# Dr. Sohail Malik v. Union of India & Anr

- **Citation:** 2025 INSC 1415
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2025-12-10
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 404 of 2024
- **Bench:** J.K. Maheshwari, Vijay Bishnoi
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/dr-sohail-malik-v-union-of-india-anr-38086
- **Pages:** 43

## Headnote

Issue arose whether the Internal Complaints Committee-ICC
constituted in one department of the Central Government has the
jurisdiction to entertain a complaint of sexual harassment under
the POSH Act against an employee of a different department of
the Central Government; whether the use of the words 'where the
respondent is an employee' as contained in s.11 of the POSH Act
would mandate that ICC proceedings must be instituted and carried
out at the workplace of the 'respondent' instead of the workplace
of the aggrieved woman where incident occurred and complaint
was made; and if not, under the scheme of s.13, how is action
supposed to be taken by the department of the 'respondent' in
pursuance of the findings of the ICC constituted at the aggrieved
woman's department; and whether the proceedings of the ICC
constituted at the workplace of the aggrieved woman, have caused
any prejudice to the appellant, warranting interference by this Court.
Headnotes†
Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention,
Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 - ss.2(o), 2(o)(v), 9,
11 - Complaint of sexual harassment - Jurisdiction of
Internal Complaints Committee-ICC - ICC constituted in one
Government Department, if can entertain a complaint under the
Act against the appellant working at a different Government
Department at the relevant time - IAS officer alleged that the
appellant IRS officer, sexually harassed her at her workplaceKrishi Bhawan, New Delhi - FIR by the aggrieved woman
against the appellant - Subsequently, complaint under the
POSH Act presented before the ICC constituted u/s.9 at the
aggrieved woman's department/workplace-Department of Food
and Public Distribution - Pursuant thereto ICC issued meeting
* Author
506
[2025] 12 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
notice/order to the appellant - Appellant filed application
before the tribunal challenging jurisdiction of ICC, however
the same was dismissed - High Court upheld the said order -
Correctness:
Held: Aggrieved woman can approach ICC of her own department
against harassment by an employee of another workplace -
Phrase 'where the respondent is an employee' in s.11, cannot be
interpreted to mean that ICC proceedings against 'respondent' may
only be instituted before the ICC constituted at the workplace of
the 'respondent' - Such restrictive interpretation of the POSH Act
contrary to the scheme and object of the Act and its intent as a
social welfare legislation, specifically in light of the wide definition of
the term 'workplace' in s.2(o)(v) which include any place visited by
the employee 'arising out of or during the course of employment' -
U/s.13, recommendations and report of the ICC are to be sent to
the 'employer' which shall then take a decision with respect to
initiation of disciplinary action - In light of the OM dt 6.07.2025,
ICC has a dual-role-to conduct the preliminary/fact-finding inquiry
under POSH Act and to act as the inquiry authority in the formal
disciplinary proceedings under the CCS CCA Rules, 1965, since
nothing prevents the ICC constituted at the Department of the
aggrieved woman from conducting the preliminary/fact-finding
inquiry and upon receiving the report of the ICC, if the employer
initiates disciplinary proceedings, the ICC constituted at the
Department of the 'respondent' shall act as the inquiry authority in
the disciplinary proceedings - In case the ICC constituted at the
aggrieved woman's workplace is conducting a fact-finding inquiry
under the POSH Act, the employer of the 'respondent', even if it
is a different department, must abide its duties u/s.19(f) to swiftly
cooperate and make available information upon a request by the
ICC of the aggrieved woman's workplace, which has duly been
complied with - 'Respondent' not shown that any prejudice has
been caused to him due to the proceedings being carried out by
the ICC constituted at the workplace of the aggrieved woman.
[Para 72]
Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention,
Prohibition and

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[2025] 12 S.C.R. 505 : 2025 INSC 1415
Dr. Sohail Malik
v.
Union of India & Anr.
(Civil Appeal No. 404 of 2024)
10 December 2025
[J.K. Maheshwari* and Vijay Bishnoi, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Issue arose whether the Internal Complaints Committee-ICC
constituted in one department of the Central Government has the
jurisdiction to entertain a complaint of sexual harassment under
the POSH Act against an employee of a different department of
the Central Government; whether the use of the words 'where the
respondent is an employee' as contained in s.11 of the POSH Act
would mandate that ICC proceedings must be instituted and carried
out at the workplace of the 'respondent' instead of the workplace
of the aggrieved woman where incident occurred and complaint
was made; and if not, under the scheme of s.13, how is action
supposed to be taken by the department of the 'respondent' in
pursuance of the findings of the ICC constituted at the aggrieved
woman's department; and whether the proceedings of the ICC
constituted at the workplace of the aggrieved woman, have caused
any prejudice to the appellant, warranting interference by this Court.
