# DHENKENAL v. STATE OF ORISSA AND ANOTHER

- **Citation:** [1964] 6 S.C.R. 301
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1964
- **Case number:** Writ Petitions Nos. 79 and 80 of 1963
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/dhenkenal-v-state-of-orissa-and-another-3084
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

6 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
301
derable force.
At any rate we do not think that there are
lll1Y substantial grounds upon which we can look at these
transact10ns in a different way. If these documents go
away, as also Exs. Al and A2, we are left with only Exs.
A3 and A4. Some argument was advanced before us to
the effect that the lands comprised in the transactions repre-
!iented by these documents have no direct access to tne
road and that, therefore, they could not have fetched a
good price.
Bearing in mind the fact that these are all
agricultural lands a rate of Rs. 4,500 per acre at which
they were sold cannot prima facie be regarded as inadequate.
As regards access, it is sufficient to say that they
are parts of the same field which abut on the road, though
the portions sold do not themselves abut on the road.
Since the lamls :;:;Id under these sale deeds were part and
parcel of the same field which abuts on the road those who
purchased these lands would naturally obtain a right of way
over the land unsold so as to have access to the road.
In the circumstances we hold that the appeal is without substance. Accordingly we dismiss it with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
RANI RATNA PROVA DEVI RANI SAHEBA OF
DHENKENAL
v.
STATE OF ORISSA AND ANOTHER
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR,
K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS
GUPTA, I. c. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JI.)
ConJtitutio11 of India, 1950, Arts, 14 and 366(22)-0rissa Private Landr
of Rulers (Assessment of Rent) Act (13 of 1958), 11. 5 and 6Validity-''Rulet', meaning of.
The petitioners in these three writ petitions challenged the operative
provisions of the OrisSa Private Lands of Rulers (Assessment of Rent)
Act, 1958 and the Rules framed thereunder. These petitioncro posses•
l9M
K. Kllllkarath-
...
Stilt< of Andhra
Pradesh
Mudhalkar I.
1964
lan•Vf, 11
SUPREME- COURT REPORTS
1964
private lands in the State of Orissa, which before the impugned Act were
Rani -
not subjected to the payment of rent. but which were assessed by the
1:):.,n;-ovo Revenue Officers in conformity with the Rules framed under the Act. The
-,.
petitioners claims a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the said orders
Stott o/ on.a of assessment. The Act was passed by the Orissa Legislature because it
was thought expedient to provide for assessment of rent with respect to
the private lands of Rulers in the State of Orissa.
The main object of the Act is to authorise the levy of rent 1n respect
of the private lands of persons included in the definition of the word
"Ruler"' prescribed by s. 2(h l of the Act. Section 2(h) defines a "'Ruler"
as meaning the Ruler of a merged territory in the State of Orissa and
includes his relatives and dependants. The petitioners attacked the provisions of the Act mainly on the ground that they contravened Art. 14 of
the Constitution.
Held: (i) that s. 6 of the Act does not contravene Art. 14 of the
Constitution for the reason that fair and equitable tests have been laid
down under s. 6 of the Act for determining the rent which should be assess·
ed in respect of the private lands of the Rulers. In the present case the
legislature had prescribed the method of determining the rent payable on
the private lands; and the relevant factors specified by s. 6 appear to be
just and substantially simiJar to the considerations which are generally
taken into account at the time of survey settlement for determining the
proper revenue assessment on ryotwari lands.
The problem posed by the requirement to levy assessment on these
private lands had to be dealt with· by the legislature on an ad ,\oc basis.
The settlement of rent and assessment introduced by the Act had been
made applicable to these lands for the first time, and so, these lands could
not be treated as comparable in every respect with the lands which were
governed by the rates prescribed under the previous !\ettlement.
(ii) In considering the validity of a statute under Art. 14 the well~
established principle is that the legislature can make class
l

## Text

6 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
301
derable force.
At any rate we do not think that there are
lll1Y substantial grounds upon which we can look at these
transact10ns in a different way. If these documents go
away, as also Exs. Al and A2, we are left with only Exs.
