# Deputy Director of C onsolidati1Jrt, Azamgarh v. Deen Bandhu Rai. Ayyangar, f

- **Citation:** [1964] 4 S.C.R. 575
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1962-08-31
- **Bench:** P. B. Gaje"Dragadkar, K. SuBBA RAo, K. N. Wanchoo, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, J. R. MuoHoLKAR
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/deputy-director-of-c-onsolidati1jrt-azamgarh-v-deen-bandhu-rai-ayyangar-f-3175
- **Pages:** 15

## Headnote

iVrits-(hro VVarranto, Scope of-Appointment of Reader by
Board of .Jppointments
of 1\fysore University-Constitutjon.
Art. 226-jurisdiction of High Court to interfere.
The University of Mysore,
~.<\ppellant no. 1, advertised
inviting applications for 6 posts of Professors and 6 posts of Readers.
A.mong the1n were included the post of a Professor
of
English an<l of a Reader in English.
Candidates for the post of
H.eader \Vere required to possess (a) a first or high second class
1v1aster':-; Degree of an Indian University in the subject; (h)
a
Research Degree of Doctorate standard or published work of a
high standard and
( c) experience of teaching post-graduate classes for 10 years in case of Professors and 5 years in case of Readers.
Anniah Gowda, appellant no. 2, 'vas selected by a Board
of _i\ppointment which was constituted to examine the fitness of
the several applicants and he was appointed a Reader in En~lish
in the Central College, Bangalore.
-
1963
Deputy Director
of C onsolidati1Jrt,
Azamgarh
v.
Deen Bandhu
Rai.
Ayyangar, f.
1963
A~gust 25
1963
The University
of Mysore and
Anr.
v.
C. D. Govinda
Rao and
Anr.
576
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
C. D. Govinda P~ao, respon<lent, filed an application in the
Mysore High Court under 1\rt. 226 of the Constitution in \Vhich
he praycQ. that a writ of quo tuarranto be issued calling upon
appellant no. 2 to show cause un<lcr what authority he was
holding the post of a Reader in English.
1-Ie also prayed for a
writ of mandamus or other appropriate \Vrit or direction calling
upon appellant no. 1 to appoint hi1n Reader.
His contention was
that the appointment of 1\nniah Gowda \vas illegal in the face of
the prescribed qualifications.
The High Court set aside the appointment of ~\nniah Go\vda
on the ground that he did not satisfy the first qualification which
required "that he inust possess either a first or a high second class
Master's degree of an Indian LTni,·ersity"
as
he
had
secured
just 50.2 per cent 1narks while the minin1u1n
requi::cd
for
a •
second class 'vas 50 per cent.
As regards the secon{: and third
qualifications, the High Court did not make a finding against
~
Anniah Go\vda.
The appellants can1e to this Court by special
leave.
Held: (i) The decision o[ the I--Iigh Conrt \Vas incorrect in
as n1uch as the High Court did not take into consideration the
Degree of Master of Arts of the Durham Uni·versity obtained by
Anniah Go\vda.
It is true that Anniah Go\.vda did
not
possess a high second class degree of an Indian University but
he
did possess the alternative qualification of J\1aster of Arts of
a
foreign University.
'fhe High Court was in error in issuing
a
writ of quo rvarranto quashing the appointment of appellant no. 2.
(ii) Boards of appointments are nominated by the Universities
and when . recon1n1endations n1ade by thein and the appointments
follo\.ving on them are challenged before the (QUrts, normally,
the courts should h·-' slow to interfere with the opinions expressed by the cx1:··rts unless there arc alle_£:ations of nialafides against them.
.\formally, it is \vise and safe for the courts
to leave the decision of academic matters to experts who are more
familiar \Vith the problems they face than the courts generally
can be.
\Vhat the High Court should have considered in this
case \Vas \vhether the appointment 1nade by the Chancellor had
contravened any statutory or binding rule or ordinance and ,vhile
doing so, the High Court should haYe shown due regard to the
opinion expressed bv the Bo::ird of experts and its recommendations on which the Chancellor had acted. 1·hc High Court should
not have thought that the Board was acting like a quasi judicial tribunal, deciding disputes referred to it for decision.
It
should not haYe applied tests \.vhich are applicable in the case of
~·rit of certiorari'.
The \vrit oE quo u•arranto gives the 'u<liciary a \veapon to
control the executive froh1 n1aking
~ '1pointments to public office
against la\.V and to protect a citizen f

## Text

-
t '
4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
575
ought to be set aside the existence of this order would be
no bar to such a course, for this order of the Settlement
Officer would fall with the order of the High Court on
which it was based.
