# Dr. Vimla v. Delhi Admir1Ulrolio11

- **Citation:** [1963] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 585
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1960-03-24
- **Bench:** S.J. Imam, K. SuRBA RAo, N. RAJAUol'ALA AYYANGAJi, J. R. MuDHOLKAR
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/dr-vimla-v-delhi-admir1ulrolio11-2790
- **Pages:** 16

## Headnote

Criminal Trial-Meaning of 'cli.-;hone.<:fl,y'
and 'fraudn·
ltntly'-Meanin!/ of 'fal-'le rlocunu:ut'
anrl 'forycry'-lndian
Penal U<xle, !SulJ (Act 15 of 18Ull), ""· ·!J, :!J, liiJ, Jl;.J, 4ui',
4(jlJ.
Dr. Vimla purchased a car in the name of her minor
daughter Nalini aged about 6 months. The price of the car
was paid by her. The transfer of the car was notified in the
name of Nalini to the Motor Registration Authority. The
insurance policy already issued was transfe1Ted in the name of
Nalini after the proposal form wa• signed by Dr. Vim la.
Subsequently, Dr. Vimla filed two claims on the ground that
the car met with accidents. She signed the claim forms as
Nalini. She also signctl the receipts ackno,vlcdging tJ1e payment of cornpensatiun 1noucy as Nalini.
l)r. \7in1la and her
husband were prosecuted under sections 120 ll, 41V, 467 an<l
468 of the Indian Penal Cude. Hoth the accused were acquitted by the Sessions Judge. Tl1c State went in appeal and the
High Court convicted Dr. Virula under s. -167 a11d ·Hill of the
Indian J>cual C11dc.
Ur. \.'hnla ..:arnc Lu this C.!vurl by special
leave.
Held, that appellaut was nut guilty of the offence under
s. 467 and 468 of tbe Indian Penal Code. She was cerlaiuly
guilty of deceit because though her uatne was
\~in1la, she
signed in all the relevant papers as Nalini and made the
Insurance Company believe that her name was Nalini, bnt
the said deceit did not either -.;ecurc to her advanlag"e or cause
any non.economic loss or injury to the Insurance Company.
The charge did not disclose any such advantage or injury nor
was there any evidence tv prove the sa1nc. 'fhc entire transac ..
tion was that of Dr. Vhnla aud it was only put through iu
the name of her n1inur daughtr-r.
Nalini was in fat;t either a
Benamidar for Dr. Vitula or lv~r 11arnc was u~erl for luck or other'
sentimental considerations. 'l'he Insurance c:ompany WOltkl
not have acted differently even if the car stood in the uame of
Dr. Vimla.
1962
~Vquember, 29.
1962
Dr. Vimla
v.
Delhi Admir1Ulrolio11
586 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19631 SUPP.
The definition of •false document' is a part of the defini·
tion of •forgery' and both must be read together. If so read,
the ingredients of the offence of forg·ry relevant to the present
case are as follows : ( 1)
fradulently signing a document or a
part of a document with an intention of causing it to be believed that such document or part of a document was signed by
another under his authority ; and (2) making of such a
document with an intention to commit fraud or that fraud may
be committed.
The expression •fraud' involves two elements, deceit and
injury to the person deceived.
Injury is something other
than
economic
loss,
that
is, deprivation of propei:ty,
whether movable or immovable or of money and it will include and any harm whatever caused to any person in body,
mind, reputation or such others.
In short, it is a non...econo.
mic or non-pecuniary loss. A benefit or advantage to the
deceiver, will almost always cause loss or detriment to the
deceived. Even in those rare cases where there is a benefit
or advantage to the deceiver, but no corresponding loss to the
deceived, the second condition is satisfied.
Haycraft v. Cre°''Y• (1801) 2 East 92, in re. Londim and
Globe Finance Corporotion Ltd., (1903) I Ch. 732, R. v.
JVelham, (1960) 1 All. E R. 260, Kotamrajit Venkatrayad1t v.
