# DR. JIW AN LAL & ORS v. BRIJ MOHAN MEHRA & ANR

- **Citation:** [1973] 2 S.C.R. 230
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1972-09-14
- **Bench:** J. M. Shelat, 0. G. Palekar, S. N. Dwivedi
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/dr-jiw-an-lal-ors-v-brij-mohan-mehra-anr-5843
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

Specific Relief-Stipulation in contract for benefit of one party onlyIf could be u•aived by hi111-Specific perfonnance-Delay in filing suit
for-lrlren 1naterial.
·
The appellant and re5pondcnts enterd into a contract under which,
from the very inception, the respondents became liable to sell their immov·
able property and the appellants became liable to buy it. One of the terms
of '.'le contract provided that if the property was requisitioned by the Gov·
ernnent prior t~ the registration of the sale-deed the respondents should
refund the earnest money paid by the appellants with interest. The premises were requisitioned before the execution of the sale-deed. The res·
pondnts tendered a cheque 'for the earnest money with interest and filed
an appeal
again;t
the order
6[ requisition
but
the
appeal
WO'
dbmissed.
NOl\\'ithstanding
the
requisition,
the
appellants
~·ere repeatedly asking the respondents to exe:cute the sale-deed in accordance with the agreement. As the respondents did not do so, the appellants
filed a suit for specific performance of the contract about two years after
the respondent's appeal against the order of requisition was dismissed. The
trial court decreed the suit but the High Court reversed the decree.
Allowing the appeal to this Court,
HELD: (I) There is nothing in the agreement to show that non·
requisitioning of the property was a condition precedent to the performance
of the seller's (respondent's) obligation ·.o sell the premises or that the contruct came to an end on the requisitioning of the prcn1iscs.
On the contrary, the no'.l-rcquisitioning of the premise~ was a condition precedent t~
the performance of the buyer's (appclbnts) obligation to buy the pre·
mises.
That is. when the premises were requisitioned. the appellants
could rescind the contract if they so desired.
As the clause relating to
requisitioning \vas inserted for the excl11sil'e benefit of the 1·endc•c and- not
for the benefit of the vendor as well as the vendee and it did not create
any liabilities against the vendee the appellants (vendee) could waive,
unilaterally, the condition precedent spcc;ificd in the clause. (238D-E. H:
236A]
Dalsukh Af. Pane/Joli v. The Guarantee Life and E111p/oyn1e11t Insurance Co. Ltd. and Others, A.LR. 1947 P.C. 182.
Hawksley '· Outram,
[1892] 3 Ch. 259 and Morrell v. S111dd and Miili1won. [19131 2 Ch. 648.
1crerred to.
(2) Where it \\'ould be uniust to give :i. remedy to a party either because he has. by his couduct. done that which might fairly be regarded a'
an equivalent to a \i,·aiver of it ort where by his conduct and neglect he
has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy. put the other party in a
situation in which it would not he reasonahle to place him if the remedy
were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and
delay are material. [236G-H: 237AJ
In the present case, the appeIJants never abandoned their rights und"r
the contract. They were justified in waiting till the elate of disposal of
the appeal against the order of requii;ition in the hope th['tt the order of
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JIWANLAL v. B. M. MEHRA (Dwivedi, J.)
231
requisition might be set aside in appeal.
Thereafter, they were pressing
the respondents to execute the sale deed. Therefore, they never waived the
remedy of specific performance .
. Further there is no allegation in the respondent's written statement
that they would be prejudiced by the specific perfcrmance, nor is there
any evidenc to that effect.
Therefore, the delay in the institution of the suit had not caused any
disadvantage to the respondents.
Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Hurd, L.R., S P.C. applied.
[Directions regarding execution of the sale deed given]
CIVIL APPELLP.TE JURISDICTION : C.A. No. 1100 of 1967.
Appeal by certificate from the judgment and decree dated
January 25, 1966 of the Punjab High Court at Chandigarh in
Civil Regular First Appeal No. 362 of 1964.
C. K. Daphtary, M. C. Chag/a, S. K. Mehta, K. R. Nagaraja,
D
M. Qamaruddin,

## Text

230
DR. JIW AN LAL & ORS.
v.
BRIJ MOHAN MEHRA & ANR.
