# dismiBBed. Imam]. r959 May I4. Appeal dismissed. S. GANGOLI v. THE STATE OF' UTTAR PRADESH

- **Citation:** [1960] 1 S.C.R. 290
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1960
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeals Nos. 20 and 21of1957
- **Bench:** B. P. Sinha, P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. N. Wanchoo
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/dismibbed-imam-r959-may-i4-appeal-dismissed-s-gangoli-v-the-state-of-uttar-1757
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

Prevention of Corruption-Railway Servant under the Government-If a public servant under the Act-Prevention of Corruption
Act, I947 (II of I947), s. 2-Indian Railways Act, I890 (9 of I890),
s. I37(4)-lndian Penal Code (45 of I86o), s. 2I.
The two appellants, who were railway servants under the
Government, were put up on trial under s. l20B of the Indian
Penal Code and s. 5(2) read with s. 5(1}(c} and 5(1)(d) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The Sessions Judge who
tried the case found, in agreement with the unanimous opinion of
the assessors, the appellants guilty and sentenced appellant No. l
to rigorous imprisonment for three years and appellant No. 2 to
rigorous imprisonment for two years. The High Court on appeal
affirmed the order of conviction and sentences passed on the
appellants. It was contended on behalf of the appellants in this
court that the order of conviction and the sentences passed on
them were illegal as they were not public servants under s. 2 of
the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947.
Held, that it was apparent from the words "for any of the
purposes of that Code " used by s. 137(4) of the Indian Railways
Act, 1890, as it stood prior to its amendment in 1955. that the bar
created by that sub-section applied, and was confined, to the
purposes of the Indian Penal Code and could not be extended
beyond its provisions. In respect of offences other than .those
under the Code, therefore, neither sub-s. (1) of s. 137, which
applied only to offences under Ch. IX of the Code, nor sub-s .. (4)
of that section could apply and the question whether a railway
servant charged with offences under the Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1947, was a public servant or not must be decided under s. z
of that Act.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
291
Section 2 of the Prevention of Corruption Act adopts, the
x959
definition of a public servant contained in s. 2I of the Indian
.
Penal Code, and since the main offences charged against the
s. Gangoli
appellants were under that Act, and not under the Code, s. 2 of
v.
the Act would apply and they would be public servants within The State of Uttar
the meaning thereof.
Pradesh
Devi Ram Deep Chand v. The State, A.I.R. 1954 Punj. 189,
disapproved.
Ram Krishan v. The State of Delhi, [1956] S.C.R. r82 and
C. A. Montorio v. The State of Ajmer, [r956] S.C.R. 682, considered.
CRIMINAL
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION:
Criminal
Appeals Nos. 20 and 21of1957.
Appeals by special leave from the j.udgment and
order dated September 14, 1955, of the AI!A.habad
High Court (Lucknow Bench) at Lucknow in Criminal
Appeals Nos. 374 and 376 of 1956, arising out of the
judgment and order dated the April 24, 1954, of the
Sessions Judge, Luc~now, in Sessions Trial No. 106 of
1951.
R. L. Anand and S. N. Anand, for the appellant in
Or. A. No, 20 of 1957.
N. 0. Chatterjee and D. N. Mukherjee, for the appellant in Cr. A. No. 21 of 1957.
H. R. Khanna and R.H. Dhe_bar, for the respondent.
1959. May 14. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
GAJENDRAGADKAR J.-Art'. the appellants S. Gangoli Gajendragadkar ],
and P.R. Chaudhri (hereafter called appellants 1 and 2
respectively) public servants under s. 2 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (Act II of 1947) (hereafter called the Act)? That is the short question
which arises for our decision in the present appeal.
• That question arises in this way.
Chaudhri had been posted as Assistant Permanent
Way Inspector, Sultanpur, East Indian Railway, in
March, 1948, in the Lucknow E.I.R. Division. Gangoli
was posted as Assistant Pay Clerk in the Lucknow
E.I.R. Division during the same period. The case
against the appellants was that they had committed
an offence under s. 120B of the Indian Penal Code and
s. 5(2) read with ss. 5(l)(c) and 5(l)(d) of the Act. It
292
SUPREM:E COURT REPORTS (1960(1)]
'959
appears that in accordance with the Pay Commission's
.
