# DEVINDER SINGH & ORS v. STATE OF PUNJAB THROUGH CBI - **Citation:** [2016] 6 S.C.R. 295 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 2016-04-25 - **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No.190 of2003 - **Bench:** V. Gopala Gowda, Arun Mishra - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/devinder-singh-ors-v-state-of-punjab-through-cbi-31528 - **Pages:** 38 ## Headnote Punjab Disturbed Areas Act, 1983 (as amended in 1989) - s.6 - Sanction before prosecution - Prosecution of police officials for cases alleging deaths caused in fake encounters and torture or death in police custody - After obtaining sanction from State Government and without obtaining sanction from Central Government - Need for sanction from Central Gm•ernmenl - Held: Jn case the version of prosecution is found to be correct, /here is no requireme/11 for sanction, as a public servant is not entitled to indulge in criminal activities - Howeve1; it would be open to the accused person to adduce evidence and such other materials to indicate that the incide111 was in discharge of their official duties - Trial court to decide the question aji·esh fi'om stage to stage or even at the time of conclusion of trial as lo whether there was reasonable nexus of the incident with discharge of official duty - Thereafter. the court shall re-examine the question <~l sanction. Code of Criminal Procedure, 197 3 - s.197 - Sanction before prosecution - Principle relatin?, to - Discussed. Disposing of the appeals and the writ petition, the Court HELD: I.The accused are not correct in saying that this Court is bound by the stand of the CBI, that it would refer the cases for sanction to the Central Government on the basis of which interim order was passed and the petition may be disposed of in terms of the interim order that the Central Government may decide the question of sanction. In the interim order, this Court has never decided the legality or the correctness of the impugned orders passed by the High Court. In the course of 1>roceedings interim order was passed on the basis of particular submission made by counsel for the CBI but this Court has never decided the question whether sanction at this stage is neccssitry 295 A B c D E F G H 296 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2016) 6 S.C.R. A or not. Hence the interim orders are of no avail to the cause espoused by the appellants. [Para 9] [303-1<'-H; 304-A] 2.1 Protection of sanction before prosecution, is an assurance to an honest and sincere officer to perform his duty honestly and to the best of his ability to further 1mblic duty. B However, authority cannot be camouflaged to commit crime. [Para 37] [329-H; 330-A) 2.2 Once act or omission has been found to have been committed by public servant in discharging his duty, it must be given liberal and wide construction so far its ofticial nature is c concerned. Public servant is not entitled to indulge in criminal activities. To that extent Section 197 Cr.P.C. has to be construed narrowly and in a restricted manner. [Para 37] (330-B) 2.3 Even in facts of a case, when public servant has exceeded in his duty, if there is reasonable connection, it will not deprive D him of protection under section 197 Cr.P.C. There cannot be a universal rule to determine whether there is reasonable nexus between the act done and official duty nor it is possible to lay down such rule. [Para 37) [330-C) 2.4 In case the assault made is intrinsically connected with E or related to performance of official duties sanction would be necessary under Section 197 Cr.P.C., but such relation to duty should not be pretended or fanciful claim. The offence 111 ust be directly and reasonably connected with official duty to requit·e sanction. It is no part of official duty to commit offence. In case offence was incomplete without proving, the official act, ordinarily F the provisions of Section 197 Cr.P.C. would apply. [Para 37[ [330-D-E) 2.5 In case sunction is necessary it has to be decided by competent authority and sanction has to be issued on the basis of sound objective assessment. The court is not to be a sanctioning G authority. [Para 37] [330-F] 2.6 Ordinarily, question of sanction should be dealt with at the stage of faking cognizance, but if the cognizance is taken erroneously and the same comes to the notice of Court at a later stage, finding to that effect is permissible and such a ple ## Text _Characters 0–39,967 of 83,198. