# DR. D.C. SAXENA v. HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF INDIA

- **Citation:** [1996] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 677
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1996-07-19
- **Case number:** Contempt Petition No. 38 of 1996
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/dr-d-c-saxena-v-hon-ble-the-chief-justice-of-india-14461
- **Pages:** 65

## Headnote

DR. D.C. SAXENA
v.
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF INDIA
JULY 19, 1996
[K. RAMASWAMY, N.P. SINGH AND S.P. BHARUCHA, .TJ.]
Constitution of India, 1950 :
A1tic/e 121}-Contempt of Cowt-Wiit petition filed before Supreme
Corat-Disn1isscd sununalily by the Bench co1nprising Chief Justice of India
as one of the Judges~Pctitimzcrfiling a second w1it petition against the Chief
Justice of India levelling allegations against and imputing motives to the CJ I
for disn1issing his fiJ:r;t 1vn·t petition-Mi/it petition containing inten1perate
language and scunilous accusations against the CJI---c.rl allocating the petiA
B
c
tion to a Bench for hearin5fl'rit petition disn1issed--Conten1pt proceedings D
initiated against the petitiollo~Held, allegatiolls made ill respect of the CJ/
in pofonna!lce of his judicial fu!lctioll intc!lded to lower the authmity of a!ld
respect for the Cowt a!ld office of the Judge--The allegations sca!ldalise the
C'o1ut-Sca11dalising judge or corut tends to b1ing autho1ity and adn1i11istration of justice into disrespect and disregard and tantan1ounts to contenzpt-Scrurilous abuse of a judge or cou1t, or attacks on personal chqracter
of a Judge are acts of contempt-It is duty of the Chief Justice of a Cowt to
assign judicial work to his brother Judges-By assigning the second w1it
petition to a Bench, CJ! ~vould not beconie a judge in his own caus~
Petitioner conunitted contenipt of Co1at-Sentenced to sbnple ilnprisonnient
for three n1onths.
A11icles 19(1) a!ld 19(2), 129 and 2I~Freedom of speech and expression-Held, is subject to A1tic/es 19(2), 129 and 215, in relation to contempt
E
F
of Court, defan1ation or incitelnent to an offenc~Any citizen is entitled to
express his opinion about the co1rectness of the judg111ent, order or sentence
within dignified alld moderate language, but motives to Judges should not be G
attJibuted; it b1ings the adn1inistration of justice into disrespect.
Article 32-Writ petitio11-Summa1y disposal of-Heid, it is not
obligato1J' to give reasons for disniissing a vv1it petition.
Contempt of Cowts Act, 1971 :
H
677
A
B
678
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1996] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
S. 2(c)-<_'rimi11a/ comempt-W1it petitin11 filed before S11preme
Cowt-Co11fai11ini; allq,11tio11s against the Chief Justice nf India for dismissillf?
petitioner's earlier ivrit petition-Held, the allegations scandalise the
Colu1-Scanda/ising the Court 1-vould n1ea11 hostile c1iticisn1 of jlldf.tCS or
co1u1-Tendency to scandalise the co1ut or tendency to loiver the autho1ity or
to obstruct the adnzinistration of justice in any 1nan11er or tc11de11cy to
challenge the authmity or majesty of j11stice, wo11/d be a uiminal contempt.
Me11s rea-He/d i11 comempt proceedings proof of mens rea is 11ot
relevant-ft is not necessa1y to establish actual intention on the pa1t of
contenuzer to inte1fere ivith adn1inistration ofjustice-lf'lzat is relevant is that
the offending act produces interference ~vith or tendency to i11te1fere ~vith the
C course of justice.
Ss. 4 and 5-Repo11 of judicial proceedings and oiticism of judicial
act-Held, a citizen is entitled to b1ing to the notice of puhlic at !arie
infi1111itics fro111 1vhich any institution including judicia1y suffers jl·o111, but
D personal attack upon a judge in connection 1vith the office he holds is not
protected by la1v-171c allegations n1ade by the co11te111ner in the second YPit
petition are neither a fair and accurate rcpo11 of the proceedings in the earlier
ivrit petition nor a fair criticisn1 thereof-bnputation of i111proper 111otives or
bias cannot be justified on the 1uinciple of fair conunent.
E
Contenipt of Court-Punislunent-Held, contenzpt jraisdiction is intended to uphold the aulh01ity and digniO' of coll!1s of law and protect public
confidence reJJosed in then1-Punis/11nent is inflicted not for p1uposes of
protecting either the coll!t or an individual judge b11t for the lJli!pose of
protecting the p11blic.
F
Practice and Procedure :
Pleadings-Held, a pa1tly-in-person or an Ad

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DR. D.C. SAXENA
v.
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF INDIA
JULY 19, 1996
[K. RAMASWAMY, N.P. SINGH AND S.P. BHARUCHA, .TJ.]
