# DEUII CLO'l1I & GENERAL MILLS n at all and that in no case cl.34(b) can possibly be made applicable to any purported _..alteration of contracting parties' right for a past period by means of retrospective legislation; all that the parties contemplated was that the mutual rights and obligations would be subject to future legislations on supply and consumption of electricity but such legislations necessarily had to be valid c legislations and if cl.34(b) was to be treated as a contractual stipulation providing that the rights stipulated in the agreement were subject to any modification by any legislation, .valid or invalid, cl.34(b) will have to be struck down as a totally uncertain clause which cannot find place in - ~any contract; (iii) that while the concessions stipulated by o the agreement under s.49(1) could have been altered in proportion to the rise in the cost of generation, such concession could not have been altogether eliminated as that would amount to a total disregard of the guiding principles contained in section-'49(3) and thus contrary to the mandate of s.49(2) of the Act; (iv) that ss.49A and 49B were integrally E connected and were intended and meant to achieve a joint purpose which was merely to validate such of the past actions of the Board as would have been valid if s.49A had already been in force at the relevant time and the demand to be falldated had to be raised prior to February 7, 1976 and not on a date subsequent thereto; since the bill dated March 12, F 1976 was subsequent to the date of promulgation of the Ordinance, the same was not validated under s.49B; it was not open to the Board to make a demand from the appellants for payment of charges for the period commencing from June 1, 1974 1 and ending with February 6, 1976 according to the uniform tariff of 1974; and (v) that the demand raised by the Board G against the appellants for payment of the difference between 1!he uniform tariffs and the agreed rate for the period subsequent to January 1, 1971 was violative. of Arts. 14,. 19(l)(f) and (g), and 31(2) of the Constitution. On behalf of the Respondent-Board it was contended: (i) H that cl. 18 is not an escalation clause; (ii) that cl.34(b) A B c D E F G H 638 SUP.REME COURT REPORTS [1986] 1 s.c.R. makes the contract subject to any legislation;· that the right~ which the parties derived under the agreement for supply of electricity at a concessional rate undet· s.49 of the Act waa defeasible; and that being so, ss.49A and 49B had to be read • into the contract and therefore became a contractual term; 1 that the appellants derived a right to get electricity at a concessional rate only for a limited period till January 1, 1971 and thereafter the Board derived the power to revise the rate of supply under cl.18 and it waa, therefore competent foi;_. the Legislature to enact a law providing for application of uniform tariffs notwithstanding any such colllllitment, undertaking or concession to the contrary made during any period prior to April 1, 1964, BBLD 1, By virtue of ss. 49A and 49B of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 as introduced by the Electricity (Supply) (Rajasthan Amendment) Act, 1976, it was lawful for the Respondent-Board to revise the special rate of tariff agreed upon and to raise a demand against therappellants by its letter dated February 1, 1971 for payment of the difference between the uniform tariff under Schedule HS/LP/HT-1 applicable to all large industrial consumers under. the Board's tariff notification dated April 26, 1969 and the1 concessional rate in terms of cl.18 of the agreement between the parties dated July 28, 1961 for the period from January 1, 1971 upto February 6, 1976, i.e. the date of promulgation of,1 the Electricity . (Supply) (Rajasthan Amendment) Ordinance, 1976, as also the general surcharge of 15% thereon levied by the Board by its tariff notification dated April 26, 1969 as, from September 16, 1966 onwards. (689 C-E) ~ 2. The Board's letter dated March 12, 1976 being subsequent to the date of promlgation of the ordinance the demand raised by the Board for payment of the revised uniform tariff under Schedule LP/HT-I applicable to all such large industrial consumers under the Board's tariff notification dated May 28, 1974 purporting to act under ss. 49A and 49B of the Act read with cl.18 of the agreement, was not validated by s.49B and, therefore, the Board was only entitled to recove~ uniform tariff at the same rate i.e. under Schedule HS/LP/HT-I of 1969 for the period from July 1, 1974 to February 6, lq76, that is, prior to the pronulgation of the Ordinance. (689 E--0) r DELHI CLOTH MILLS v. STATE ELECT. BOARD 639 A ~ 3, The Board was entitled by the terms of s.49A to raise · a demand for payment of the revised uniform tariff under· Schedule LP/HT-I of 1974 w.e.f. February 7, • 1976 and thereafter as per the revised uniform tariffs framed from time to time as applicable to all large industrial consumers in terms of cl.18 of the agreement. [689 G-H; 690 A] B 4. An "escalation clause" according to its accepted ~ legal connotation means a clause which takes care of the rise and fall of prices in the market, whereas the right to review confers the power to revise the rate of supply. [666 D-E] S. The word 'review' in cl.18 necessarily implies the c power of the Board to have a second look and to so adjust from time to time its charges as to carry on its operations under the Act without sustaining a loss. The parties clearly contemplated by cl.18 for a fresh revision of the rate once in a block of five years. The only fetter on the power of the --~ review is that contained in the proviso to cl.18, according to o which power of review shall be exercisable if the component of cost of generation out of the total cost varies by 25% or more ) and that such power shall not be exercisable by the Board till January l, 1971. Therefore, cl.18 cannot be regarded to be an escalation clause. [666 F-H] Butterworths' Encyclopadeia of Forms and Precedents, 4th Edn., Vol.3·, p.148; Hudson's Building E and Engineering Contracts, 10th Edn., Keating's Building Contracts, 4th Edn., p.498; Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Edn. , p. 639; .American Jurisprudence, 2nd Edn., Vol.17, p. 786 and Corpus Juris F Secnnchm, Vol.17, p.806, referred to. 6, The true: object and purpose of the enactment should not be ignored and due effec-t should be given to the provisions of ss.49A and 49B of the Act with a retrospective effect which clothed the Board with power to make the uniform G tariffs applicable to bulk consumers like the appellants who ..-under agreements entered into with the Board on July 28, 1961, · that is, before April l, 1964, the cut-out date mentioned in sub-s.(1) of s.49A had been, to the great financial detriment of the Board, enjoying a concessional rate of supply which had no relation to the eldsting cost of generation, with the ·H A B c D E F G H 640 - SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986] 1 S.C.R. result that the burden of this cost had to be passed over to...- other consumers. As is clear from the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Bill, the Legislatllre thought it expedient to amend the Act so as to cover the rising cost of generation from time to time, notwithstanding any special contract, undertaking or concession to the contrary. The legislative mandate contained in ss.49A and 49B of the Act as introduced by the Rajasthan Electricity (Supply) Amendment Act, 1976, subserves the public interest to ensure that the Board shall ,. not, as far as practicable, after taking credit for any subvention from the State Government under s.63, carry on its operations under the Act at a loss. (672 A-El 7.1 It is not uncommon for statutory contracts to contain a term like cl.34(b) which makes the contract subject to future legislation. Such a clause can usually be found in forest or excise contracts relating to the grant of a privilege which subjects the mutual rights and obligations )- -- . flowing from such a contract to be liable to be altered or modified by subsequent legislations. [669 A-Bl 7.2 In the instant case, the rights which the appellants derived under the agreement for supply of electricity at a concessional rate under s.49 was defeasible inasmuch as on a fair construction of the terms of cl.34(b) taken in conjunction with the conduct of the parties, it is clear that the parties had contemplated that the mutual rights and obligations under the contract would be subject to alteration by future legislation. That being so, ss.49A and 49B have to1 be read into the contract and these provisions by virtue of-, cl.34(b) became a contractual stipulation. [668 E-F; 670 H; 671 A-Bl 8. The State Legislature under Entry 38 of the Concurrent List was competent to enact the Rajasthan Electricity (Supply) Amendment Act, 1976 and introduced the impugned ss.49A and 49B with retrospective effect to overcome the difficulty created by the decision of this Court in Indian Aluminiua Company's case (Supra). There being a change in the law brought about"' by the introduction of ss.49A and 49B of the Amending Act, the Court is bound to give effect to these provisions notwithstanding anything contained in the Act or in any agreement, undertaking, commitment O> concession to the contrary made by the Board before the first day of April, DELHI CLOTH MILLS v. STATE ELECT. BOARD 641 --11964, or the decision of this Court in Indian Aluminilllll Company's case (supra). [673 D-D] Indian Aluminium Company v. Kerala State Electricity Board, [1976] l s.c.R. 70 referred to. 9. A combined reading of the provislons contained in ss.49A and 49B shows that the Board is relieved of the A B _..shackles of the contractual obligations flowing from the agreements relatable to s.49(3), and the Board is empowered in terms of s.49A to revise the tariffs or frame uniform tariffs with respect to consumers enjoying special benefits as from c September 16, 1966. However, the Board could not on the strength of s.49A alone recover the