# DILIP S. DAHANUKAR v. KOT AK MAHINDRA CO.LTD. AND ANR - **Citation:** [2007] 4 S.C.R. 1122 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 2007 - **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 521 of 2007 - **Bench:** S.B. Sinha, Dal Veer Bhandari - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/dilip-s-dahanukar-v-kot-ak-mahindra-co-ltd-and-anr-22709 - **Pages:** 33 ## Headnote r Code of Criminal Procedure, 197 3 : c Sections 357 and 424-Jmprisonment for default in payment of fineHeld-It remains stayed pending elapsing of period for presenting appeal or decision therein-Section 424 is subject to Section 357(2). Section 357(3)-Compensation not forming part of sentence of fineRecovery of-Held-Pending elapsing of period for presenting appeal or D decision therein, its recovery remains stayed-It is unacceptable that although '! compensation payable out of quantum of fine would remain stayed under ... Section 357(2) of Code, if a compensation is directed to be paid under sub- ) Section (3) thereof. same would not attract said provision-It was more so as compensation was recoverable as a 'fine~ but legal fiction raised in relation to recovery of fine only, it is in that sense 'fine' stood on a higher E footing than compensation-If, therefore, under Section 357(2) realization of fine' is to be stayed automatically, there is no reason as to why legislative intent cannot apply to compensation directed to be paid in terms of subSection (3). Section 357(3)-Compensation not forming part of sentence of fineF Quantum of-Held-It compensates in one way or another, hence amount / thereof must be reasonable and not arbitrary-It should not be more than -..:. sufficient to compensate complainant-Ordinarily, it should be less than amount which can be granted by a Civil Court upon appreciation of evidence brought before it for losses which might have reasonably been suffered by G plaintiff-Though there is no upper limit to it, its subject to other provisions of Code which mandates that amount of fine imposed on an accused cannot be mor:e than five thousand-Jn view of fact that Parliament did not think it fit to put a ceiling limit in regard to amount of compensation leviable upon A_ an accused, discretionary jurisdiction thereto must be exercised judiciously. H 1122 DILIPS. DAHANUKAR.v. KOT AK MAHINDRA CO. LTD. 1123 Section 357(3)-Compensation not forming part of sentence of fine- A Order for payment of-Held-Before issuing a direction to pay compensation, capacity of accused to pay it must be judged; a summary enquiry in this behalf is necessary and some reasons, which may not be very elaborate, also have to be assigned-Furthermore, as Section 357(3) neither imposes any limitation o~ power to grant compensation nor enumerates factors for which B it is to be paid, power to grant it should be exercised only in appropriate cases, and such jurisdiction cannot be exercised at whims and caprice of a judge. Section 357(3)-Compensation not forming part of sentence of fineConditions for suspension of sentence-Held-They should also be C reasonable-A part of compensation may be directed to be deposited, but that must be a reasonable amount-Order may not be passed which cannot be complied resulting in a person being sent to prison-Court, in such cases, must endeavour to strike a balance-Section 421 of Code may be taken recourse to-Ordinarily, a person should not suffer imprisonment only because conditions imposed for suspending sentence are harsh-Also, an accused D shall not be taken in custody during trial. Section 357-Compensation-Award of-Held-Magistrates cannot award it in addition to fine-1--Power to award it under Section 357(3) .is not an ancillary power, but an additional power-Also, when fine is imposed, private party has no right to insist that compensation may be awarded to him E out of it. Section 357(3)-Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881-Sections 138 and 141-Company along with its Chairman convicted for offence punishable under Section 138 r.w. 141 of Act of 1881-Company sentenced to pay afine F of twenty five thousand rupees and in default thereof, Chairman was to suffer simple imprisonment for one month-Also, Chairman sentenced to simple imprisonment for one month and directed to pay a compensation of ftjieen lakhs rupees under Section 357(3) to complainant-On admission of appeal against it, direction given for depositio ## Text _Characters 0–39,911 of 76,241. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39911 for what follows._ A DILIP S. DAHANUKAR v. KOT AK MAHINDRA CO.LTD. AND ANR. APRIL I 0, 2007 B [S.B. SINHA AND DAL VEER BHANDARI, JJ.] r Code of Criminal Procedure, 197 3 : c Sections 357 and 424-Jmprisonment for default in payment of fineHeld-It remains stayed pending elapsing of period for presenting appeal or decision therein-Section 424 is subject to Section 357(2). Section 357(3)-Compensation not forming part of sentence of fineRecovery of-Held-Pending elapsing of period for presenting appeal or D decision therein, its recovery remains stayed-It is unacceptable that although '! compensation payable out of quantum of fine would remain stayed under ... Section 357(2) of Code, if a compensation is directed to be paid under sub- ) Section (3) thereof. same would not attract said provision-It was more so as compensation was recoverable as a 'fine~ but legal fiction raised in relation to recovery of fine only, it is in that sense 'fine' stood on a higher E footing than compensation-If, therefore, under Section 357(2) realization of fine' is to be stayed automatically, there is no reason as to why legislative intent cannot apply to compensation directed to be paid in terms of subSection (3). Section 357(3)-Compensation not forming part of sentence of fineF Quantum of-Held-It compensates in one way or another, hence amount / thereof must be reasonable and not arbitrary-It should not be more than -..:. sufficient to compensate complainant-Ordinarily, it should be less than amount which can be granted by a Civil Court upon appreciation of evidence brought before it for losses which might have reasonably been suffered by G plaintiff-Though there is no upper limit to it, its subject to other provisions of Code which mandates that amount of fine imposed on an accused cannot be mor:e than five thousand-Jn view of fact that Parliament did not think it fit to put a ceiling limit in regard to amount of compensation leviable upon A_ an accused, discretionary jurisdiction thereto must be exercised judiciously. H 1122 DILIPS. DAHANUKAR.v. KOT AK MAHINDRA CO. LTD. 1123 Section 357(3)-Compensation not forming part of sentence of fine- A Order for payment of-Held-Before issuing a direction to pay compensation, capacity of accused to pay it must be judged; a summary enquiry in this behalf is necessary and some reasons, which may not be very elaborate, also have to be assigned-Furthermore, as Section 357(3) neither imposes any limitation o~ power to grant compensation nor enumerates factors for which B it is to be paid, power to grant it should be exercised only in appropriate cases, and such jurisdiction cannot be exercised at whims and caprice of a judge. Section 357(3)-Compensation not forming part of sentence of fineConditions for suspension of sentence-Held-They should also be C reasonable-A part of compensation may be directed to be deposited, but that must be a reasonable amount-Order may not be passed which cannot be complied resulting in a person being sent to prison-Court, in such cases, must endeavour to strike a balance-Section 421 of Code may be taken recourse to-Ordinarily, a person should not suffer imprisonment only because conditions imposed for suspending sentence are harsh-Also, an accused D shall not be taken in custody during trial. Section 357-Compensation-Award of-Held-Magistrates cannot award it in addition to fine-1--Power to award it under Section 357(3) .is not an ancillary power, but an additional power-Also, when fine is imposed, private party has no right to insist that compensation may be awarded to him E out of it. Section 357(3)-Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881-Sections 138 and 141-Company along with its Chairman convicted for offence punishable under Section 138 r.w. 141 of Act of 1881-Company sentenced to pay afine F of twenty five thousand rupees and in default thereof, Chairman was to suffer simple imprisonment for one month-Also, Chairman sentenced to simple imprisonment for one month and directed to pay a compensation of ftjieen lakhs rupees under Section 357(3) to complainant-On admission of appeal against it, direction given for deposition of amount of five lakhs rupees each-Correctness of-Direction of Trial Judge was unreasonable- For all G intent and purpose, both Sub-sections (1) and (3) of Section 357 were invoked-Liability of Chairman was a vicarious one in terms of Section 141 of Act of 1881- Direction/or payment of compensation of fifteen lakhs rupees by Chairman of Company found to be wrong when fine of only of twenty five thousand rupees was imposed on Company-On facts, Chairman directed to H 1124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007) 4 S.C.R. ..:. y-<·- A deposit one /akh rupees which complainant was entitled to withdr- "\ ~ . ·- r A_ DILIPS.DAHANUKARv.KOTAKMAIDNDRACO.LTD. 1127 reasonable amount [Para 53] [1147-F-GJ 3. In a case of this nature, the Court must invoke the doctrine of purposive construction. Sub-Section (2) of Section 357 was enacted for a definite purpose. It must be given its full effect (Para 58] (1148-C] A K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Ba/an & Anr., [1999] 7 SCC 510, B Suganthi Suresh Kumar v. Jagdeeshan, [2002] 2 SCC 420 and National Insurance Co. Ltd v. Laxmi Narain Dhut, (2007) 4 SCALE 36, relied on. K.L. Gupta v. Bombay Municipal Corpn. (1968] 1 SCR 274, Maruti Udyog Ltd. v. Ram Lal, (2005) 2 SCC 638, Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance & Investment Co. Ltd., (1987) 1 SCC'424, Punjab Land C Development and Reclamation Corpn. Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, (1990] 3 SCC 682, Bairam Kumawat v. Union of India, (2003] 7 SCC 628, Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2005] 3 SCC 682, referred to. V. Prasada Rao v. The State of A.P. & Anr., 2002 Crl. Law Journal 395, approved. · R (Haw) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department & Anr., (2006) 3 All ER p. 428-438, referred to 4.1. Unfortunately, the Legislature has not made any express provision in this behalf. In absence of any express provision, the question must be D considered having regard to the overall object of a statute. E (Para 53) (1147-D) 4.2. The purpose of imposition of fine and/or grant of compensation to a great extent must be considered having the relevant factors therefor in mind. It may be compensating the person in one way or the other. The amount of compensation sought to be imp J .r- • A._ ~ -._ .. ~ ,... DILIPS.DAHANUKARv.KOTAKMAIDNDRACO.LTD. 1129 Procedure may take recourse to, but therefor he cannot be remanded to A custody. [Para 54) [1147-G] 4.9. Ordinarily, an accused shall not be taken in custody during trial. Thus, while exercising the appellate power, ordinarily, a person should not suffer imprisonment only because the conditions imposed for suspending the sentence are harsh. [Para 66) [1153-A-B] B 4.10. Having regard to the aforementioned factors the amount of compensation not only must be reasonable one, the conditions for suspending the sentence should also be reasonable. It is only with that intent in view, the doctrine of purposive construction should be applied. [Para 67) [1153-B-C] 5. Magistrates cannot award compensation in addition to fine. When a c fine is imposed, however, the private party has no right to insist that compensation may be awarded to him out of the amount of fine. The power to award compensation under Section 357(3) is not an ancillary power. It is an additional power. [Para 42) [1144-C] Ba/raj v. State, (1995) Crl. Law Journal 3217, referred to D 6.1. Primafacie, without going into the merit of the appeal, the direction of the Trial Judge appears to be somewhat unreasonable. Appellant has been sentenced to imprisonment. Only fine has been imposed on the Company. Thus, for all intent and purpose, the Trial Judge has invoked both Sub-sections E (1) and (3) of Section 357 of the Code. The liability of the appellant was a vicarious one in terms of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The question may also have to be considered from the angle that the Trial Judge thought it fit to impose a fine of Rs. 25,000/- only upon the Company. If that be so, a question would arise as to whether an amount of compensation for a sum of Rs. 15 lakhs should have been directed to be paid by the Chairman of F the Company. The answer is that it is not. [Para 69] [1153-D-E] 6.2. In the facts and circumstances of the case, it is reasonable to direct the appellant to deposit a sum of Rs. 1 lakh within a period of four weeks, from date. The Respondent - Company, however, would be entitled to withdraw the said amount The deposit of such amount by the appellant shall be without G prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties in the appeal. [Para 71) [1154-B-C) 7.1. A penal statute, in the event, the different meanings are possible to be given, must be construed liberally in favour of an accused. [Para 56] [1148-A-B] H 1130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007) 4 S.C:R. A 1.:J.. While the Court shall give due weight to the need of the victim, it B cannot ignore the right of an accused. In a case of conflict, construction which favours the accused shall prevail. [Para 57) [1148-B] 8. Legal fiction must be c()nstrued having regard tO the purport of the statute. [Para 44) [1144-F] Sadashiv Dada Patil v. Purushottam Onkar Patil (DJ By Lrs., (2006) 10 SCALE 21, MP. State Electricity Boardv. Union of India & Ors., (2006) 9 SCALE 194, Maruti Udyog Ltd. v. Ram Lal & Ors., [2005] 2 SCC 638 and Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. P. Kesavan & Anr., [2004) 9 SCC 772, C referred to D E F G H CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 521 of 2007. From the Judgment and Order dated 06.06.2006 of the High Court of Bombay in Criminal Writ Petition No. 1167 of2006. WITH Criminal Appeal No. 522 of2007 Kamal Mohan Gupta for the Appellant. Uday Lalit, Nandini Gore and V.N. Raghupathy for the Respondents. · The Judgment of the Court was delivered by S.B. SINHA, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. Interpretation of Section 357 of the Co~ of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ('the Code', for short) vis-a-vis the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act ('the Act', for short), as regards power to impose sentence of fine is involved in these appeals which arise ~ut of a judgment and order dated 6.6.2006 passed by the High Court of Bombay in Criminal Writ Petition No. 1167 of2006. 