Report a sum of Rs. 16,685 was entrusted to appels. Gangoh
lant No. 2 by the railway department to be disbursed
The 5,.~· of u1

## Text

290
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]
r959
In our opinion, there oan be no manner of doubt
that the appellant's entry into India without a passAbdul Rahim
t
·
t
t"
f
3 f th R 1
d
1
.1 R h" 1 1 por was m con raven ion o r.
o
e
u es an
smat
a imooa
.
1
v.
therefore pumshable under r. 6(a) at>.d the appel ant
Tiu siatenf
was rightly convicted.
The appeal is accordingly
Bombay
dismiBBed.
Imam].
r959
May I4.
Appeal dismissed.
S. GANGOLI
v.
THE STATE OF' UTTAR PRADESH
(and connected appeal)
(B. P. SINHA, P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR and
K. N. WANCHOO, JJ.)
Prevention of Corruption-Railway Servant under the Government-If a public servant under the Act-Prevention of Corruption
Act, I947 (II of I947), s. 2-Indian Railways Act, I890 (9 of I890),
s. I37(4)-lndian Penal Code (45 of I86o), s. 2I.
The two appellants, who were railway servants under the
Government, were put up on trial under s. l20B of the Indian
Penal Code and s. 5(2) read with s. 5(1}(c} and 5(1)(d) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The Sessions Judge who
tried the case found, in agreement with the unanimous opinion of
the assessors, the appellants guilty and sentenced appellant No. l
to rigorous imprisonment for three years and appellant No. 2 to
rigorous imprisonment for two years. The High Court on appeal
affirmed the order of conviction and sentences passed on the
appellants. It was contended on behalf of the appellants in this
court that the order of conviction and the sentences passed on
them were illegal as they were not public servants under s. 2 of
the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947.
Held, that it was apparent from the words "for any of the
purposes of that Code " used by s. 137(4) of the Indian Railways
Act, 1890, as it stood prior to its amendment in 1955. that the bar
created by that sub-section applied, and was confined, to the
purposes of the Indian Penal Code and could not be extended
beyond its provisions. In respect of offences other than .those
under the Code, therefore, neither sub-s. (1) of s. 137, which
applied only to offences under Ch. IX of the Code, nor sub-s .. (4)
of that section could apply and the question whether a railway
servant charged with offences under the Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1947, was a public servant or not must be decided under s. z
of that Act.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
291
Section 2 of the Prevention of Corruption Act adopts, the
x959
definition of a public servant contained in s. 2I of the Indian
.
Penal Code, and since the main offences charged against the
s. Gangoli
appellants were under that Act, and not under the Code, s. 2 of
v.
the Act would apply and they would be public servants within The State of Uttar
the meaning thereof.
Pradesh
Devi Ram Deep Chand v. The State, A.I.R. 1954 Punj. 189,
disapproved.
Ram Krishan v. The State of Delhi, [1956] S.C.R. r82 and
C. A. Montorio v. The State of Ajmer, [r956] S.C.R. 682, considered.
CRIMINAL
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION:
Criminal
Appeals Nos. 20 and 21of1957.
Appeals by special leave from the j.udgment and
order dated September 14, 1955, of the AI!A.habad
High Court (Lucknow Bench) at Lucknow in Criminal
Appeals Nos. 374 and 376 of 1956, arising out of the
judgment and order dated the April 24, 1954, of the
Sessions Judge, Luc~now, in Sessions Trial No. 106 of
1951.
R. L. Anand and S. N. Anand, for the appellant in
Or. A. No, 20 of 1957.
N. 0. Chatterjee and D. N. Mukherjee, for the appellant in Cr. A. No. 21 of 1957.
H. R. Khanna and R.H. Dhe_bar, for the respondent.
1959. May 14. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
GAJENDRAGADKAR J.-Art'. the appellants S. Gangoli Gajendragadkar ],
and P.R. Chaudhri (hereafter called appellants 1 and 2
respectively) public servants under s. 2 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (Act II of 1947) (hereafter called the Act)? That is the short question
which arises for our decision in the present appeal.
• That question arises in this way.
Chaudhri had been posted as Assistant Permanent
Way Inspector, Sultanpur, East Indian Railway, in
March, 1948, in the Lucknow E.I.R. Division. Gangoli
was posted as Assistant Pay Clerk in the Lucknow
E.I.R. Division during the same period. The case
against the appellants was that they had committed
an offence under s. 120B of the Indian Penal Code and
s. 5(2) read with ss. 5(l)(c) and 5(l)(d) of the Act. It
292
SUPREM:E COURT REPORTS (1960(1)]
'959
appears that in accordance with the Pay Commission's
.