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39967 for what follows._ [2016] 6 S.C.R. 295 DEVINDER SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB THROUGH CBI (Criminal Appeal No.190 of2003) APRIL 25, 2016 [V. GOPALA GOWDA AND ARUN MISHRA, JJ.) Punjab Disturbed Areas Act, 1983 (as amended in 1989) - s.6 - Sanction before prosecution - Prosecution of police officials for cases alleging deaths caused in fake encounters and torture or death in police custody - After obtaining sanction from State Government and without obtaining sanction from Central Government - Need for sanction from Central Gm•ernmenl - Held: Jn case the version of prosecution is found to be correct, /here is no requireme/11 for sanction, as a public servant is not entitled to indulge in criminal activities - Howeve1; it would be open to the accused person to adduce evidence and such other materials to indicate that the incide111 was in discharge of their official duties - Trial court to decide the question aji·esh fi'om stage to stage or even at the time of conclusion of trial as lo whether there was reasonable nexus of the incident with discharge of official duty - Thereafter. the court shall re-examine the question <~l sanction. Code of Criminal Procedure, 197 3 - s.197 - Sanction before prosecution - Principle relatin?, to - Discussed. Disposing of the appeals and the writ petition, the Court HELD: I.The accused are not correct in saying that this Court is bound by the stand of the CBI, that it would refer the cases for sanction to the Central Government on the basis of which interim order was passed and the petition may be disposed of in terms of the interim order that the Central Government may decide the question of sanction. In the interim order, this Court has never decided the legality or the correctness of the impugned orders passed by the High Court. In the course of 1>roceedings interim order was passed on the basis of particular submission made by counsel for the CBI but this Court has never decided the question whether sanction at this stage is neccssitry 295 A B c D E F G H 296 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2016) 6 S.C.R. A or not. Hence the interim orders are of no avail to the cause espoused by the appellants. [Para 9] [303-1<'-H; 304-A] 2.1 Protection of sanction before prosecution, is an assurance to an honest and sincere officer to perform his duty honestly and to the best of his ability to further 1mblic duty. B However, authority cannot be camouflaged to commit crime. [Para 37] [329-H; 330-A) 2.2 Once act or omission has been found to have been committed by public servant in discharging his duty, it must be given liberal and wide construction so far its ofticial nature is c concerned. Public servant is not entitled to indulge in criminal activities. To that extent Section 197 Cr.P.C. has to be construed narrowly and in a restricted manner. [Para 37] (330-B) 2.3 Even in facts of a case, when public servant has exceeded in his duty, if there is reasonable connection, it will not deprive D him of protection under section 197 Cr.P.C. There cannot be a universal rule to determine whether there is reasonable nexus between the act done and official duty nor it is possible to lay down such rule. [Para 37) [330-C) 2.4 In case the assault made is intrinsically connected with E or related to performance of official duties sanction would be necessary under Section 197 Cr.P.C., but such relation to duty should not be pretended or fanciful claim. The offence 111 ust be directly and reasonably connected with official duty to requit·e sanction. It is no part of official duty to commit offence. In case offence was incomplete without proving, the official act, ordinarily F the provisions of Section 197 Cr.P.C. would apply. [Para 37[ [330-D-E) 2.5 In case sunction is necessary it has to be decided by competent authority and sanction has to be issued on the basis of sound objective assessment. The court is not to be a sanctioning G authority. [Para 37] [330-F] 2.6 Ordinarily, question of sanction should be dealt with at the stage of faking cognizance, but if the cognizance is taken erroneously and the same comes to the notice of Court at a later stage, finding to that effect is permissible and such a plea can be H taken first time before appellate Court. It may arise at inception DEVINDER SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB THROUGH 297 CBI itself. There is no requirement that accused must wait till charges are framed. [Para 37] [330-G] 2. 