We therefore allow the appeal and set aside the order
of the learned Judges as also the order of the Settlement
Officer dated August 31, 1962 which was dependent on
it, and direct the Settlement Officer to take the applications
of tl1e respondents for permission to effect the exchange
to his file and dispose of tl1em in accordance witl1 law and
in the light of the observations contained in this judgment.
'We consider it necessary to add, to avoid any misconception, that the Act has (in 1958 and 1963) undergone radical alterations, and the Settlement Officer in dealing with
the applications according to law would have regard to
these later enactments only in so far as they apply to the
case on hand.
In the circumstances of the case we make no order as
to costs in this Court.
THE UNIVERSITY OF MYSORE AND ANR.
ti.
C. D. GOVINDA RAO AND ANR.
(P. B. GAJE"DRAGADKAR, K. SuBBA RAo, K. N. WANCHOO,
N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND J. R. MuoHoLKAR, JJ.)
iVrits-(hro VVarranto, Scope of-Appointment of Reader by
Board of .Jppointments
of 1\fysore University-Constitutjon.
Art. 226-jurisdiction of High Court to interfere.
The University of Mysore,
~.<\ppellant no. 1, advertised
inviting applications for 6 posts of Professors and 6 posts of Readers.
A.mong the1n were included the post of a Professor
of
English an<l of a Reader in English.
Candidates for the post of
H.eader \Vere required to possess (a) a first or high second class
1v1aster':-; Degree of an Indian University in the subject; (h)
a
Research Degree of Doctorate standard or published work of a
high standard and
( c) experience of teaching post-graduate classes for 10 years in case of Professors and 5 years in case of Readers.
Anniah Gowda, appellant no. 2, 'vas selected by a Board
of _i\ppointment which was constituted to examine the fitness of
the several applicants and he was appointed a Reader in En~lish
in the Central College, Bangalore.
-
1963
Deputy Director
of C onsolidati1Jrt,
Azamgarh
v.
Deen Bandhu
Rai.
Ayyangar, f.
1963
A~gust 25
1963
The University
of Mysore and
Anr.
v.
C. D. Govinda
Rao and
Anr.
576
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
C. D. Govinda P~ao, respon<lent, filed an application in the
Mysore High Court under 1\rt. 226 of the Constitution in \Vhich
he praycQ. that a writ of quo tuarranto be issued calling upon
appellant no. 2 to show cause un<lcr what authority he was
holding the post of a Reader in English.
1-Ie also prayed for a
writ of mandamus or other appropriate \Vrit or direction calling
upon appellant no. 1 to appoint hi1n Reader.
His contention was
that the appointment of 1\nniah Gowda \vas illegal in the face of
the prescribed qualifications.
The High Court set aside the appointment of ~\nniah Go\vda
on the ground that he did not satisfy the first qualification which
required "that he inust possess either a first or a high second class
Master's degree of an Indian LTni,·ersity"
as
he
had
secured
just 50.2 per cent 1narks while the minin1u1n
requi::cd
for
a •
second class 'vas 50 per cent.
As regards the secon{: and third
qualifications, the High Court did not make a finding against
~
Anniah Go\vda.
The appellants can1e to this Court by special
leave.
Held: (i) The decision o[ the I--Iigh Conrt \Vas incorrect in
as n1uch as the High Court did not take into consideration the
Degree of Master of Arts of the Durham Uni·versity obtained by
Anniah Go\vda.
It is true that Anniah Go\.vda did
not
possess a high second class degree of an Indian University but
he
did possess the alternative qualification of J\1aster of Arts of
a
foreign University.
'fhe High Court was in error in issuing
a
writ of quo rvarranto quashing the appointment of appellant no. 2.
(ii) Boards of appointments are nominated by the Universities
and when . recon1n1endations n1ade by thein and the appointments
follo\.ving on them are challenged before the (QUrts, normally,
the courts should h·-' slow to interfere with the opinions expressed by the cx1:··rts unless there arc alle_£:ations of nialafides against them.
.\formally, it is \vise and safe for the courts
to leave the decision of academic matters to experts who are more
familiar \Vith the problems they face than the courts generally
can be.
\Vhat the High Court should have considered in this
case \Vas \vhether the appointment 1nade by the Chancellor had
contravened any statutory or binding rule or ordinance and ,vhile
doing so, the High Court should haYe shown due regard to the
opinion expressed bv the Bo::ird of experts and its recommendations on which the Chancellor had acted. 1·hc High Court should
not have thought that the Board was acting like a quasi judicial tribunal, deciding disputes referred to it for decision.
It
should not haYe applied tests \.vhich are applicable in the case of
~·rit of certiorari'.
The \vrit oE quo u•arranto gives the 'u<liciary a \veapon to
control the executive froh1 n1aking
~ '1pointments to public office
against la\.V and to protect a citizen f :'om being deprived of public office to which he has a right.