Headnotes†
Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention,
Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 - ss.2(o), 2(o)(v), 9,
11 - Complaint of sexual harassment - Jurisdiction of
Internal Complaints Committee-ICC - ICC constituted in one
Government Department, if can entertain a complaint under the
Act against the appellant working at a different Government
Department at the relevant time - IAS officer alleged that the
appellant IRS officer, sexually harassed her at her workplaceKrishi Bhawan, New Delhi - FIR by the aggrieved woman
against the appellant - Subsequently, complaint under the
POSH Act presented before the ICC constituted u/s.9 at the
aggrieved woman's department/workplace-Department of Food
and Public Distribution - Pursuant thereto ICC issued meeting
* Author
506
[2025] 12 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
notice/order to the appellant - Appellant filed application
before the tribunal challenging jurisdiction of ICC, however
the same was dismissed - High Court upheld the said order -
Correctness:
Held: Aggrieved woman can approach ICC of her own department
against harassment by an employee of another workplace -
Phrase 'where the respondent is an employee' in s.11, cannot be
interpreted to mean that ICC proceedings against 'respondent' may
only be instituted before the ICC constituted at the workplace of
the 'respondent' - Such restrictive interpretation of the POSH Act
contrary to the scheme and object of the Act and its intent as a
social welfare legislation, specifically in light of the wide definition of
the term 'workplace' in s.2(o)(v) which include any place visited by
the employee 'arising out of or during the course of employment' -
U/s.13, recommendations and report of the ICC are to be sent to
the 'employer' which shall then take a decision with respect to
initiation of disciplinary action - In light of the OM dt 6.07.2025,
ICC has a dual-role-to conduct the preliminary/fact-finding inquiry
under POSH Act and to act as the inquiry authority in the formal
disciplinary proceedings under the CCS CCA Rules, 1965, since
nothing prevents the ICC constituted at the Department of the
aggrieved woman from conducting the preliminary/fact-finding
inquiry and upon receiving the report of the ICC, if the employer
initiates disciplinary proceedings, the ICC constituted at the
Department of the 'respondent' shall act as the inquiry authority in
the disciplinary proceedings - In case the ICC constituted at the
aggrieved woman's workplace is conducting a fact-finding inquiry
under the POSH Act, the employer of the 'respondent', even if it
is a different department, must abide its duties u/s.19(f) to swiftly
cooperate and make available information upon a request by the
ICC of the aggrieved woman's workplace, which has duly been
complied with - 'Respondent' not shown that any prejudice has
been caused to him due to the proceedings being carried out by
the ICC constituted at the workplace of the aggrieved woman.
[Para 72]
Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention,
Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 - s.11 - Inquiry into the
complaint - Textual interpretation of s.11 - Meaning of the
word 'where' as used therein:
[2025] 12 S.C.R.
507
Dr. Sohail Malik v. Union of India & Anr.
Held: s.11(1) envisages three distinct situations or contingencies,
followed by how inquiry into a complaint is to be carried out by the
ICC or Local Committee - Use of the word 'where' as it occurs in the
contingency (i) and (ii), refers to two different conditions precedent/
situations, where contingency (i) relates to a situation in case the
'respondent' is 'employee' under the meaning as prescribed under
the POSH Act, inquiry must be made by the ICC in accordance
with the service rules applicable to him, and contingency (ii) relates
to a situation in case no such rules exist, it shall be inquired into
by ICC in such manner as prescribed - Contingency (iii) is a
different situation altogether-in case the 'respondent' is a domestic
worker, the Local Committee shall, on taking a prima facie view
about the existence of a case against 'respondent', forward the
complaint to the police - Contingency (i) and (iii) operate in the
form of 'either-or' - Grammatical function of the word 'where' as
appearing in s.11 is that of a 'conditional conjunction'- When the
section is read as a whole, it has been constructed in the form of
'where and where or, detailing three different contingencies and
the procedure to be followed in each contingency - Merely the
phrase 'where the respondent is an employee' cannot be read in
isolation, all parts of the section must be read together to find out
a workable conclusion - In case the 'respondent' is an 'employee',
the ICC is obligated to apply the service rules applicable to him,
but it does not mean that the ICC constituted at the workplace
of the aggrieved woman cannot exercise jurisdiction - As such,
the construction of s.11 is in the nature of a procedural section
rather than one that lays down jurisdictional restraints. [Paras 42,
43, 45, 46]
Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention,
Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 - s.11 - Inquiry into
the complaint - Respondent, if to be employee of the same
workplace as aggrieved woman:
Held: Definitions of the word 'employee' and 'workplace' are
completely neutral, as they do not suggest that the 'respondent'
must necessarily be an employee of the workplace where the
aggrieved woman works - Expansive definitions of the words
"respondent, employee and workplace" enable the ICC constituted
at the aggrieved woman's workplace to exercise jurisdiction over
an employee of a different workplace - None of these definitions
provide that the 'respondent' must necessarily be an employee of
508
[2025] 12 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
the same workplace where the aggrieved woman works - It cannot
be said that in view of s.19(h), the only remedy available to the