7 Question of sanction can be raised at the time of framing of charge and it can be decided prima facie on the basis of accusation. It is open to decide it afresh in light of evidence adduced after conclusion of trial or at other appropriate stage. (Para 37] (.330-11; 331-A] 2.8 Question of sanction may arise at any stage of (lroceedings. On a police or .iudicial inquiry or in course of evidence during trial. Whether sanction is necessary or not may have to be determined from stage to stage and material brought on record depending upon facts of each case. Question of sanction can be considered at any stage of the proceedings. Necessity for sanction may reveal itself in the course of the progress of the case and it would be open to accused to place material during the course of trial for showing what his duty was. Accused has the right to lead evidence in support of his case on merits. [Para 37] [331-B-CI 2.9 In some cases, it may not be possible to decide the question effectively and finally without giving opportunity to the defence to addm~c evidence. Question of gootl faith or bad faith may be decided 011 conclusion of trial. ll'ara 37] [331-D] 2.10 In the instant cases, the allegation as per the (lrosecution case it was a case of fake encounter or death caused by torture whereas the defence of the accused person is that it was a case in discharge of official duty and as the deceased was· involved in the terrorist activities and while maintaining law and order the incident has taken place. The incident was in the course of discharge of official duty. In case the version of the prosecution is found to be correct, there is no requirement of any sanction. However it would be' upen to the accused persons to adduce the evidence in defence and to submit such other materials on rec1.1rd indicating that the incident has taken place in discharge of their official duties and the orders passed earlier would not come in the way of the trial court to decide the question afresh in the light of the aforesaid principles from stage to stage or even at the time of conclusion of the trial at the time of judgment. As at this stage it cannot be said which version is correct. The trial court A B c D E F G H 298 A B c D E F G H SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016) 6 S.C.R. has prima facie to proceed on the basis of prosecution version and can re-decide the question afresh in case from the evidence adduced by the prosecution or by the accused or in any other manner it comes to the notice of the court that there was a reasonable nexus of the incident with discharge of official duty, the court shall re-examine the question of sanction and take decision in accordance with law. The trial to proceed on the aforesaid basis. [Para 37] (331-D-H; 332-AI Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari 1955 (2) SCR 925 - followed. Dr. Hori Ram Singh v. Emperor AIR 1939 FC 43; Shreekantiah Ramayya Munipalli v. The State of Bombay 1955 (1) SCR 1177; Bhappa Singh v. Ram Pal Singh & Ors. 1981 (Supp) SCC 12; State of Mahamshtra v. D1: Budhikota Subbarao 1993 (2) SCR 311 : 1993 (3) SCC 339; Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan v. State of Gujarat 1997 (3) Suppl. SCR 705 : 1997 (7) SCC 622; Suresh Kumar Bhikamchcmd Jain v. Pandey Ajay Bhushan & Ors. 1997 (5) Suppl. SCR 524 : 1998 (1) SCC 205; Gauri Shankar Prasad v. State of Bihar & Anr. 2000 (3) SCR 159 : 2000 (5) SCC 15; Abdul Wahab Ansari y. State of Bihar & A11r. 2000 (3) Suppl. SCR 747 : 2000 (8) sec 500; P.K. Pradhan V. State of Sikkim represented by the Central Bureau of Investigation 2001 (3) SCR 1119: 2001 (6) SCC 704; State of H.P. v. M.P. Gupta 2003 (6) Suppl. sen. 541 : 2004 (2) sec 349; State of Ori.Isa & Ors. v. Ganesh Chandra Jew 2004 (3) SCR 504 : 2004 (8) SCC 40; K. Kalimuthu P. State by DSP 2005 (3) SCR 1: 2005 (4) SCC 512; State of Karnataka through CBI v. C. N<1garaJaswa111y 2005 (4) Suppl. SCR 169: 2005 (8) SCC 370; Sankaran Moitra v. Sadhna Das & Anr. 2006 (3) SCR 305 : 2006 (4) SCC 584; Harpal Singh v. State (!l Punjab 2007 (12) SCR 830 : 2007 (13) sec 387; General Officer Commanding, Rashtriya R(fles v. Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr. 2012 (5) SCR 599: 2012 (6) SCC 228; D. T. Virupakslwppa v. C. Suhash 2015 (5) SCR 534 : 2015 (12) SCC 231; 0111 Prakash 1•. State of DEVINDER SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB THROUGH 299 CBI Jharkhand 2012 (9) SCR 125: 2012 (12) SCC 72; Manorama Tiwari & Ors. v. Surendra Nath Rai 2015 (9) SCR 436 : 2016 (1) SCC 594; Shambhoo Nath Misra v. State of UP. & Ors.1997 (2) SCR 1139: 1997 (5) sec 326; S.K. Zutshi & Am: V. Bi111al Debnath & Anr. 2004 (8) sec 31; P.P. U1111ikrishna11 & Am: V. Puttiyottil Alikutty & A11r. 2000 (3) Suppl. SCR 142 : 2000 (8) SCC 131; Satyavir Singh Rathi, Assisrant Co111111issioner of Police & Ors. v. State through Central Bureau of Investigation 2011 (6) SCR 138 : 2011 (6) SCC 1; Para111jit Kaur (Mrs) v. State of Punjab & Ors. 1995 (5) Suppl. SCR 250 : (1996) 7 SCC 20 - relied on. Birendra K. Singh v. State qf Bihar 2000 (8) SCC 498 - referred to. Case Law Reference AIR 1939 FC 43 relied on Para 10 1955 (1) SCR 1177 relied Oil Pam 11 1955 (2) SCR 925 followed Para 13 1981 (Supp) sec 