Constitution of India, 1950 :
A1tic/e 121}-Contempt of Cowt-Wiit petition filed before Supreme
Corat-Disn1isscd sununalily by the Bench co1nprising Chief Justice of India
as one of the Judges~Pctitimzcrfiling a second w1it petition against the Chief
Justice of India levelling allegations against and imputing motives to the CJ I
for disn1issing his fiJ:r;t 1vn·t petition-Mi/it petition containing inten1perate
language and scunilous accusations against the CJI---c.rl allocating the petiA
B
c
tion to a Bench for hearin5fl'rit petition disn1issed--Conten1pt proceedings D
initiated against the petitiollo~Held, allegatiolls made ill respect of the CJ/
in pofonna!lce of his judicial fu!lctioll intc!lded to lower the authmity of a!ld
respect for the Cowt a!ld office of the Judge--The allegations sca!ldalise the
C'o1ut-Sca11dalising judge or corut tends to b1ing autho1ity and adn1i11istration of justice into disrespect and disregard and tantan1ounts to contenzpt-Scrurilous abuse of a judge or cou1t, or attacks on personal chqracter
of a Judge are acts of contempt-It is duty of the Chief Justice of a Cowt to
assign judicial work to his brother Judges-By assigning the second w1it
petition to a Bench, CJ! ~vould not beconie a judge in his own caus~
Petitioner conunitted contenipt of Co1at-Sentenced to sbnple ilnprisonnient
for three n1onths.
A11icles 19(1) a!ld 19(2), 129 and 2I~Freedom of speech and expression-Held, is subject to A1tic/es 19(2), 129 and 215, in relation to contempt
E
F
of Court, defan1ation or incitelnent to an offenc~Any citizen is entitled to
express his opinion about the co1rectness of the judg111ent, order or sentence
within dignified alld moderate language, but motives to Judges should not be G
attJibuted; it b1ings the adn1inistration of justice into disrespect.
Article 32-Writ petitio11-Summa1y disposal of-Heid, it is not
obligato1J' to give reasons for disniissing a vv1it petition.
Contempt of Cowts Act, 1971 :
H
677
A
B
678
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1996] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
S. 2(c)-<_'rimi11a/ comempt-W1it petitin11 filed before S11preme
Cowt-Co11fai11ini; allq,11tio11s against the Chief Justice nf India for dismissillf?
petitioner's earlier ivrit petition-Held, the allegations scandalise the
Colu1-Scanda/ising the Court 1-vould n1ea11 hostile c1iticisn1 of jlldf.tCS or
co1u1-Tendency to scandalise the co1ut or tendency to loiver the autho1ity or
to obstruct the adnzinistration of justice in any 1nan11er or tc11de11cy to
challenge the authmity or majesty of j11stice, wo11/d be a uiminal contempt.
Me11s rea-He/d i11 comempt proceedings proof of mens rea is 11ot
relevant-ft is not necessa1y to establish actual intention on the pa1t of
contenuzer to inte1fere ivith adn1inistration ofjustice-lf'lzat is relevant is that
the offending act produces interference ~vith or tendency to i11te1fere ~vith the
C course of justice.
Ss. 4 and 5-Repo11 of judicial proceedings and oiticism of judicial
act-Held, a citizen is entitled to b1ing to the notice of puhlic at !arie
infi1111itics fro111 1vhich any institution including judicia1y suffers jl·o111, but
D personal attack upon a judge in connection 1vith the office he holds is not
protected by la1v-171c allegations n1ade by the co11te111ner in the second YPit
petition are neither a fair and accurate rcpo11 of the proceedings in the earlier
ivrit petition nor a fair criticisn1 thereof-bnputation of i111proper 111otives or
bias cannot be justified on the 1uinciple of fair conunent.
E
Contenipt of Court-Punislunent-Held, contenzpt jraisdiction is intended to uphold the aulh01ity and digniO' of coll!1s of law and protect public
confidence reJJosed in then1-Punis/11nent is inflicted not for p1uposes of
protecting either the coll!t or an individual judge b11t for the lJli!pose of
protecting the p11blic.
F
Practice and Procedure :
Pleadings-Held, a pa1tly-in-person or an Ad11ocate has lihe1ty of expression-But they equally oa:e counte1vailing duty to nzaintain dignity,
deconan and order in the cou1t proceedings and judicial process-T71ey
should not indulge in 1t·1iting in the pleadings scunilous accusations against
G a judge or cowt.
The contemner, a Professor of English, tiled before this Court a "Tit
petition seeking: a direction to the Union of India to recover fron1 the then
Prime J\.linister of India and President of Congress Party, the expenditure
incurred for the private use of Indian Air Force Aircrafts and Helicoptt>rs.
H The writ petition ca1ne to he listed for admission before a Bench comprising:
D.CSAXENAv. HON'BLEC.J.J.
679
the Chief Justice of India and another Judge. The contemner appeared
in-person. The Bench sent for the Solicitor General of India and asked him
to verify the contents of the \lTit petition. On the next date, i.e. 7th August,
1995, the \\'rit petition ca1ne to he listed before a Bench con1prisi11g the Chief
Justice of India and m·o other Judges; the Solicitor c;eneral of India placed
the record before the Court; and the Court, after perusing the record and
hearing the conte1nner, sum1narily dismissed the writ petition.