September 14, 1972
[J. M. SHELAT, 0. G. PALEKAR AND S. N. DWIVEDI, JJ.]
Specific Relief-Stipulation in contract for benefit of one party onlyIf could be u•aived by hi111-Specific perfonnance-Delay in filing suit
for-lrlren 1naterial.
·
The appellant and re5pondcnts enterd into a contract under which,
from the very inception, the respondents became liable to sell their immov·
able property and the appellants became liable to buy it. One of the terms
of '.'le contract provided that if the property was requisitioned by the Gov·
ernnent prior t~ the registration of the sale-deed the respondents should
refund the earnest money paid by the appellants with interest. The premises were requisitioned before the execution of the sale-deed. The res·
pondnts tendered a cheque 'for the earnest money with interest and filed
an appeal
again;t
the order
6[ requisition
but
the
appeal
WO'
dbmissed.
NOl\\'ithstanding
the
requisition,
the
appellants
~·ere repeatedly asking the respondents to exe:cute the sale-deed in accordance with the agreement. As the respondents did not do so, the appellants
filed a suit for specific performance of the contract about two years after
the respondent's appeal against the order of requisition was dismissed. The
trial court decreed the suit but the High Court reversed the decree.
Allowing the appeal to this Court,
HELD: (I) There is nothing in the agreement to show that non·
requisitioning of the property was a condition precedent to the performance
of the seller's (respondent's) obligation ·.o sell the premises or that the contruct came to an end on the requisitioning of the prcn1iscs.
On the contrary, the no'.l-rcquisitioning of the premise~ was a condition precedent t~
the performance of the buyer's (appclbnts) obligation to buy the pre·
mises.
That is. when the premises were requisitioned. the appellants
could rescind the contract if they so desired.
As the clause relating to
requisitioning \vas inserted for the excl11sil'e benefit of the 1·endc•c and- not
for the benefit of the vendor as well as the vendee and it did not create
any liabilities against the vendee the appellants (vendee) could waive,
unilaterally, the condition precedent spcc;ificd in the clause. (238D-E. H:
236A]
Dalsukh Af. Pane/Joli v. The Guarantee Life and E111p/oyn1e11t Insurance Co. Ltd. and Others, A.LR. 1947 P.C. 182.
Hawksley '· Outram,
[1892] 3 Ch. 259 and Morrell v. S111dd and Miili1won. [19131 2 Ch. 648.
1crerred to.
(2) Where it \\'ould be uniust to give :i. remedy to a party either because he has. by his couduct. done that which might fairly be regarded a'
an equivalent to a \i,·aiver of it ort where by his conduct and neglect he
has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy. put the other party in a
situation in which it would not he reasonahle to place him if the remedy
were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and
delay are material. [236G-H: 237AJ
In the present case, the appeIJants never abandoned their rights und"r
the contract. They were justified in waiting till the elate of disposal of
the appeal against the order of requii;ition in the hope th['tt the order of
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JIWANLAL v. B. M. MEHRA (Dwivedi, J.)
231
requisition might be set aside in appeal.
Thereafter, they were pressing
the respondents to execute the sale deed. Therefore, they never waived the
remedy of specific performance .
. Further there is no allegation in the respondent's written statement
that they would be prejudiced by the specific perfcrmance, nor is there
any evidenc to that effect.
Therefore, the delay in the institution of the suit had not caused any
disadvantage to the respondents.
Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Hurd, L.R., S P.C. applied.
[Directions regarding execution of the sale deed given]
CIVIL APPELLP.TE JURISDICTION : C.A. No. 1100 of 1967.
Appeal by certificate from the judgment and decree dated
January 25, 1966 of the Punjab High Court at Chandigarh in
Civil Regular First Appeal No. 362 of 1964.
C. K. Daphtary, M. C. Chag/a, S. K. Mehta, K. R. Nagaraja,
D
M. Qamaruddin, K. S. Suri and R. K. Mehtq, for the appellants.
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H
M. C. Seta/vad, S. T. Desai and /. N. Shroff for respon-
. dent No. 1.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DwIVEDI, J. This is an appeal against the judgment and decree
of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, dated January 25,
1966. The High Court reversed the judgment and decree of the
Subordinate Judge, 1st Class, Ari:tritsar, dated August 17, 1964.
