# DEVIDAS AND OTHERS v. SHRISHAILAPPA AND OTHERS

- **Citation:** [1961] 3 S.C.R. 896
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1961
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 112of1957
- **Bench:** J. L. Kapur, M. Hidayatullah, J. c. SHAH
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/devidas-and-others-v-shrishailappa-and-others-1942
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

Mortgage-Non-joinder of parties-Proper, but not necessary,
party added beyond limitatior>-Suit instituted on behalf of joint
family-Plaintiff not described as manager in the plaint-M ainlainability of suit-Indian Limitation Act, z908 (9 of I908), s. zz.
The manager of an undivided Hindu family consisting of
himself, his brother and their step-mother •.. instituted a suit for
recovery of the amount due under a mortgage belonging to the
family.
The step-mother who was interested in the mortgagee
right was not made a party to the suit. Though the manager
(the first plaintiff) did not describe himself as the manager in the
plaint, the allegations in the plaint showed that the suit was filed
on behalf of the joint family. No objection as to non-joinder was
raised in the trial court, but when the appeal was pending in the
High Court the step-mother was added as a party on her application .. The contesting defendants pleaded that as all persons
having an interest in the mortgage security were not joined as
parties within the period of limitation prescribed for a suit to
enforce the mortgage, and the first plaintiff did not, in any Gase,
purport to institute the suit in his capacity as the manager, the
suit must fail.
Held: (I) that the failure to join a per.son who is a proper
but not a necessary party does not affect the maintainability of
the suit nor does it invite the application of s. 22 of the Indian
Limitation Act, 1908 ;
(2) that the question whether a suit was instituted by the
manager of an undivided Hindu family in his personal capacity
or as representing the family depends upon the circumstances of
each case and that the failure of the plaintiff to describe himself
as the manager in the plaint is not decisive of the question.
(1) (1955) 28 l.T.R. 189
(2) (1955127 l.T.R. 176,
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
897
In the present case, the step-mother was not a necessary
party, and the facts showed that the suit was instituted by the
first plaintiff in his capacity as manager. Accordingly, the suit
was maintainable.
Guruvayya Gowda and Others v. Daltatraya Anant and Others
(1904) I.L.R. 28 Born. rr, referred to.

## Text

896
SUPHEME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
1961
and that in our opinion is the effect of the proviso to
Commissio"" of s. 30(1) read with sub-s. (2) of s. 30 of the Act. It is
Income-tax,
unnecessary therefore to refer to the two cases referred
Bombay
to by the High Court, i.e., Raja of Venkatagiri v. Com·
. •·.
missioner of Income-tax (1) and Kamdar Brothers v. Con,
M/s.F•lmistanLtd.missioner of Income-tax(').
Ka-;::; J.
The appeal is without force and is therefore dismissed with costs.
F~bruary 2I.
Appeal dismissed.
DEVIDAS AND OTHERS
v.
SHRISHAILAPPA AND OTHERS.
(J. L. KAPUR, M. HIDAYATULLAH and J. c. SHAH, JJ.)
Mortgage-Non-joinder of parties-Proper, but not necessary,
party added beyond limitatior>-Suit instituted on behalf of joint
family-Plaintiff not described as manager in the plaint-M ainlainability of suit-Indian Limitation Act, z908 (9 of I908), s. zz.
The manager of an undivided Hindu family consisting of
himself, his brother and their step-mother •.. instituted a suit for
recovery of the amount due under a mortgage belonging to the
family.
The step-mother who was interested in the mortgagee
right was not made a party to the suit. Though the manager
(the first plaintiff) did not describe himself as the manager in the
plaint, the allegations in the plaint showed that the suit was filed
on behalf of the joint family. No objection as to non-joinder was
raised in the trial court, but when the appeal was pending in the
High Court the step-mother was added as a party on her application .. The contesting defendants pleaded that as all persons
having an interest in the mortgage security were not joined as
parties within the period of limitation prescribed for a suit to
enforce the mortgage, and the first plaintiff did not, in any Gase,
purport to institute the suit in his capacity as the manager, the
suit must fail.