12 relied Oil Para 14 1993 (2) SCR 311 relied on Para 15 1997 (3) Sllp11I. SCR 705 relied on Para 16 1997 (5) Suppl. SCR 524 relied on Pam 17 2000 (3) SCR 159 relied Oil Para 18 2000 (3) Suppl. SCR747 relied on Para 20 2000 (8) SCC498 referred to Parn 20 2001 (3) SCR 1119 relied Oil Para 21 2003 (6) Sup11I. SCR 541 relied Oil Pam 22 2004 (3) SCR 504 relied Oil Para 23 2005 (3) SCR 1 relied on Para 24 2005 (4) Suppl. SCR 169 relied on Para 25 A B c D E F G H 300 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 6 S.C.R. A 2006 (3) SCR 30 relied on Para 26 2007 (12) SCR 830 relied on Para 27 2012 (5) SCR 599 relied on Para 28 2015 (5) SCR 534 relied on Para 29 B 2012 (9) SCR125 relied on Para 29 2015 (9) SCR436 relied on Para 30 1997 (2) SCR 1139 relied Oil Para 31 2004 (8) sec 31 relied Oil Para 32 c 2000 (3) Suppl. SCR 14 relied on Para 33 2011 (6) SCR 138 relied on Para 34 1995 (5) Suppl. SCR 250 relied on Para 36 CRIMINAL APPELLATE /ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: D Criminal Appeal No. 190 of2003. E r G H Fro111 the Judgment and Order dated 05.03.200 l of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal Revision No. 175 of 2000. WITH CRLA. Nos. 352. 353. 354. 355. 356. 357. 358. 360. 36 i i62, 363. 364. 365. 366. 367. 368. 369. 371, 373, 3 74. 375. 377. 378. 379. -' ,) .. 381, 382. 383. 384. 385. 386. 387. 388. 389. 390 and 391 of2016 W. P. (Crl.) No. 139 of 2012. V. Giri. Colin Gonsall'es, Sr. Advs .. Sudhir Walia, Ms. Niharika Ahluwalia, Ms. Pragya Wazir. AbhishekAtrey, K. K. Mohan. Ms. Daina. Ms. Jyoti Mendiratta, Ms. Ka111ini Jaiswal, Ms. Shumaila Altaf, Advs. for the Appellants. Ms. Vibha Datta Makhija. Sr. Adv., Bharat Sangal, Irshad Ahmad. Kuldip Singh, Ms. Puja Sharma. Ms. Binu Tamta. B. Raghunath. Ms. Sushma Suri, B. V. Balarnrn Das. Ms. Kritika Sad1deva, Raj iv Nanda. Kumar l'arimal. P. Parmeswaran. Ajay Pal. Ms. Sushma Suri, Arvind Kumar Shanna. Advs. for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DEVINDER SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB THROUGH 301 CBI ARUN MISHRA, J, 1. Leave granted in all the special leave petitions. 2. In the appeals the question involved is whether in view of the provisions contained in section 6 of Punjab Disturbed Areas Act, 1983 (as amended in 1989) (for short "the 1983 Act") the prosecution or other legal proceedings relating to Police officers can be instituted without prior sanction of the Central Government. 3. The case set up by the appellants in Criminal Appeal No.190 of 2003 is that they are the officers of the Punjab Pol ice. At the relevant time they were entrusted with the duties and responsibilities of public order and peace in the State of Punjab. It is averred by the appellants that, in the early 1980s, there was a sudden spurt in the terrorist activities, massive killings at the hands of terrorists, looting, exto11ions, kidnapping, resulting into total collapse of the civil administration. More than 25,000 civilians, 1800 men in uniform and their relatives had been killed at the hands of the terrorists resulting into migration of civil population in the border districts of Amritsar, Ferozpur and Gurdaspur. District Amritsar was bifurcated into three police districts for the purpose of better administration, namely Amritsar, Taran Taran and Majitha. The present cases arise from police district Taran Taran which is the closest police district to Pakistan. It is further averred that on 22.7.1993 four persons were killed in an encounter with the police. The prosecution alleged that they were ki lied in a fake encounter. On the basis of the complaint lodged by Chaman Lal, father of one of the deceased, the CBI obtained sanction from the State Government to prosecute the accused as at the relevant time, under section 6 of the 1983 Act, sanction from Central Government was required. However, on the basis of sanction obtained from the State Government, the CBI filed chargesheet against the accused persons in the Court of Special Judge, Patiala. The appellants filed application under section 227 of the Cr.P.C. for discharge on the ground that they had acted in the incident in the course of their duty and sanction granted by the State Government was without jurisdiction, illegal and void. 4. The CBI contested the application on the ground that sections 4 and 5 of the 1983 Act were not applicable and there was no need for obtaining any sanction because the deceased had been killed in a fake encounter. The Special Com1 dismissed the application filed by the A B c D E F G H 302 A B c D E F G H SUPREME COURT REPORTS . [2016] 6 S.C.R. accused persons. Aggrieved thereby, they approached the High Court by tiling a criminal revision and the same has also been dismissed. The High Court has held that as per prosecution case it is a case of fake encounter, as such sanction is not required. The same could not be said to be an act in discharge of official duties. Aggrieved thereby the appellants are before this Court. The facts are more or less similar in all the cases. 