The conten1ner tiled a second \\Tit petition before this Court arraigning the Chief Justice of India as a party respondent thereto. lie alleged,
inter alia, in the said petition that it was improper for the respondent (the
Chief Justice of India) to have heard the earlier nTit petition; the respondent by disn1issing the earlier \Vrit petition, ll'ilfully and advertently vi.:,Iated
the fundamental rights not only of the petitioner but also of the people of
the India; the respondent caused fabrication of court proceedings of
7.8.1995 in the earlier YtTit petition as the said proceedings did not indicate
the presence of the Solicitor General of India; the respondent deliberately
A
B
c
and wilfully failed to perform hmdamental duties and stultified their perD
for1nance by the petitioner; dis1nissal of the earlier \\'rit petition Yt'ithout
recording: reasons \\'as against the rn'in princi11Ies of transparency and
accountability; the respondent had attempted but failed to bro\\'heat the
petitioner; the respondent by allowing his son, a law:yer practising in the
Supreme Court, to stay \\.ith him in his official residence presumably to E
n1isuse the official facilities and prestige of oflice of Chief Justice of India;
during pendency of the "Tit petition the respondent "be advised to proceed
on leave; so that he may not directly or indirectly influence any of the judges
hearing the matter"; the respondent was Hable to reimburse from his pocket
not only the cost incurred by the petitioner in the two writ petitions, but
also the entire loss caused to the State as a consequence of non-payment of F
dues by the Prime Minister. The petitioner, inter alia, prayed: (a) that it be
declared that the respondent was unlit to hold the ollke of Chief Justice of
India; (b) that the respondent be stripped of his citizenship; (c) that an FIR
he registered against the respondent for con1mitting forgery and fraud; and
( d) that prosecution of the respondent under the Prevention of Corruption
Act be directed.
G
This Court pointed out to the conten1ner the scandalous nature of
accusations 1nade in the second '"''rit petition 1 but he persisted for consideration of the said accusation and reiterated that he would stand by the
sarne. The Court disrnissed the second \Vrit petition and, considering the H
680
SUPREME COURT REPOR rs [1996] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A
allegations n1acle therein by the conteJnner against the Chief Justice of
India and the Court to be scandalous and scurrilous, directed the issue of
notice to the contemner "'h)' proceedings to punish him for conten1pt of the
Court be not initiated against him. The conternner \Vas sen'ed \\'ith a
conte1npt notice enlisting 14 instante!'i of allegations niade in the second
B
\\Tit petition, which "'ould 1nin1a facie constitute contu1nacious conduct of
the conten1ner to scandalise the Court.
The contemner filed \\Titten sub1nissions stating that the Bench
which dismissed the second writ petition had been constituted by the
respondent, \Vho had thereby becon1e a Judge in his 0"11 cause; that the
C second \Vrit petition therefore, \.'t'as not listed before a court con1petent to
decide it; that the order of its dismissal \.\.'as therefort~, non-est and it \.\.'as
still deemed to be pending; that the petition should be listed before a Bench
of not less than 5 .Judges; that no conten1pt proceedings could be initiated
against hiln and the notice \.'t'as, therefore, premature. Later, the conte1nner
filed a statement of arnendments n1odit)'ing only a fe\\' of the itenis enlisted
D in the contempt notice and stating that prayers (b) and (c) in the writ
petition be treated as deleted.
It \\.'as submitted by the Solicitor General of India, ap11earing as
anzicus c1uiae, that the averments made in the second "'rit petition
E re•nained on the record; theyn·ereex-facie contumacious and the contemner
expressed no regret for \.\'hat he had stated therein; and even the niodified
averments '"'ere contumacious.
It \\.'as mainly contended by the conte1nner that he did not seek any
gain for himself and he made the avrrments for the public good; he had no
F
intention to scandalise the court; that the certified copy of the order
dt.7.8.95 in the lirst writ petition did not indicate that the Solicitor General
appeared as a111icus curiae; the aver1nents n1acle in the \.\Tit petition being:
truthful and factual and n1ade \'t'ithout rancour or n1alicc should not he
construed scandalous; the provisions of sections 4 and 5 of the Contempt
G of Courts Act were applicable; and,. therefore, he did not commit any
conten1pt of the Court. The conten1ncr also challenged the constitutionality
of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
Disposing of the Contempt Petition, this Court
H
HELD : By the Cowt :
D.C. SAXEN1\ v. HON°BLE C.J.I.
681
The contcn1ncr has con1n1itted the contempt o!' this Court under A
Article 129 of the Constitution. He ~s convicted and sentenced to undergo
sin1ple imprisonrnent for a period of three n1onths and to pay a line in the
sum of Rs. 2,000.
Per K. Ramaswamy, J
1.1. Scandalising the Judges or Courts tends lo bring the authority
and administration of law into disrespect and disregard and tantamounts
to contempt. Tendency to scandalise the Court or tendency to lower the
authority of the Court or tendency to interfere with or tendency to obstruct
the adminstration of justice in any manner or tendency to challenge the
authority nr majesty or justice, would be a criminal contem1it. All acts which
bring the Court into disrepute or disrespect or which offend its dignity or its
majesty or challenge its authority, constitute contempt C(nnmitted in respect
of single Judge or single Court or in certain circun1stances comn1itted in
respect of the whole of the judiciary or judicial system. [713-H, 714-A]
E.M.S. Namboodi1ipad v. T. Narayanan Nambiar, [1971] I S.C.R. 697,
relied on.