Report a sum of Rs. 16,685 was entrusted to appels. Gangoh
lant No. 2 by the railway department to be disbursed
The 5,.~· of u11., among Class IV staff working under appellant No. 1.
Pra<Ush
This payment had to be made in the presence of, and
was to be attested by, appellant No. 1.
According to
Gaj<ndragaakar J. the prosecution both the appellants had entered into a
criminal conspiracy to misappropriate a part of the
said government amount entrusted to appellant No. 2
by paying to the respective members of Class IV staff
lesser amounts than those to which they were entitled
and by making entries in the pay-sheets which purported to show that the due amounts had been paid to
them. In accordance with this conspiracy payment
was made on March 11, 1948, in a running train between Faizabad and Chilbila and the entries in the
pay-sheets show that the whole of the amount of
Rs. 16,591 had been paid to 216 employees. The
entries also show that the payment had been made by
appellant No. 2 and the same had been attested by
appellant No. 1. In fact the whole amount had not
been disbursed to the employees who in all were paid
Rs. 1,555 less. In this manner the two appellants had
misappropriated the sum of about Rs. 1,555 and had
falsified the pay -sheets in pursuance of their conspfracy.
Within a few days of the said payment the
employees became suspicious because they learnt that
persons recruited on the same day had been paid larger
amounts as arrears. T'!iereupon they approached the
higher officers and made a complaint to them. They
were advised to present their grievance in writing and
as a result some of the employees did present applications in writing complaining that they had not received
the due payment of their arrears.
These representations led to an enquiry and Mr. Dalip Singh in fact
recorded some of the statements on April 6 and 7,
1948. The prosecution alleges that this development
alarmed appellant No. 1 and he tried to hush up the
matter by calling all the men together and paying
them the amounts which had been previously wrongfully deducted from their arrears. It is the prosecution case that on this day three documents were
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
293
executed, Exs. 5, 10 and·ll, which would clearly show
z95'
that. the appellants had committed the offences charged
h
S. <.iat1goli
against t em.
.
.
,
v.
Both the appellants demed the charges.
They The State of uttar
pleaded that they had not entered into any conspiracy
Pradesh
and it was their suggestion that they had been falsely
. --
implicated in the present case. Appellant No. I Ga;endragadkar J.
pleaded that the case against him had been started,
and false evidence had been secured by H.N. Das with
the aid of Shambu because relations between him and
Das were not friendly. Appellant No. 2 pleaded that
he had been falsely implicated because, contrary to the
suggestion of the police, he had refused to implicate
appellant No. l. According to them the evidence
adduced by the prosecution was interested and false,
and the documents produced by it were either fabricated or irrelevant.
In support of its case the prosecution examined 44
witnesses, relied upon the three documents Exs. 5, 10
and 11 and urged that the charges framed against the
appellants were clearly established by the said evidence.. The learned Sessions Judge at Lucknow who
tried the case against the appellants agreed with the
unanimous opinion of the assessors and held that the
charges framed against the appellants had been proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. He accordingly convicted
them of the said offences and sentenced appellant No. 1
to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three years and
appellant No. 2 to suffer rigorous imprisonment for
two years.
This order of conviction and sentence was challenged
by the appellants by preferring appeals in the High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad. These appeals,
however, failed and the High Court substantially
agreed with the conclusions of the learned trial judge.
Mr. Justice Kidwai who heard these appeals no doubt
partly accepted t.he defence plea and held that Das
was not a reliable witness and that he might have been
responsible for the fabrication of Ex. 10. The learned
judge also found that Shambu was likewise an unreli-
<tble witness. EYeu HO it was held that the evidence of
gangmen W<ts on the whole satisfactory a;nd t.hat the
294
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1))
x959
documents Exs. 5 and 11 cor.roborated the oral evidence
adduced by the prosecution. In the result the order of
S. Gangoli
v.
conviction and seutence passed against the appellants
The Staie ofuttar by the trial judge was confirmed. It is against this
Pradesh
order passed by the High Court that the appellants
.
-
have preferred the present appeals by special leave;
Ga1md••Cfdkar f. and the only point which they have raised before us is
that their oonviction and sentence are illegal because
they are not public servants under s. 2 of the Act.