Emperor (1905) I. L. R. 28 Mad. 90, -Sarendra Nath Gha&e v.
Emperor, (1910) I. L. R. 38 Cal. 75,
Sanjiv llatnappa v.
Emperor, A. I. R. 1932 Born. 545 and Emperor v. Abdul
Hamid, A. I. R. 1944 Lah. 380, referred to.
CRIMINAJ, APPELLATEjUltJSJ..W,,'TION: Criminal
Appeal No. 213 of 1960.
Appeal
by special leave from the judgment
and order dated March 24, 1960, of the Punjab High
Court (Circuit Bench) Delhi in Criminal Appeal
Case No. 41-D of 1958.
11. L. A·nand, an<l
K. Bulde·v Mehl!,, for the
appellant.
V. D. MahaJan
and P. D. Me1Wn, for the
respondent.
1962.
November 29. The Judgment of the
Court was delivered by
•
2

## Text

2 S.C.R.
SUPRE!vIE COURT REPORTS
5135
DR. VIMLA.
·v.
DELHI ADMINISTRATION
(S.J. IMAM, K. SuRBA RAo, N. RAJAUol'ALA
AYYANGAJi and J. R. MuDHOLKAR, JJ.)
Criminal Trial-Meaning of 'cli.-;hone.<:fl,y'
and 'fraudn·
ltntly'-Meanin!/ of 'fal-'le rlocunu:ut'
anrl 'forycry'-lndian
Penal U<xle, !SulJ (Act 15 of 18Ull), ""· ·!J, :!J, liiJ, Jl;.J, 4ui',
4(jlJ.
Dr. Vimla purchased a car in the name of her minor
daughter Nalini aged about 6 months. The price of the car
was paid by her. The transfer of the car was notified in the
name of Nalini to the Motor Registration Authority. The
insurance policy already issued was transfe1Ted in the name of
Nalini after the proposal form wa• signed by Dr. Vim la.
Subsequently, Dr. Vimla filed two claims on the ground that
the car met with accidents. She signed the claim forms as
Nalini. She also signctl the receipts ackno,vlcdging tJ1e payment of cornpensatiun 1noucy as Nalini.
l)r. \7in1la and her
husband were prosecuted under sections 120 ll, 41V, 467 an<l
468 of the Indian Penal Cude. Hoth the accused were acquitted by the Sessions Judge. Tl1c State went in appeal and the
High Court convicted Dr. Virula under s. -167 a11d ·Hill of the
Indian J>cual C11dc.
Ur. \.'hnla ..:arnc Lu this C.!vurl by special
leave.
Held, that appellaut was nut guilty of the offence under
s. 467 and 468 of tbe Indian Penal Code. She was cerlaiuly
guilty of deceit because though her uatne was
\~in1la, she
signed in all the relevant papers as Nalini and made the
Insurance Company believe that her name was Nalini, bnt
the said deceit did not either -.;ecurc to her advanlag"e or cause
any non.economic loss or injury to the Insurance Company.
The charge did not disclose any such advantage or injury nor
was there any evidence tv prove the sa1nc. 'fhc entire transac ..
tion was that of Dr. Vhnla aud it was only put through iu
the name of her n1inur daughtr-r.
Nalini was in fat;t either a
Benamidar for Dr. Vitula or lv~r 11arnc was u~erl for luck or other'
sentimental considerations. 'l'he Insurance c:ompany WOltkl
not have acted differently even if the car stood in the uame of
Dr. Vimla.
1962
~Vquember, 29.
1962
Dr. Vimla
v.
Delhi Admir1Ulrolio11
586 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19631 SUPP.
The definition of •false document' is a part of the defini·
tion of •forgery' and both must be read together. If so read,
the ingredients of the offence of forg·ry relevant to the present
case are as follows : ( 1)
fradulently signing a document or a
part of a document with an intention of causing it to be believed that such document or part of a document was signed by
another under his authority ; and (2) making of such a
document with an intention to commit fraud or that fraud may
be committed.