The Subordinate Judge had decreed the plaintiffs' suit for possession of the premises by specific performance of the agreement to
sell. The High Court dismissed the suit.
Brij Mohan Mehra, one of the respondents, was the defendant,
and the appellants were the plaintiffs in the suit. There was an
agreement between Dr. Jiwan Lal, the first appellant, Shri Krishan
Das the second appellant, and one Bal Kishan Das, the predecessor in interest of the appellants Nos. 3 to 8 and Brij Mohan Mehra.
It was concluded on December 9, 1959. By that agreement Brij
Mohan agreed to sell the premises in suit to Dr. Jiwan Lal, Shri
Kishan Das and Bal Kishan Das. The sale consideration was
Rs. 122500/-. The prospective vendees paid Rs. 10,0001as
earnest money. The balance of the sale consideration was to be
paid by them at the time of the registration of the sale deed. The
material terms inGorporated in els. 5, 6, 7 and 9 of the agreement
are set out here :
· 5. The sale deed shall be executed and registered
by the vendor in favour of the purchasers within three
232
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973] 2 S.C.R.
months from the date when the premises are vacated by
the Income-tax Authorities and intimation is given to the
purchasers b,y the vendor per registered pos1.
6. In the event ~f the above said premises, which is
the subject matter of sale not being vaca1ed by the
lncome~tax Authorities or is subsequently requisitioned
by 1he Government prior to the registration of the saledeed the vendor shall refund to the purchaser the sum
of Rs. 10,0001- (Rupees ten thousand only) received
by the vendor as earnest money plus interest at the rate
of 6 per cent per annum.
7. If even after the vendor having satisfied the purchasers regarding the title of the premises whic.h are the
subject matter of sale, the Purchasers do not complete
the sale-deed and have it registered within the stipulated
period as mentioned in clause No. 5 above, the earnest
money so paid by the Purchasers to the Vendor shall
stand forfeited for non-performance of the contract hereinfore entered into,. and the Vendor shall be at liberty
to retain or re-sell the property.
9. From 1he date from which the above said premises
are vacated by the Income-tax Authorities to the date of
execution and registrntion of the sale-deed the Vendor
shall affect such repairs as may be necessary with the
consent of the Purchasers at the expense ot the Purchasers.
The purchasers shall be liable to pay after
such repairs etc. are effected. all expenses and incidentals
incurred in connection therewith by the vendor before
the sale deed is executed and tendered for regis•tration.
The 'purchasers shall also pay for and on account of the
Chowkidar to look after and maintain the condition of
'lhe premises in good order till the execution and registration 6f the sale-deed.
·
The premises were requisitioned by the Additional District
Magistrate, Amritsar on January 23,
1960.
Thereafter Brij
Mohan Mehra refused to execute the sale-deed in spite of the
requests of the prospective vendees.
So the plaintiffs instituted
their suit. · Their case was that the premises were requisitioned
on the manipulation of Brij Mohan Mehra, that clause 6 of the
agreement was intended to. be for the benefit of the prospective
vendees, that the prospective vendees waived the
condition in
ch,6. th:1t Brij Mohan Mehra could not· put an end to the contract
by relying on cl. 6. and that the plaintiffs have. always been ready
3nd willing to perforin their part of the Ob}igatiqn · tinder tbe
~1gree1nent.
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J!WANLAL v. B. M. MEHRA (Dwivedi, J.)
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Brij Mohan Mehra contested their claim.
His case was that
the. agreement was a contingent agreement, that it became void
on the requisitioning of the premises, that no contract ever came
to existence prior to the requisitioning of the premises, that he
did not manipulate for the requisition of the premises, that the
plaintiffs could not waive the condition in cl. 6, that they were
not ready and willing to perform their obligation under the agreement and that they were guilty of !aches and should be deemed
to have abondoned their rights under the agreement.
The Subordinate Judge held that the plaintiffs were
always
ready and willing to. perform their obligation under the
agreernent.
The agreement did not become void on the requisitioning
of the premises and Brij Mohan Mehra had manipulated for the
requisitioning of the premises.
He could not rescind the contract
by relying on cl. 6.
The plaintiffs waived the condition in cl. 6
and insisted on buying the property.
They were not guilty of
!aches and they did not abondon their claim under the agreement.
On those findings, the Subordinate Judge decreed the plaintiffs'
suit.