'fhese proceedings also ·tend
to protect the public from usurpers of public office vvho might be
< •
...
#"
•
/
st5FREMI) couRT REP.G)RTS
'
I
.
allowed to ~ontinuc eitherr:r,vith the connivance. of the execuq.ve or
by the re;;i.sqn of its apathy.
Before ~:person. can effectiyely claim
a writ of' quo· warranto, he has to ~tisfy the court that, the office
in question is a' Public offiCe and j; held by a~usurper 'vithout legal
authoritr.
'
... CIVIL APPJiLLATE JuR1so1cTroN : Civil Appeals Nos. 417
and 41? of 1963.
Appeaf by special leav.e from the judgment and order
dated March 7,''·1962, of the Mysore High Court in Writ
Petition No. 1197rof, 1960.
"
.
'C. K. Daphtary~..Attorney-General for India, B. R.
Ethirajulu Naidu, S. N .. -Andley, Rameshm1r flath and
P. L. Vohra, for the appellant (in C.fi.. No. 417 /63).
V. K. Govindarajulu and R. l;opalakrislman for the
appellant in C.A.No. 418/63.
, S. f(.. Venkataranga' I yengaf, J. B. Datkchanji O.C.
Mathur, Ra~inder Naratn, for respol)~ents.
August. 26, 1963. Tlie JudgJTiept of the Court was del~11ered by
•
'
. ~ ..
. GAJENpRAGADKAR, J.-T,pe pei{t\on f~om which these
appeafs by special leave ·arise was llle'd by the respondent,
C.D. G<;>vinda Rao, in the MysorG J:figh Court under art.
226 of the Constitution. By that 'pe\ition, he prayed th:at
~ .writ of quo warranto be issued; calling up~:m Ariniah
Gowda to show cause a~ ·to under what authority he was
holding the post of a Research Reader ,in English in the
Central Cgllcge, Bangalpre.
H_e ,.also ,Prayed. for. a -writ
of mandamus or other ·\lppropnate wnt or duection calli,ng 11pon the University of Mysor,e to appoint him
Research Reader in tile scale of Rs. 501}.25-800. His case was
that the appointment of Anniah. '-Gav.:da to the post at
Research Rea<ler was ilfegal in the face of the prescribed
qualifications an<l that he was qualified .. to be .appointed
to that post.
T;J;iat is" why he wanted 1 the_ appointment
of Anniah Gowda to be quashed, and he asked for
a
writ, directing the UniversiW to 'a,PPP\nt him in that
post. ,To his petition, he impleaded the Ui;11versity ,of Mysore
by its Registrar,- and .Ann,ial} Cjow\la as tll<;. opposite party .
1963
T h,e U niver,,rity
of M ysorc and
Anr.
v.
C. D. Govinda
Rao and
Anr.
Gajondragadkar /.
1963
The University
of M ysorc and
Am.
v.
C. D. Govinda
R•o and
Anr.
Gajcndragadkar /.
578
SUPREME COURT REP.ORTS
[1964]
The University of Mysore and Anniah Gowda disputed
the validity of the claim made by the respondent. They
urged that Anniah Gowda was properly appointed Researcl1
Reader and that the contention made by the respondent
that the said appointment was invalid was not justified.
On these pleadings, evidence was led by both the
parties in respect of their respective contentions in the form
of affidavits. The High Court has held that the appointment of Anniah Gowda was invalid and so it has quashed
the Resolution of the Board of Appointments of the University of Mysore recommending his appointment and has
directed that his appointment subsequently made by the
Chancellor of the University should be set aside. The High
Court, however, refrained from granting the respondent
a writ of mandamus, directing his appointment to die said
post, because it took the view that even if the appointment
of Anniah Gowda was set aside, it did not follow that tlie
respondent would necessarily be entitled to that post. That
question, according to the High Court, may have to be
considered bv the University and the Board afresh. The
University and Anniah Gowda, then, moved die High
Court for a certificate to appeal to this Court against its
judgement, but the application was rejected. Thereupon
the Universitv and Anniah Gowda by separate applications
moved this Court for special leave, and on special leave
heing granted to them, they have brought the two present
appeals before us (Civil Appeals 417 & 418 of 63). In this
judgment, we will describe the Univernity and Anniah
Gowda a9 Appellants 1 and 2 respectively.
It appears that on 31st July 1959, appellant No. 1
published an advertisement calling for applications for six
posts of Professors and six posts of Readers. Amongst them
were included the post of Professor of English and the
Reader in English. The qualifications prescribed for these
posts are material and it is convenient to set'them out at this
stage :
"Q l"fi
.
ua 1 cauons :
(a) A First or High Secoi1d Class Master's Degree of
an .Indian University or an equivalent qualification
of a Foreign University in the subject concerned;
(b) A Research Degree of a Doctorate Standard or
published work of a high Standard;
..