A3 and A4. Some argument was advanced before us to
the effect that the lands comprised in the transactions repre-
!iented by these documents have no direct access to tne
road and that, therefore, they could not have fetched a
good price.
Bearing in mind the fact that these are all
agricultural lands a rate of Rs. 4,500 per acre at which
they were sold cannot prima facie be regarded as inadequate.
As regards access, it is sufficient to say that they
are parts of the same field which abut on the road, though
the portions sold do not themselves abut on the road.
Since the lamls :;:;Id under these sale deeds were part and
parcel of the same field which abuts on the road those who
purchased these lands would naturally obtain a right of way
over the land unsold so as to have access to the road.
In the circumstances we hold that the appeal is without substance. Accordingly we dismiss it with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
RANI RATNA PROVA DEVI RANI SAHEBA OF
DHENKENAL
v.
STATE OF ORISSA AND ANOTHER
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR,
K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS
GUPTA, I. c. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JI.)
ConJtitutio11 of India, 1950, Arts, 14 and 366(22)-0rissa Private Landr
of Rulers (Assessment of Rent) Act (13 of 1958), 11. 5 and 6Validity-''Rulet', meaning of.
The petitioners in these three writ petitions challenged the operative
provisions of the OrisSa Private Lands of Rulers (Assessment of Rent)
Act, 1958 and the Rules framed thereunder. These petitioncro posses•
l9M
K. Kllllkarath-
...
Stilt< of Andhra
Pradesh
Mudhalkar I.
1964
lan•Vf, 11
SUPREME- COURT REPORTS
1964
private lands in the State of Orissa, which before the impugned Act were
Rani -
not subjected to the payment of rent. but which were assessed by the
1:):.,n;-ovo Revenue Officers in conformity with the Rules framed under the Act. The
-,.
petitioners claims a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the said orders
Stott o/ on.a of assessment. The Act was passed by the Orissa Legislature because it
was thought expedient to provide for assessment of rent with respect to
the private lands of Rulers in the State of Orissa.
The main object of the Act is to authorise the levy of rent 1n respect
of the private lands of persons included in the definition of the word
"Ruler"' prescribed by s. 2(h l of the Act. Section 2(h) defines a "'Ruler"
as meaning the Ruler of a merged territory in the State of Orissa and
includes his relatives and dependants. The petitioners attacked the provisions of the Act mainly on the ground that they contravened Art. 14 of
the Constitution.
Held: (i) that s. 6 of the Act does not contravene Art. 14 of the
Constitution for the reason that fair and equitable tests have been laid
down under s. 6 of the Act for determining the rent which should be assess·
ed in respect of the private lands of the Rulers. In the present case the
legislature had prescribed the method of determining the rent payable on
the private lands; and the relevant factors specified by s. 6 appear to be
just and substantially simiJar to the considerations which are generally
taken into account at the time of survey settlement for determining the
proper revenue assessment on ryotwari lands.
The problem posed by the requirement to levy assessment on these
private lands had to be dealt with· by the legislature on an ad ,\oc basis.
The settlement of rent and assessment introduced by the Act had been
made applicable to these lands for the first time, and so, these lands could
not be treated as comparable in every respect with the lands which were
governed by the rates prescribed under the previous !\ettlement.
(ii) In considering the validity of a statute under Art. 14 the well~
established principle is that the legislature can make class
legislation,
provided the classification on which it purports to be based is rational and
has a reasonable nexus with the object intended to be achieved by it. If
the party fails to show that the said classification is irrational, or has no
nexus with the object intended to be achieved by the impugned Act, the
initial presumption of constitutionality would help the State to urge that
the failure of the party challenging the validity to rebut the initial presum·
ptiori goes against his claim that the Act is invalid.
In all oases where the material adduced before the court in matten
relating to Art. 14 is unsatisfactory, the court may have to allow tho
State to lean on the initial presumption of constitutionality.
(iii) There is no substance in the contention that the impugned Act is
void because the definition of the word "Ruler" is inconsistent with Art.
366(22) of the Constitution. There is no doubt that the definition of the
word "Ruler" prescribed by s. 2(h) of the Act is wider than that prescribed
by Art. 366(22) of the Constitution.