On appeal by Brij Mohan Mehra, the High Court--: reversed
the d~cree and dismissed the suit.
The High Court .·field that
cl. 6 of the agreement imposed obligations on Brij Mohan Mehra
to sell and on the prospective vendees to buy only if vacant posession could be delivered to the latter and not otherwise.
As soon
as the premises were requisitioned the entire contract fell through
and thereafter there subsisted no c1iforceable obligation on either
side.
The prospective vendees could not waive the condition in
cl. 6.
On those findings and without expressing
any
opinion
about the other findings of the Subordinate Judge, the High
Court reversed his decree.
The following p_oints arise for determination by this Court.
( l) Was there a concluded contract'!
(2) Was the non-requisitioning of the premises a
condition precedent to· the performance of the
seller" s obligation to sell ?
(3) Was the non-requisitioning of the premises a
condition precedent to the performance of the
buyers' obligation to buy ?
( 4) ·Could the buyers waive the condition
and
insist on th~ performance of the
seller's obligation ?
( 5 J Were the buyers guilty of !aches and was there
abandonment of their claim ?
234
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973] 2 S,C,,R.
Re. Point No. 1.
Neither party· has argued that there was no formation of the
contract between the parties.
The contract was not made 'subject to the non-requisitioning of the premises'.
By cl. 1 of the
agreement, the vendor agreed to sell and the purchasers agreed
to purchase the premises.
Clause 5 makes the vendor liable to
execu'.-: a sale deed wiihin a certain time.
So there was a concluded contract between the parties.
The seller became liable to
sell and the buyer became liable to buy from the very inception
of the contract.
Re. PoiM No. 2.
Even though the agreement was drawn on the legal advice of
one Mohan Singh, a lawyer for both parties, clause · 6 of the
agreement does not expressly subject the seller's obligation to sell
to the contingency of the non-requisitioning of . the
premises.
Nor does it say that the contract would come to an end on the
requisitioning of the premises.
Brij Mohan Mehra has
~en
care to use clear and specific language in els. 7 and 9 to safe·
guard his interests. If it were intended that his obligation to
sell should come to an end on the requisitioning of the premises,
there is no reason why cL 6 should not have expressed that intention fairly clearly.
Brij Mohan Mehra, the prospective vendor,
is a businessman.
It is difficult to conceive that he would have
negotiated for the right to rescind the contract in the event of the
reqmsitioning of the premises, for the sale price of a vacant premises is usually higher than the sale price of an occupied · premises.
By subjecting his obligation to sell to the non-requisitioning of the premises he would have put himself at a disadvantage.
It is evident from cl. 6 that the object of the prospective vendees
was to obtain vacant possession of the premises.
But we
are
unable to discern anything in the agreement to show that it was
also the object of the prospective vendor.
As already indicated,
he stood to gain nothing from that object.
Clause 9 of the
agreement provides that the vendor would make repairs between
the date of vacating the premises by the Income-tax Authorities
and the date of the execution of the sale deed with the consent
of the yendees ai their expense. The want of a provision in the
agreement fixing responsibility for the repairs after the
requisitioning of the premises would not suggest that the non-requisitioning of the premises was a condition precedent to the performance
of the seller's obligation to sell.
After the requisition, the repair
ex;penses would be a matter to be settled between the requisitioning authority and the owner of the
premises.
Accordingly
"1' proYision like the one in cl 9 could not be inserted in the agreement.
According to cl. 6. the vendor becomes liable on
the
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JIWANLAL v. B. M. MEHR:A (Dwivedi, !.)
235
requisitioning of the premises to refund tl,le earnest money of
Rs. 10,000/· with interest at 6% per annum. The term for
payment of interest should not present any difficulty in the cal·
culation of interest if it is held that the seller's obligation to sell
was not subject to the contingency of the non-requisitioning of
the premises.
We are satisfied that the interest became payable
not from the date of the non-requisitioning of the premises, but
from tlie date of the payment of the earnest money. . In qther
words, the interest would accrue from December 9, 1959, the
date on which the agreement was executed.
That it is so, is
also .. evident from the conduct of Brij Mohan Mehra.
When the
premises were requisitioned he sent a letter on February 11, 1960
along with a cheque for Rs. 10, 103 .28 to the prospective vendees.