•
-
4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
579
(c) Ordinarily, ten years (not less. than five years
irr any case) experience of teaching post-graduate
classes and guiding research in the case of Professors and at least five years experience of teaching
degree classes and independent research in the case
of Readers;
( d) The knowledge of
regional
language
Kannada is considered as a desirable qualificarion.
Preference will be given to candidates who have
had experience in teaching and organisation of research and have also done advanced research
work."
In accordance with s. 26(2) of the Mysore University
Act, 1956 (No. 23 of 1956), as it then stood, a Board of
Appointments was nominated, consisting of the Vice-Chancdlor and two Specialists in English.
These Specialists
were Professor P. E. Dastoor of the Delhi University and
Professor L. D. Murphy of Madras. The posts of Professor
and Reader had been advertised in pursuance of ·a grant
made to appellant No. l by the University Grants Commission.
Four applications were received for the posts of
Professors :md Reader in English and these applicants were
interviewed by the Board on June 8, 1960. The Board had
the advantage of consulting Professor C.D. Narasimhiah,
Principal, Maharaja's College, Mysore.
After taking into
account the opinion expressed by Prof. Narasimhiah, the
Board considered the academic qualifications of the four
applicants and their performance at the interview and came
to the conclusion that none of them was fit enough to be
appointed a Professor under the U .G .C. Scheme in grade
800-1,250.
Accordingly, the Board resolved that the said
posts be kept vacant for the present and be re-advertised. In
regard to the filling of the post of Reader under the U.G.C.
Scheme in the grade of 500-25-800, the Board, after considering all aspects of the case, came to the conclusion that
appellant No. 2 was the most suitably qualified person and
unanimously resolved that he be appointed Reader in the
said grade under the U.G.C. Scheme. This report was in
due course approved by the Chancellor on October 3, 1960,
and after he was appointed to the post of Reader, appellant No. 2 assumed charge on October 31, 1%0. Meanwhile, even before he .assumed charge of his office, the
1963
The University
of Mysore and
Anr.
v.
C. D. Govinda
Rao and
Anr.
Gaiendragadkar f.
1963
The University
of Mysore and
Anr.
v.
C. D. Govinda
Rao and
Anr.
Gajendragadk_ar /.
580
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
respondent had filed his present petition on October 15,
1960, and he had claimed an injunction against appellant
No. 1. from proceeding to fill the post, but since the post
had already been filled up, he modified his claim and asked
for a writ of quo warranto against appellant No. 2. That
is how the main dispute which arose between the two
appellants and the respondent was in regard to the validity
of the appointment of appellant No. 2 to the post of Reader
in English, and as we have already pointed out, the High
Court upheld the contentions of the respondent and quashed the appointment of appellant No. 2.
The judgment of the High Court docs not indicate that
the attention of the High Court was drawn to the technical
nature of the writ of quo warranto which was claimed by
the respondent in the present· proceedings, and the conditions which had to be satisfied before a writ could issue
in such proceedings.
As Halsbury has observed :*
"An information in the nature of a quo warranto took
the place of
the obsolete writ of
quo warranto
which lay against a person who claimed or usurped
an office, franchise, or liberty, to inquire by what
authority he supported his claim, in order that the right
to the office or franchise might be determined."
Broadly stated, the quo warranto proceeding affords a
judicial remedy by which any person, who holds an independent substantive public office or franchise or liberty,
is called upon to show by what right he holds the said
office, franchise or liberty, so that his title to it may be duly
determined, and in case the finding is that the holder of
the office has no title, he would be ousted from that office
by judicial order. In other words, the procedure of quo
wrarranto gives the Judiciary a weapon to control the Executive from making appointments to public office against
law and to protect a citizen from being deprived of public
office to which he has a right. These proceedings also tend to
protect the public from usurpers of public office, who might
be allowed to continue either with the connivance of the
Executive or by rearnn oi its apathy. It will, thus, be seen
that before a person can effectively claim a writ of quo
-"'T-Ialsbury~s La\VS of England, 3rd ed.., vol. 11, p. 145.
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-
I
..
•
·•
4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
581
1963
warranto, he has to satisfy the Court that the office in
question is a public ciffice-aQd is held by a usurper wit.liout
legal authority, and that inevitably would lead to the
The University
of Mysore and
enquiry as to whether the lippointment of the alleged u~m;-
Ann
per has been made in accordance )'l'ith la':" or nqt.
v.
In the present case, it does not appear tha't the attentioll. __ c._Jl;,;G':,~da
of the Court was drawn to this aspect of•.the matter. The
Anr.
judgment does not shpw that any statutory provision~ for
rules were placed before the Court .and that in makinil: 'the
appointment of appellant No. 2 these statutory provisions
had been contravened.