aggrieved woman when the perpetrator of sexual harassment is
an outsider (employee of a different workplace) is to register a
complaint under the IPC through the employer, since s.19(h) makes
it a duty of the employer to facilitate the initiation of action under
the IPC if the aggrieved woman so desires, it is not in derogation
or exclusion of the power to initiate proceedings under the POSH
Act - Even where the 'respondent' is not an employee anywhere,
criminal proceedings may be initiated. [Paras 47, 49, 50]
Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention,
Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 - Contextual Interpretation
of provisions of the POSH Act - Intent, purpose and context
of the Act:
Held: POSH Act was enacted by the legislature, recognizing the
legislative void - Its intent is to uphold women's right to equality
u/Arts.14 and 15 and right to a dignified life u/Art.21 - POSH Act
does not merely punish acts of sexual harassment, but actively
imposes a legal duty on employers to prohibit and prevent
harassment - Narrow interpretation of provisions of the POSH Act, in
order to hold that only the ICC of the workplace of the 'respondent'
has jurisdiction to inquire into complaints against him, irrespective
of where the workplace of the aggrieved woman is or where the
alleged act of sexual harassment took place, would undermine the
POSH Act's remedial social welfare intent since it would create
significant practical hurdles for the aggrieved woman - POSH Act,
by introducing s. 2(o)(v) which enlarged the scope of 'workplace'
to include any place visited by the employee during the course of
employment, including during transportation, has expanded the
scope of 'workplace' manifold - In such a case, the intent of the
legislature was clearly to prohibit acts of sexual harassment at any
place incidental to work and employment, at any place visited by
the employees during the course of employment - Taboo around
sexual harassment at the workplace and the fear of stigma which
may be attached to the aggrieved woman as a consequence of a
complaint regarding sexual harassment already poses a massive
psychological barrier for the aggrieved women which actively
dissuades them from pursuing their remedy in law - In view thereof,
the intent of the legislature behind giving such a wide meaning to
the word 'workplace' to go beyond the bounds of the traditional
[2025] 12 S.C.R.
509
Dr. Sohail Malik v. Union of India & Anr.
meaning implying location of the office, cannot be brushed aside
by narrow construction of other provisions of the POSH Act - It
cannot be said that only the ICC constituted at the workplace of
the 'respondent' has the jurisdiction to entertain complaints and
not the ICC constituted at the aggrieved woman's workplace.
[Paras 53, 54, 56, 57]
Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention,
Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 - s.13 - Inquiry
report - Construction and the scheme of s.13 - Role of ICC
in conducting inquiry - Action to be taken by the department
of the 'respondent' in pursuance of the findings of the ICC
constituted at the aggrieved woman's department:
Held: Under the scheme of the POSH Act and particularly u/s.13,
nothing prevents the ICC constituted at the workplace of the
aggrieved woman from carrying out the preliminary/fact-finding
inquiry at the first stage - After completion of the fact-finding inquiry,
the ICC constituted at the workplace of the aggrieved woman
can send its recommendation and report to the employer of the
'respondent' - Upon receiving the findings and recommendations
of the ICC constituted at the aggrieved woman's workplace, the
employer of the 'respondent' and the Disciplinary Authority, upon
making a decision that disciplinary proceedings are warranted,
can then issue a charge-sheet to the 'respondent' and initiate
disciplinary proceedings against him - In this inquiry, the ICC
constituted at the workplace of the 'respondent' may conduct the
second stage formal inquiry, acting as the inquiring authority for
the purpose of the disciplinary proceedings - As such, the OM
dated 16.07.2015, in respect of employees of the Government
of India treats inquiry into complaints of sexual harassment as
a two-stage process where there is a preliminary/fact-finding
inquiry at first and then a disciplinary proceedings based on the
findings of the preliminary/fact-finding inquiry - Fact that ultimately
disciplinary action against the 'respondent' has to be taken by his
employer and his department cannot be an impediment for the
ICC constituted at the workplace of the aggrieved woman to take
up the fact-finding inquiry u/s.11 when read with the OM - s.13(3)
(i) lays down that the ICC, upon reaching the conclusion that the
allegations against the 'respondent' are proved, shall recommend
to the employer to take disciplinary action for sexual harassment
as a misconduct in accordance with the provisions of the service
rules of the 'respondent'. [Paras 66, 67]
510
[2025] 12 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Interpretation of statutes - Principles of Statutory Interpretation -
Relevance of text and context of a statute:
Held: Language employed in a statute is the best aid for statutory
interpretation - Primary rule of construction is the intention of the
legislature and the same must be found in the words used by the
legislature itself - However, where there is doubt or ambiguity
about the meaning of the words used, interpretation must be made
keeping in mind the object and purpose of the statute - Thus,
both text and context of a statute have their own relevance while
interpreting provisions of a statute - Part of a section cannot be
read in isolation, the construction of the entire section must be
made as a sum of its parts and no word or phrase thereof can be
picked out in isolation to give a certain meaning to the section as
a whole. [Paras 32, 35]
Case Law Cited
Balasinor Nagrik Coop. Bank Ltd. v. Babubhai Shankerlal Pandya
(1987) 1 SCC 606 - held applicable.
Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan [1997] Supp. 3 SCR 404 : (1997)
6 SCC 241; Medha Kotwal Lele v. Union of India (2013) 1 SCC
311; Kanai Lal Sur v.Paramnidhi Sadhukhan [1958] 1 SCR 360 :
1957 SCC OnLine SC 8; RBI v. Peerless General Finance &
Investment Co. Ltd. [1987] 2 SCR 1 : (1987) 1 SCC 424; Eera v.
State (NCT of Delhi) [2017] 7 SCR 924 : (2017) 15 SCC 133; S.G.
Glass Works (P) Ltd. v. CCE [1994] Supp. 5 SCR 305 : (1995) 1
SCC 680 - referred to.
Davies Jenkins & Co. Ltd. and Davies (Inspector of Taxes) [1968]
AC 1097 - referred to.
Books and Periodicals Cited
Concise Oxford English Dictionary 10th Edition, 2002, Pg. 1629;
Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words and Phrases South Asian
Edition, 2008, Volume 3 at Pg. 3009; P. Ramanatha Aiyar's
Advanced Law Lexicon 7th Edition, Volume 4, at Pg. 6754;
Justice C.K. Thakker's Encyclopaedic Law Lexicon 2008/2009
Edition, Volume 4 at Pg. 5030 - referred to.
List of Acts
Constitution of India; Penal Code, 1860; Central Civil Services
(Conduct) Rules, 1964; Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace
[2025] 12 S.C.R.
511
Dr. Sohail Malik v. Union of India & Anr.
(Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Rules, 2013; Central
Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965;
Information Technology Act, 2000.
List of Keywords
Internal Complaints Committee-ICC; Jurisdiction of ICC; Complaint
of sexual harassment; Where the respondent is an employee;
ICC proceedings; Workplace of the 'respondent' instead of the
workplace of the aggrieved woman where incident occurred and
complaint was made; Complaint of sexual harassment; Appellant
and aggrieved woman working at different Government Department;
IAS officer; IRS officer; Role of ICC in conducting inquiry; Principles
of Statutory Interpretation; Relevance of text and context of a
statute; Duties of employer.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 404 of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 30.06.2023 of the High Court
of Delhi at New Delhi in WP(C) No. 8624 of 2023
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant(s):
Vipin Sanghi, Sr. Adv., Piyush Sharma, Anuj Kumar Sharma, Aditya
Dikshit, Shivesh Srivastava, Piyush Sharma.
Advs. for the Respondent(s):
Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, Mrs. Archana Pathak Dave, A.S.Gs., Raj
Bahadur Yadav, Abhijeet Singh, Ms. Shivika Mehra, Ms. Harshita
Choubey, Hritik Kashyap, Noor Rampal, Shreekant Neelappa
Terdal, Abhay Kumar, Shagun Ruhil, Karan Chopra.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
J.K. Maheshwari J.
1.
Assailing the final judgment dated 30.06.2023 passed by the High
Court of Delhi at New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as "High Court")
in WP (C) 8624/2023 confirming the judgment dated 23.06.2023
512
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Supreme Court Reports
of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi
(hereinafter referred to as "CAT") in OA No. 1838/2023, the instant
appeal has been preferred.
2.
The jurisdictional challenge by the Appellant in the present case,
inter alia relates to whether the Internal Complaints Committee
(hereinafter referred to as "ICC") constituted at a certain Department
of the Government of India can entertain a complaint under the
Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition
and Redressal) Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as "POSH Act")
against the Appellant who was working at a different Department of
the Government of India at the relevant time.
FACTS
3.
The Appellant is a 2010 batch officer of the Indian Revenue Service
(hereinafter referred to as "IRS") who, at the relevant point of time,
was posted as OSD, Investigation, Central Board of Direct Taxes,
Delhi. A 2004 batch Indian Administrative Service (hereinafter referred
to as "IAS") officer (hereinafter referred to as "aggrieved woman")
who was, at the relevant time, posted as Joint Secretary, Department
of Food and Public Distribution alleged that on 15.05.2023, the
Appellant sexually harassed her at her workplace, which was at
Krishi Bhawan, New Delhi.