difference between the uniform tariffs fixed from time to time and the agreed rate of supply from the appellants for the period from January 1, 1971 to February 6, 1976 without the aid of s.49B. [677 F-H; 678 A] 10. Section 49B on its terms has no application unless there was a demand raised or created prior to February 7, 1976, the date of promulgation of the ordinance. There is, therefore, insuperable barrier in applying the uniform tariff under Schedule LP/HT-I framed by the Board's tariff notification dated'May 28, 1974 from the billing month of July 1974 i.e. from June 1, 1974 to February 6, 1976. The Board never intimated the appellants that they would have to pay charges for the supply of electricity to them at that rate. Therefore, the appellants would be liable for that period to ~pay charges at the uniform tariff as per Schedule HS/LP/HT-I 'framed by Board's tariff notification dated April 26, 1969. [678 A-DJ 11. The word "surcharge" is not defined in the Act. Plainly, it means an additional or extra charge of payment. A surcharge is in substance an addition to the stipulated rates D E F of tariff~ The general surcharge of 15% as also that the G uniform tariff were part of the general burden borne by all consumers alike. Whatever may have been the position under the .,-old s.49, the new section as substituted by the Amendment Act 30 of 1976, makes it plain that the Board can fix uniform tariffs. The power to fix uniform tariffs must necessarily include power to make uniform increase in tariffs. Section 49A H had the effect of removing the Board from the shackles of the agreement to supply electricity as a concessional rate entered A B c D E 'F G H 642 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986] l s.c.R. into under s.49. The effect of the non/obstante clause in "y sub-s.(l) of s.49A was to nullify the agreement. (678 E-F; 679 G-H; 680 A-BJ Bisra Stone Lille Co. Ltd. v. Orissa State llectricity Board, [1976] 2 s.c.R. 307; and Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, p. 2199 relied upon. Inclfan AlUlliniua Co. v. l'erala State llectricity Board, >-- (1976] l s.c.R. 70; and ntagarh Papers Kills Ltd. v. Orissa State llectricity Board & Anr., (1975] 2 S.C.R. 436 referred to. 12. Where a law does not, in reality, affect a transfer of ownership or possession, Art. 31(2) cannot be attracted. In order to constitute acquisition within the meaning of .\.rt.31(2), there llllSt be transfer of ownership of property to the State or to a Corporation owned or controlled by the State. (683 F-G] . r13. Unless the taking of property had taken place in either of the two way i.e. "acquisition or requisitioning", there was no obligation to pay compensation under the Constitution. The extinction of the right of the appellants under the contract with the Board to get electric supply at· a concessional rate under cl.18 of the agreement for the period after January 1, 1971 when revision of tariff was due under cl. 18 thereof, had not amounted to acquisition of property under Art. 31(2). Further, there was no question .of any; transfer of money representing any debt owned by the Board from the appellants which stood extinguished by reason of ss.49A and 49B of the Act. All that the appellants had under their contracts with the Board was a defeasible right by reason of cl. 34(b) of the agreement. The appellants had contracted themselves by cl. 34(b) to be subject to any subsequent legislation, and s. 49A of the Act struck at the agreement. It is an enabling provision and empowers the Board to revise the tariffs for supply of electricity to a class of consumers enjoying special benefit under agreement entered~ into under s. 49(3). The Board was competent to review the tariff in terms of cl. 18 of the agreement as from January l, 1971. Section 49A liberates the Board from the constraints of the agreed rate under the agreement entered into by the Board with the appellants under s.49 of the Act and empowers the DELHI CLOTH MILLS v. STATE ELECT. BOARD 643 ~aising of demand according to the uniform tariffs. Here, there was no debt due or owing to the State or a Corporation owned or controlled by the State. Article 31(2) was thus not attracted. [683 G-H; 684 A-B; 683 C-F] 14. The concept of "property" in Art. 31 is not a narrow concept and is used in a comprehensive sense. Any legal right which can be enforced through a Court is a right in the nature -Vf property within the meaning of Art. 31. (682 G-H; 683 A] Indian· AJnwinfna Co. v. Kerala State Electricity Board, A B [1976] l S.C.R. 70; Madan Mohan Patbalt v. Union of India, c [1978] 3 S.C.R. 334; R.H. Maharajadhiraja Madhav Rao Jiwaji Rao Scindia Bahadnr v. Union of India, [1971] 3 S.C.R. 9; and State of M.P. v. Rajojirao Sbindi, [1968] 3 s.C.R. 489 distinguished • . · 15. The contention based on Art. 19(1 )(f) and (g) cannot D , prevail. The present case concerns only with sale of goods i.e. electricity and price to be paid therefor, for "tariff" is nothing but the price. The contract itself provided for