B
c
D
1.2. A libel upon a court is a reflection upon the sovereign people
themselves. Scandalising the court is a convenient expression of scurrilous
attack on the majesty of justice calculated to undermjne its authority and E
public confidence in the administration of justice. The malicious or
slenderous publication inculcates in the mind of the people a general disaffection and dissatisfaction on the judicial determination and indisposes
their mind to obey them. If the people's allegiance to the law is so fundamentally shaken it is the n1ost vital and most dangerous obstruction of F
justice calling for urgent action. [714-F, 715-E]
C. Raviclwndran Iyer v. Justice A.M. Bhattachmjee & Ors., [1995] 5
sec 457, referred to.
Halsbury's Laws of England, (4th Edn.) Vol. 9 para 27, page 21, G
referred to.
13. Scandalising the Court would mean hostile criticism of Judges
as Judges or judiciary. Any personal attack upon a judge in connection \\.'ith
office he holds is dealt with under law of libel or slender. Yet defamatory
publication concerning the Judge as a Judge brings the court or judges into H
6S2
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 11996] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A
l'ontcn1pt~ a serious i1n1>edin1cnl tojuslire and an inroad on the n1ajesty of
ju!'ltite. Any raricature of a judge calculated to IO\\'er the dignity of the court
l\'ouh.I destroy, undcr1nine or lend to u11dern1ine public confidL•nl'C in the
adrninistration of justice or rnajesty of justice. It \Vould, therefore, be scandalising the Judge as a .Judge~ in other \\'ords, irnputing partiality, corrupB
c
tion, bias, i1nporpcr n1otives to a judge is scandalisation of the court and
\\'ould be conte1npt of the court. Even irnputation of lack of ilnpartiatity or
fairness to a .iucl~e in the discharge of his otlicial dutit-s amounts to contetn pt. The gravan1en of the offence is that of lowering: his dignity or
authority or an affront to majesty of justice. [716-B-D]
1.4. Punishment is inflicted not for !he purpose of protecting either
the Court as a whole or the individual Judges of the Court from a repetition
of the attack, but of protecting the public and especially those who either
voluntarily or by compulsion are subject to the jurisdicti'on of the Court,
from the mischief' they will incur if the authority of the tribunal is undermined or in1paired. In consel)uence, the Court has regarded with particular
D seriousness the allegations of partiality or bias on the part of a Judge or a
Court. [714-H, 715-A]
2.1. Freedom of' speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19(l)(a)
brings within its ambit the corresponding duty and responsibility and puts
E limitations on the exercise of that liberty. If a speech of expression was
untrue and so reckless as to its truth, the speaker or the author does not
get protection of the constitutional right. Freedom of speech and expression, therefore, would be subject to Articles 19(2), 129 and 215 of the
Constitution, in relation to contempt of Court, defamation or incitement to
an offence etc. 1711-H·E]
F
2.2. A citizen is entitled to bring to the notice of' the public at large
the infirmities from which any institution including judiciary suffers from.
Courts, the instrumentalities of the State are subject to the Constitution
and the laws and are not above criticism. Section 5 of' the Contempt of
G Courts Act accords protection to fair criticism and saves from contempt of
Co1n1. Any citizen is entitled to express his honest opinion about the
correctness of the judgment, order or sentence with dignified and moderate
language pointing out the error or defect or illegality in the judgment, order
or sentence. But motives to the Judges need not be attributed. It brings the
adrninistration of justice into disrepute. Any criticism about judicial sysH tc1n or the judges \Vhich hampers the udministration of justice or "'hich
D.C. SAXENA 1•. HON'IJl.E CJ.I.
683
erodes the faith in the ol~jective approach of the Judges and brings adA
ministration of justice to ridicule 1nust be prevented.
1712-A-C; 718-F; 712-F-G]
Slui Baradaka11ta Mishra Etc. v, The Registrar of 01issa High Cow1 &
Anr. Etc., [1974] 1SCC374; followed.
P.N. Duda v. F. Shiv Slumkar, AIR (1968) 1208, referred to.
Ambard v. Attomey-General for Tli11idad a11d Tobago, 1935 AC 322,
referred to.
B
2.3. An advocate or a party appearing in person is given liberty of C
expression. But, they equally O\\'e countervailing duty to maintain dignity,
decoru1n and order in the court proceedings or judicial process. Liberty of
free expression is not to be confounded or confused vdth licence to n1ake
unfounde1I allegations against any institution much less the judiciary.
When an advocate or a party appearing before the Court requires to conD
duct himself in a manner helitting the dignity and decorum of the Court,
he cannot have a free licence to indulge in writing in the pleadings the
scurrilous accusations or scandalisation against the judge or the Court. If
the reputation or dignity of the judge, who decides the case are allowed to
be prescribed in the pleadings, it would atli:ct the respect for the Court and
independence of the judiciary. [713-E-F; 720-C-D]
E
Slui Baradaka11ta Mishra Etc. v. The Registrar of Olissa High Cmm &
Anr. Etc., [1974] 1 SCC 374, followed.
Re: Roslwn La/Ahuja, [1993] Suppl. 4 SCC 446; L.D. Jaikwal v, State
of U.F., [1984] 3 SCC 405; Re : Slui S. Mulgaokar, [1978] 3 SCC 497; K.A.
Mohammed Ali '" C.N. Frasannan, [1994] Supp. 3 SCC 509; Sambu Nath
Iha v. Kedar Prasad Si11ha, [1992] l SCC 573 and Charan Lal Sahu v. Union
of India &Anr., [1988] 3 SCC 255, relied on,
F
E.M.S. Namboodi1ipad v. T. Naraya11an Nambiar, [1971] I SCR 697, G
referred to.