The expression •fraud' involves two elements, deceit and
injury to the person deceived.
Injury is something other
than
economic
loss,
that
is, deprivation of propei:ty,
whether movable or immovable or of money and it will include and any harm whatever caused to any person in body,
mind, reputation or such others.
In short, it is a non...econo.
mic or non-pecuniary loss. A benefit or advantage to the
deceiver, will almost always cause loss or detriment to the
deceived. Even in those rare cases where there is a benefit
or advantage to the deceiver, but no corresponding loss to the
deceived, the second condition is satisfied.
Haycraft v. Cre°''Y• (1801) 2 East 92, in re. Londim and
Globe Finance Corporotion Ltd., (1903) I Ch. 732, R. v.
JVelham, (1960) 1 All. E R. 260, Kotamrajit Venkatrayad1t v.
Emperor (1905) I. L. R. 28 Mad. 90, -Sarendra Nath Gha&e v.
Emperor, (1910) I. L. R. 38 Cal. 75,
Sanjiv llatnappa v.
Emperor, A. I. R. 1932 Born. 545 and Emperor v. Abdul
Hamid, A. I. R. 1944 Lah. 380, referred to.
CRIMINAJ, APPELLATEjUltJSJ..W,,'TION: Criminal
Appeal No. 213 of 1960.
Appeal
by special leave from the judgment
and order dated March 24, 1960, of the Punjab High
Court (Circuit Bench) Delhi in Criminal Appeal
Case No. 41-D of 1958.
11. L. A·nand, an<l
K. Bulde·v Mehl!,, for the
appellant.
V. D. MahaJan
and P. D. Me1Wn, for the
respondent.
1962.
November 29. The Judgment of the
Court was delivered by
•
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
687
SUBBA RAo, ].-This appeal by Special leave
raises the question as' to the true meaning of the expression 'fraudulently' ins. 46! of the Indian Penal
Code.
The facts either admitted or found by the courts
below may be briefly stated. The appellant is the
wife of Siri Chand Kaviraj. On January 20, 1953,
she purchased an Austin 10 Horse Power Car with
the r<'gistration No. DLA. 4 79li from Dewan Ram
Swarup in the name of her minor daughter Nalini
aged about six months at that till!le.
The price for
the car was paid by Dr. Vimla. The transfer of the
car was notified in the name of Nalini to the Motor
Registration Authority. The car at that time was
insured against a policy issued by the Bharat Fire &
General Insurance Co., Ltd., and the policy was due
to expire sometime in April, 1953. On a request
made by Dewan Ram Swarup, the said policy was
transferred in the name of Nalini. In that connection, Dr. Vimla visited the Insurance Company's
Office and signed the proposal form as Nalini. Subsequently, she also filed two claims on the ground that
the car met with accidents. In cbnnection with
these claims, she signed the claim forms as Nalini and
also the receipts acknowledging the payments of the
compensation money as Nalini. On a complaint made
by the company alleging fraud on the part of
Dr. Vimla and her husband, the police made investigation and prosecuted Dr. Vimla and her husband
Siri Chand Kaviraj in the Court of Magistrate 1st
Class Delhi. The Magistrate committed Dr. Vimla
and her husband to Sessions to take their trial under
ss. 120-B, 419, 467 and 468 .of the Indian Penal Code.
The learned Sessions Judge held that no case had
been made out against the accused under any one of
those sections and on that finding, acquitted both of
them. The State preferred an appeal to the High
Court of Punjab and the appeal was disposed of by
a Division Ucnch of that <:ourt comprising Falshaw
1962
Dr. Vimla
v.