revision of the rate under _cl.18 of the agreement after January 1, 1971. The Board was within its powers in applying the uniform tariffs to the appellants after the period E stipulated for had expired. There was nothing unreasonable for the Board to have enforced the uniform tariffs as against the appellants as from January 1, 1971. Reasonableness of the increase in tariff is established by the fact that the Board lf&S not bound to supply electricity to the appellants at a concessional rate by incurring operational losses beyond that F date. [687 D-F] 16. The appellants have not shown nor produced any material to show that they have suffered any loss on account of the increase in tariff. There is nothing to show that the appellants had not the capacity to bear the burden of uniform G tariffs. It cannot be said that the impugned demand made by J.he Board as against the appellants were confiscatory in nature. When all the large industrial undertakings including the public sector undertakings of the Government of India and the State Government were paying for the supply of electricity at uniform tariffs fixed from time to time, the appellants had H no right to claim immunity. [687 F; 688 D-E) A B c D E F G H 644 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986] 1 s.c.R. 17. It is evident that the cost of generation in the grid.- was far higher than the concessional rate at which the appellants were getting the supply. As a result the Board was incurring very heavy losses on account of this low rate for a large bulk consumption. It would have been unreasonable for the Board not to have applied the uniform tariffs to the appellants as from January 1, 1971 when t:he Board derived the power to revise the rate under cl.18 of the agreement. The component of cost of generation worked out by the Board shows~ that the appellants were getting their electricity free of all charge. Even the uniform tariff under HS/LP/HT-I was very much less than the price at which the Board was getting its supply. Therefore, there was no reason why the appellants should not be treated alike wit all other large industrial undertakings which were all subjected to payment of uniform tariffs fixed from time to time. The contention based on Art.14 must, therefore fail, [686 D-F; H; 687 A-CJ 18. There was no question of any estoppel against the , Board inasllllch as the appellants did not open their PVC plant on account of any assurance or promise by the Board. The appellants approached the Board for supply of high tension ower for their industrial complex and the Board complied with the request. Even·otherwise, the appellants have not made out that but for the statutory contract for s;upply of electricity at a concessional rate under s.49 they would not have established their industry. There were number of incentives offered by the State Government to enterpreneurs to set up their industries in the State. The Board l.s not the Government and the appellants cannot rely on promissory estoppel for thJ incentive offered by the Government. [688 F-H; 689 A-BJ 19. All the appeals, except CA. No. 2675/80 are dismissed. Civil Appeal No. 2675/80 arising out of the judgment and order of the Division Bench of the High Court dated September 12, 1980 dismissing S.B. Writ Petition No. 8579/80 filed by the appellants challenging the validity of the bill dated March 12, 1976, for payment of Rs. 21,35, 506. 70p. for the billing month of February 1976, is partly~ allowed to the extent that the said bill is quashed with the declaration that the Respondent Board is empowered in terms of s.49A of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 as introduced by the Electricity (Supply) (Rajasthan Amendment) Act, 1976 to DELHI CLOTH MILLS v, STATE ELECT, BOARD [SEN, J,] 645 ~ raise a fresh demand for payment under Schedule HS/LP/HT-1 of 1969 for the period from July 1, 1974 to February 6, 1976 and further that the Board is entitled to recover from the appellants charges under Schedule LP /HT/ 1 of 197 4 as from February 6, 1976 and thereafter as per the revised uniform tariffs, framed from time to time as applicable to all large industrial consumers together with general surcharge of 15% thereon in terms of cl. 18 of the agreement. [ 690 E-H; _. 691 A-BJ -, CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 2675-2679 of 1980. Civil Appeals Nos. From the Judgment and Order dated 12th September, 1980 of the Rajasthan High Court in Writ Petitions Nos. 628/76, 525/77, 114, 121 and 152 of 1973. Shanti Bhushan and P.H. Parekh for the Appellants. Dr, Y.S. Chitale, S.N. Kakkar, V.M. Tarkunde, B.D. Sharma, Sushil Kumar Jain, Sudhanshu Atreye, Badri Das Sharma, R.K. Mehta and H.P. Gupta for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SEN, J, These five consolidated appeals by special leave from the common judgment and orders of a Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court dated September 12, 1980 raise questions of far-reaching importance. By the judgment under appeal, the Division Bench