3. Accused No.1-M/s. Goodvalue Marketing Co. Ltd., a company registered and incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 and Accused · · No.2-Appellant herein were convicted for ~ommission of an offence involving Section 138 of the Act by a judgment of conviction and sentence dated }- ,) ....... J :z ... ..... DILIPS. DAHANUKARv. KOTAKMAHINDRACO.LTD. [S.B.SINHA,J.] 1131 23.2.2006 holding: "The accused No. I company Mis. Goodvalue Marketing Co. Ltd. stands convicted for the offence punishable under Section 138 r.w. 141 of Negotiable Instruments Act. A The accused No.I company, is sentenced to pay a fine ofRs.25,000/ B - (Rupees Twenty Five Thousand only). In default of payment of fine, the accused No.2 Mr. Dilip S. Dahanukar, the Chairman of accused No.I and representative at the trial, shall suffer SJ. for I month. The accused No.2 Mr. Dilip S. Dahanukar, stands convicted for the offence punishable under Section 138 r.w. 141 of Negotiable C Instruments Act, 1881. The accused No.2 is sentenced to suffer S.I. for 1 month. The accused No.2 is also directed to pay compensation to the complainant, quantified (sic) at Rs.15,00,000/- (Rupees Fifteen lakhs D only), under Section 357(3) ofCr.P.C. The accused No.2 is entitled to pay the amount of compensation in two equal monthly instalments of Rs.7,50,000/- each. The first instalment ofRs.7,50,000/- shall be paid on or before 23-03-2006 and the second instalment of Rs.7,50,000/- shall be paid on or before 24-04-2006 in default of payment of the amount of compensation the accused No.2 shall suffer further S.I. for E 2 month." 4. An appeal was preferred thereagainst. The Appellate Court by an order dated 27.4.2006 while admitting the appeal, directed them to deposit a sum of Rs. 5 lakhs each within four weeks from the said date. A writ petition was filed by the appellants questioning the legality of the said order which F by reason of the impugned judgment has been dismissed. 5. Submissions of Mr. Su bash Jha, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant are : i) That having regard to the provisions of Section 357(2) of the Code, G the impugned judgment is wholly unsustainable inasmuch as in terms thereof the amount of fine imposed would automatically be suspended. ii) Right to prefer an appeal being a constitutional right in terms of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, no condition could have been imposed H 1132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007) 4 S.C.R. A in respect therefor or for suspension of sentence. 6. Mr. Uday Umesh Lalit, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, on the other hand, would submit that a distinction must be made between imposition of fine and application thereof, as contemplated under Clauses (a) to (d) of Sub-Section (1) of Section 357 and an amount of B compensation directed to be paid under Section (3) thereof. 7. We have noticed hereinbefore the sentence imposed upon the accused. It was submitted that a conjoint reading of Section 357 read with Sections 421 and 424 of the Code would clearly go to show that it is permissible for a Court C to direct recovery of fine forthwith and if it is to be held that recover; of fine is automatically stayed, Section 421 and 424 of the Code would become nugatory. 8. The Act is a special statute. Section 138(1) thereof provides for imposition of sentence upto two years or a fine which may extend to twice D the amount of the cheque or with both. · E F G H 9. Before embarking upon the rival contentions raised by the parties, we may notice the relevant provisions of the Code : "357. Order to pay compensation. (1) .When a Court imposes a sentence of fine or a sentence (including a sentence of death) of which fine forms a part, the Court may, when passing judgment order the whole or any part of the fine recovered to be applied- * * * * (b) in the payment to any person of compensation for any loss or injury caused by the offence, when compensation is, in the opinion of the Court, recoverable by such person in a Civil Court; * * * * (2) If the fine is L:nposed in a case which is subject to appeal, no such payment shall be made before the period allowed for presenting the appeal has elapsed, or if an appeal be presented, before the decision of the appeal. (3) When a Court imposes a sentence, of which fine does not form a part, the Court may, when passing judgment order the accused person to pay, by way of compensation such amount as may be >- I DILIP S. DAHANUKARv. KOTAKMAIDNDRA CO.LTD. [S.B. SINHA, J.] 1133 specified in the order to the person who has suffered any loss or A injury by reason of the