Dllhi Adillinislrlllilo
Su6b• Rao, I
1962
Dr. Vimla
••
D1lhi Administration
Subba Rao, J,
588 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963] SUPP.
and Chopra, JJ. The learned Judges confirmed the
acquittal of Siri Chand; but in regard to Dr. Vimla,
they confirmed her acquittal under s. 419 of the
Indian Penal Code, but set aside her acquittal under
ss. 467 and 4()8 of the Code and instead, convicted
her under the said sections and sentenced her to
imprisonment till the rising of the court and to the
payment of a fine of Rs. 100/- or in default to undergo simple imprisonment for two weeks. Dr. Vim)a
has preferred the present appeal by special leave
against her conviction and sentence.
The facts found may be briefly summarised
thus : Dr. Vimla purchased a motor car with her own
money in the name of her minor daughter, had the
insurance policy transferrrd in the name of her
minor daughter by signing her name and she
also received compensation for the claims mac!e
by her in regard to the two accidents to the car. The
claims were true claims and she received the moneys
by signing in the claim forms and also in the receipts
as Nalini.
That is to say, Dr. Vimla in fact and in
substance put through her transactions in connection
with the said motor car in the name of her minor
daughter. Nalini was in fact either a benamidar for
Dr. Vimla or her name was used for luck or other
sentimental considerations.
On the facts found,
neither Dr. Vimla got any advantage either pecuniary
or otherwise by signing the name of Nalini in any of
the said documents nor the Insurance Company
incurred any loss, pecuniary or otherwise, by dealing
with Dr. Vimla in the name of Nalini. The Insurance
Company would not have .acted differently even if
the car stood in the name of Dr. Vimla and she made
the claims and n'Ceived the amounts from the insu ·
ranee company in her name. ()n the said facts, the
question that arises in this case is whether Dr. Vim la
was guilty of offences under
&~. 463 and 464 ot lhc
Indian Penal Code.
2 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
589
Learned Counsel for the appellant contends that
on the facts found, tne appellant would not be guilty
of forgery as she did not "fraudulently" sign the
requisite forms and the receipts in the name of Nalini,
as. by so signing, she did not intend to cause injury
to the insurance company. In other words, the contention was that a person does not act fraudulently
within the meaning of s. 464 unless he is not only
guilty of deceit but also he intends to cause injury to
the person or persons deceived, and as in the present
case the appellant had never had the intention to
cause injurv to the insurance company and as on the
facts found no injury had been caused at all to the
company, the appellant could not be found guilty
under' the said sections.
Before we consider the decisions cited at the
Bar it would be convenient to look at the relevant
provisions of the Indian Penal Code.
Section 463 : Whoever makes any false
document or part of a document with intent to
cause damage or injury, to the.public or to any
person, or to support any claim or title, or to
cause any person to part with property or to
enter into any express or implied contract, or
with intent to commit fraud or that fraud may
be committed, commits forgery.
Section 464 : A person is said to make
a false documcr t-First-Who
dishonestly
or fraudulently makes, signs, seals or executes
a document or part of a document, or makes
any mark denoting the execution of a document, with the intention of causing it to be
believed that such document/or part of a docu·
ment was made, signed, sealed or executed by
or by the authority of a person by whom or
by whose authority he knows that it was not
made, signed, sealed or executed, or at a time
1.962
Dr. Vimla
v.
Delhi Ad.IJ!irJ.iLlration·
Subba Rao, J,
1962
Dr. Vim/a
v.
Delhi Adminislratic"
Subba Ra<J. J,
590 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [Hl63] SUPP.
at which he knows that it was not made,
signed, sealed or executed ; or
"
• ••
The definition of "false document" is a part of the
definition of "forgery". Both must be read together.
If so read, the ingredients of the offence of forgery
relevant to the present enquiry arc as
follow.~ :
(I) fraudulently signing a document or a part of a
document with an inteniion of causing it to Le
believed that such document or part of a document
was signed by another or under his
authority ;
(2) making of such a document with an intention to
commit fraud or that fraud may be committed.
[n
the two definitions, both ·mens l'Ca dPscribed iQ s.464
i. r .. "fradukntly" and the intention to commit
fraud in s. 463 have the same meaning.
This
redundancy has perhaps become necessary as the
element of fraud is not the ingredient of other intentions mentioned in s. 463.