Ambard v, Attomcy-Genera/ for T!inidad and Tobago, 1936 AC 322,
referred to.
Special Reference No. I of 1964, [1965] 1 SCR 413, referred to.
H
684
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A
"Reg11ialion of Lmvyers - Problems of Law und Ethics", (Thrid Edition
- 1922) page 747, referred to.
3.1. The conte1nner made allegations in the second 'vrit petition in the
language as "it was improper" for the Chief Justice "to hear it (the first writ
petition)", "the course of action" by the Chief Justice "in dealing with the
B grouse of the petitioner and dismissing his petition, is totally unjust, unfair, arbitrary and unlawful. It is flagrant violation of mandate of Article
14"; " violation of the oath of ollice by" the Chief Justice; the Chief Justice
"responded that he (Solicitor General) was there to assist the Court, contrary to evidence of the Court proceedings"; "declare the respondent unfit
C to hold the office of Chief Justice of India", When these imputations were
pointed out to the contemner by three-Judge Bench while dismissing the
second "'rit petition, to be scandalous and reckless, he stated that he "stood
by" these allegations. He repeated the same with justification in his preliminary submissions. He has stated that the accusations made ''"'ere truthful
and "carefully worded". These imputations are obviously reckless apart
D from scandalising this Court, in particular, the Chief Justice of India, and
\\'ere intended to foul the process of the Court or lcnver or at any rate tend
to lower the authority of the Court in the estimate of the public and tend to
undermine the eflicacy of the judicial process. The accusations are gross
contempt. (722-F-H; 723-A]
E
3.2. It is the duty of the Court to hear and decide any matter posted
for adn1ission. Therefore, there is nothing improper for the Court presided
over by the Chief Justice of India to hear and decide the matter (the first
\\Tit petition). (721-G-H]
F
3.3. When the first writ petition came up for admission, the Court
sent for the Solicitor General to obtain information from the Government
as to the correctness of the allegations. Accordingly the Solicitor General
placed the record before the Court, and on perusal thereof the Court
declined to exercise the power under Article 32 of the Constitution. In the
G proceedings of the Court, recorded by the Staff, it was recorded that the
Solicitor General appeared in the Court in his official capacity. The counsel
as Solicitor General of India or in personal capacity obviously acted as
amicus on behalf of the Court. [721-H; 722-A-B; E-F]
3.4. The contemner stated that since the first writ petition was not ..
H disposed of by a Bench of not less than five Judges, the writ petition was
D.C. SAXENA v. J-!ON'BLE C.J.L
685
not dismissed in the eye of law and the order of dis1nissal "is non-est" and A
it is
11not decided and disposed of constitutionally". This assertion flies in
the face of the judicial finality of the order of this Court and tends to
question the authority of the Court. It creates tendency to obstruct the
administration of justice and, therefore, it,vould he an outrageous criminal
contempt. [723-B]
3.5. The conhnner in regard to the tjueStion posed by hin1 in the \\Tit
petition, nan1ely, "what are the legal consequences of the violation of oath
of oflice by
11 the Chief Justice, states in his 11reliminary sub1nissions that it
is a constitutional question re(fUired to be decided by a Constitution Bench.
The oath of office taken by a Judge of this Court is not that he should allow
every case or dismiss every case but only to uphold the Constitution and
B
c
the laws and to administer justice in accordance therewith in tune with the
oath of his office. The protection of Articles 124(4), 121, 211, the Judicial
Officer Protection Act and the Judges (Protection) Act is to ensure independence to the judiciary. Threat to judicial process is a challenge to the
authority of the Court or majesty of justice. It would be cx-facie contumaD
cious conduct. [726-A-C]
3.6. The contemner alleged that omission to record reasons was violative of the principles of natureal justice and the Chief Justice of Jodi&
committed impropriety in deciding the matter. It is not obligatory for this E
Court to give reasons .for dismissing the writ petition. Besides, the decision
is that of the Bench on behalf of the Court, and the Chief Justice, being the
seniormost among the members constituting the Bench, had spoken on
behalf of the Bench. Therefore, the attribution of improper motives scandalise the efficacy of judicial adjudication and per se contumaciously lowers
or at any rate tends to lower the dignity or authority of the Court. [723-C-D]
F
3.7. The prayers (a) to (d) seeking a declaration that the respondent
is unlit to hold the office of Chief Justice of India, that the Chief Justice be
stripped of the citizenship and seeking prosecution of the Chief' Justice,
though sought to be withdrawn, which would be of no conset1uence, are G
unbelievably outrageous contempt. [723-E]
4. The contemner by stating iu his writ petition that Chief Justice's
utmost reluctance to perform his fundamental duties and constitutional
obligations was apparent, which after failing to browbeat the 11etitioner ... n,
imputed motives to the Chief Justice in the discharge of his constitutional H
686
Sll l'REME CO\Jlff REPORTS [1996] SU PP. 3 S.C.R.
A
duty of deciding a case and that by not ad1nitting the \\Tit petition or by
dismissing it, the CJI \\'as reluctant to perform his constitutional duty.