In the letter he has expressly stated that the interest has been cal·
culatcd from .December 9, 1959 to. February 11,
1960.
The
accrual of interest after the date of the requisitioning of the pre·
mises c<mld be prevented by tendering the amount of the· earnest
money to the prospective vendees.
The term for interest in
cl. 6 would not therefore indicate that the seller's obligation to
sell was subject to the condition of the non-requisitioning of the
premises.
In our view there is nothing in the agreement in gene·
ral and in cl. 6 in particular to show that the non-requisitioning
of the premises was a condition precedent to the performance of
the seller's obligation to sell the premises, or that the contract
came to an end on the requisitioning of the Premises.
Re. Point No. 3
Mohan Singh is a lawyer.
The agreement was drawn with
his legal advice.
He has appeared as a witness for Brij Mohan
Mehra.
He has stated that the prospective vendees wanted to
purchase the premises for setting up a hotel. Naturally, they
would be keen on getting vacant possession of the premises.
Accordingly they would-negotiate for the right to rescind the
contract in the event of the requisitioning of the premises. Clause
6 . expressly imposes an obligation on the vendor to refund the
earnest niciney wi~1. in~erest. There is impliedly created thereby
a correspondmg nght m the· bu).'ers to demand back the earnest
money with· interest.
The right to demand back the earnest
money necessarily implies the right to rescind the contract Tue
refund could i;ot be claimed as long as the contract remained in
force .. '!'f e thmk that the non-requisitioning of the premises was
~ condition preceden~ to the performance of the buyers' obligation to buy the prem~ses. When the premises were requisitioned
the buyers could rescmd the contract, if they so desired.
Re. Point No. 4
As alr~ady discussed, cl. 6 was inserred in the agreement for
the exclu~1ve benefit of the vendees and not for the benefit of the-
236
SUPREME COURT !lEPORTS
[1973] 2 s.c.R.
vender as well as the vendees. So the vendees could waive the
condition precedent specified in cl. 6. In Dalsukh M: PanchQli
v. The Guarantee Life and Employment Insurance Co., Ltd. and
9thers(1), there was an agreement for sale of immovable prO-:
perty.
The property was under attachment by an order of the
Court and was about to be sold by public auction.
A certain
amount was paid by the prospective vendee as earnest money.
Clause 4 of the agr.i;:ement provided that the balance of. the sale
consideration would be paid before the Sub-Registrar. at the time
of the registration of the sale deed within 30. days of the approval
of the Court to the agreement.
The Court did not approve the
offer.
Thereupon the vendor asserted that the contract has c<Qme/
to an end, while the vendee counter-claimed th.at as he has waived
the condition in cl. 4, the contract subsisted.
The Privy Council held that as the condition in cl. 4 "was not excl~ively for th~
·benefit of the purchaser" it could not be waived by him and· that
the entire contract fell through. It would follow that where a
stipulation is for the exclusive benefit of one contracting· party
and does not create liabilities against him he can waive it unilakrally. (See also Hawksley v. Outram( 2 ) and Morrell v. Studd
and Millington(').
Re. Point No. 5
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The agreement was made on December 9, 1959. The premises were requisitioned by an order dated January 23, 1960.
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Brij Mohan Mehra filed an appeal against the order of requisition.
It was dismissed on August 1, 1960. The suit was instituted on
November 5, 1962.
As the appeal was pending, the ' plaintiffs
could reasonably wait until August 1, 1960 in the hope that the
order of requisition might be set aside· in appeal.
So no legiti-.
tnate objection can be taken on' the score of delay until August
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I, 1960.
The suit was instituted within two years, three. months
and four days of the dismissal of appeal on August 1, 1960. It
is now to be seen whether this delay is such as would disentitle
the plaintiffs to the relief of ·specific performance of the contract.
In lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Hurd('); Lord Selborne said:
"The doctrine of Jaches in courts of equity is not
an arbitrary or technical doctrine.
Where it would be
practically unjust to give a remedy either because the
party has by his conduct done that which. might fairly
be regarded as an equivalent to a waiver of it, or where
by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not
waiving that remedy put th~ o~her party i:n a situation
in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the
<Jf A.LR. 1947 P.C. 182.
(2) (1892] 3 Ch. 359 at page 376
<il [1913] 2 Ch. 618 at p:\ge 66~.