has upheld the constitutional validity of ss. 49A and 49B of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, as introduced by the Electricity (Supply) (Rajasthan Amendment) Act, 1976, with retrospective effect, making it lawful for the Rajasthan State Electricity Board to revise from time to time the tariffs fixed for the supply of- electricity in respect of any period commencing from September 16, 1966 i.e. the date of introduction of the new s. 49 by the Electricity (Supply) (Amendment) Act, 1966, and for the validation of amount ~· realized, demand made or created by the Board according to the uniform tariffs in force from time to time before the publication in the official Gazette of the Electricity (Supply) (Rajasthan Amendment) Ordinance, 1976, i.e. prior to February 7, 1976, the date of promulgation of the Ordinance. A B c D E F G H A B c D E F G H 646 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986] 1 s.c.R. Upon that view, the Division Bench has reversed the judgmemt and order of Tyagi, J. dated October 17, 1969 and upheld the impugned notification dated July 26, 1966 issued by the Board for the levy of a general surcharge of 15% of the normal tariff as also the judgment and order of J,P. Jain, J, dated April 13, 1973 holding that the Board was entitled to recover from the appellants the difference between the normal rate of tariff and the special rate of tariff agreed upon between the parties in terms of a statutory agreement dated July 28, 1961 under s.49 of the Act as it then stood, by virtue of ss. 49A and 49B of the Act read with cl.18 of the agreement as from January 1971 onwards for the supply of electrical energy to the appellants for the electro-chemical, electro-thermal and poli--vinyl chloride industry known as Messrs Shriram Vinyl & Chemical Industries, Kota, formerly known as Rajas than Vinyl & Chemical Industries, and to levy the general surcharge of 15% thereon contrary to the terms and conditions of the aforesaid agreement for the supply of such electrical energy to the appellants at a concessional rate for a period of 20 years. Pursuant thereto, the Division Bench has upheld the demand raised by the Board by its letter dated February 1, 1971 for payment of Rs,ll,67,959.95p. for the billing month January 1971 onwards at normal tariffs together with general surcharge of 15% thereon under Schedule HS/LP/HT-1 applicable to all large industrial consumers under the Board's tariff notification dated April 26, 1969, under cl.18 of the agreement i.e. prior to the proU11lgation of the Ordinance. It has also upheld the demand raised by the Board's letter dated March 12, 1976 for payment of Rs.21,35,506.72p. for the billing month February 1976 at normal tariff plus the general surcharge of 15% thereon under Schedule LP/HT-1 applicable to all large industrial consumers under the Board's tariff notification dated May 28, 1974 purporting to act under ss. 49A and 49B of the Act read with cl.18 of the agreement for the period subsequent to the proU11lgation of the Ordinance. The principal question in controversy is whether ss. 49A and 49B of the Act were integrally connected with each other; and if so, the retrospective conferment of a prospective power validated any amount realized, or demand made or created by the Board, according to the uniform tartffs from time to time, . DELHI CLOTH MILLS v, STATE ELECT. BOARD [SEN, J. ] 64 7 ~from or against any person claiming any special tariffs under any agreement, undertaking, commitment or concessions made, before the first day· of April 1964 i.e. the date when the uni-form tariffs were first framed by the Board at different rates for different classes of consumers by its notification dated March 18, 1964, notwithstanding anything contained in the Act or ~n any such agreement, undertaking, commitment or concessions so made. This question turns on a construction of ~ the provisions contained in ss. 49A and 49B of the Act, the constitutionality of which has not been challenged before us. Sub-s. (1) of s. 49A of the Act by the use of a~ obstante clause has the effect of nullifying all such agreements, undertakings or commitments made before the first day of April 1964 by the Board or the Government of Rajasthan or the Government of any covenanting State of Rajasthan or in any judgment and order of any court, and provides that it shall be lawful for the Board to revise, from time to time, the tariffs fixed for the supply of electricity to persons other than licensees and to frame uniform tariffs for the purpose of such supply in respect of any period counnencing on and from September 16, 1966, the date when new s. 49 had come in force. Sub-s. (2) thereof provides that in revising the tariffs or framing uniform tariffs under sub-s,(l), the Board shall be· guided by the principles set out in s,59 and as respects any period commencing on and from September 16, 1966 i.e. after the introduction of the new s. 49 of the Act, by the principles laid down in sub-ss. (2), (3) and (4) of s. 49. Sub- s. l (3) of s. 49A provides that all such agreements, undertaking, ·commitment or concessions as are referred to in sub-s.