act for which the accused person has been so sentenced. * ** * (5) At the time of awarding compensation in any subsequent civil B suit relating to the same matter, the Court shall take into account any sum paid or recovered as compensation under this section." "421. Warrant for levy of fine. (1) When an offender has been sentenced to pay a fine the Court passing the sentence may take action for the recovery of the fine in either or both of the following C ways, that is to say, it may- (a) issue a warrant for the levy of the amount by attachment and :>ale of any movable property belonging to the offender; (b) issue a warrant to the collector of the district, authorizing him to realize the amount as arrears of land revenue from the movable D or immovable property, or both of the defaulter: Provided that, if the sentence directs that in default of payment of the fine, the offender shall be imprisoned, and if such offender has undergone the whole of such imprisonment in default, no Court shall issue such warrant unless, for special reasons to be recorded in E writing, it considers it necessary so to do, or unless it has made an order for the payment of expenses or compensation out of the fine under Section 357." "431. Money ordered to be paid recoverable as a fine. Any money (other than a fine) payable by virtue of any order made under F this Code, and the method of recovery of which is not otherwise expressly provided for, shall be recoverable as if it were a fine:" "439. Special powers of High Court or Court of Session regarding bail. (1) A High Court or Court of Session may direct- (a) that any person accused of an offence and in custody be released on bail, and if the offence is of the nature specified in sub-section (3) of Section 437, may impose any condition which it considers necessary for the purposes mentioned in that sub-section; G (b) that any condition imposed by a Magistrate when releasing any H I A B c 1134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007) 4 S.C.R. person on bail be set aside or modified: Provided that the High Court or the Court of Session shall, before granting bail to a person who is accused of an offence which is triable exclusively by the Court of Session or which, though not so triable, is punishable with imprisonment for life, give notice of the application for bail to the Public Prosecutor unless it is, for reasons to be recorded in writing, of opinion that it is not practicable to give such notice. (2) A High Court or Court of Session may direct that any person who has been released on bail und~r this Chapter be arrested and commit him to custody." 10. It is, therefore, apparent that if a Court imposes a sentence of fine or a sentence or where it forms a part thereof, the Court is entitled to direct that whole or any part of the fine recovered, to be applied to in respect of the factors enumerated in clauses (a), (b), (c) or (d). Section 421 of the Code D deals with the mode and manner in which the fine levied is to be recovered. Section 424 deals with the steps required to be taken by the Court where the amount of fine has not been paid forthwith. Section 357 deals with two types of cases, namely, (i) where only a sentence has been imposed; and (ii) where fine also forms part of the sentence. When a fine is imposed simplicitor Section 421 read with Section 424 would be applicable but where fine forms E part of the sentence, it would not have any application. 11. A statute must be read harmoniously. An amount of compensation directed to be paid may not form part of a fine. It may be awarded separately. It may be recoverable as if it is a fine in terms of Section 431 of the Code but F by reason thereof it would not become automatically recoverable forthwith. The legal position, however, must be considered keeping in view the purport and object of the Act. 12. An appec.: is indisputably a statutory right and an offender who has been convicted is entitled to avail the right of appeal which is provided for G under Section 374 of the Code. Right of Appeal from a judgment of conviction affecting the liberty of a person keeping in view the expansive definition of Article 21 is also a Fundamental Right. Right of Appeal, thus, can neither be interfered with or impaired, nor it can be subjected to any condition. 