The idea of deceit
is a necessary ingredient of fraud,
but it does not
exhaust it; an additional element is implicit in the
n prcssion.
The 'cope of that something more is the
subject of may decisions. We shall consider that
question at a later stage in the light of the decisions
bearing on the subject. The second thing to be
noticed is that in s. 464 two adverbs, "dishonestly"
and "fraudulently" are used alternatively indicating
thereby that one excludes the other. That means
they are not tautological and must be given different
meanings. Section 24 of the Penal Code defines
"dishonestly" thus :
"Whoever does anything with the intention of causing wrongful gain to one person or
wrongful loss to another person, is said to do
that thing dishonestly".
"Fraudulently" is defined in s. 25 thus :
"A person is said to do a thing fraudulently if he qoes that thing with inteqt to
2 S.C.R. SUPREME GOUR T REPORTS
591
defrand but not otherwise".
1961
The
word
"defraud" indudes an element of
deceit.
Deceit is not an ingredient of the definition of the word
"dishone~tlv" while it is an
important ingredient of the' definition
of the
word "fraudulently". The former involves a pecuniary or economic gain or loss while the latter by
construction excludes that clement.
Further, the
juxtaposition of the two expressions "dishonestly"
and "fraudulently" used in the various sections of
the Code indicates their close affinity and therefore
the definition of one mav give colour to the other.
To illustrate, in the definition of "dishonestly",
wrongful gain or wrongful loss is the necessary
ingredient.
Both need not exist, one would be
enough. So too, if the expresssion "fraudulently '
were to be held 'to involve the clement of injury to
the person or persons deceived, it would be reasonable·
to assume that the injury should be something other
than pecuniary or economic loss.
Though almost
always an advantage to one causes loss to another
and vice versa, it need not necessarily be so.
Should
we hold that the concept of 'fraud" would include
not only deceit but also some injury to the person
deceived, it would be appropriate to hold by analogy
drawn from the definition of "dishone~tly" that to
satisfy the definition of "fraudulently" it would be
enough if there was a non-economic advantage to
the deceiver or a non-economic loss to the deceived.
Both need not co-exist.
Let us now consider some of the leading text
book writers and, decisions to ascertain the meaning
of the word "fraudulently"
The classic definition of the word "fraudulently" is found in Stephen's History of the Criminal
Law of England, Vol. 2, at p. 121 and it reads:
"I shall not attempt to construct a defini.
tjon which will meet every case which mi9ht
Dr. v1 .. 10
••
D1lhl Uma.ilrrotW.
Sulh Rao, J.
J!J52
Dr. Jlimlli
v.
ntlhi' Administration
592 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963] SUPP.
he suggested, but there is little danger in saying
that whrnevcr the words "fraud" . or "intent
to defraud" or "fraudulently" occur in the
definition of a crime two elements at least are
essential to
the commission of the crime :
namclv, first, deceit or an intention to deceive
or in some cases mere secrt"cy ; and secondly,
either actual in jury or possible injury or to a
risk of possible injury by means of that deceit
or secrecy ............. This intent is very seldom
the only, or the principal, intention entertained
hy the framlulcnt person,
whose principal
ol,jcct in nearly every case is his own advantage. . .............. A practically conclusive test
of tlw frauclul1·nt character of a deception for
criminal purposes is this : Did the author of
the deceit derive any advantage from it which
could not have been had if the truth had been
known ? If so, it is hardly possible that the
advantage should not have had an equivalent
in loss or risk of loss to someone else, and if so,
there was fraud."
It would be seen from this passage that "fraud" is
made up of two ingredients, deceit and injury. The
learned author also realizes that the principal object
of every fraudulent person in nearly every case is to
derive some advantage though such advantage has a
corresponding loss or risk of loss to another. Though
the author has not visualized the extremely rare
situation of an advantage secured by one without a
corresponding loss to another, this idea is persued
in later decisions.