5. Writ Petition (Crl.) No.139/2012 has been filed by Chaman Lal with a prayer that Union of India may be directed to grant sanction under section 197 Cr.P.C. for prosecution of police officer as set out in the affidavit of CBI filed in Appeal No.190/2003. 6. This Court vide order dated 20.7.2001 stayed the further proceedings before the trial court in SLP (Crl.) No.2336/2001 - Balbir Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab. Similar orders of interim stay were passed in other cases also. One such order was passed on 2 I .1.2002 in SLP (Crl.) Nos.3072-75/2001 and these matters had been tagged. On behalf of the accused appellants, order dated 16.2.2006 has been referred to in which it has been observed that the CBI had stated during the course of the arguments that the mater be sent to the Central Government with the entire record to consider the question of sanction in terms of section 6 of the 1983 Act. This Court in view of the stand taken by the CBI continued the interim stay on operation of the impugned orders and observed that the Central Government will consider the matter in terms of section 6 and in accordance with Jaw without being prejudiced by any observation made in any of the impugned orders. Cases were ordered to be listed afterthree months. This Court was informed by the Additional Solicitor General on I 0. I 0.2006 that the Central Government has opined that the case of Balbir Singh was not a fit case for giving sanction for prosecution in terms of section 6 of the 1983 Act. So far as Harpal Singh is concerned, the Central Government was not the competent authority and with respect to another accused Bhupiiiderjit Singh, CBI has not submitted full report. Thereafter interim order was passed on 13 .2.2007 by this Court to consider grant of sanction in the case ofGurmeet Singh. On 22.9.2010 this Court noted in the interim order that Balbir Singh in Crl. Appeal No.190/2003 had died and this Court dismissed the appeal as abated against him. Appeal with respect to other appellants was adjourned. Interim stay was granted in other connected matters on 30. 7 .20 I 2 with respect to cases pending in the trial court at Patiala. DEVINDER SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB THROUGH CBI [ARUN MISHRA, J.] 7. It was submitted by learned counsel appearing on behalf of accused appellant that sanction to prosecute was necessary in view of the provisions contained in section 6 of the 1983 Act as amended in 1989. Thus the prosecution could not have been launched without obtaining sanction of the Central Government. This Court by interim order had directed on submission being raised by CBI that the matter will be referred to the Central Government for sanction and in certain cases Central Government had granted sanction and in others it had declined. Sanction to prosecute was necessary as the act was done in discharge of official duties. As a matter of fact, false allegations of fake encounter have been made in the cases. The deceased indulged in various criminal activities. They were creating unrest and the officers have discharged their duties at the time of the incident. Thus without prior sanction to pn:isecute by the Central Government, they could not have been prosecuted. The prosecution deserves to be quashed. Per contr11, it was submitted on behalf of the CBI and the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the complainant that in such cases of criminal activities, fake encounters, custodial death due to torture etc., sanction to prosecute is not at all required as fake encounters, torture in custody and other criminal acts complained of do not form part of their official duties. Thus, the High Court has rightly upheld the order of the trial court, in such cases the sanction to prosecute is not necessary in such cases. 8. The matters in question as per prosecution case pertain to death caused in fake encounter, or by torture or death in police custody. 