4.
An FIR bearing No. 53/2023 was registered by the aggrieved woman
against the Appellant on 16.05.2023 under Sections 354, 354D,
506, 509 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as
"IPC"). As stated across the Bar, chargesheet has been filed in the
said case on 09.03.2024 under Sections 354, 354-D, 506, 509, 201
and 204 of IPC and Section 67 of the Information Technology Act,
2000 and the criminal case is pending.
5.
Subsequently, a complaint under the POSH Act was presented
before the ICC constituted under Section 9 of the POSH Act at the
aggrieved woman's department / workplace, i.e., the Department of
Food and Public Distribution on 24.05.2023.
6.
Since the present appeal arises out of the challenge to the jurisdiction
of the ICC, we are not concerned with the fate of the criminal case
ensuing out of the incident and are not delving into the particular
facts and details as contained in the complaint.
[2025] 12 S.C.R.
513
Dr. Sohail Malik v. Union of India & Anr.
7.
Pursuant to the complaint by the aggrieved woman, the ICC through
its Member Secretary issued a meeting notice/order bearing F No.
01/01/2023-ICC dated 13.06.2023 to the Appellant, scheduling a
hearing for the complaint, for him to appear on 22.06.2023 along
with a response to the complaint.
8.
It was at this stage, the Appellant filed OA No. 1838/2023 before
the CAT seeking direction to set aside the order/notice dated
13.06.2023 and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom.
The CAT dismissed the OA filed by the Appellant, which has been
upheld by the High Court vide the impugned order. Upon preferring
the present appeal before this Court, vide order dated 18.07.2023
it was directed that the inquiry may go on, but the final outcome of
the inquiry shall be kept in a sealed cover.
9.
We have been informed across the Bar that the inquiry has since
concluded and we have also been supplied a copy of the inquiry
report and proceedings in sealed cover, which is awaiting subsequent
action, subject to outcome of the present appeal.
SCHEME OF THE POSH ACT
10. The scheme of the POSH Act itself is drawn from the monumental
judgment of this Court in Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan1 in a writ
petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India filed by social
activists, NGOs and public-spirited persons, where this Court came
up with various guidelines to enforce the fundamental right of
'gender equality' and 'right to life and liberty' under Articles 14, 15,
19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution of India. While coming up with
the guidelines, the Court interpreted Article 14, 42 and 52(A) of the
Constitution of India and also drew inspiration from recommendations
of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (hereinafter referred to as "CEDAW").
11. This Court, even prior to the POSH Act being legislated, through
an interim order dated 26.04.2004 in Medha Kotwal Lele v. Union
of India2 clarified that the Complaints Committee envisaged by the
Court in Vishaka (Supra) shall be deemed to be an inquiry authority
1
(1997) 6 SCC 241.
2
(2013) 1 SCC 311.
514
[2025] 12 S.C.R.
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for the purposes of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964
(hereinafter referred to as "CCS (Conduct) Rules".
"2. Notice had been issued to several parties including
the Governments concerned and on getting appropriate
responses from them and now after hearing the learned
Attorney General for UOI and the learned counsel, we
direct as follows:
"Complaints Committee as envisaged by the Supreme
Court in its judgment in Vishaka case [(1997) 6 SCC
241 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 932] , SCC at p. 253, will be
deemed to be an inquiry authority for the purposes
of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964
(hereinafter called the CCS Rules) and the report of
the Complaints Committee shall be deemed to be
an inquiry report under the CCS Rules. Thereafter
the disciplinary authority will act on the report in
accordance with the Rules.""
12. The POSH Act itself was notified on 09.12.2013. Along with the
said Act came to be enacted The Sexual Harassment of Women
at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Rules, 2013
(hereinafter referred to as "POSH Rules").
13. Section 2(a) of the POSH Act defines the term 'aggrieved woman':
"(a) "aggrieved woman" means -
(i) in relation to a workplace, a woman, of any age whether
employed or not, who alleges to have been subjected to
any act of sexual harassment by the respondent;
(ii) in relation to dwelling place or house, a woman of any
age who is employed in such a dwelling place or house;"
14. The term 'employee' has been defined in Section 2(f) of the POSH
Act as:
"(f) "employee" means a person employed at a workplace
for any work on regular, temporary, ad hoc or daily wage
basis, either directly or through an agent, including a
contractor, with or, without the knowledge of the principal
employer, whether for remuneration or not, or working
on a voluntary basis or otherwise, whether the terms of
[2025] 12 S.C.R.