Even in the 1nodified staten1ent, he attributed motives to CJJ in the perfr)rrnance of his constitutional duty \\'hile the Bench that dis1nissed the first
\\Tit petition consisted of' three Judges. By infereru.:e, he suggested the other
B
c
Judges to be mere non-entity. lfis revised imputation con1pounds the con1nlission of flagrant conte1npt by substituting: the '''ord
11bro\\'beat" \Vith the
\rords
11discerned reluctance". The conten1ner contnn1aciously attributed
motives to the Court, in particular to the presiding ofticer of the court, the
Chief Justice of India, and !hereby he scandalised the Court in the estimate
of the general public. [700-G; 701-B-0; 724-E]
5.l. The conten1ner, referring: to dismissal of his earlier \Vrit petition,
imputed to CJI, "and \Vithout recording the reasons for dismissing the
petition. So much for the vaunted adherence to the tnin principles of
transparancy and accountability". He imputed to the CJI to have facilitated
the Congress President to avoid payment of public dues. In his preliminary
D submission he had given justification for his attributing motives to CJI
stating that the Solicitor General handed over some documents to the
Bench, without supplying copies thereof to him and the Chief Justice asked
him to argue on the supposition that nothing has been given to the Bench.
In vie\\' of this, reference has been made to the "t,vin principles of
E transparancy and accountaliility". The insinuation tends to bring the Court
into contempt in the estimate of the general public and that the Court
lacked fairness, objectivity and dismissed the writ petition for known
reasons. It also tends to interfere with the administration of justice and
that the Court should give reasons lest the order be believed to be shrouded
with suspicion. Therefore, it is ex-facie contumacious. [724-A-B]
F
6. The contemner stated in the nrit petition, thus : can the Chief
Justice "be allowed to take shelter behind the cloak of judicial immunity,
particularly when unlike the President of India, who cannot be impleaded
in civil or criminal proceedings during his tenure of otlice, he enjoys no
G such constitutional protection?
11 This bravado not only in1pinges upon the
protection given by Article 124(4) of the Constitution and under relevant
provisions of the Protecti"n of Officials Act. Ex-facie it is an outrageous
tendency to lower the authority of the Court and interference nith judicial
administration. The assertion of the contemner that this is a constitution
conundrum rei1uired to be decided by a Constitution Bench of this Court
H highlights contumacious conduct of"the contemner. [725-C·D]
D.C. SAXENA v. IJON'IJLE C..1.1.
687
7. The contemncr further stated that "for "ilrully and advertently A
,·iolating the fundan1ental rights of not only the petitioner as an individual,
but that of the people of India, \Vho are ulthnately sovereign, has not "the
Lhief Justice "forfeited any legal protection, even if it \rere available to him".
The words "advertently" and "wilfully" do emphasise the emphatic tone of
the language and the n1otive of the conte1nner, and attribute rnotives to this
Court that the relief sought for in the first \\Tit pt'tition "advertently
11 \\'as B
not granted and was "wilfully" declined and thereby the Chier Justice lost
constitutional protection of not being prosecuted. This accusation is a
culnlination of the contumacious conduct of wanton scandalisation of the
Court and reckless denigration. In his an1ended petition, he further aggravates the conte1npt stating that the disn1issal of the first petition sent C
\\Tong signals to the entire judiciary of,vhich the respondent is the head as
Chief Justice of India. The scurrilous attack, therefore, is not only on the
respondent as a Judge but also as the Chief Justice of lnida and also as
head of the institution of the whole country. Thereby he designedly aud
deliberately allowed himself being brought within ex-facie criminal contempt. [725-E-H]
D
8. The contemner stated that uFor deliberate and \\'ilful failure to
perform his fundamental duties and stultifying their performance by the
petitioner "the Chief Justice should "be stripped of his citizenship". The
contemner attributed that the respondent as Chief Justice of India and as E
a Judge of this Court deliberately and wilfully failed to perform his fundamental duties by dismissing the "Tit petition and stultified the performance of fundamental duties by the petitioner. Thereby, he seeks stripping
of citizenship of the Chief Justice. It is an unbelievable outrageous affront
to the majesty of justice on the part of the contemner and scandalisation
of this Court. It tends to lower the dignity and authority of the Court and F
also so"'S seed for persons \\'ith similar propensity to undern1ine the
authority of the Court or the judiciary as a \\'hole. The contemner crossed
all boundaries of recklessness and indulged in 'vild accusations. He sought
justification in his preliminary submissions that it being a question of la\\',
it does not amount to personal hnputation or insinuation. This \\'ould G
further compound the contempt. [726-D-F]
9.1. The contemner alleged in the writ petition: "For allrming his son
who is practising: in the Supreme Court, to stay 'vith him in his oflicial
residence, and presurnably 1nisusing official facilities and prestige of office
of Chief Justice of India, is not" respondent "liable to be prosecuted under H
6R8
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 11990] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A Prevention of Corruption Act". The contemner sought justification to the
.said in1putation from reports said to have been published in a news
1nag:azine and a daily newspaper. But he has not placed on record the said
material. He also admitted that he did not make any independent enquiry
in this regard. For the said imputation he said that the Chief Justice of
B
India is liable to be prosecuted under the Prevention of Corruption Act.