9. lt was submitted by learned counsel on behalf cifthe appellants that in the course of proceedings the CBI has taken a stand that it would refer the cases for sanction to the Central Government. This Court is bound by such stand of the CBI on the basis of which interim order was passed and the petition may be disposed of in terms of the interim order that the Central Government may decide the question of sanction. We are not at all impressed by the submission made by learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants. In the interim order this Court has never decided the legality or the correctness of the impugned orders passed by the High Court. In the course of proceedings interim order was passed on the basis of particular submission made by counsel for the CBI but this Court has never decided tl~e question whether sanction 303 A B c D E F G H 304 A B c D E F SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 6 S.C.R. at this stage is necessary or not. Hence the interim orders are ofno avail to the cause espoused by the appellants. I 0. On merits, accused-appellants have relied upon the decision of the Federal Cou1i in D1: Hori Ram Singh v. Emperor [AIR 1939 FC 43] in which Federal Court has laid down that the question of good faith or bad faith is expected to be decided by the court after trial. The question of good faith or bad faith should not be introduced at the stage of section 270( 1) with regard to the meaning of the words "purporting to be done in official duty", the court observed that it is difficult to say that it necessarily implies "'purporting to be done in good faith". In the case of embezzlement, an officer is not doing an act in execution of his duty. It would amount to criminal breach of trust under section 409 !PC but in case of provision under section 477-A !PC if an act is done willfully, with intention to defraud, falsify any book or account, in such cases for prosecution under section 409, consent of Governor is not necessary but for prosecution under section 4 77 A, consent is necessary. l l. Reliance has also been placed on the decision of this Court in Shreekantiah Ramayya Munipa/li v. The State of Bombay [ 1955 ( 1) SCR 1177] wherein this Comi had observed thus: "Now it is obvious that if section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is construed too narrowly it can never be applied, for of course it is no part of an official's duty to commit an offence and never can be. But it is not the duty we have to examine so much as the act, because an official act can be performed in the discharge of official duty as well as in dereliction of it. The section has content and its language must be given meaning. What it says is - "when any public servant . . . .. is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty ...... " We have therefore first to concentrate on the word G 'offence'. H Now an offence seldom consists of a single act. It is usually composed of several elements and, as a rule, a whole series of acts must be proved before it can be established. In the present case, the elements alleged against the second DEVINDER SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB THROUGH CBI [ARUN MISHRA, J.) accused are, first, that there was an "'entrustment" and/or "dominion"; second, that the entrustment and/or dominion was ;'in his capacity as a public servant"; third, that there was a "disposal"; and fourth, that the disposal was ';dishonest". Now it is evidentthatthe entrustment and/or dominion here were in an official capacity, and it is equally evident that there could in this case be no disposal, lawful or otherwise, save by an act done or purporting to be done in an official capacity. Therefore, the act complained of, namely the disposal, could not have been done in any other way. If it was innocent, it was an official act; if dishonest, it was the dishonest doing of an official act, but in either event the act was official because the second accused could not dispose of the goods save by the doing of an official act, namely officially permitting their disposal; and that he did. He actually permitted their release and purported to do it in an official capacity, and apart from the fact that he did not pretend to act privately, there was no other way in which he could have done it. Therefore, whatever the intention or motive behind .the act may have been, the physical part of it remained unaltered, so if it was official in the one case it was equally official in the other, and the only difference would lie in the intention with which it was done: in the one event, it would be done in the discharge of an official duty and in the other, in the purported discharge of it. The act of abetment alleged against him stands on the same 305 A B c D E footing, for his part in the abetment was to permit the disposal F of the goods by the doing of an official act and thus "willfully suffer" another person to use them dishonestly: section 405 of the Indian Penal Code. In both cases, the ;'offence" in his case would be incomplete without proving the official act. We therefore hold that section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure applies and that sanction was necessary, and as there was none the trial is vitiated from the start. We therefore quash the proceedings against the second accused as also his conviction and sentence." G H 306 A B c D E F SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 6 S.C.R. 12. This Court has observed in Shreekantiah Ramayya (supra) that cases have to be decided on their own facts. 