders- to avoid injustice; that substantive provision of para 522
could not be controlled or curtailed effectively so as to confine its operation within narrow constitutional limits; that it was not the duty of the
court to condone the constitutional delinquencies of those limited by the
Constitution if they arrogated uncontrolled unconstitutional powers,
which were neither necessary nor germane for supposed efficiency of
services in the Banks as a business enterprise, and that in a system
governed by rule of law, discretion when conferred upon executive
authorities must be confined within clearly defined limits.
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In Civil Appeal No. lllS of 1976, the appellant-employee of the
Zila Parishad contended that his services were terminated on account of
the vindictiveness of some of the employees of the respondent, and
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without enquiry. The employer submitted that the termination order
was passed on the basis of the condition in the mutually agreed terms of
contract of appointment, and resolution passed by the Board, and that
Rule l(i) of District Board Rules, 1926, Part V gave right to both the
parties to terminate the employment on one month's notice.
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On the questions (i) whether Regulation 9(b) of the Delhi Road
Transport Authority (Conditions of Appointment and Service) Regulations, 1952, was arbitrary. illegal, discriminatory and violative of audi
a/teran1 partem and so constitutionally invalid and void; and (ii)
whether the Regulation could be interpreted and read down in such a
manner as to hold that it was not discriminatory, or arbitrary and did
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not confer unbriddled and uncanalised power on the authority to terminate the service of an employee, including a permanent employee,
without any reason whatsoever,
Dismissing Civil Appeal No. 2876 of 1986 (appeal by the Delhi
Transport Corporation), allowing Civil Appeal No. lllS of 1976, and
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directing other matters to be placed before a Division Bench, in ac-
D.T.C. v. D.T.C. MAZDOOR CONGRESS
149
cordance with the majority decision (per Ray, Sharma, Sawant and
K. Ramaswamy, JJ.) this Court,
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HELD: Per Ray, J.:
I.I Regulation 9(b) of the Delhi Road Transport Authority (Conditions of Appointment and Service) Regulations, 1952 which confers
powers on the authority to terminate the services of a permanent and
confirmed employee by issuing a notice terminating the services or by
making payment in lieu of notice without assigning any reasons in the
order and without. giving any opportunity of hearing to the employee
before passing the orders is wholly arbitrary, uncanalised and unrestricted violating principles of natural justice as well as Article 14 of the
Constitution. There is no guideline in the Regulations or in the Delhi
Road Transport Authority Act, 1950 as to when or in which cases and
circumstances this power of termination by giving notice or pay in lieu
thereof can be exercised. [264G, 285C]
1.2 Government Companies or Public Corporations which carry
on trade and business activity of State being State instrnmentalities, are
State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and as such
they are subject to the observance of fundamental rights embodied in
Part III as well as to conform to the directive principles in Part JV of the
Constitution. Jn other words, the Service Regulations or Rules framed
by them are to be tested by the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution. Furthermore, the procedure prescribed by their Rules or Regulations must be reasonable, fair and just and not arbitrary, fanciful and
unjust. [264H, 265A:Bl
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1.3 The 'audi alteram partem' rule which, in essence, enforces the
equality clause in Article 14 of the Constitution is applicable not only to
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quasi-judicial orders but to administrative orders affecting prejudicially the party-in-question unless the application of the rule has been
expressly excluded by the Act or Regulation or Rule which is not the
case here. Rules of natural justice do no supplant but supplement the
Rules and Regulations. Moreover, the Rule of Law, which permeates the
Constitution of India, demands that it has to be obse.-ved both subG
stantially and procedurely. Rule of law posits that the power to be
exercised in a manner which is just, fair and reasonable and not in an
unreasonable, capricious or arbitrary manner leaving room for dis_,..
crimination. [2650-E]
Regulation 9(b) does not expresssly exclude the application of the
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'audi a/teram partem' rule and as such the order of termination of
service of a permanent employee cannot be passed by simply issuing a
month's notice or pay in lieu thereof without recording any reason in
the order and without giving any hearing to the employee to controvert
the allegation on the basis of which the purported order is made. [265F]
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1.4 Considering from all these aspects Regnlation 9(b) is illegal
and void, as it is arbitrary, discriminatory and without any guidelines
for exercise of the power. It confers unbridled, uncanalised and
arbitrary power on the authority to terminate the services of a permanent employee without recording any reasons and without conforming to the principles of natnral justice. It is also void under Section 23 of
the Contract Act, as being opposed to public policy and also ultra vires
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of Article 14 of the Constitution. [265E, 265B-C, 266G]
Moti Ram Deka Etc. v. General Manager, NEF Railways, Maligaon, Pandu, Etc., [1964] 5 SCR 683; Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union
'?f India, [1958] SCR 828; Shyam Lal v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and
D Anr., [1955] SCR 26; Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S.R.