The conten1ner in his preliminary subnlissions reiterated that this is a
ttuestion of la\\' based on infor1nation received. He stood by the in1putation
and reiterated with further justification in that behalf made in his preliminary submission. The persona! allegation against the Chief.Justice of India
of allowing his son to practise in the Supreme Court is false. His permitting
C his son to reside in his otlicial residence has no rele\'ance to the first \\-'rit
petition relating to the recovery of alleged dues frorn the Congress Presi~
dent. Irrelevancy of the accusations apart, the prayer for prosecution of the
Chief Justice oflndia under The Prevention of Corruption Act is an assault
on majesty of justice, affront to authority of law, the gravest conturnacious
conduct and scurrilous scandalisation of the Court. [704-G, 705-C-F]
D
K. Veeraswami v. Union of India & 01:1-., [1991] 3 SCR 189 and C.
Ravichandran Iyer v. Justice A.M. Bhaltachmjee & Ors., [1995] 5 SCC 457,
cited.
E
9.2. Article 124(4) of the Constitution read with the Judges (Inquiry)
Act prescribes the procedure to take action against a Judge of the Su1ireme
Court or of the High Court for proved misbehaviour or incapacity. Articles
121 and 211 of the Constitution prohibit discussion, in the Parliament or
in the Ligislature of a State, of the conduct of a Judge of the Supreme Court
or High Court respectively. Therefore, when the Constitution prohibits the
F discussion of the conduct of a Judge, by implication, no one has power to
accuse a Judge of his misbehaviour or incapacity except and in accordance
with the procedure prescribed in the Constitution and the Judges (Inquiry)
Act or as per the procedure laid down in Bhattachmjee's case. [727-C-F]
G
Ravichandran Iyer v. Justice A.M. Blzallac/1a1jee & Ors .• [1995] 5 SCC
457, relied on.
Ill. The contemner posed, is the respondent "not liable to pay from
his pocket not only legitimate cost incurred hy the petitioner but also the
foss caused to the public exchequer by non-payment of dues" by the ConH gress President'? This was reiterated in the preliminary submission. The
D.C. SAXENA v. HON.BLE CJ.I.
689
implication is that by judicial act, if a presiding judge dismisses a petition, A
he is liable to bear personally not only the costs incurred by the litigant hut
also the resultant loss to the State nith interest payable thereon. This
in1putation is a deliberate interference 'rith the judicial process and tends
to lower the authority of the Court spreading rippling effect on independence of the judiary, authority of the Court and \Vanton interference
\\'ith judicial process. It must be held to be a depraved contumacious
conduct. [728-A-C]
ll.l. The contemner stated in the writ petition that the seniormost
Judge of the court should be permitted to constitute a Constitution Bench
B
of judges "excluding any Judg:e \Vho O\\'es his elevation to the apex Court to
C
the respondent, and during its pcndcncy the respondent " may be advised
to proceed on leave, so that he niay not directly or indirecly influence any
of the Judges hearing the matter". In his prelin1inary objections he
reiterated the assertion. This relates to interference \'t'ith the judicial
management of the Court and the duty a Judge, and is a deliberate interference in the judicial 1nanagen1cnt tending to disaflcction in the cflicacy of D
<lispeusation ofjustit:e. [728-J)]
11.2. The contcmner further made an accusation that the Chief Justice of India should not constitute a Bench of the Judges appointed during
his tenure so that he (Chief Justice of India) may not directly or indirectly E
influence any of the Judges hearing the matter. It would thus be in unequivocal loud expression that the contemner attributed motives to the CJJ
that the Judges appointed during his tenure as Chief Justice are amenable
to his influence in judicial adjudication and \\'ould decide the causes by
1iressure or influence directly or indirectly brought by the Chief Justice of
India. Equally it is a corollary that these Judges are amenable to influence
F
and thereby they do not decide the cases before them legally and objectively.
The Court is subject to presume and decided cases under inlluence. These
allegations are flagrantly outrageous to scandalise the Court. Though the
contemner sought leave to n1odify this statement, ultimately, in his
an1ended statement, he did not touch upon this aspect and thus stood by G
his avern1ents calculatedly n1ade. Thus the conte1nner has cornmitted contempt of this Court under Article 129 of the Constitution. [728-F-GJ
S.P. Gupta v. U11io11 of !11diu, AIR (1982) SC 149, cited.
12.1. In a criminal contempt proceedings of sumn1ary nature, the H
690
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 119961SUPP.3 S.C.R.
A proor of n1ens rea is absolutely unnecessary. For~ criminal cont.empt as
defined in Section 2 (c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 any
enunu:rated or any other act apart, to create disaffection, disbelief in the
efficacy of judicial dispensation or tendency to obstruct administration of
justice or tendency to lower the authority or majesty oflaw by any act of the
B
parties, constitutes criminal contempt. Thereby it excludes the proof of
n1ens rea. What is relevant i~ that the offending or affront act produces
interference with or tendency to interfere with the course ofjustice. [717-A-B]
12.2. Absence of personal gain to seek in the list except said to have
been fired by public duty and has professed respect for the Court, are
C ileither relevant nor a defence for the offence of contempt. \Vhat is 1natt!rial
is the effect orthe offending act and not the act per se. [717-C]
12.3. It is, therefore, not necessary to establish actual intention on the
part of the contc1nner to interfere \\'ith the ad1ninistration of justice.
I\·faking rcckles:, allegations or vilification of the conduct of the Court or the
D judge \rould he contempt. Imputation of corrupt or itnproper motive in
judicial conduct would impair the etlicacy of judicial di.spensation and due
protection of the liberties of the citizen or due ad1ninistration of justice.