(4) Low Reports 5 P.C. 221 (at page 2391
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JIWAN LAL v. B. M. MEHRA (Dwivedi J.)
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remedy were afterwards to ):le asserted, in either of
these cases lapse of time and delay are most material."
In his written ·'Statement Brij Mo.ian Mehra pleaded only
waiver and not also that he would be prejudiced by specific performance.
TJ_tere was considerable correspondence between the
parties.between February 11, and April 27,
1960. In their
letters· the prospective ve.ndees repeatedly asked Brij
Mohan
Mehrn to execute a sale deed in accordance with the agreement.
They_ .also said that they were ready and willing to pay the sale
consideration stipulated in the agreell}erit. But Brij Mohan Mehra
persisted in his refusal to execute the sale deed.
Eventually .on
April 17, 1960 one Sardari Lal Sachdev, Advocate, gave notice
on behalf of the proS'pective vendees to .. Shri Hans Raj Mittal,
Advocate, for Brij Mohan Mehra. It is said in that notice that
the prospective vendees would attend the office of the Sub-Registrar, Amritsar on April 30, 1960 between 10 A.M. and 12 noon
and ·that Brij Mohan Mehra should reach there to get the sale
deed registered.
As April 30, 1960 was a holiday, the prospective vendees later sent a telegram to Brij Mohan Mehra to appear
before. the Sub-Registrar and produced before him a sum of
Rs. 1,12,500/-. The money was counted by the clerk of the
Sub-Registrar.
Brij Mohan Mehra did not appear before the
Sub-Registrar on that date.
The Sub-Registrar has
supported
this version of the plaintiffs.
Dr. Jiwan Lal, one of the plaintiffs,
has deposed that even after April 29, 1960, he had been asking
Brij Mohan Mehra to execute a registered sale deed but he had
been evading.
One Mr. Ranbir Mehta went along with him to
Brij Mohan Mehra for the same
purpose.
But Brij
Mohan
Mehra told him that as the premises had been attached by the
Rani of Kashmir he should wait for some time.
Dr. Jiwan Lal
then added : "Thereaftet I went and asked him to complete the
sam~ but he continued to evade."
There appears to be no crossexamination on this part of his statement on behalf of Brij
Mohan Mehra.
Dr. Jiwan Lal denied in his cross-examination
that the plaintiffs had abondonecl their claim.
It is not possible
to believe that the plaintiffs, who were so insistant on the execution ·of the sale deed in their favour and who had actually appeared before the Sub-Registrar with the requisite amount of money
for payment to the vendor, would abandon their claim after
April 29 or August 1, 1960.
There is no reason to disbelieve
Dr. Jiwan .Lal's staten~~nt that even after April 29, 1960, he had
been pressing upon BnJ Mohan Mehra to execute a re"i>tered sale
deed.
In our opinion the plaintiffs did not abandon etheir rights
under the agreement.
The institution of the suit after two years
does not appear to have caused any disadvanta"e to Brij Mohan
Mehra.
As already stated earlier, there is no :uch allegation in
238
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973] 2 s.c.R.
his written statement nor is there a11y evidence to that effect.
Brij Mohan Mehra has admitted in his cross-examination that the
prices of properties started depreciating in or about October 1962
when there Wi!S Chinese aggression on India.
The suit was
instituted after the Chinese aggression.
So it cannot be said that
the specific performance of the agreement was likely to cause any
prejudice to Brij Mohan Mehra on the date of the institution of
the suit.
The suit cannot accordingly be dismissed on account
of delay.
In view of our earlier findings, it is not necessary to decide
whether the requisitioning of the premises was a manoeuvre of
Brij Mohan Mehra to slide back'from the agreement.
We set aside the judgment and decree of the High Court. The
suit of the plaintiffs is decreed.
Brij Mohan Mehra is directed
to execute a sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs ,in terms of the
agreement, dated December 9, 1959, on the plaintiffs tendering
to him a sum of Rs. 112500/- and necessary expenses for execution and registration of the sale deed within two months from
today. If Brij Mohan Mehra fails to execute the sale deed, the
plaintiffs should deposit the requisite amount in the trial court
within three months from today and apply for the execution of the
decree for execution of the sale deed.
The plaintiffs shall get
their costs throughout from Brij Moh.an Mehra.
Appeal allowed.
V.P,S.
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