13. Reliance has also been placed on a decision of this Court in Matajog Dobey v. H C. Bhari [ 1955 (2) SCR 925] in which a complaint was filed under sections 323, 341, 342, and 109, Cr.P.C. Summons were issued to accused persons under section 323. An objection was taken by accused Bhari as to want of sanction under section 197 Cr.P.C. It was upheld and all the accused were discharged. The High Court affirmed the order of the Presidency Magistrate. This Court held that where in pursuance ofa search warrant issued under section 6 of the Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1947, they were required to open the entrance door and on being challenged by the Darwan they tied him with a rope, causing him injuries and alleged to have assaulted the proprietor mercilessly with the help of two policemen. In the facts of the case it was held by this Court that sanction was necessary as the assault and the use of criminal force related to the performance of the official duties of the accused within the meaning of section 197 Cr.P.C. In the matter of grant of sanction under section 197 Cr.P.C., the offence alleged to have been committed by the accused must have something to do with the accused, with the discharge of official duty. In other words, there must be a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of official duty. That must have a relation to the duty that the accused could lay a reasonable claim, but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did it in the course of the performance of his duty. The question of sanction may arise at any stage of prosecution, the Constitution Bench also held that the facts subsequently coming to light on a police or judicial inquiry or even in the course of the prosecution evidence at the trial, may establish the necessity for sanction. Whether sanction is necessary or not, may have to be determined from stage to stage. This Court has held thus : "Is the need for sanction to be considered as soon as the G complaint is lodged and on the allegations therein contained? H At first sight, it seems as though there is some support for this view in Hori Ram :S case and also in Smjoo Prasad v. The King-Emperor (1945) F.C.R. 227. Sulaiman, J. says that as the prohibition is against the institution itself, its DEVINDER SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB THROUGH CBI [ARUN MISHRA, J.] applicability must be judged in the first instance at the earliest stage of institution. Varadachariar, J. also states that the question must be determined with reference to the nature of the allegations made against the public servant in the criminal proceeding. But a \areful perusal of the later paits of their judgments shows that they did not intentto lay down any such proposition. Sulaiman, J. refers (at page 179) to the prosecution case as disclosed by the complaint or the police report and he winds up the discussion in these words: "Of course, if the case as put forward fai Is or the defence establishes that the act purported to be done is in execution of duty, the proceedings will have to be dropped and the complaint dismissed on that ground". The other learned Judge also states at page 185, ·'At this stage we have only to see whether the case alleged against the appellant or sought to be proved against him relates to acts done or purporting to be done by him in the execution of his duty". It must be so. The question may arise at any stage of the proceedings. The complaint may not disclose that the act constituting the offence was done or purported to br: done in the discharge of official duty; but facts subsequently coming to light on a police or judicial inquiry or even in the course of the prosecution evidence at the trial, may establish the necessity for sanction. Whether sanction is necessary or not may have to be determined from stage to stage. The necessity may reveal itself in the course of the progress of the case." 14. In Bhappa Singh v. Ram Pal Singh & Ors. 1981 (Supp) SCC 12 there was firing by the Customs party as they were resisted in carrying out a raid peacefully and an injury was sustained by the Customs party. This Court considered grant of protection under section I 08 of the Gold (Control) Act, 1968 providing immunity to an officer for official act done in good faith under the Act. This Court has discussed the matter thus: "6. In view of the circumstances mentioned