Held: (I) that the failure to join a per.son who is a proper
but not a necessary party does not affect the maintainability of
the suit nor does it invite the application of s. 22 of the Indian
Limitation Act, 1908 ;
(2) that the question whether a suit was instituted by the
manager of an undivided Hindu family in his personal capacity
or as representing the family depends upon the circumstances of
each case and that the failure of the plaintiff to describe himself
as the manager in the plaint is not decisive of the question.
(1) (1955) 28 l.T.R. 189
(2) (1955127 l.T.R. 176,
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
897
In the present case, the step-mother was not a necessary
party, and the facts showed that the suit was instituted by the
first plaintiff in his capacity as manager. Accordingly, the suit
was maintainable.
Guruvayya Gowda and Others v. Daltatraya Anant and Others
(1904) I.L.R. 28 Born. rr, referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION:
Civil Appeal No.
112of1957.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
decree dated Januarv 28, 1954, of the Bombay High
Comt in :First Appeal No. 69 of 1950.
Pur8hottam T1ikamdM and Nanni! Lal for .the
appellants.
C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor.General of India, S. N.
Andley, J.B. Dadachanji and P. L. Vohra for respondents Nos. 1 and 2.
B. R. L. Iyengar for respondents Nos. 6 to 9.
1961. February 21. The ,Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
SHAH, J.-The genealogy which sets out the
relationship bet\\een some of the principal parties in
this litigation is as follows:
I
Balappa
I
I
I
Rachappa
Ba!!a\inga ppa
deft. 9
(adopted by
l
Basavanappa)
Chanamalappa
I
Malappa
(deft. 5)
I
Chanabasappa
(deft, 6)
Mallappa
I
I
Shivappa
I
I
I
Basavanappa
I
Basalingappa
(Parvatewa
respdt. 12)
I
I Shrisbailappa
(plaintiff 1)
I
I
Balappa
Basavanappa
(adopted by
(deft. 7)
Cbanamalappa
I
Chanamalappa
I
Balappa
I
Sbivappa
(plaintiff :z)
Shrishadappa
(deft. 8)
Mallappa had four sons Bala.ppa, Shiva.ppa, Basava.nappa. and Chanamalappa. These four sons formed
a. joint Hindu family. Chanamalappa separated himself from the joint family sometime in the year 1909
and his other three brothers continued to remain
joint. Shivappa was the Manager of the joint family
DeuidtJs
v.
SllrJshailappa
Shah ].
· r96r
Devidas
v.
·Shrishailappa
Shah I
898
StJPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
after the death of Mallappa. Shivappa died in 1928
and Rachappa became the Manager of the family.
The joint family possessed lands in seventeen villages
and many houses in Khanapur. The family had also
a.n extensive money.lending business. One Biishetta.ppa Neeli-hereinafter referred to as Bashettappawas married to the sister of Rachappa. On July 29,
1929, Bashettappa executed a deed of simple mortgage in favour of Rachappa in respect of certain
parcels of lands and houses belouging to him to secure
repayment of Rs. l,73,000/-, Rs. 76,700/- out of which
were received in cash and the balance represented
a.mounts which Rachappa agreed to pay to Bashettappa's creditors. To one Gurappa, Bashettappa owed
Rs. 8,000/-
as an unsecured debt and Rachappa
agreed to pay that debt. In Insolvency Application
No. 22 of 1929 of the file of the First Class Subordinate
Judge, Dharwar, Bashettappa was adjudicated an
insolvent and receivers were appointed by the Insolvency Court to administer his estate. The receivers
applied for a declaration that the mortgage deed in
favour of Rachappa was in fraud of creditors and ;was
accordingly void. The Assistant Judge, Dharwar, in
Appeal No. 25 of 1934 from the order of the Insolvency Court held that Rachappa was entitled out of the
mortgage amount to recover Rs. 45,700/- as a secured
debt and Rs. 31,000/- as unsecured debt. Gurappacreditor of Bashettappa-in the meanwhile filed Suit
No. 84of1932 against Rachappa and other members
of his family in the court of the Frst Class Subordinate Judge, Dharwar, for a decree for Rs. 8,000/'
claiming that Rachappa had, acting on behalf of the
joint family of which he was the man'1ger, undertaken
under the deed of mortgage to pay that amount and
that he-Gurappa-had accepted that undertaking.