Section 2 of the Act provides that for the purposes
of this Act public servant means a public servant as
defined in s. 21 of the Indian Penal Code. It is not
disputed that under s. 21 the appellants are public
servants. The East Indian Railway which has employed the appellants was at the material time owned by
the Government of India and managed and run by it,
and so if the status of the appellants had to be judged
at the material date solely by reference to s. 21 of the
Code there would be no difficulty in holding that they
are public servants as defined by the said section.
It is, however, urged that, for determining the status
of a railway servant, it is necessary to consider s. 137
of the Indian Railways Act, 1890 (Act 9 of 1890). It
may be recalled that when this Act was passed almost
all the railways in India were owned and managed by
public limited companies and as such railway servants
as defined by s. 3(7) of the Railways Act could not be
treated as public servants under s. 21 of the Code.
After the railways were nationalised and taken over by
the Government of India, this position has materially
altered. But prior to the nationalisation of railways,
the position was that railway servants as such did not
fall under s. 21 of the Code. That is why s. 137(1) and
(4) purported to bring them within the definition of
public servants contained in the said section. Sub-s. (I)
of s. 137 provides that every railway servant shall be
. deemed to be a public servant for the purposes of
ch. IX of the Indian Penal Code. The effect of this
sub-section is to treat railway servants as public
servants under s. 21 for the purpose of offences relating to public servants which are dealt with by ss. 161
to 171 is ch. IX of the Code. It is thus clear that the
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
. 295
result of this provision was to treat railw~y servants
I959
as public servants even though they did not satisfy the
s. Gangoli
requirements of the definition of s. 21. Having providv.
ed for the extension of the said definition to railway The State of Uttar
servants for the purposes of ch. IX of the Code, subPradesh
s. (4) prescribed that notwithstanding anything con- G . d:r-adk 1
tained in s. 21 of the Indian Penal Code a railway aJen ag
ar •
servant shall not be deemed to be a public servant for
any of the purposes of that Code except these mentioned in sub-s. (1). It is on this sub-section that the
appellants' argument is based. It is urged by Ivlr. B. L.
Anand that this sub-section clearly provides that
railway servants shall not be deemed to be public
servants except for the purposes of ch. IX ; and since
the appellants had not been charged with any of the
offences ip. ch. IX of the Code they cannot be treatel'l
as public servants for the offences under ss. 5(1) and
5(2) of the Act. It is true that these two sub-sections
have been amended by Act 17 of 1955. Sub-s. (4) has
been deleted and sub-s. (1) ·now provides that every
railway servant being a public servant as defined in
s. 21 of the Indian Penal Code shall be deemed to be a
public servant for the purposes of ch. IX and s. 409 of
that Code. In other words, under the amended provision of s. 137(1) railway servants would be deemed
to be public servants under s. 21 of the Indian Penal
Code only for the purpose of ch. IX and s. 409 of that
Code. We are, however, concerned with the provisions
of s. 137 prior to its amendment in 1955.
Now s. 137, sub-s. (4) opens with the non-obstante
clause and expressly states that a railway servant shall
not be deemed to be a public servant for any of the
purposes of that Code subject of course to the exception
mentioned ip sub-s. (1). The argument is that the
non-obstahte clause has the effect of excluding the
application of s. 21 of the Code in all cases except
those falling under ch. IX of the Code ; and it is urged
that since the offences charged against the appellants
are outside _ch. IX of the Code, sub-s. (4) creates a
bar against treating them as public sarvants for
the pur"pose of the said offences. This argument,
however, ignores the relevant words "for any
296
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]
z959
of thii purposes of that Code" used in sub-s. (4).
5 G
I"
These words indicate that the bar created by
· :~go,.
sub-s. (4) applies, and is confined, to the purposes of
TM State of Uttar that Code and cannot be extended beyond the said
Pradesh
purposes. What sub-s. ( 4) really provides is that if
-
a railway servant is charged for an offence under the
Gajendragadkar J. Indian Penal Code and the said offence is outside
ch. IX of the Code he cannot be treated as a public
servimt. This sub-section does not purport, or intend
to make any provision in respect of offences which
a.re outside the Penal Code, In respect of such offences neither sub-s. (1) nor sub-s. (4) of the Railways Act
would apply, and the question as to whether railway
servants fall within the mischief of the Act must be
decided in the light of the provisions of the said Act
itself.