13. We may take notice of some of the decisions operating in the field H in this behalf. DILIP S. DAHANUKAR v. KOT AK MAHINDRA CO. LTD. [S.B. SINHA, J.] 1135 In Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Chaudhry & Ors. AIR [1957] SCR A 540, this Court opined : "(i) That the legal pursuit of a remedy, suit, appeal and second appeal are really but steps in a series of proceedings all connected by an intrinsic unity and are to be regarded as one legal proceeding. (ii) The right of appeal is not a mere matter of procedure but is a substantive right. (iii) The institution of the suit carries with it the implication that all . rights of appeal then in force are preserved to the parties thereto till B the rest of the career of the suit. C (iv) The right of appeal is a vested right and such a right to enter the superior court accrues to the litigant and exists as on and from the date the !is commences and although it may be actually exercised when the adverse judgment is pronounced such right is to be governed by the law prevailing at the date of the institution of the suit or D proceeding and not by the law that prevails at the date of its decision or at the date of the filing of the appeal. (v) This vested right of appeal can be taken away only by a subsequent enactment, if it so provides expressly or by necessary intendment and not otherwise." 14. This Court, in Babu Rajirao Shinde v. The State of Maharashtra, [1971] 3 sec 337, observed that a convicted person must be held to be at least entitled to one appeal as a substantial right. E 15. Yet again in Siddanna Apparao Patil v. The State of Maharashtra, F [1970] I SCC 547, this Court held: "The right to prefer an appeal from sentence of Court of Sessions is conferred by Section 410 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The right to appeal is one both on a matter of fact and a matter of law. It fa only in cases where there is a trial by jury that the right to appeal is under G Section 418 confined only to a matter of law." 16. In State of Gujarat v. Salimbhai Abdu/ga.ffar Shaikh and Ors., [2003] 8 sec 50, it was held: "10. Sub-section (4) of Section 34 of POTA provides for an appeal to H A B c D E F G H 1136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 4 S.C.R. the High Court against an order of the Special Court granting or refusing bail. Though the word "appeal" is used both in the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Code of Civil Procedure and in many other statutes but it has not been defined anywhere. Over a period of time, it has acquired a definite connotation and meaning which is as under: "A proceeding undertaken to have a decision reconsidered by bringing it to a higher authority, especially the submission of a lower court's decision to a higher court for review and possible reversal. An appeal, strictly so-called, is one in which the question is, whether the order of the court from which the appeal is brought was right on the material which the court had before it. An appeal is removal of the cause from an inferior to one of superior jurisdiction for the purposes of obtaining· a review or retrial. An appeal, generally speaking, is a rehearing by a superior court on both law and fact." 11. Broadly speaking, therefore, an appeal is a proceeding taken to rectify an erroneous decision of a court by· submitting the question to a higher court, and in view of the express language used in .subsection (1) of Section 34 of POTA the appeal would lie both on facts and on law. Therefore even an order granting bail can be examined on . merits by the High Court without any kind of fetters on its powers and it can come to an independent conclusion whether the accused deserves to be released on bail on the merits of the case. The considerations which are generally relevant in the matter of cancellation of bail under sub-section (2) of Section 439 of the Code witl not come in the way of the High Court in setting aside an order of the Special Court granting bail. It is, therefore, evident that the provisions of POTA are in clear contradistinction with that of the Code of Criminal Procedure where no appeal is provided against .an order granting bail. The appeal can lie only against an order. of the Special Court arid unless there is an order of the Speciaf Court refusing, bail, the accused will have no right to file an appeal before the High Court praying for grant of bail to them. Existence of an order of the ·special Court is, therefore, a sine qua non for approaching the High Court." 17. In regard to the principles of natural justice, it was stated in Madhav Hayawadanrao Hoskot v. State of Maharashtra, reported in [1978] 3 SCC 552: "11. One component of fair procedure is natural justice. Generally :' .- ~-. ·-····'L -~>'. I ·y - DILIP S. DAHANUKAR v. KOT AK MAHINDRA CO. LTD. [S.B. SINHA, J.] 113 7 speaking and subject to just exceptions, at least a single right of A appeal on facts, where criminal conviction is fraught with long loss of liberty, is basic to civilized jurisprudence. It is integral to fair procedure, natural justice and nonnative universality save in special cases like the original tribunal being a high bench sitting on a collegiate basis. In short, a first appeal from the Sessions Court to the High B Court, as provided in the Criminal Procedure Code, manifests this value upheld in Article 21." 