..
6 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
The definitions prescribed by Art. 366 are intended for the purpose of
1964
interpreting the articles in the Constitution itself. unless the context other- R
.
RatnapTDN
wise requires. The whole object of defining the word "Ruler" in the Act
ani
Del'l
ia to specify and describe the lands in respect of which the operative proT.
Yisions of the Act would come into play.
It is in that connection that
State of Orilla
the word "Ruler" has been broadly defined in an inclusive manner.
(iv) The impugned Act is entirely outside the purview of Art. 31 of
the Constitution as it has not purported either to deprive the Rulers of
their property, or to acquire or requisition the said property. It is a simple
measure authorising the levy of a tax in respect of agricultural lands.
Pratap Kesari Deo v. The State of Orirsa, A.I.R. 1961
Orissa 13J.
relied on.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petitions Nos. 79 and 80
of 1963 and 140 of 1962.
Petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for
the enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
S. N. Andley, Rameshawar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for
the petitioner (in Petition Nos. 79 and 80 of 1963).
Sarjoo · Prasad, Ajoy Kumar Gajdhar Mahapatra and
A.. D. Mathur for the petitioner (in Petition No. 140/1962).
S. V. Gupte Additional Solicitor-General, S. B. Misra,
R. Ganapathi Iyer and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondents
(in all the petitions).
M. C. Setalvad, J. B. Dadachanji, Ravinder Narain and
0. C. Mathur, for the interveners (in Petition No. 140/
1962).
January 23,
1964. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
GAJENDRAGADKAR J.-The pellt1oners
in these three Ga1••dragadkar I.
petitions have
moved this
Court under Art. 32 of the
Constitution and claimed a declaration
that the operative
provisions of the Orissa Private Lands of Rulers (Assessment of Rent) Act. 1958 (hereinafter called 'the Act') and
the Rules framed thereunder are unconstitutional and ultra
vires.
The private lands in the possession and enjoyment
of the three respective petitioners have been assessed by the
Revenu~ Officers in conformity with the Rules framed under
the Act. The petitioners claim a writ or direction, or order
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1964
in the nature of certiorari quashing the said orders of assess-
&ni ~aprova ment.
~vi
The petitioner in Writ
Petition No. 140/1962 is the
Stat• of Ori"a Patrani Saheba of Keonjhar and is in possession and enjoyGaf•nd~kar J. ment of
e~ght villages, viz., Mangalpur; Barigan; N'.la
Rampas; NI!ung; Ghutru; Mohadijore; Patang and Anara
in the district of Keonjhar.
These villages were granted
to her for maintenance a long time ago and as such, they
have been recorded in the village papers as Khoraki Posaki
(Maintenance Grant) Lands since the last
settlement of
1918.
She has held these lands without paying· assessment; and her case is that the rekvant provisions of the Act
which authorise the levy
of assessment in respect of her
lands are unconstitutional and invalid.
In her
petition,
she has referred to the fact that from time to time, the
Government of the day had refrained from
levying any
assessment in respect of her lands and thereby recognised
her right to hold the said villages on assessment-free basis.
The Revenue Officer of Keonjhar levied an assessment in
respect of the said villages purporting to act under the
Rules framed under the provisions of the Act. The petitioner then preferred
appeals to the Board of Revenue
against the said assessment orders but these appeals were
dismissed.
The assessment levied against the petitioner in
respect of these rands is of the order of Rs. 9,000 and odd
and it has to be paid by her from 1958 retrospectively.
The petitioner in W .P. No. 79 /1963 is Smt. Rani Raina
Prova Devi who is the wife of Raja Sankar Pratap Singh
Deo Mahindra Bahadur, ex-Ruler of Dhenkanal State in
Orissa.
At the time when the State of Dhenkanal merged
with India, the petitioner was in possession and enjoyment
of lands in five villages as a Qroprietor. In respect of these
lands, assessment had never been levied; but purporting to
give. effect to the relevant provisions of the Act, the Revonue Officer Dhenkanal assessed rent in respect of all the
lands which are in possession and enjoyment of the petitioner. The appeals preferred by the petitioner
against
the said order of assessment failed; and so, the petitioner
filed the present writ petition challenging the validity of the
Act as well as the validity of the assessment order.