Tendolkar & Ors., [1959] SCR 279; Jyoti Pershad v. The Administrator
for the Union Territory of Delhi, [1962] 2 SCR 125; State of Orissa v.
Dr. (Miss) Binapani Devi & Ors., [1967] 2 SCR 625; A.K. Kraipak &
Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., [1969] 2 SCC 262; Union of India v.
Col. J.N. Sinha and Anr., [1971] I SCR 791; Air India Corporation v.
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V.A. Rebello & Anr., AIR 1972 S.C. 1343; The Workmen of Sudder
Office Cinnamara v. The Management, [1971] 2 Lab LJ 620; Tata Oil
Mills Co. Ltd. v. Workmen & Anr., [1964] 2 SCR 125; Maneka Gandhi
v. Union of India, [1978] 2 SCR 621; E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil
Nadu and Anr., [1974] 2 SCR 348; Municipal Corporation of Greater
Bombay v. Malvenkar & Ors., [1978] 3 SCR 1000; Manohar
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P. Kharkherand Anr. v. Raghuraj & Anr., [1981] 2 LLJ 459; L. Michael
& Anr. v. Johnaton Pumps India Ltd., [1975] 3 SCR 489; Sukhdev
Singh & Ors. v. Bhagat Ram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi & Anr., [1975]
I SCC 421; S.S. Muley v. J.R.D. Tata & Ors., [1979] 2 SLR 438; West
Bengal State Electricity Board & Ors. v. Desh Bandhu Ghosh and
Ors., [1985] 3 SCC 116; Workmen of Hindustan Steel Ltd. andAnr. v.
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Hindustan Steel Ltd. and Ors., [1985) 2 SCR 428; O.P. Bhandari v.
Indian Tourism Development Corporation Ltd. & Ors., [1986] 4 SCC
337; Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. & Anr. v. Brojo
Nath Gaizguly & Anr., [1986] 3 SCC 156 and Delhi Transport Undertakingv. Balbir Saran Goel, [1970] 3 SCR 757, referred to.
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2.1 An Act can be declared to be valid wherein any tenn has been
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D.T.C. v. D.T.C. MAZDO()R CONGRESS
151
used which per se seems to be without jurisdiction, but can be read
down in order to make it constitutionally valid by separating and
exclu.ding the part which is invalid or by interpreting the word in such a
fashion as to make it constitutionally valid and within jursidictioin of
the legislature which passed the said enactment, by reading dowu the
provisions of the Act. This however, does not under any circumstances,
mean that where the plain and literal meaning that follows from a bare
reading of the provisions of the Act, Rule or Regulations that it confers
arbitrary uncanalised, unbridled unrestricted power to terminate the
services of a permanent employee without recording any reasons for the
same and without adhering to the princples of natural justice and equality before the law as envisaged in Article 14 of the Constitution, it can
be read dowu to save the said provision from constitutional invalidity,
by bringing or adding words in the said legislation, such as saying that
it implies that reasons for the order oftennination have to be recorded. [271C-F]
2.2 In interpreting the provisions of an Act, it is not premissible
where the plain language of the provision gives a clear and unambiguous meaning that it can be interpreted by reading dowu and presuming certain expressions in order to save it from constitutional invalidity.
Therefore, it is impossible to hold by reading dowu the provisions of
Regulation 9(b) framed under section 53 of the Delhi Road Transport
Act, 1950 read with Delhi Road Transport (Amendment) Act, 1971 that
the said provision does not confer arbitrary, unguided, unrestricted and
uncanalised power without any guidelines on the authority to terminate
the services of an employee without conforming to the principles of
natural justice and equality as envisaged in Article 14 of the Constitution of India. [271F-H, 272A]
Union of India & Anr. v. Tulsiram Patel & Ors., [1985] Supp. 2
SCR 131; Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of India, [1968] 1 SCR 185;
Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh, Indore. & Ors. v.