[717-~'-E]
13. The Court does not sit to try the conduct of a judge to whom the
E imputations are n1ade. It \\'01Ild not be open to the conte1nner to bring
fornard evidence or circumstances to justify or to show \\
1hether and lunv
fairly imputation were justified because the judge is not before the Court.
The defence justification to an imputation \rould not, therefore, be available
to the conten1ner. The imputation of improper motives or bias cannot be
justified on the principle of fair comment. [718-B]
F
14. When this Court pointed out the scandalous nature of accusations which found place in his petition, the contemner persisted for consideration of the ~aid accusations to lay proceeding against the Chief
Justice of India for prosecution and other reliefs. He stated that he \Vould
G stand by those accusations. He reiterated them in his preliminary subniissions \\ith further justification. He admitted that many of them are stringent and pungent. He rnodified some but by compounding further
contempt. In spite of the Solicitor General pointing out the seriousness of
the accusation and the conte1nner having consultation \rith son1e Advocates
at the Bar, he did not retract his steps. He did not tender any unconditional
H apology, though this Court is not bound to accept such an unconditional
D.C. SA,XENA v. HON'BLE C.J.I.
691
apology. [729-F-H, 730-A-C]
15. Considered fro1n the totality of the facts and circun1stances, the
gravest nu•gnitude of the contu1nacio11s conduct of the cnntcmner, he has
to he convicted. [7 30-C]
Per Bila111cl!a, J. (Concuning) :
1.1 A.ny act done or \\Titing published \\'hich is calculated to bring a
Court or a Judge into contenipt or to lower his authority or to intt:rfere \Vith
the due course of justice is a conten1pt of the court; scurrilous abuse of a
Judge or Court, or attacks on the personal character of a judge are acts of
contempt. [738-D]
R. v. Grey, [19110] 2 Q.ll., 36; He/more v. Smith, (1886) 35 Ch. D. 449;
Ambard v. A.G. for T1inided and To/Jago, (1936) A.C. 322; Re. A.G. of
Canada and Alexander ct al, (1976) 65 D.L.R. (3rd) 608 and Re. Wiseman,
(1969) NZLR 55, referred to.
1.2. The contempt jurisdiction is intended to uphold the authority
and dignity of the Courts of law \Vhichi on behalf of the State, deliver justice
and protect the public confidence that is reposed in them. [739-B]
A
B
c
D
2. The contempt notice to the alleged contemner pursuant to the E
order of dismissal of his second \\Tit petition \\'as issued in exercise of the
power of this Court, recognised by Article 129 of the Constitution, to punish
for contempt of itself. The issue of the constitutionality of the Contempt of
Courts Act is, therefore, not germane. 1739-C]
3. The contemner in the second \\Tit petition stated that the responF
dent (the Chief .Justice of India) had
11caused fabrication of court proceedings on 7th August, 1995 and \\as, therefore, liable to prosecution under the
relevant provisions of the Indian Penal Code". The relevant prayer of the
\\Tit petition \\'as that an F.I.R. be registered against the respondent under
the Indian Penal Code for con1mitting "forgery and fraud". The 1noditit:aG
tion 1nade by the contemner of the averments in this regard is that the
respondent \\'as responsible for
11inaccurate recording of the proceedings of
7th August 1995", and the prayer is sought to be deleted. 111e rnodilication
does not speak of inadvertant or inaccurate recording or express and regret
for the allegations of fabrication, forgery and fraud. The ·allegation of
inaccurate recording, as 1nade, suggests that such recording \\'as delibt!rate H
692
SUPREME COURT REPORTS j1996] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A and there is, therefore, no 1nore than some moderation of language. The
allegations of fabrication, forgery, fraud and inaccurate recording of
proceedings are n1ade in respect of a Judge in the perfortnance of his
judicial function. They are of a 1nost serious character. l'hey are intended
to lon,er the authority of and respect for the Court and the otlice of the
B
Judge. [739-G-H, 740-A-C]
4. There are allegations in the second writ petition that the respondent violated his oath of office and failed to perform his fundamental
duties. The summary dismissal of a writ petition by a judge is not a
violation of his oath or fundamental duties; at \\'orst, it might be a judicial
C error. The dis1nissal of a \Vrit petition cannot \\'arrant the charge of viola~
tion of his oath by a Judge; and no n1ore serious charge against a judge can
be rnade. \Vhat the conten1ner conveniently does not mention is that the
three .Judges (including the respondent) '''ho constituted the Bench found
no n1erit in the earlier writ petition and disrnissed it. The averment made
in the second writ petition that the earlier \Vrit petition ,,·as disrnissed by
D the respondent suggests that the other hro Judges counted for nothing.
This is also conten1pt. The allegations are scurrilous and scandalise the
Court. [740-D-E]
5. It is the duty of the Chief Justice of a Court lo assign judicial work
E to his brother judges. It was, therefore, the duty of the respondent to assign
the second \\Tit petition to a Bench to hear it. By doing so he did not, as is
alleged, become a Judge in his own cause. It is contempt to imply, as the
conten1ner does, that the respondent would assign it to a Bench \\
1hich
\Vould not 11ass an order adverse to hhn. It is also contempt to iinply that
Judges would be so amenable.