A decree e;i; pr;irte was passed in~ that sui_t against
Rachappa on February 28, 1933, and the claim against
the other members of the family was either withdrawn
or rejected. On July 23, 1939, the three branches .of
the joint family by mutual agreement severed the
joint status and properties movables and immovables
belonging to the family were <livided.
Pursuant tq
" '
3 S.C.R.
SUPRE~IE COURT REPORTS
899
this division, lands and houses which fell to the shares
of the three branches were mutated in the Revenue
and Municipal records in the names of the managers
of the respective branches. Movables were also
divided. The mortgage amount recoverable from
Basliettappa and a claim against one Desai were, it is
the case of the plaintiff in the suit out of which this
appeal arises, kept joint. Gurappa after making certain
infructuo11s attempts to execute the decree filed dharkhast No. 176 of 1940 to recover .Rs. 11,061-6.9 and
prayed for an order of attachment and sale of the
rights of Rachappa under the mortgage bond dated
July 29, 1929. One Ganpatrao N. Madiman-hereinafter referred to as Madiman~offered the highest bid
at the court auction and the mortgage bond was sold
to him for Rs. 20,000/-. An application. filed by
Rachappa for setting aside the sale pleading that the
sale was vitiated by material irregularities and fraud
in publishing and conducting the sale was rejected.
The mortgage bond was delivered by the executing
court to Madiman and orders were issued against
Bashettappa and the receivers of his estate prohibiting them from making payments of the dues under the
mortgage or any interest thereon to any person or persons except the purchaser Madirnan. In Miscellaneous
Application No. 57 of 1944, Madiman applied to the
Insolvency Court to be recognised as an unsecured
creditor for Rs. 31,000/-, and the application was
granted on the footing that the entire inter0b't under
the mortgage bond was purchased by him. Receivers
appointed by the Insolvency Court thereafter put up
for sale the equity of redemption in the mortgaged
properties and the same was purchased for Rs. 15,500/-
by Madiman.
The sale deed in this behalf was
executed by the receivers in favour of Madirnan on'
January 28, 1947. Madiman accordingly became the
owner of the equity of redemption and claimed to be
entitled to the entire mortgagee right as a purchaser
of the right, title and interest of Rachapp.a.
Basalingappa who was the natural brother of
Hachappa and was adopted by his uncle Basavanappa
died in 1946 leaving him surviving his widow
J 1.5
I96I
Devidas
v.
Shrishailappo
Shah J.
Devidas
v.
Shrisltaila~pa
Shah].
900
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
Parvatewa, and two sons Shrishailappa and Shivappa.
The sons of Basalingappa who will hereinafter be
. referred to as the plaintiffs filed Suit No. 253 of 194 7
for a decree for Rs. 1,23,400/- by enforcing the mortgage deed executed by Bashettappa claiming that
Madiman had at the court auction acquired in t.he
mortgagee right only the right, title and interest of
Rachappa which was a third a.nd the plaintiffs and
defendants 5 to 8 sons of Shivappa continued to remain
owners of the remaining two-third share. The plaintiffs
prayed for a decree that the amount due under the
mortgage be awarded to them and in default of payment the amount be realised by sale of the mortgaged
property. To this suit were impleaded Bashettappa
as defendant No. 1, receivers of his estate as defendants Nos. 2 and 3, Madiman as defendant No. 4, sons
of Shivappa as defendants Nos. 5 to 8 and Rachappa.
and his son as defendants Nos. 9 and 10. Madirnan
died after the institution of this suit and his sons
were impleaded as defendants Nos. 4A to 4C and his
widow as defendant 4D.
Madiman's sons were the
principal contesting defendants and the me.in contentions raised by them were:
(1) tha,t the mortgagee
right wa,s the separate property of Rachappa and it
did not belong at a,ny time to the joint family of
Rachappa defenda,nts 5 to 8 a,nd the plaintiffs, (2) that
in any event, at the partition between the three
branches the mortgagee right lrnd fallen to the share
of Racha,ppa a,nrl that it was not kept undivided as
alleged by the plaintiffs, and (3) that in Execution
Petition No. 176 of' 1940, the entire interest of the
joint family \rns ~old aud it was purcha,sed by Madi.
man and consequently, the plaintiffs could not enforce
the mortgage.