6 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
The petitioner in W.P. No. 80 of 1963 is the ex-Ruler
lf611
of Dhenkanal.
On the date of merger he held and was in Rani Rlltnaprovo
possession of 89 acres 18 dee. and 5 kadis of land in NizDevi
garh Town as his private lands.
These lands were never
state !i Orln4
subjected to the payment of rent and yet the Revenue Offi-
. -
cers assessed rents in respect of these lands under _ the Gai•ndrapdkar 1
provisions of the Act.
The petitioner failed in persuading
the Appellate Authority to set aside the order of assessment, and so, has filed the present writ petition challenging
the validity of the Act and the order of assessment.
Thus,
the facts on which the three petitions claim relief are substantially 5imilar and they have raised common
points of
law for our decision.
That is why the three petitions have
been heard together and would be disposed of by a common
judgment.
The Act which is challenged in the present proceedings
was passed by the Orissa Legislature because "it was
thought expedient to provide for ·assessment of rent with
respect to the private lands of Rulers in the State of Orissa".
It received the assent of the Governor on the 21st Mav,
1958 and was published in the State Gazette on the 6th
Iune, 1958. It consists of 15 sections and the main object
of the Act is to authorise the levy of rent in respect of the
private lands of persons included in the definition of
the
word "Ruler" prescribed by s. 2 ( h) of the Act. Section 2 ( e)
defines 'private land' as meaning any land held on the date
of merger by a Ruler free from payment
of rent, while
s. 2(h) defines a "Ruler" as meaning the Ruler of a merged
territory in the State of Orissa and include~ his relatives
and dependants. Thus, the definition of the word "Ruler"
is an inclusive definition and takes within its sweep the relatives of the Ruler and his dependants, with the
result
that private lands held by such relatives or dependants by
virtue of the grants made by the ruling_ Prince ?~ otherwise
come within the mischief of the operative prov1s1~ns of the
Act.
Section 2(i) provides that all other expressions. used
and not defined in the Act shall have the same meanmg as
are resi;iectively assigned to them under the tenancy laws
in force in the concerned areas.
Section 3 contaim
~he
main operative provision and it lays down that notwlth·
134-159 S.C.-20
3c6
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
~
standing anything contained in any other law, custon::, conRani Ratnaprova tract or agreement to the contrary, the private lands neJ<l
D.vl
by a Ruler shall, with effect from the date of commenceState ~i Orl."a men! of this Act, be liable to assessment and levy of rent
0 ,.1,ndragadkar J. ~s provid.ed in the Act.
Thus, the effect of this provision
is that pnvate lands held by Rulers which till then were not
liable to pay rent or assessment, were made liable to pay
the same.
In other words the exemption
from the payment of assessment or rent which the private lands of Rulers
enjoyed till then ceased to be operative, and the said !ands
were treated like other lands in the State liable to pay
assessment and rent.
Section 4 provides for the appointment of Revenue Officers, and sections 5 and 6 deal with the classification of
lands and prescribe the maximum rates of rent, and
the
procedure in detennining the rent respective;y. Under s. 5,
· the lands have to be classified as irripted-wet land, rainfed-wet land, and dry land; this section provides that subject to the provisions of s. 6, the rates at which the fair
and equitable rent shall be assessed with respect to the said
th re.~ cRl c.~cries of land shall not exceed the amount as may
be prescribed from time to time by the State Government.