Radha/crishan & Ors., [1979] 2 SCC 249; In Re The Hindu Women's
Rights to Property Act, 1937, and the Hindu Women's Rights to Property (Amendment) Act, 1938 and in Re a Special Reference under
Section 2 13 of the Government of India Act, 1935, [1941] FCR 12;
R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. The Union of India, [1957] SCR 930;
R.L. Arora v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., [1964] 6.SCR 784 and The
Mysore State Electricity Board v. Bangalore Woollen, Cotton and Silk
Mills Ltd. & Ors., [1963] Supp. 2 SCR 127, Jagdish Pandey v. The
Chancellor of Bihar & Anr., [1968] 1SCR231, referred to.
H.N. Seervai: Constitutional Law of India, Third Edition, p. 119,
A
B
c
D
E
F
referred.to.
H
A
B
c
D
E
152
SUPREME COURT. REPORTS
[ 1990] Supp. 1 S.C.R.
Per Sharma, J.
J ~ J The rights of the l?arties in the present cases cannot be governed by the general principle of master and servant, and the management cannot have unrestricted and unqualified power of terminating
the services of the employees. In the interest of efficiency of the public
bodies, however, they should have the authority to terminate the employment of undesirable, inefficient, corrupt, indolent and disobedient
employees, but it must be exercised fairly, objectively and independently; and the occasion for the exercise must be delimited with precision and clarity. Further, there should be adequate reason for the use of
such a power, and a decision in this regard has to be taken in a manner
which should show fairness, avoid arbitrariness and evoke credibility.
And this is possible only when the law lays down detailed guidelines in
unambiguous and precise terms so as to avoid the danger of misinterpretation of the situation. An element of uncertainty is likely to
lead to grave and undesirable consequences. Clarity and precision are.
therefore, essential for the guidelines. [272D-F]
J.2 Regulation 9(h) of the Delhi Road Transport Authority (Condition of Appointment and Service) Regulation, 1952 cannot, therefore,
be upheld for lack of adequate and appropriate guidelines. [272G]
Per Sa want, J.
J. l. There is need to minimise the scope of the arbitrary use of
power in all walks of life. It is inadvisable to depend on the good sense of
the individuals, however high-placed they may be. It is all the more
improper and unde.sirable to expose the precious rights like the rights of
life, liberty and property to the vagaries of the individual whims and
F
fancies. It is trite to say that individuals are not and do not become
wise because tI;tey occupy high seats of power, and good sense, circumspection and fairness do not go with the posts, however high they may
he. There is only a complaisant presumption that those who occupy high
posts have a high sense of responsibility. The presumption is neither
legal nor rational. History does not support it and reality does not
G
warrant it. In particular, in a society pledged to uphold the rule oflaw,
it would he both unwise and impolitic to leave any aspect of its life to be
governed by discretion when it can conveniently and easily be covered
by the rule oflaw. [276E-F]
1.2 Beyond the self-deluding and self-asserting righteous preH
sumption, there is nothing to support the 'high authority' theory. This
•
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D.T.C. v. D.T.C. MAZDOOR CONGRESS
153
theory undoubtedly weighed with some authorities for some time in the
A
past. But its unrealistic pretensions were soon noticed and it was buried
without even so much as an ode to it. [278A-B]
1.3 The employment under the public undertakings is a public
employment and a public property. It is not only the undertakings but
also the society which has a stake in their proper and efficient working.
B
Both discipline and devotion are necessary for efficiency. To ensure
both, the service conditions of those who work for them must b<
encouraging, certain and secured, and not vague and whimiscal. With
capricious service conditions, both discipline and devotion are endan-
~
gered, and efficiency i~ impaired. [276G-H, 277 A]
1.4 The right to life includes right to livelihood. The right to c
livelihood, therefore, cannot hang on to the fancies of individuals in
authority. The employment is not a bounty from them nor can its survival be at their mercy. Income is the foundation of many fundamental
rights and when work is the sole source of income, the right to work
becomes as much fundamental. Fundamental rights can ill-afford to be
D
consigned to the limb of undefined premises and uncertain applications.