515
Dr. Sohail Malik v. Union of India & Anr.
employment are express or implied and includes a coworker, a contract worker, probationer, trainee, apprentice
or called by any other such name;"
15. The term 'employer' has been defined in Section 2(g) of the POSH
Act as:
"(g) "employer' means -
(i) in relation to any department, organisation, undertaking,
establishment, enterprise, Institution, office, branch or
unit of the appropriate Government or a local authority,
the head of that department, organisation, undertaking,
establishment, enterprise, institution, office, branch or unit
or such other officer as the appropriate Government or
the local authority, as the case maybe, may by an order
specify in this behalf;
(ii) in any workplace not covered under sub-clause (i), any
person responsible for the management, supervision and
control of the workplace.
Explanation. -For the purposes of this sub-clause
"management" includes the person or board or committee
responsible for formulation and administration of polices
for such organisation;
(iii) in relation to workplace covered under sub-clauses
(i) and (ii), the person discharging contractual obligations
with respect to his or her employees;
(iv) in relation to a dwelling place or house, a person or a
household who employs or benefits from the employment
of domestic worker, irrespective of the number, time
period or type of such worker employed, or the nature of
the employment or activities performed by the domestic
worker;"
16. The word 'respondent' has been defined in Section 2(m) of the POSH
Act as "a person against whom the aggrieved woman has made a
complaint under section 9".
17. Most importantly, the word 'workplace' has been defined in Section
2(o) of the POSH Act as follows:
516
[2025] 12 S.C.R.
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"(o) "workplace" includes -
(i) any department, organisation, undertaking, establishment,
enterprise, institution, office, branch or unit which is
established, owned, controlled or wholly or substantially
financed by funds provided directly or indirectly by the
appropriate Government or the local authority or a
Government company or a corporation or a co-operative
society;
(ii) any private sector organisation or a private venture,
undertaking, enterprise, institution, establishment, society,
trust, non-governmental organisation, unit or service
provider carrying on commercial, professional, vocational,
educational, entertainmental, industrial, health services
or financial activities including production, supply, sale,
distribution or service;
(iii) hospitals or nursing homes;
(iv) any sports institute, stadium, sports complex or
competition or games venue, whether residential or not
used for training, sports or other activities relating thereto;
(v) any place visited by the employee arising out of or
during the course of employment including transportation
by the employer for undertaking such journey;
(vi) a dwelling place or a house;
18. Section 2(h) of the POSH Act defines 'Internal Committee' as an
Internal Complaints Committee constituted under Section 4 of the
POSH Act, which, in turn, provides for constitution of the Internal
Complaints Committee, its composition, membership and manner
of removal of members.
19. The definition of the term 'sexual harassment' itself has been laid
down in Section 2(n) of the POSH Act, while Section 3(2) of the
Act further explains 'acts' or 'circumstances' which may amount to
sexual harassment. Section 3(1) of the POSH Act provides that 'No
woman shall be subjected to sexual harassment at any workplace'.
20. A complaint of sexual harassment may be made by an aggrieved
woman under Section 9 of the POSH Act, as quoted below:
[2025] 12 S.C.R.
517
Dr. Sohail Malik v. Union of India & Anr.
"9. Complaint of sexual harassment.- (1) Any aggrieved
woman may make, in writing, a complaint of sexual
harassment at workplace to the Internal Committee if so
constituted, or the Local Committee, in case it is not so
constituted, within a period of three months from the date
of incident and in case of a series of incidents, within a
period of three months from the date of last incident:
Provided that where such complaint cannot be made
in writing, the Presiding Officer or any Member of the
Internal Committee or the Chairperson or any Member of
the Local Committee, as the case may be, shall render
all reasonable assistance to the woman for making the
complaint in writing:
Provided further that the Internal Committee or, as the case
may be, the Local Committee may, for the reasons to be
recorded in writing, extend the time limit not exceeding
three months , if it is satisfied that the circumstances were
such which prevented the woman from filing a complaint
within the said period.
(2) Where the aggrieved woman is unable to make a
complaint on account of her physical or mental in capacity
or death or otherwise, her legal heir or such other person
as may be prescribed may make a complaint under this
section."
21. The ICC or the Local Committee, upon receiving a complaint, may,
at the request of the aggrieved woman, take steps to settle the
matter between the aggrieved woman and the respondent through
'conciliation' under Section 10 of the POSH Act.