The proviso to s. 5 deals with the special category of cases
where the tenants of the Ruler have already acquired rights
of occup~ncy, and lays down that the rent payable by the
Ruler in respect of such lands shall be such proportion of
the rent received by him from the tenants as may be
prescribed. Under s. 6, the consideratiu:i< which have to be
borne in minJ in cietermining the rates of fair r.nd eqt!itaole
rent are specified by clauses (a) to ( e), viz., the nature of
the soil and general productivity of such land; the class
under which the land is assessable; market value of the
land; the pr·evailing rates of rent obtaining for similar Janda
in the neighbourhood; and such
other matters
relating
thereto as may be prescribed. It is thus clear that whereas
s. 5 requires the classification of the Ruler's private lands
to be made and provides for the prescription of the maximum of the rent which may be levied in respect of them,
s. 6 indicates the factors which have to be borne in mind in
determining the rates of fair and equitable rent. Clause (e)
6 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
shows that in addition to the factors mentioned in clauses
1964
(a) to (d), other matters may also be specified by the Rules. Rani Ratnaprova
The rest of the sections deal with matters relating to tho
Devi
levy and recovery of assessment with which we are not
Stat• !; Orina
concerned in the present petitions.
Gai•ndragadk., J.
The first contention which has been raised before us
by the petitioners is that the provisions contained in sections
5 and 6 are invalid inasmuch as they contravene Art. 14 of
the Constitution. It is convenient to refer to some facts
set out in W.P. No. 79/1963 in support of this argument.
We have already noticed that under s. 6 certain considerations which the Act considers to be relevant have
been
prescribed, and so, the Revenue Officer has to bear those
considerations in mind in determining the fair and equitable
rent in respect of a given land.
W.P. No. 79/1963 points
out that as a result of the consideration of the relevant factors mentioned in s. 6, the rates fixed by the ~reliminary
pattas in respect of the petitioner's lands are in every case
higher than the rates of rent which are in operation in respect of the Revisional Settlement Khatian. Basing themselves on the fact that in the calculation of the rent made
by L'ie Revenue Officers in respect of the private lands of
Rulers they have arrived at a figure of rent which is generally higher than the rent which would be determined in
case the rates current under the Settlement prevailing in
respect of the other lands were applied, the petitioners contend that in their operation the relevant provisions of the
Act have introduced an illegal discrimination as
between
their lands and the other lands liable to assessment of rent
in the State of Orissa. It is also, urged in support of this
argument that it would not be a\valid consideration for
levying higher assessment in respect of the private lands
of Rulern that they were not required to pay assessment
until the Act was passed. The legislature may in its authority make the private lands of Rulers liable to assessment
of rent, but when these lands are brought within the class
of assessable lands, they should be treated in the same way
as the other assessable lands are treated in Orissa. That,
briefly stated, is the contention on which the validity of the
~ct is challenged under Art. 14. Prima facie, there is
I
308
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1164
some force in this contention.
But, on the whole we arc
llmti R;;;;.,,prova not satisfied that the plea thus raised by the petitioners can
!Nvi
be said to di;place and rebut the initial presumption of con-
"·
Slid• of Orina stitutionality in favour of the impugned Ftatute.
G~n4r•f0dkor J.
In dealing with tl•e question raised before UF it is necessary to bear in mind the fact that in regard to other assessable lands, a survey settlement which had already been made
was in operation and was expected to continue in operation for a certain specified period; usually, when a settlement has been made and assessment levied in pursuance of
it, it cannot be revised merely by an executive order during
the stipulated period, though, of course, the legislature can,
if it so desires, make a law prescribing for a fresh assessment even during the said specified period.
But, in
the
present case, the legislature appears to have taken the view
that it was not necessary or expedient to introduce a fresh
•
settlement in regard to all the other assessable lands, and so,
it has passed the present statute only in regard to the private lands of Rulers.
That is one relevant and historical
fact which cannot be ignored.
•
Proceeding to deal with the private lands of Rulers on
this basis, the legislature had to prescribe the method of
determining the rent payable by the said lands; and the relevant factors specified by s. 6 ap;iear to be just and sub~tan
tially similar to t~e considerations which
are
generally
taken into account at the time of survey settlement for
determining
the proper
revenue assessment on ryotwari
lands.
There has been some argument at the Bar before
us as to whether the market value of the land which has
been prescribed as a relevant consideration by s. 6 was also
treated as relevant on the occasion of the earlier settlement.
No material has, however, been placed before us in that
behalf, and so, it is not possible to decide whether this consideration was taken into account on the earlier occasion
or not, and if it was not, what the effect of the said circumstance would be on the validity of the impugned statute.