Th~ ·matter ,appears to have been
argued 'before the High Court on the assumption that if the
appqintment of appellant No. 2 was shown to be inconsistent with the qualification as they \Vere advertised by appellant No. I, that itself would justify the issue of a writ'
of quo warranto. In the present proceedings, we do not
propose to consider whether this assumption \\'.as wellfounded or not. We,.propose-- to deal with the appeals on
the basis that It may have been open .to the' High Court to
quash ·the appointment of appellant· .No. 2 even if it was
shown that one· or the other of the qualifications prescribed by the advertisement published by appellant No. I was ·
not satisfied b)' him.
Realising the difficulty which he,may have to face,.Mr.
S. K. Venkataranga Iyengar for th~. respondent wanted
to raise the contention that the appointment of appellant
No. 2 was made in contravention of the statutory rules
and ordinances framed by appellant No. I. He attempted
to argue that he had referred to the statutory ·rules and
ordinances in the High, Court, but, unfortunately, the same·
had not been mentioned or discussed in the judgment. We
have carefully considered the affidavits filed by both tlie
parties in the present proceedings and we have no hesitation in holding that at no stage it appears to have been urged
by the respondent before the High Court that the infirmity
in the appointment of appellant No. 2 proceeded from the
fact that the statutory rules and ordinances made by appellant No. 1 had l:ieen contravened. The' affidavit filed by the
respond~nt in support of his petition m.erely described the
appointment of appellant No. 2 as being illegal, and significantly added that the said appointment of appellant No. 2
and the failure of the University to appqinube· respondent,
Gajendragadkar ].
1963
The University
of Mysore and
Anr.
v.
C. D. Govinda
Rao and
Anr.
Gaiendragadkar ].
582
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
were illegal in the face of the prescribed qualifications,
and these qualifications in the context undoubtedly referred
to the qualifications published in the notification by which
the relevent post had been advertised.
It appears that in one of the affidavits filed on behalf
of appellant No. 1 reference was made to the rules framed
under the Mysore University Act (No. 23 of 1956), and it
was added that the appointment to the post of Reader in
question had to be made in accordance with the regulations
framed by the University Grants Commission under s. 26
(l)(e) of the University Grants Commission Act, 1956.
This was disputed by the respondent, and in that connection, he alleged in a vague manner that all the appointments made by appellant No. 1 were regulated by the ordinances and rules framed under the Mysore University Act.
Then, he alleged that the ordinances made in this regard
by the Senate in their meeting held on Aut,>Ust 19, 1959,
were approved by the Chancellor in his letter dated January 22, 1960. Having made these allegations, no attempt
was maJe in the High Court to produce these ordinances
and to show when they came into force. It appears that
the statutory rules framed by appellant No. 1 under s. 26
(1) received the approval of the Chancellor on January 22,
1960, but we do not know even today when they were
published in the Gazette. Similarly, the ordinances framed
were approved by the Chancellor on the same day, hut we
do not know when they came into force. The statutory rules,
thus, framed and approved, come into force on the date of
the publication of the Mysore Gazette, and the ordinances
come into force from such date as the Chancellor may direct
(vide s. 42(5) of the Mysore University Act No. 23 of 1956).
Therefore, though some reference was made to the ordinances, no attempt was made to show when the ordinances
came into force and no arguments appear to have been urged
on that account. The judgment delivered by the High Court
in the present proceedings is an elaborate judgment and
we think it would be legitimate to assume that it does not
refer to the statutory rules and ordinances for the simple
reason that neither party relied on them and the High Court
had, therefore no occasion to examine them. In any case,
we do not think it would be open to the respondent to take
a ground about the effect of the statutory rules and ordi-
,
-
... ---
. 4 S.C.R
SUPREME . COURT REPORTS •.
583
. ' '
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. ·-~ --~- .--< -
'nances for the first time in appeal. The petition·, which he
originally file<l, when rea<l with the affi<lavit ma<le by him,
docs support this view an<l unambiguously shows that he
·,. confined his attack against the validity of the appointment
'
of appellant No. 2 solely to the ground that appellant No.
2 ·did not satisfy· the qualification prescribed by the notic
The University
of 'Mysore anti·
A~r.
v. ,.
. _.fications by which applications had been called for by appellant No.-1. That is the basis on which the HighCourt
has dealt with this matter and that is the basis on which
we propose to deal with_it. -~- _ ~-·
C. D. GovinJa ·
Ra~ and
Anr.
Let ~s briefly indicate the findings recorded by thi:
High Court before examining the merits of the contentions
'I raised by the appellants in these appeals._In this connection,
it is necessary to recall the four qualifications pre~cribed ..
by the notification. The last one which relates to the knowledge of the Kannada language is not in dispute and· may
be left out of consideration. The first qualification -is that .