That will be a mockery of them. [277B]
1.5 Both the society and the individual employed, therefore, have
an anxious interest in service conditions being well-defined and explicit to the extent possible. The arbitrary rules which are also somet~es
E
described as Henry VIII Rules, can have no place in any service
conditions. [277C]
Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi
& Anr., [1975] 3 SCR 619; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [!978] 2
SCC 621; The Manager, Government Branch Press & Anr. v. D.R.
F
Belliappa, [1979] 1 SCC 477; The Managing Director, Uttar Pradesh
Warehousing Corporation & Anr. v. Vinay Narayan Vajpayee, [1980] 2
SCR 773; A.L. Kalra v. The Project & Equipment Corporation of India
Ltd., [1984] 3 SCR 646; Workmen of Hindustan Steel Ltd. & Anr. v.
Hindustan Steel Ltd. & Ors., [1985] 2 SCR 428; West Bengal State
Electricity Board & Ors. v. Desh Bandhu Ghosh & Ors., [1985] 2 SCR
G
1014; Olga Tellis & Ors. v. Bombay Municipal Corporation & Ors.
etc., [1985] Supp. 2 SCR 51; Union of India & Anr. v. Tulsiram Patel &
Ors., [1985] Supp. 2 SCR 131; Central Inland Water Transport Corpp-
'
ration Ltd. & Anr. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly & Anr. etc., [1986] 3 SCR
-
156; O.P. Bhandari v. Indian Tourism Development Corporation Ltd.
,
& Ors., [1986] 4 SCC 337; N.C. Dalwadi v. State of Gujarat, [1987] 3
H
154
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1990] Supp. 1 S.C.R.
A
SCC till; M.K. Agarwal v. Gurgaon Gramin Bank & Ors., [1987]
Supp. SCC 643 and Daily Rated Casual Labour employed under p & T
Department through Bhartiya Dak Tar Mazdoor Manch etc. v. Union
of India & Ors., [1988] I SCC 122, referred to.
B
c
2.1 The doctrine of reading down or of recasting the statute can
be applied in limited situations. It is essentially 'used, firstly, for saving
a statute from being struck down on account of its unconstitutionality.
It is a~ extension of the principle that when two interpretations are
possible-one rendering it constitutional and the other making it constitutional the former should be preferred. The unconstitutionality may
spring from either the incompetence of the legislature to enact the
statute or from its violation of any of the provisions of the Constitution.
The second situation which summons its aid is where the provisions of
the statute are vague and ambiguous and it is possible to gather the
intention. of the legislature from the object of the statute, the context in.
which the provision occurs and the purpose for which it is made. However, when the provision is cast in a definite and unambiguous language
D
and its intention is clear, it is not permissible either to mend or bend it
even if such recasting is in accord with good reason and conscience. In
such circumstances, it is not possible for the Court to remake the
statute. Its only duty is to strike it down and leave it to the legislature if
it so desires, to amend it. If the remaking of the statute by the courts
E
F
G
H
is to lead to its distortion that course is to be scrupulo11sly avoided. The
doctrine can never be called into play where the statute requires extensive additions and deletions. Not only it is no part of the court's duty to undertake such exercise, but it is beyond its jurisdiction to do so. [288F-H, 289A-B]
Re Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, and the Hindu
Women's Rights to Property (Amendment) Act, 1938 etc., [1941] FCR
12; Nalinakhya Bysack v. Shyam Sunder Halder & Ors., [1953] SCR
533; R. M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. The Union of India, [1957] SCR
930; Keditr Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, [1962] Supp. 2 SCR 769; R.L
Arora v. State of Urtar Pradesh & Ors., [1964] 6 SCR 784; Jagdish
Pandey v. The Chancellor, University of Bihar & Anr., [1968] I SCR
231; Shri Umed v. Raj Singh & Ors., [1975] I SCR 918; Mohd. Yunus
Salim's case, AIR 1974 SC 1218; Sunil Batra etc. v. Delhi Administration & Ors., [1978] 4 SCC 494; Excel Wear etc. v. Union of India &
Ors., [1979] 1SCR1009; Minerva Mills Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India
&. Ors., [1981] 1SCR206; Union of India & Anr. etc. v. Tulsiram Patel
etc., [1985] 3 SCC 398 and Elliott Ashton Welsh, !Iv. United States, 398
US 333; 26 L.ed. 2nd 308, referred to.