· The trial court 110gatived the contentions raised bv
the sons of Madinia.1i. and held that only a third shaie
in the mortgagee right was purchased at the court
auction by Madiman. The court accordingly passed
a decree against defondants Nos. 4A to 4D for pay.
ment of Rs. 60,933-5-4 and proportionate costs with
future intPrest at 6°1,, per annum "" Rs. 30,466-10-8
I
~ I '
' '
II
·""".""1-1',.---:··~ ·,\
. "._;.
3 s.C:IL
SU PH EM!<: cuuil1: '1tEPOR'fS
',_".
,
'
901
. ·;_.,_,_,, ... ,• ~ ..
'
'
'
'. from ,the date of the suit to the plaintiffs and defendants ·5 to 8 within. six months and in uefanlt of payment for sale of the mortgaged property. Against that
decree, defendants 4A to 4C-hereinafter referred to
as the appellants-appealed to the High Court at
Bombay. The High Court held that the .mortgagee
right belonged to the joint family, that the agreement
·to pay Rs. 8,000/· to Gurappa was not binding upon
· ' that family and therefore in execution . of the decree
passed in favmir of Gurappa_only the right, title and
· interest of Rachappa was purchased by Madiman. The
High Court further held that there was in 1939
··severance ofjoint family status between the· members
·of the family of Rachappa, plaintiffs and others, but
as in the state of the record in the view of the court a
finding on the question whether the mortgage debt was
kept undivided could not be recorded, they remanded
the case for recording a finding on the following issue :
'' \Vhether it is proved that the mortgage debt of
29th July, 1929, fell to the share of defendant No. 9
· · at the family partition of July, 1939, " and ·
directed the trial court· to allow both the parties ·to
lead evidence upon this issue and to certify its findings
thereon. The trial court recorded a negativt> finding
on that issue. It held that the mortgage claim .was
kept undivided at· the partition. The High Court
confirmed this finding. and dismissed the appeal filed
by the appellants, subject to a slight· modification as
to the rnte of interest awarded by the trial court .
. \Vith special leave under Art. 136 of the Constitution,
this appeal is preferred.
,
·
.
.
· ·
.. No serious argument was advanced before us on the
plea that the amount due under the mortgage from
Bashettappa was not the property of the joint family.
At the material time .when the mortgage deed was
executed by .Bashettappa,
Rachappa
was the
manager of the joint family.
In Suit Xo. 84 of 1932
tiled by Gurappa it was alleged that Rachapp:i. was the
manager of the joint family consisting of himself and
the branches of Shi\·appa and 1fa~;wanappa, arnl tha.t
the mortgage trans;\ction was for· t hl• ·hem· tit of tlw
joint family and that Rachappa ha<l entered into that
.
.
'
-
.
Devidas
v.
Slirishailap'pa
S/iah ].
z,6I·
. ·DMdas
v.
Shmhailappa
Sha~}.
902
SUPREME COUHT REPORTS
[1961]
transaction· for and on behalf of the joint family, and
in that suit Rachappa alone was declared liable to pay
Rs. 8,000/-.
Partition of the year 1939 is supported
by evidence which has remained unchallenged. Intimation was given to t.he village and Municipal authorities pursuant to the partition for mutating the names
of the different branches to whom the shares were
allotted. The evidence of Rachappa and Mallappa
that the partition took place also has remained
uncontradicted.
The question which calls for consideration is whether at . the partition, the mortgagee right under
the deed executed by Bashettappa was kept undivided.
Mallappa defendant No. 5 in his evidence wh.en he
was examined after remand stated that " an equal
division was made of the lands according to the income
and that Racha.ppa was not given a smaller share in
the lands." He alsll stated that the houses were
divided in equal shares and the outstandings in the
money-lending busines8 except, two bonds-the mortgage bond, executed by Bashettappa and one Desaiwere kept undivided.
He denied the suggestim;1 that
the mortgage d<lht due from Bashettappa was allotted
exclusively to Rwhappa.
l{achappa in hiH evidence,
also stated that the mortgage bond was kept undivided
between the three branches and that. it was not true
that it was allotted to bis share at the partition.
Devidas----,defendant No. 4A-had evidently no. personal knowledge rtbout, this partition or the terms
thereof.