· the applicant must have a First or a high Second Class
.
Master's Degree of an Indian University or an equivalent .
qualification of a foreign University in the subject con-
,_,,_ cerned. It appears that appellant No. 2 secured 502 per ·
cent marks ·in his Master's· Degree examination. It was
urged by the respondent before the High Court that when .
50 per cent is the minimum required for securing a second
class, it would be idle to suggest that a candidate, who. ·.
obtains 502 per _ cent, has secured a high _ Second Class .
Master's Degree, and ·so the respondent pleaded that· the
first condition had not been satisfied by the appellant No.
_.
2. The High Court has upheld this plea •. In regard to
the ·second qualification, ·it appears that appellant No. z·.
has obtained a Degree of Master of Arts of Jlle University ·
of ITurham. The High Court has held that in regard to
this qualification, if the Board took the vic:W that the appe!-'
·. !ant No. 2 statisfied that qualification, it would not ~e just
for the Court to differ from that opinion; · In other words,
the High Court did not make a finding in favour of the
'respondent in regard to qualification No. 2. In regard to
~ the third qualification, the matter appears to have been
debated at length before the HighCourt. Evidence was bl
by both ,the parties and the respondent seriously disputed _ ·•
. the claim made· by both the appellants that · appellant
·No. 2 satisfied the test of five years experience of teaching
GajenJrazaJk_ar /.
-
J ..
.
'
'
'
\ 584
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
. ·--...
' '
: .
''1963'
_\\
Th• Univnsity
of Mysore and
Anr.
v.
C. D. Got11°nda
.
RJio and
Anr •.
--·
Gaj"11dragad-
. kar /. -
. : Degree' classes. . The High Court ex:uillned this evidence'.
and ultimately came to the conclusion that though the mate-
. rial adduced by the appellants on this point was unsatisfactory, it could not make a finding in favour of the respon- ..,;·
dent. In this connection, the High Court has severely· ,
criticised the conduct of appellant No. 1 to which we will
. refer ,later. Thus, it is clear that substantially the High
Court decided to quash the appointment· of· appellant No.
2 on the ground that it was plain that he did not satisfy
the first qualification •. In this connection, the High Court
has also criticised the report made by the Board and has
_ obserVed that the Members of the Board did· not appear
to have applied . their minds to the question which they y
were called upon to consider.
In our opinion, in coming to the conclusion that appel-
. !ant No. 2 did not satisfy the first qualification, the High
Court is· plainly in error. The judgment shows that the •
learned Judges concentrated on the question as to whether
. a candidate obtaining 50 per cent marks could be said to
have secured a high Second Class Degree, and if the relevant
question had to be determined solely by reference to this ~
· · aspect of the matter, the conclusion of the High Court would
· have been beyond reproach. But what the High Court has
failed to notice is the fact that the first qualification consists ·
of two parts-the first part is: a high Second Class Master's ·
'Degree of ari Indian University, and the second part is: its
' equivalent which is an equivalent qualification of a foreign
University. The High Court does not appear to have considered the question as to whether it would be appropriate
,__
for ,the High Court to differ from the opinion of the Board
when it was quite likely that the Board may have taken the
view that the Degree of Master of Arts of the Durham· University. which appellant No. 2 had obtained, was equivalent
.· to a h,igh Second Class Master's Degree of an Indian University. This aspect.of the question pertains purely to an academic matter and Courts would naturally hesitate to express
a· definite opinion, particularly, when it appears that the•
.. .,_
·Board of experts' was satisfied that appellant No. 2 fulfilled·
--· the first qualification. If only the attention of. the High
court had been drawn to the equivalent furnished in the first
qualification, we have no doubt that it would not have
held that the Board had acted capriciously in expressing_ the·
'
""
,
'
'
,
'
"
'
'
'·
•
I
4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
585
opinion that appellant No. 2 satisfied all the qualificatioru
including the first qualification. As we have already observed though the High Court felt some difficulty about
the two remaining qualifications, the High Court has not
rested its decision on any definite finding that these qualifications also had not been satisfied. On reading the first
qualification, the position appears to be .very simple; but
unfortunately, since the equivalent qualification specified
by cl. (a) was apparently not brought to the notice of the
High Court, it has failed to take that aspect of the matter
into account. On that aspect of the matter, it may follow
that the Master's Degree of the Durham University secured
by appellant No. 2, would satisfy the first qualification and
even the second. Besides, it appears that appellant No. 2
has to his credit published works which by themselves
., '1
would satisfy the second qualification.
Therefore, there
is no doubt tbat the High Court was in error in coming to
~
,-n_."
the conclusion that since appellant No. 2 could not be said
to haye secured a high Second Class Master's Degree of an
Indian University, he did not satisfy the first qualification.