Having regard to the relevant factors presi;ribed by s. 6, it
would, however, not be unreasonable to take the view that
fair and equitable tests have been Iaici down for determin~
6 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
309
ing the rent which should be assessed in respect of the private lands of the Rulers, aPd in the absence of any proof Ralfi 11atna,_
that there has been a material departure in that behalf, we
Dttll
find it difficult to uphold the plea that s. 6 can be attacked
llal• !i <>ru.
on the ground that it has contravened Art. 14 of the Con- Gajendraiodkar I.
stitution.
The problem posed by the requirement to levy assessment on these private lands had to be dealt with by the
legislature on an ad hoc basis. The settlement of rent and
assessment introduced by the Act had been made applicable
to these lands for the first time, and so, strictly speaking,
these lands cannot be treated as comparable in every respect with the lands which ~ere governed by the rates prescribed under the previous settlement and that may help to
meet the argument that the impugned Act contravenes Art.
14. If the two categories of
lands do not constitute
similar lands in all particulars, no valid complaint can be
made on the ground that there has been discrimination as
between them. That is another aspect which may be relevant.
There is yet another· factor which may be mentioned in
this connection. It appears that in 1959, the Orissa Legislature has passed an Act, No. 3 of 1959 with a view to con-
~olidate and amend the Jaws relating to survey, record of
rights and settlement operations in the State of Orissa, and
so, it appears that after the settlement operations are duly
conductea and completed under the relevant provisions of
this latter Act, assessment in regard to all the assessable
lands, including the private lands with which we are concerned in the present proceedings would be made on the
basis pre~cribed by it.
The operation of sections 3, 5 and
6 of the impugned Act is, therefore, limited to the period
lletween June, 1958 when the Act came into force and the
date when the assessment determined under the provisions
of the subsequent Act actually come into operation in respect of all the lands. That is another factor which has to be
considered in dealing with the question about the validity
of the impugned Act.
The allegations made by the petitioners, in challonginc
the validity of the Act are somewhat vague and the mate-
310
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
!!!!,.
rials placed by them in support of their challenge are inltJJlli RatMprova sufficient, inadequate and unsatisfactory.
The rerly made
~:•'
by t?e State is also not very helpful or satisfactory.
It is
State of Ori61a ·precisely where a challenge to the validity of a statute is
G•iendratadkar J. ma~e by a pa~ty under Article 14 and he fails to adduce
satisfactory evidence in support of his challenge that the
task of the Court to decide the issue becomes very difficult.
In considering the validity of a statute under Art. 14, we
cannot ignore the well-established principle that the legislature can make class legislation, provided the classification
on which it purports to be based is rational :;nd has a reasonable nexus with the object intended to be achieved by it,
and so, on the failure of the party to show that the said
classification is irrational, or has no nexus with the obiect
intended to be achieved by the impugned Act, the initial
presumption of constitutionality would help the State to urge
that the failure of the party challenging the validity to rebut
the 'initial presumption goes against his claim that the Act
is invalid. In all cases where the material adduced before
the Court in matters relating to Art. 14 is unsatisfactory, the
Court may have to allow the State to lean on the doctrine
of initial presumption of constitutionality and that is precisely what has happened in these cases. On the whole therefore we must hold that the petitioners have failed to show
that the impugned Act contravenes Art. 14 of the Constitution.
It is then argued that the Act is invalid because the
definition of the expression "Ruler" is inconsiste'-1t with the
definition of the sai<I word prescribed by Art. 366(22)
of the Constitution.
Art. 366(22) defines a "Ruler" in relation to an Indian State as meaning the Prince, Chief, or
other person by whom any such covenant or agreement as
is referred to in clause (1) of Art. 291 was entered into and
who for the time being is recognised by the President as the
Ruler of the State, and includes any person who for the
time being is recognised by the President as the successor
of such Ruler. There is no doubt that the definition of the
word " Ruler" prescribed by s. 2(h) of the Act is wider thaa
that prescribed by Art. 366(22). The dependants of the
Ruler and his relatives ~
not included in the latter defini..