That takes us to the question whether the appellants' can'be said to be public servants under s. 2 of the
Act. S. 2, as we have indicated, in substance incorporates in itself the definition of a public servant contained in s. 21 of the Indian Penal Code.
There can
be no doubt that the effect of s. 2 of the Act is that
the status of accused persons has to be determined by
the applica.tion-0f s. 21 of the Indian Penal Code as if
the said section had been included in the Act. If that
be so the appellants cannot resist the conclusion that
they a.re public servants under s. 2 of the Act. The
contention that because s. 2 of the Act refers to s. 21
of the Indian Pena.I Code the bar created by s. 137(4)
of the Railways Act would inevitably come into o]:leration is unsound.. The said bar can be invoked only if
the status of the accused person is being determined
for any purposes of the Code other than those of
ch; IX. In the present case the main offences charged
are under the Act and not under the Code, and so
s. 137 (4) in inapplicable.
With regard to the construction of s. 137(4) there is
another consideration which ma.y
be
indicated.
S. 137(1) brings within the definition of s. 21 of the
Code railway servants who but for it would not have
satisfied the tests laid down in s. 21.
The deeming
provision of sub-s. (1) would be clearly inappropriate
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
297
and unnecessary if the railway servants concerned
z959.
could be treated as public servants under s. 21 itself.
s. Gangoli
In other words, railway servants employed by the
v.
railway administration owned and conducted by the The State ofUllar
Government of India would be public servants under
Pradesl•
s. 21 as such without recourse.to the statutory fiction G . d-adk 1
introduced by s. 137(1). Having provided for this
a;en rag
0
'
•
statutory fiction by sub-s.(l), sub-s. (4) purports to
cover the same ambit and to deal with the same class
of railway servants and it provides that this class of
persons shall not be deemed to be public servants
except as mentioned in sub-s. (1).
This negative
statutory fiction is only intended to emphasise the fact
that persons who are treated as public servants by
virtue of sub-s. (1) can be dealt with only under the
provisions of ch. II of the Code and no other. Could
it have been intended by the Legislature that sub-s. (4)
should exclude the application of the provisions of the
Code other than those contained in ch. IX to railway
servants who would be public servants under s. 21
without the aid of sub-s. (1) of s. 137 ? Prima facie
such an intention cannot be attributed to the Legislature. It is true that the non-obstante clause lends
some assistance to the argument of the appellants that
with the exception of the provisions of ch. IX, s. 21
of the Code would be inapplicable to railway servants ;
but the said non-obstante clause cannot prima facie
be wider in its scope than sub-s. (1) of the said section.
The said non-obstante clau.se has apparently been
inserted ex abundanti cautela (1) to clarify the effect of
s. 137(1)
The two sub-sections introduce a p_ositive
and a negative fiction respectively and thereby achieve
the same result.
However, since we are concerned
with the provisions of the Act and not with any provisions of the Code other than ch. II it is unnecessary
to pursue this point any further and to express a
definite opinion on this aspect of the matter.
We must now refer to the decisions to which our
attention was invited.
The first case on which
Mr. Anand relied is the decision of the Punjab High
(J) (1955) 2 S. C. R. 977 -
Rai Bahadur Kanwar Raj Nath & Ors. v.
Pramod C. Bhatt, Custodian of Evacuee Property.
38
298
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]
z959
Court in Dem Ram Deep Chand v. The State('). In
that case the accused were goods clerks employed by
S. Gangoli
v.
the railway and they were being prosecuted in the
The State o/Uttar court of a First-Class Magistrate on charges under
Pradesh
s. 408 of the Penal Code.
It was urged on their
· -
behalf that the offences alleged against them were in
Gajm••cadk•• J. substance offences under s. 5 of the Act, and that they
could be tried by a special judge alone. That is why
the High Court was moved for a transfer of the case
against them from the court where it was pending to
the court of th!'! special 'judge. From the judgment of
the High Court it clearly appears that the learned
Assistant Advocate-General intimated to the Court
that the prosecution did not propose to frame or
prove a. charge against the appellants under s. 5 of
the Act. Therefore s. 2 of the Act did not really fall
to be· construed by the court; and so the observations
made by Dul at,, J ., that if the petitieners are not public
servants within the meaning of s. 21 of the Penal Code
they cannot be called public servants for the purposes
of.Act 2 of 1947, is clearly obiter. If, however, this
observation was intended to be a decision on the
point, it must, with respect, be held to be based on a
misconstruction of s. 137(4).