in the last paragraph, there is little room for doubt that the Customs party was not out to commit dacoity either in the jewellery shop or the chaubara, that they also committed no trespass 307 A B c D E F G H 308 A B c D E F G 1-1 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 6 S.C.R. into either of those places, but that the purpose of the raid was to find out if any illegal activity was being carried on therein. The presence of two licensed Gold-smiths in the chaubara speaks volumes in that behalf. It may fu11her be taken for granted that the Customs party was manhandled before they themselves reso1ted to violence, because there was no reason for them to open fire unless they were resisted in the carrying out of the raid peacefully. 7. Even though what we have just stated is a general prima facie impression that we have formed at this stage on the materials available to us at present, it may not be possible to come to a conclusive finding about the falsity or otherwise of the complaint. But then we think that it would amount to giving a go-by to Section I 08 of the Gold (Control) Act, if cases of this type are allowed to be pursued to their logical conclusion, i.e., to that of conviction or acquittal. In this view of the matter we do not feel inclined to upset the impugned order, even though perhaps the matter may have required fu11her evidence before quashing of the complaint could be held to be fully justified. The appeal is accordingly dismissed." 15. In State of Maharashtra v. D1: Budhikota Subbarao 1993 (3) SCC 339, this Cou11 considered grant of sanction under section 197 on complaint of espionage. It was held that it was during the discharge of official duty the act was done, also considering the provisions contained in the Official Secrets Act, 1923 and the Atomic Energy Act, 1962, sanction for prosecution under section 197 Cr.P.C. was necessary. The meaning of the 'official act' has been considered by this Court and held thus: "6. Such being the nature of the provision the question is how should the expression, 'any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purpo1ting to act in the discharge of his official duty', be understood? What does it mean? ·official' according to dictionary, means pertaining to an otlice. And otlicial act or official duty means an act or duty done by an officer in his official capacity. In S.B. Saha v. MS. Kochar (1979) 4 SCC 177 it was held: (SCC pp. 184-85, para 17) DEVINDER SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB Tl-IROUGl-I CBI [ARUN MISHRA, J.] "'The words ·any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty' employed in Section 197( I) of the Code, are capable of a narrow as well as a wide interpretation. If these words are constrned too narrowly, the section will be rendered altogether sterile, for, 'it is no part of an official duty to commit an offence, and never can be'. In the wider sense, these words will take under their umbrella every act constituting an offence, committed in the course of the same transaction in which the official duty is performed or purports to be performed. The right approach to the import of these words lies between these two extremes. While on the one hand. it is not every offence committed by a public servant while engaged in the performance of his oflicial duty, which is entitled to the protection of Section 197(1 ), an act constituting an offence, directly and reasonably connected with his official duty will require sanction for prosecution under the said provision." Use of the expression. ·official duty' implies that the acl or omission must have been clone by the public servant in courst: of his service and that it should have been in discharge of his duty. The section docs not extend its protective cover to every act or omission done by a public servant in service but restricts its scope of operation to only those acts or omissions which are done by a public servant in discharge of official duty. In I'. Arulsll'ami v. Slate of Madras ( 1967) I SCR 20 I this Court after reviewing the authorities right from the days of Federal Cou1t and Privy Council held: "' ... It is not therefore every offence committed by a public servant that requires sanction for prosecution under Section 197( I) of the Criminal Procedure Code: nor even ewry act done by him while he is actually engaged in the performance of his official duties; but if the act complained of is directly concerned with his official duties so that, if questioned. it could be claimed 309 A B c D E G H 310 A B c D E F G H SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2016] 6 S.C.R. to have been done by virtue of the office, then sanction \\ould be necessary. It is the quality of the act that is imp