HiR st:ttement that Rachappa had told him
at the time when Madiman offered his bid at the court
auction that the mortgage bond was allotted exclusively to Rachappa's share could not in the circumstances of the case be true itn<l was r.ightly disbelieved
by the trial court and the High Court.
On an analysis of t,hc various entries on the record
of rights relating to the lauds held by the three
branches, the trial Judge held that the plaintiffs'
father had received at the partition lands admeasuring
203 acres 18 gunthas assessed at Rs. 233-1.0, defendants 5 t,o 8 had received 127 acres 29 gunthas of lands
assessed at Rs. 262.6-0 and Rachn.ppa had received
3 S.C.R
SUPREME COURT ltEPORTS ,
903
:,;<';.
.<'1'\~:
122 acres 18 gunthas of lands assessed at/;RS· 232-6-0
"in addition to a number of lands whose';.~reas and
assessment were not known". In theview··Of the trial
court, this supported the plea that the partition of
lands was not unequal. It appears from entries inthe
record of rights that Rachappa rec·eived at the partition lands producing annually 86 bags of paddy,
defendants 5 to 8 received lands p!'oducing 92 bags of
paddy and Basalingappa received for his share lands
producing 89 bags of paddy. It also appears from the
village Panchayat extracl s that the family was
possessed in 1938-39, of 30 houses which stood in
Rachappa's name as m>inager and the total· rental ·of
those houses was Rs. 1,262/,. These .30 houses we're
also divided : 16 houses were allotted to defendants 5
to 8, 10 houses to l~achappa and 3 houses to the plrtintiffs and this d.ivision was not shown to be uneq 1ml.
According to the trial Judge, the movables were also
equally divided. The view of the trial judge as to ·the
equality "f the division of the houses, lands, movables
and outstandings was confirmed by the High Court.
The High Court accordingly held agreeing with the
trial Judge that the mort.gagee right was left undivided.
Prima facie, the question whether at a partition between members of a joint Hindu family certain property
was left undivided is a question of fact depending upon
appreciation .of evidence.
Before the trial court and
the High Court there was evidence of defendants 5
and 9 corroborated by the division of the properties
movable and immovable, indicating that the mortgage
claim was left undivided and this court according to
its settled practice regards that conclusion as binding.
But counsel for the appellants submitted that to
certain important circumstances which appeared from
the evidence, due weight was not attached by the trial
Court and the High Court.
[Their Lordships then considered the arguments
urged on behalf of the appellants and concluded.]
We would not be justified in an appeal with special
leave in discarding that finding because some other
'evidence which could have been brought before the
court in support thereof was not tendered.
nevidas
v.
Siu ishailappa
Shah].·
Dtvidas
v.
Shrishailappa
Slush J.
904
cl.'Pl:lEME ()JUKT l:lEPORfc
l Hl61 J
It was also urged that once it is proved that there
is a partition of the joint family, it must be presumed
that all the properties are partitioned and whoever
alleges that any propert.y was kept undivided, the
burden of proving that fact lies upon him, and reliance
in support thereof was placed upon the decision
of the Judicial Committee of the Pri vv Council in
Rajah Kishen Dutt Ram Panday v. Narendar Rahadoor
Singh (1 ). But the case of the plaintiffs here is not
that the members of the family remained joint qua
the mortgagee right but that it was not allotted to
any member of the family because it was the subject.
matter of pending litigation. Q·ua that property also
the three branches were divided and it was since the
partition of their tenancy-in-common. It was the
case of the plaintiffs that the property was not divided by metes and bounds, as it could not be, pending
the settlement of the disputes.
After the case reached the High Court after remand,
counsel for the appellants raised an argument about
non-joinder of Parva'.tewa-step-mother of the plaintiffs. It was urged tltr,t the suit as framed was
defective and was bound to fail.
Parvatewa was
undoubtedly interested in the mortgagee right and
was not joined as a party to the suit. But no objection as to non-joinder was raised in the trial court.
After the finding of the trial court was received,
Parvatewa applied to be joined as a party respondent
in the appeal and that application was granted by the
High Court. Relying upon the application and the
order passed by the High Court, counsel for the
appellants urged that the suit filed by the plaintiffs
was not properly 0onstituted because all persons
having an interst in the mortgage security were not
joined as parties
withi~ the period of limitation
prescribed for a suit to enforce the mortgage. The
partitior. of 1939 was between three branches of
Rachappa, Shivappa and Basavanappa, and there is
no evidence that the joint faJY1ily status between
members of these three branches inter se was severed.