22. In case an inquiry is to be made into the complaint filed by an
aggrieved woman, Section 11 of the POSH Act lays down the provision
for inquiry into the complaint. It is a major bone of contention in the
present case and is relevant, hence quoted as follows:
"11. Inquiry into complaint.- (1) Subject to the provisions
of section 10, the Internal Committee or the Local
Committee, as the case may be, shall, where the
respondent is an employee, proceed to make inquiry into
the complaint in accordance with the provisions of the
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service rules applicable to the respondent and where no
such rules exist, in such manner as may be prescribed
or in case of a domestic worker, the Local Committee
shall, if prima facie case exist, forward the complaint to
the police, within a period of seven days for registering
the case under section 509 of the Indian Penal Code (45
of 1860), and any other relevant provisions of the said
Code where applicable:
Provided that where the aggrieved woman informs the
Internal Committee or the Local Committee, as the case
may be, that any term or condition of the settlement
arrived at under sub-section (2) of section 10 has not been
complied with by the respondent, the Internal Committee
or the Local Committee shall proceed to make an inquiry
into the complaint or, as the case may be, forward the
complaint to the police:
Provided further that where both the parties are employees,
the parties shall, during the course of inquiry, be given
an opportunity of being heard and a copy of the findings
shall be made available to both the parties enabling them
to make representation against the findings before the
Committee.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 509
of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), the court may,
when the respondent is convicted of the offence, order
payment of such sums as it may consider appropriate, to
the aggrieved woman by the respondent, having regard
to the provisions of section 15.
(3) For the purpose of making an inquiry under sub-section
(1), the Internal Committee or the Local Committee, as
the case may be, shall have the same powers as are
vested in a civil court the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
(5 of 1908) when trying a suit in respect of the following
matters, namely:-
(a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any
person and examining him on oath;
(b) requiring the discovery and production of
documents; and
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Dr. Sohail Malik v. Union of India & Anr.
(c) any other matter which may be prescribed.
(d) The inquiry under sub-section (1) shall be
completed within a period of ninety days."
23. Thereafter, Section 13 of the POSH Act lays down the procedure
which is to be followed upon completion of an inquiry. The said
provision is also relevant and is therefore quoted herein:
"13. Inquiry report.- (1) On the completion of an inquiry
under this Act, the Internal Committee or the Local
Committee, as the case may be, shall provide a report of
its findings to the employer, or as the case may be, the
District Officer within a period of ten days from the date
of completion of the inquiry and such report be made
available to the concerned parties.
(2) Where the Internal Committee or the Local Committee,
as the case may be, arrives at the conclusion that the
allegation against the respondent has not been proved, it
shall recommend to the employer and the District Officer
that no action is required to be taken in the matter.
(3) Where the Internal Committee or the Local Committee,
as the case may be, arrives at the conclusion that the
allegation against the respondent has been proved, it
shall recommend to the employer or the District Officer,
as the case may be-
(i) to take action for sexual harassment as a
misconduct in accordance with the provisions of the
service rules applicable to the respondent or where no
such service rules have been made, in such manner
as may be prescribed;
(ii) to deduct, notwithstanding anything in the service
rules applicable to the respondent, from the salary or
wages of the respondent such sum as it may consider
appropriate to be paid to the aggrieved woman or to
her legal heirs, as it may determine, in accordance
with the provisions of section 15:
Provide that in case the employer is unable to make
such deduction from the salary of the respondent due to
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his being absent from duty or cessation of employment
it may direct to the respondent to pay such sum to the
aggrieved woman:
Provided further that in case the respondent fails to pay
the sum referred to in clause (ii), the Internal Committee
or as, the case may be, the Local Committee may forward
the order for recovery of the sum as an arrear of land
revenue to the concerned District Officer.
(4) The employer or the District Officer shall act upon the
recommendation within sixty days of its receipt by him."
24. The POSH Act, in Section 19, also imposes an active duty on the
'employer' to prohibit and prevent sexual harassment at the workplace
and to co-operate with the working of the ICC. The said provision is
relevant, and is therefore reproduced as under:
"19. Duties of employer.- Every employer shall -
(a) provide a safe working environment at the workplace
with shall include safety from the persons coming into
contact at the workplace;
(b) display at any conspicuous place in the workplace, the
penal consequences of sexual harassments; and the order
constituting, the Internal Committee under sub-section (1)
of section 4;
(c) organise workshops and awareness programmes at
regular intervals for sensitising the employees with the
provisions of the Act and orientation programmes for the
members of the Internal Committee in the manner as may
be prescribed;
(d) provide necessary facilities to the Internal Committee
or the Local Committee, as the case may be, for dealing
with the complaint and conducting an inquiry;
(e) assist in securing the attendance of respondent and
witnesses before the Internal Committee or the Local
Committee, as the case may be;
(f) make available such information to the Internal
Committee or the Local Committee, as the case be, as it
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Dr. Sohail Malik v. Union of India & Anr.
may require having regard to the complaint made under
sub-section (1) of section 9;
(g) provide assistance to the woman if she so chooses to
file a complaint in relation to the offence under the Indian
Penal Code (45 of 1860) or any other law for the time
being in force;
(h) cause to initiate action, under the Indian Penal Code
(45 of 1860) or any other law for the time being in force,
against the perpetrator, or if the aggrieved woman so
desires, where the perpetrator is not an employee, in the
workplace at which the incident of sexual harassment
took place;
(i) treat sexual harassment as a misconduct under the
service rules and initiate action for such misconduct;
(j) monitor the timely submission of reports by the Internal
Committee."