0 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
3u
tion, though they are expressly included in the former. But
1964
it must be remern h~red that the definitions prescribed by Rani Ratnapron
Art. 3 66 are intended for the purpose of interpreting the
Devi
articles in the Constitution itself, unless the context otherStat• ~i ortno
wise requires, and so, the argument that the definition of
-
th
d "R 1 "
'bed b
h A
· ·
·
. h Gai<ndragadkar I.
e wor
u er prescn
y t e
ct 1s mcons1stent wit
the definition prescribed by Art. 366(22), has really
no
substance or meaning.
Besides, it is fallacious to assume
that the Act ha> made any provision in respect of Rulers
as such; what the Act has purported to do is to authorise
the levy of assessment and rent in respect of lands situated
in Orissa; t~ese lands are the private lands of the Rulers as
defined bys. 2(h), and so, 'there is no doubt ihat the whole
object of defining the word "Ruler" is to specify and describe the lands in respect of which the operative provisions
of the Act would come into play.
The subject-matter of
the levy consists of the private lands and the compendious
way adopted by the legislature in describing the said lands
is tbat they are the private lands of the Rulers.
It is
in
that connection that the word "Ruler" has been broadly defined in an inclusive manner.
If the legislature had said
that the private lands of the Rulers as well as the pnvate
lands of the dependants and relatives of Rulers were liable
to the levy permitted under s. 3, the petitioners would not
have been able to raise any objection because, then, it would
have been unnecessary to define the word "Ruler" in
a
comprehensive way.
Once it is conceded, as it must be,
that the Orissa Legi,lature was competent to pass the Act
under Entry 18 of List II of the Seventh Schedule, it is
idle to suggest that the method adopted by the Act in describing the lands which are made liable to pay assessment,
introduces any infirmity in the Act itself.
Therefore,
we
are satisfied that the contention that the definition of the
word "Ruler" is inconsistent with Art.
366(22) and that
makes !he whole Act void, is without any substance.
The third argument which was faintly urged before us
is that the Act contruvenes the provisions of Art. 31 of the
Constitution.
This argument is wholly misconceived. Art.
31 (I) deals with the deprivation of property save by authe>-
rity of Jaw, and cannot obviously be invoked against any
312
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1g64J
1964
of the provisions of the Act; and Art. 31 (2) deals
with
Jt4nt
RaJn.aprova compulsory acquisition or requisition which also is entirely
1!~v•
inapplicable to the present Act.
What the Act has purS1a11 of Ori"a ported to do is to authorise the levy of assessment in resGoillldraiadkar J. p~ct of lands which till then had been exempted from the
said levy, and as Art. 31{5)(b)(i) provides nothing contain·
ed in clause (2) shall affect the provisions of any Jaw which
the State may make for the purpose of imposing or levying.
any tax or penalty. If the Orissa Legislature has imposed
a tax in the form of the assessment of the private lands of
Rulers, clearly it has not purported either to deprive
the
Rulers of their property, or to acquire or requisition
the
said property; it is a simple measure authorising the levy
of a tax in respect of agricultural lands and as &uch, it
i~
entireiy outside 'the purview of Art. 31.
It appears that
in Pratap Kessari Deo v. The State of Orissa & Ors., (
1
) the
validity of the Act was challenged before the Orissa High
Court, and the said High Court has repelled the challenge
and upheld the validity of the Act.
In our opinion, the
view taken by the Orissa High Court is right.
1964
January,
U
The result is. the petitions fail and are dismissed with
costs.
One set of hearing fees.
Petition dismissed.
FADDI
l'.
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
(M. HIDAYATULLAH AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL JJ.)
First lnformatinn Report by accused--Admi.~sibility in Evide11c~-lndia•
Evidenc~ Act. 1872 (1of1872) ss. '.!l, 25-Code of Cri1ninal Pro;tdu'" 1898 (V of 1898), r. 162.
On the first information report lodged by th~ appellant, the corpse of
his step-son was recovered. The police arrested three oth .... ner<;ons indicated to be the culprits, but as a result of the investigatio11. Lbe arpellant
(') A. I. R. 1961 Orissa, 13!.