It is plain that Master's Degree of the Durham University
which appellant No. 2 has obtained, can be and must have
been taken by the Board to be equivalent to a high Second
Class Master's Degree of an Indian University, and that
means the first qualification js satisfied by appellant No. 2.
That being so, we must hold that the High Court was in
error in issuing a writ of quo warranto, quashing the appointment of appellant No. 2.
Before we part with these appeals, however, reference
must be made to two other matters. In dealing with the
case presented before it by the respondent, the High Court
has criticised the report made by the Board and has observed
that the circumstances disclosed by the report made it diflicult for the High Court to treat the recommendations made
by the experts with the respect that they generally deserve.
We are unable to see the point of criticism of the High
Court in such academic matters. Boards of Appointments
are nominated by the Universities and when recommenda-
. .. .
tions made by them and the appointments following on
. , .:· them, are challenged before courts, normally the courts
~
should be slow to interfere with the opinions expressed by
/ the experts. There is no allegation about mala fides against
"!'
:";.F ia-2 s. c. India/64
"
•··
1963
TAc University
of Mysore and
Anr.
v.
C. D. Govinda
Rao and
Anr.
G•jendragadk_ar /.
1963
The University
of Mysore ant1
Anr.
v.
C. D. Gavina•
Rao and
Anr.
Gajendratadk_ar /.
586
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
the experts who constituted the present Board; and so, we
think, it would normally be wise and safe for the courts to
leave the decisions of academic matters to experts who are
more familiar with the problems they face than the courts
generally can be. The criticism made by the High Court
against the report made by the Board seems to suggest that
the High Court thought that the Board was in the position
or ari executive authority, issuing an executive fiat, or was
acting like a quasi-judicial tribunal, deciding disputes referred to it for its decisions. In dealing with complaints
made by citizens in regard to appointments made by academic bodies, like the Universities, such an approach would
not be reasonable or appropriate. In fact, in issuing the
writ, the High Court has made certain observations which
~how 'that the High Court applled tests which would
legitimately be applied in the case of writ of certiorari.
In the judgment, it has been observed that the error in this
case is undoubtedly a manifest error. That is a consideration which is more germane and relevant in a procedure for
a writ of certiorari. What the High Court should have
considered is whether the· appointment made by the Chancellor had contravened any statutory or binding rule or
ordinance, and in doing so, the High Court should have
shown due regard to the opinions expressed by the Board
& its recommendations on which the Chancellor has acted.
In this connection, the High Court has failed to notice one
significant fact that when the Board wnsidered the claims
of the respective applicants, it examined them very carefully and actually came to the conclusion that none of them
deserved to be appointed a Professor. These recommendations made by the Board clearly show that they considered
the relevant factors carefully and ultimately came to the
conclusion that appellant No. 2 should be recommended for
the post of Reader. Therefore, we are satisfied that the
criticism made by the High Court against the Board and
its deliberations is not justified.
It appears that the High Court was also dissatisfied with
the conduct of appellant No. 1 and its officers, and in fact,
while dealing with the question about the length of the
teaching experience of appellant No. 2,
the High
Court has observed that "the material placed on record
is of a doubtful nature characterised by a clear tendency
4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
587
to mislead the Court, if not an actual attempt to do so". The
learned Attorney-General has complained that this criticism
is not justified. In fact, after the judgment was pronounced, an application was made to the same learned Judges
to expunge the criticism made against appellant No. 1, and
in support of this application, Mr. Ethirajulu Naidu, who
was then the Advocate-General and who had argued the
matter before the High Court, made an affidavit, showing
that appellant No. 1 could not be charged with having
attempted to mislead the High Court.
Even then, the
High Court was not fully satisfied, and so in a judgment
delivered by it on the application subsequently made to
quash the said observations, the learned Judges observed
that they were willing to accept and did accept the assurance given by the learned Advocate-General that there was
no actual attempt made to mislead the Court. Even so,
they held that the material placed before the Court could
or did have a tendency to mislead, and that is the opinion
which they thought even after hearing the learned Advocate-General, was well founded, at any rate, not unwarranted
This criticism has beeen made by the High Court because when an affidavit was filed before it by Mr. Thimmaraju, the Gazatted Assistant of appellant No. 1, he produced on June 1, 1961, a statement from the Service Register
of appellant No. 2. This extract purported to show that
appellant No. 2 had more than five years' teaching experience prescribed by the third qualification. The Register
was then sent for by the High Court and examined, and
it became clear that whereas the first four entries in the
statement filed by the deponent were borne out by the said
Register, the subsequent eight entries did not appear in
that Register. Later when the High Court was moved,
after the judgment was pronounced, for expunging the
remarks, another document was produced. This purported
to be the gazetted Officers' Register, and the statements
contained in the extract filed by Thimmaraju appeared in
that Register. The explanation given by Appellant No. 1 and
the learned Advocate-General was that when appellant No. 2
was a non-gazetted servant, his service register was seperately kept; but in regard to Government gazetted servants,
a general service Register was kept, and all the statements
1963
The University
of Mysore and
Anr.
v.