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE CAT AND HIGH COURT
25. The thrust of the challenge as presented by the Appellant before the
CAT and the High Court, in short, was that since the Department
of Revenue was the controlling authority of the Appellant, the ICC
constituted under the Department of Food and Public Distribution
did not have the jurisdiction to entertain the complaint filed by the
aggrieved woman under Section 9 of the POSH Act. As such, the
Appellant contended that it was only the ICC constituted under his
own Department which can institute ICC proceedings against him.
To buttress this argument, much emphasis was laid by the Appellant
on Section 11 of the POSH Act. The Appellant urged that use of the
words 'where the respondent is an employee' in Section 11 implies
that the inquiry into a complaint for sexual harassment must be
done by the ICC constituted at the workplace where the Appellant
is employed. Consequently, he argued that the workplace of the
aggrieved woman and the 'respondent' alleged of the act of sexual
harassment have to be the same, for the POSH Act to apply.
26. The CAT dismissed the challenge laid out by the Appellant and held
that the word 'where' used in Section 11 of the POSH Act relates to
difference in procedure to be followed by both types of committees
(ICC or Local Committee) when the 'respondent' is an employee
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and when he is a domestic worker. The CAT also observed that
the word 'workplace' has been defined in the POSH Act in relation
to the aggrieved woman and the complaint under Section 9 of the
POSH Act may be enquired upon even when the 'respondent' has
no relation whatsoever with the workplace of the aggrieved woman.
27. The High Court, in the impugned order, engaged in purposive
interpretation of the POSH Act and held that if the provisions of
the POSH Act are interpreted in the manner as suggested by the
Appellant, it shall be contrary to the intent and purpose behind enacting
the POSH Act. The Court agreed with the interpretation of Section
11 of the POSH Act by the CAT and held that Section 11(1) does
not require that the aggrieved woman and the 'respondent' must be
working in the same Department. The High Court also interpreted the
phrase 'service rules applicable to the respondent' as mentioned in
Section 11 to hold that this phrase itself shows that the 'respondent'
need not be an employee of the same workplace. The High Court
also interpreted Section 13 of the POSH Act and held that the ICC,
on finding that sexual harassment has been proved, may recommend
to the employer or District Officer of the 'respondent' to take action
in accordance with services rules applicable to them.
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
28. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Vipin Sanghi appearing for the Appellant
has argued with vehemence that for civil servants, the CCS
(Conduct) Rules are a complete code on sexual harassment and
the correct recourse against a civil servant, therefore, is institution
of disciplinary proceedings in accordance with Rule 3C of the CCS
(Conduct) Rules. It is urged that such a disciplinary proceeding can
only be handled by the ICC constituted in his department, since his
controlling authority is different from the controlling authority of the
aggrieved woman where ICC proceedings have been instituted.
Placing heavy reliance on Section 13 of the POSH Act, he argues
that the ICC constituted where the appellant is an employee, solely
has jurisdiction to entertain complaints of sexual harassment, since
it is only his employer which may take action based on the findings
of the ICC. Learned Senior Counsel also urged that the use of
the phrase 'where the respondent is an employee' in Section 11
necessarily requires that the ICC proceedings must be instituted at
the workplace of the Appellant. It has been argued that as per Section
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Dr. Sohail Malik v. Union of India & Anr.
19(h) of the POSH Act, the only remedy available to the aggrieved
woman when the perpetrator of an act of sexual harassment is not
an employee of the same department, is to initiate action under the
IPC or any other law.
29. Per contra, learned Assistant Solicitor General, Ms. Aishwarya Bhati
has argued that such an interpretation of Section 11 and other
provisions of the POSH Act would cause violence to the general
ethos of the POSH Act and defeat its very purpose. She has urged
that the POSH Act was legislated as a special law for women in
order to prevent the hardship faced by women at their workplace
and any interpretation of the Act must be done keeping this object
in mind. The wide ambit given to the word 'workplace' in Section
2(o) of the POSH Act and the word 'employer' in Section 2(g) of the
POSH Act shows the legislative intent to ensure sexual harassment
complaints by all women are duly addressed and enquired into. There
is no vacuum in the POSH Act for dealing with inter-departmental
enquiries of sexual harassment complaints. Under Section 13(3),
upon allegations of sexual harassment being proved, it has been
said that the employer or the district officer shall take necessary
action, which duly addresses the present situation.