18. The legal position was declared as under : "Where the prisoner seeks to file an appeal or revision, every facility for exercise of that right shall be made available by the Jail C Administration; These benign prescriptions operate by force of Article 21 (strengthened by Article 19(1 )( d) read with sub-article (5) from the lowest to the highest court where deprivation of life and personal liberty is in substantial peril." 19. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Mardia Chemicals Ltd. and Ors v. Union of India and Ors., [2004] 4 SCC 31 l, where the constitutionality of provisions of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets D and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 were quested qua Section E 17(4) thereof, held: "In view of the discussion already held in this behalf, we find that the requirement of deposit of 75% of the amount claimed before entertaining an appeal (petition) under Section 17 of the Act is an oppressive, onerous and arbitrary condition against all the canons of F reasonableness. Such a condition is invalid and it is liable to be struck down." 20. In Transmission Corporation of A.P. v. Ch Prabhakar & Ors. (2004] 5 SCC 551, this Court held: "The appeal is the right of entering a superior court and invoking its G aid and interposition to redress an error of the court below. Though procedure does surround an appeal the central idea is a right. The right of appeal has been recognized by judicial decisions as a right which vests in a suitor at the time of institution of original proceedings." H A B c D E F 1138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 4 S.C.R. 21. In Madhav Hayawadanrao Hoskot v. State of Maharashtra, (1978] 3 SCC 544, this Court held : " .... The fact remains· that prisoners are situationally at the mercy of the prison 'brass' but their right to appeal, which is part of the constitutional process to resist _illegal deprivation of liberty, is in peril if district jail officials ipse dixit that copies have been served is to pass muster without a title of prisoner's acknowledgement. What is more, there is no statutory provision for free legaf services to a prisoner, absent which a right of appeal for the legal illiterates is nugatory and, therefore, a negation of that fair legal procedure which is implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution as made explicit by this·Court in Maneka Gandhi." It was further held:- "Freedom is what freedom does and here we go straight to Article 21 of the Constitution, where the guarantee of personal liberty is phrased with superb amplitude." 22. Although it has been contended that direction to impose a fine of Rs.5 lacs had been issued as a condition precedent for admitting the appeal; from the order of the Appellate Court, the same does not appear to be correct. In its order dated 23.4.2006, the learned Appellate Court directed:- "Appeal admitted. Substantive sentence @ compensation payable in default is suspended till the disposal of the appeal, on payment of Rs.5 lacs within four weeks. Call R & P. Appellant be released on same bail. Appellant to furnish fresh bail bond." 23. We may also notice that appellant sought time for depositing the amount of compensation and also asked for the indulgence of the Court for G reduction of the said amount as also for extension of time. H In the Memorandum of Appeal, it was prayed:- "( d) That the order of depositing of the compensati~n imposed by the trial court be suitably modified, to enable the appellant No. 2 time and come up with reduced amount of funds to comply with the same." .. DILIP S. DAHANUKAR "·KOT AK MAHINDRA CO. LTD. [S.B. SINHA, J.] '1139 / -., .. : 24. Although the right of appeal being a vested right cannot be taken A away, we must also notice that right of the Court cannot be taken away to suspend the sentence and such a provision would be ultra vires. It was so held in Dadu alias Tulsidas v. State of Maharashtra, [2000] 8 SCC 437]. 25. The distinction between sub-Sections (1) and (3) of Section 357 is apparent. Sub-Section ( l) provides for application of an amount of fine while B imposing a sentence of which fine forms a part; whereas sub-Section (3) calls for a situation where a Court imposes a sentence of which fine does not form a part of the sentence. 26. Compensation is awarded towards sufferance of any loss or injury c by reason of an act for which an accused person is :;entenced. Although it provides for a criminal liability, the amount which has been awarded as compensation is considered to be recourse of the victim in the same manner which may be granted in a civil suit. So far as Appellant No. 2 is concerned, no fine has been imposed on him. He was directed to pay compensation. 27. The question is as to whether the matter would come within the D purview of sub-Section (3) and if so, whether sub-Section (2) of Section 357 would automatically be attracted. 28. The purposes for application of fine imposed has been set out in clauses (a) to (d) of sub-Sections (l) of Section 357.