1'
,...
~
D.T.C. v. D.T.C. MAZDOOR CONGRESS
155
2.2 Therefore, the doctrine of reading down cannot be availed of
A
for saving the regulation in the instant case. In the first instance, the
"
regulation is a part of the service regulations of the employees made by
the Delhi Road Transport Authority in exercise of the powers conferred
by sub-section (1) read with clause (c) of sub-section (2) of Section 53 of
the Delhi Road Transport Act, 1950, whose object is to provide for the
establishment and the regulation of Road Transport Authority for the
B
;
promotion of a co-ordinated system of road transport in the State of
Delhi. There is nothing either in the object of the service regulations or
in the object of the Act which has a bearing on Regulation 9(b). If
anything the object of the Act would require framing of such service
regulations as wonld ensure dedicated and diligent employees to run the
undertaking. The dedication of the employees would pre-suppose secuc
rity of employment and not a constant hanging of the Democle's sword
over their head, and hence would in any case not bear the existence of
such regulation. Secondly, the language of regulation is so crystal clear
that no two interpretations are possible to be placed on it and hence it is
not permissible to read in it any meaning other than what is clearly
~i;-
sought to be conveyed by it. Thirdly, the context of the regulation
D
makes it abundantly clear that it is meani to be a naked hire and fire
rule and the authority ha• been vested with unguided and arbitrary
power to dispense with the services of any category of the employees.
Sub-clause (a) of the Regulation mentions elaborately the circumstances
in which the services of an employee can be terminated without any
notice or pay in lieu of such notice. Sub-clause (b) follows closely on its
E
heel and states in clear language that when the termination is made due
to reduction of establishment or in circumstances other than those
mentioned in sub-clause (a), one month's notice or pay in lieu thereof is
all that is necessary to be given for terminating an employee's services.
The intention of the rule-making authority, therefore, is more than
clear. It was to give an absolute free hand without any limitations F
whatsoever to terminate the services of any employee. Both the
language of the regulatfon as well as the context in which it is cast leave
·no scope for reading into it any further provision. [289C-H, 290A]
2.3 Moreover, reading in the rule circumstances under which
alone the rule can be used, and reading it down to read in it words or G
expressions or provisions in order to save the legislation would not only
distort the intention of the rule-making authority but woald also
""
require .extensive amendment of a very vague nature to it. The reading
-I
in the regulation of a provision that the concerned employees should be
_ _,,,,_
-·
given a hearing with regard to his mis-conduct will require that he
shonld first he intimated of the misconduct of which he is guilty. But
H
•
156
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1990] Supp. I S.C.R.
,_
A
that kind of a situation is taken care of by sub-clause (a) of the said
regulation. There is. therefore, no need of a separate provision for the
same. If, on the other hand, the services of an employee are to be
•
terminated on grounds other than those mentioned in sub-clause (a),
then those grounds being unknown to the employee, cannot be met by
him even if he is given a hearing. The Court cannot read in the rule all
B
circumstnaces where it is not possible or necesary to hold an enquiry.
~
Such situations are capable of being formulated easily and conveniently
(
at least in gcl'1eral ter1n~ as is done by the Constitution-1nakers in the
'
second proviso to Article 3JJ(2). The reading of such circumstances in
the existing regulation would require its extensive recasting which is
impermissible for the Court to do. There is no authority which supports
c
such wide reading down of any provision of the statute or rule/regulalion. Therefore the doctrine of reading down is 'ingularly inapplicable
to the p~esent case. [281B, 2908, 29IA-F]
I
3. Clause (b) of Regulation 9 contains the much hated and abused
Tule of hire and fire reminiscent of the days of laissez faire and unreD
strained freedom of contract. [274E]
Per Ramaswamy, J.
'
I
>
I. I The question of security of work is of most importance. If a
person 'does not have the feeling that he belongs to an organisation
E
engaged in promotion, he will not put forward his best effort to produce
more. That sense of belonging arises only when he feels that he will not
he turned out of employment the next day at the whim of the management.