Plaintiff" No. 1 was the manager of the branch of
(I) (1875) L.R. 3 l.A. 85.
-
3 s.e.Ri.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
005'
BM!ava.napp& and when he filed the suit for enforce.
ment of the mortgage, he must be deemed to have
filed it as manager of that branch, and the allegations
in the plaint especially in paragraph 4 make it abund.
a.1ltly clear that the suit was filed on behalf of t.he
br&nch of Basa vana ppa. Plaintiff No. 1 therefore
represented a.II the members of that branch having an
interest in the pr6perty.
In Guruvayya Gowda and Others v. Dattatraya Anant
and Others (1 ), it was held that the question of the
right of a. manager to sue in that capacity is one of
authority. If the other co.sharers are adults and the
right to insist on the other coparceners being brought
on the record is for the benefit of the defendant to
insure himself against further litigation and is therefore dependent on the objection being taken at an
early -stage, the objection on the score of want of
authorisation being one of a character which it is
clearly open to the defendant to waive. Parvatewa
was in the suit as constituted not a necessary party.
It is true that she was interested in the mortgage
security and could have been joined as a proper
pil.rty; but failure to join a person who is a proper
but bot a necessary party does not affect the maintainability of the suit nor does it invite the application of
s.• '22 of the Indian Limitation Act. The rule that a.
person who ought to have been joined as a. plaintiff
to the suit and is not made a. party will entail dismis.
sal of the suit, if the suit as regards him be ba.rreci.by
limitation when he is joined, has no application to
non-joinder of proper parties. In Gurumyya' a case (1)
a suit to recover possession of a house was originally
brought by two plaintiffs, the second plaintiff being
described as the manager of the family. At a. late
stage of the suit, defendants raised an objection that
the other members of the family had not been· joined.
The trial court allowed the application filed by the
other members to be joined as parties and decreed the
suit; but the appellate court dismissed the suit holding that it was barred because of s. 22 of the Limitation Act. The High Court held that s. 22 of the
(1) (190•) I.L.R. 28 Bo111. p.
v.
Shiidai)appu
ShdJ.
•
,~,
Bevidfis
v.
SArislu!iltV>J>•
906
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19Sl]
Limitation Act does not in itself purport to determine
directly whether the joinder of the parties after the
illlltitution of a suit in all oases necessarily involves
the bar of limitation if the period prescribed for such
a suit has then expired. Such a result must depend
upon whether the joinder was necessary'to enable the
court to award such. relief as may be given in the suit
as framed. If fresh parties are merely joined fur the
purpose of safeguarding the rights subsisting as
between them and others claiming generally in the
same interest, the determination of the date of the
institution of the suit as regards such freshly joined
p&rties does not ordinarily affect the right of the
original plaintiff to continue the suit and will not
attract the application of the general provisions of
tha Limitation Act.
Pie.in tiff No. 1 did not describe himself as a manager
in the plaint; but failure to so describe himself is not
decisive of the question whether the suit was instituted by him in his capacity as a manager. It must
depend upon the circumstances of each case whether
the suit was instituted by the manager in his personal
capacity or as representing the family. In paragraph 4
of the plaint, it was averred by the plaintiffs that in
the consideration for the mortgage, they had a third
share, that defendants 5 to 8 had a third share and
defendants 9 and 10 bad the remaining share. These
averments clearly indicate that according to the
plaintiffs there was no division between the members
of each of the individual branches and that-the shares
of the branches collectively were determined. Plaintiff No. 1 was the only adult member in his branch
and he must be presumed to be the manager. The
suit in these circumstances must he regarded as instituted by plaintiff No. 1 in his capacity as manager
and he must he deemed to represent all the members
of his branch of the family, males as well as females.
Addition to the suit of any member of the branch to
whillh the plaintiffs belonged would only mean setting
out the nanw of such a person eo nomine. _
All the objections raised by the appellants theEefove
fail and the appeal is dismissed with costs.
Appeal diamiaaed,
-