C. D. Govinda
Rao and
Anr.
Gajemlragadkar f.
1963
The University
of Mysore and
Anr.
v.
C. D. Govinda
Rao and
Anr.
Gsjendragadkar f.
588
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964}
filed by Mr. Thimmaraju really contained facts taken from
the separate service Register of appellant No. 2 when he
was a non-gazetted servant, and facts taken from the Government gazetted servants'
Register,
after he became a
gazetted servant. It is undoubtedly true that the statement
filed by Thimmaraju seems to suggest that all the facts
stated in the statement were gathered from service Register
of appellant No. 2, and that, strictly, was not accurate at
~11. Therefore, on the inaccuracy of the statement made
by Mr. Thimmaraju, the High Court would have been
justified.in making an adverse comment; but in considering the question as to whether Thimmaraju or appellant
No. I on whose behalf he made the affidavit, attempted or
intended to mislead the Court, it is necessary to bear in
mind other relevant facts. On the question about the length
of the teaching career of appellant No. 2, appellant No. 2
had made a detailed affidavit on July 22, 1%1. In this affidavit, he had set out the several teaching assignments he
had held and the periods during which he held them, and
these clearly show that his teaching experience of the prescribed character is much more than five years which is the
minimum prescribed.
It is remarkable that though the
respondent purported to make a rejoinder to the affidavit
filed by appellant No. 2, the details given by appellant No.
2 in regard to his teaching experience have not been specifically or categorically traversed by the respondent. Besides, it is significant that the Government gazetted officers'
Register, which was produced before the High Court later,
amply bears out the facts in the statement filed by Thimmaraju. Therefore, one thing is clear that the material
fact about the length of the teaching experience of appellant
No. 2 is fully established by the affidavit of appellant No.
2 and even by the gazetted officers' Register which was
later produced, and so, it seems to us that the High Court
need not have been so severe on appellant No. 1 when it
observed that the material produced by appellant No. 1 had
a tendency to mislead the Court, if not an actual attempt
to do so. It is undoubtedly true that Thimmaraju should
have looked into the record more carefully and should
have stated clearly that the facts stated in the statement filed
by him were taken partly from the individual service register of appellant No. 2 and partly from the Register
..
-
.
,..
..
4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
589
which is kept as a general Register for gazetted servants
in the State. Therefore, we think there is some substance
in the contention made by the learned Attorney-General
that the harsh criticism made by the High Court against
appellant No. 1 is not fully justified.
In th.e resnlt, the appeals are allowed, the order passed
by the High Court is set aside and the writ petition filed
by the respondent is dismissed with costs throughout, There
will be one set of hearing fees in both the appeals filed
by the two appellants.
Appeals allowed.
SHRANAPPA MUTYAPPA HALKE
v.
ST A TE OF MAHARASHTRA
(and connected appeals)
(S. K. DAs, AcTING C.J., M. HmAYATULLAH AND K. C. DAs
GUPTA, JJ.)
Criniinal
Trial-Evidence
of
tvitness
before
con1;nztt1ng
court--Resiled iH Sessions Court-}Vhether corroboration required
-Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act 5 of 1898), s. 288.
1'he appellants were conYicted by the t-Iigh Court for
co1nmi.tti11ci three 1nur<lers. In this case the liigh Court considered the
testin1ony of one HPar\Vati'', given by her in the con1mitting court.
She was an eye witness of the occurrence according to her testimony in the com1nitting court.
In the sessions court she resiled
frorn_ her previous staten1ent before the committing l\.1agistrate and
made a definite staten1ent that she had not seen the occurrence.
lier evidence before the con1mitting court was tendered as evidence
under s. 288 Criminal Procedure Code in the court of sessions.
Hr:r evidence before the con1mitting court \Vas not corroborated in
respect of p!rticipation in the occurrence by four appellants. The
I-Iigh Court convicted the appellants on the basis of the state1nent
made by Par\.vati before the committing Magistrate on the ground
that it was substantive evidence \.Vhich did not require any corroboration.
Held, that the evidence of a \Vitness tendered under s. 288
of the Code of Cri1ninal Procedure before the Sessions Court is
substantive evidence.
In law such evidence is not required to be
corroborated.
But where a person has made t\vo
contradictory
statements on oath it is ordinarily unsafe to rely implicitly on he~
1963
The University
of Mysore and
Anr.
v.
C. D. Govinda
Rao and
Anr.
Gaiendr.gadkar f.
1%3
August 27