Mr. Anand has also fairly invited our attention to
two decisions of this Court-Ram Krishan v. The State
of Delhi(') and G. A. Montorio v. The State of Ajmer(')
-which are prim.a facie against his contention. In the
first of these two decisions the appellants had been
charged under s. 120B of the Indian Penal Code for
criminal conspiracy to cause offence of criminal misconduct punishable under s. 5(2) of the Act to be
committed by Madan Lal as also under that section
read with s. 116 of the Code. They had been convicted by the special judge on both the counts and their
conviction had been upheld by the High Court. In
their appeal before this Court one of the points raised
by the appellants was that Madan Lal was not a public
servant within the meaning of the Act. It appears
that the offence in question had been committed on
(1) A. I. R. 1954 Punj. 189.
C>) [1956] s.c.R. 18i.
(3) [1956] s.c.R. 682.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
299
December 29, 1951, and the argument was that under
z959
s. 137(1) and (4) Madan Lal who was a railway servant
s. Gangoli
could not be held to be a public servant under s. 2 of
v.
the Act. Chandrasekhara Aiyar, J., who delivered the T'MStataofUll"'
judgment of the Court, cited s. 137(1) and added that
Prad1Sh
sub-s. (4) had been omitted by the amendment of 1955.
-
Then the learned judge referred to s. 2. of the Act and Gajendra:adhar J.
coneluded thus :
" The result is that before the
amendment railway servants were treated as public
servants only for the purpose of ch. IX of the Indian
Penal Code but now as the result of the amendment
all railway servants have become public servants not
only for the limited purpose but generally under the
Prevention of Corruption .Act." With respect, it may
be pointed out, that this observation seems to give to
the amended provisions of s. 137 of the Railways Act
retrospective effect. The question of the construction
of the relevant sections does not appear to have been
fully argued before this Court and it has not been
considered. It is nevertheless true that in respect of
an offence committed in 1951 Madan Lal was held to
be a .public servant under s. 2 of the Act.
In the case of Montorio (1) the main point raised
before this Court was whether the accused was a public
servant under s. 21 of the Code and that was considered by this Court; in dealing with that question
this Court construed s. 21 and held that the appellant
was an officer within the meaning of s. 21(9) and therefore a public servant within the meaning of s. 21.
Incidentally reference has been made to the earlier
decision of this Court in the case of Ram lfrishan (2)
and it has been observed that the said decision "lays
down that before the amendment of s. 137 of the Railways Act, by Act 17 of 1955, railway servants were
treated as public servants only for the purposes of
ch. IX of the Indian Penal Code but in any event they
were public servants under the Prevention of Corruption Act." With respect, this latter statement does
not appear to be bor.ne out by the judgment in the
case of Ram Krishan (~).
lI) [1956] S.C.R. 682.
(2) [1956] S.C.R. 182,
300
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1))
i959
Going back to s. 2 of the Act once more we must
s. Gangoli
hold that in defining a public servant it enacts the
v.
same d~finitfons as s. 21 of the Indian Penal Code and
Tlte stat• of u11a, under this interpretation of the section the appellants
p,adesh
undoubtedly are public servants. The result is the
. -
courts below were right in holding that the appellants
Ga1"'4,agadka, J. could be properly charged and tried for offences under
s. 5(2) read, with s. 5(l)(c) and s. 5(l)(d) of the Act.
The validity of the charge under s. 120B has not been
and cannot be challenged.
Mr. Anand for appellant No. 1 and Mr. Chatterjee
for appellant No. 2 appealed to us to reduce the
sentence passed against their clients. It was urged in
sup,Port of this plea that tkough the charge against
them was in respect of a large amount of Rs. 1,555
evidence had been adduced to prove midappropriation
of Rs. 218 which is a much smaller amount. We do
not think that in the circumstances of this case the
actual amount shown to have been misappropriated
has a decisive or even a material bearing on the
question of sentence. The positions respectively occupied by the appellants, the relations between them
and the Class IV servants, the method adopted by the
appellants in committing the offence and the other
circumstances have all been considered by the courts
below in passing concurrently the respective orders of
sentence against the appellants. In our opinion there
is no justification for interfering with the said orders.
The appeals accordingly fail and are dismissed. The
appellants to surrender to their bail bonds.
Appenls dismissed.