(l), shall, insofar as they are inconsistent with the provisions of sub-ss.(l) and (2) and to the extent of the tariffs fixed or provisions made therein for such fixation, be void and shall I be deemed always to have been void. One of the crucial questions is whether the demand to be validated in terms of s. 49B of the Act, had to be raised prior to February 7, 1976 and not on a date subsequent thereto and therefore the appellants __,were liable to pay the revised uniform tariff under Schedule · LP/HT-1 of the Board's tariff notification dated May 28, 1974 w.e.f, July· 1, 1974. The contention on behalf of the appellants is that s. 49B of the Act in terms does not have the effect of validating the demand raised by the Board by its letter dated March 12, 1976 for payment of charges for the A B c D E F G H A B c D E F G H 648 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986] 1 s.c.R. supply of electrical energy to them at uniform tariff framed y by the aforesaid Board's notification dated May 28, 1974, such a demand having been made after the pronulgation of the Ordinance i.e. after February 7, 1976; and if that be so, whether the Board was only entitled to recover from the appellants uniform tariff under Schedule HS/LP/HT-1 framed by the Board's tariff notification dated April 26, 1969 as from January 1971 onwards. Various subsidiary questions also arise, viz. whether the demands so raised are violative of Art.14, "- Art,19(l)(f) and (g) and Art.31(2) of the Constitution. The Facts Facts giving rise to these appeals are these. By an agreement dated July 28, 1961 the Rajasthan State Electricity Board, Jaipur agreed to apply the appellants with bulk electrical energy upto maximum of 25,000 KW per year for their Rajasthan Vinyl & Chemical Industries situate at Kota for electro-chemical, electro-thermal and PVC and allied industrial products at a concessional rate for a period of 20 years upon the terms and conditions contained therein. Cl.17 of the agreement provides for a special rate of tariff as negotiated between the parties and is in these terms : "17. The consumer shall pay to the Board every month charges for the electrical demand made by the consumer during the preceding month at the rate of 201.04/12 = Rs. 16.753 per KVA of the demand assessed which shall be calculated as defined in 1 clause 19." We are informed that this works out roughly to 3p. per unit. ..-- -- Under cl.18 of the agreement, the rate of supply was reviewable by the Board every five years after January 1, 1971. Proviso thereto was in the nature of a rider and it provided that the revision of rate shall be effected provided the component of cost of generation out of the total cost 'r varied by 25% or more from the cost last fixed. The relevant part of cl.18 may be reproduced "18 ........ The rate of supply as determined in clause 17 above shall be reviewed every fifth year ~.- DELHI CLOTH MILLS v. STATE ELECT, BOARD [ SEN, J. ] 64 9 starting from the date of first supply provided the component of cost of generation out of total cost varies by 25% or more from the cost last fixed. Further the rate fixed by this Agreement shall be reviewed only on or after 1st January, 1971." It is not necessary to set out cl.31 which is the arbitration clause. Cl.34(b) of the agreement which has a material bearing _.. upon these appeals reads as follows : 1134(b) Nothing contained in this Agreement or any amendment thereof shall restrict any rights, obligations and discretions which the Board or the Consumer has derived under any legislation relating to supply and consumption of Electricity enacted during the period of this Agreement," It is necessary to mention that Messrs Rajasthan Vinyl & Chemical Industries was set up by the appellants at Kata for electro-chemical, electro-thermal and PVC and allied industrial products with a capital investment of Rs,10 crores as a result of the Board agreeing to supply electrical energy at a concessional rate which came to be known later as Messrs Shriram Vinyl & Chemical Industries. It is a power oriented industry and electricity is the basic raw material. The only other industry of this kind in the country was the one set up by Messrs Calico Mi1ls Ltd. which has since been closed. It is common ground that the Board commenced supplying 1 electrical energy to the appellants with effect from March 1, 1963. The Board in pursuance of its powers under s. 49 of the Act, with the prior concurrence of the State Government, has been issuing various notifications from time to time bringing into effect the revised tariffs for the supply of electricity to its different classes of consumers at different rates. The first of these was notification dated March 18, 1964 which brought into effect the revised tariffs for the supply of electricity to its consumers and they became applicable for -r the consumption recorded for the billing month May 1964 onwards.