As regards the nature of this injury, in Kenny's
Outline of Criminal Law, 15th Edn., at p. 333, it is
stated that pecuniary detriment is unnecessary.
In Haycraft v. Greasy (') LeBlanc, .J.,
observed:
(I) (1801) 2 East 92,
·. 2 s.c.R. ·SUPREME c6uR.'f REPORTS·~. 593
· "by fraud is meant an int~tion to deceive:
1962
· whether it be from any expectation of advant'.
age to the party himself or from the ill ·will.
n" :_imla
towards the other is immaterial."
Delhi Admin;,,,.,;,,.
This passage for the first· time brings out the distinction between an advantage derived bv the person
who deceives ·in. contrast to the loss incurred by the
person deceived: Buckley. J., in Re London ,[: Globe
Finance Corporation Ltd. (1)
brings out the ingredients of fraud thus :
.
·
·
, ~/"To deceive is, I· apprehend, to induce a man
· · to believe that a thing is true. which is false,
., '
and which the person practisin~ the deceit
·knows or believes to be false. To defraud is to
deprive by deceit: it . is by deceit to induce a .
· man to act to bk injury. l\fore tersely it may
be put, that to deceive• is by falsehood to
induce a state of mind; to defraud is by .. deceit
to induce a course of action." ·
. ,J
The English decisions have been elaborately considered by the Court of Crim!nal Appeal in R. v.
Welham ('}: In ·that ·case; hire-purchase finance.
companies advanced 'money on a' hire-purchase formand agreement and on credit-sale agreements witnessed by the accused.· The form and agreements
were forgeries.
The accused was · charged with
offences of uttering forged documents with intent to
defraud. It was not proved that he had intended to
cause any loss of · S oney to the finance companies.
His intention had. been ~y deceit' to induce any
person who was charged with the duty 'of seeing that ,
the credit restrictions then current were ·observed to
. act in a way ' in \vhich he wou Id· not act if he had
known·· the tme facts, namely, not to prevent the
advancing of. large sums · of money' exceeding the
limits allowed· hy Ia\v at the time. The· court held . ·
that the said intention ainount~d to inter>d to defraud.
(I) ( 1903) I ch. 732 •
\2) (1960) I All. E. R. 260, 26!, 266.
•
•
SuLha Ra1J, J.
1962
Dr. Vimla
v.
Delhi Administration
Subba Rao, J.
594 SUPREME COURT R.EPORTS [1963] SUPP.
Hilbery, J., speaking for the court, pointed out the
distinction between deceit and defraud and came to
the conclusion that "to defraud" is to deprive by
deceit." Adverting to the argument that the deprivation musl he something of value, i. e. economic loss,
the learned J 11dgc observed :
"We have, however, come to the condusiuu
that this is too narrow a view. While, no doubt,
i11 most cases or an intention to defraud the
iulrntion is to cause an economic loss, there is
nu reason to introduce any such limitation.
Provided that the intention is to cause the
person deceived to act to his real detriment, it
matters not that he suffers no economic loss. It
is sufficient if the intention is to deprive him of
a right or to induce him to do something contrary to what it would have been his duty to do,
had he not been deceived."
On the basis of the said principle, it was held that
the accused by deceit induced the finance companies
to advance moneys contrary to the credit restrictions
and that he was guilty of the offence of forgery.
This decision is therefore a clear authority for the
position that the loss or the injury caused to the
person deceived need not be economic loss.
Even a
deprivation of a right without any economic consequences would be enough. This decision has not
expressed any definite opinion on the question whether a benefit to the accused without a corresponding
loss to the person deceived would amount to fraud.
But it has incidentally touched upon that aspect.
The learned Judge again observed :
" .................................. This the appellant
was doing in order that he might benefit by
getting further loans."
This may indicate that a benefit derived by the
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
595
person deceiving another may amount to an act to
defraud that other.
A full Bench of the .Madras High Court, in
Kult,inrajn Venkatmyu.du v. Em.11cror (') had to
consider the case of a person obtaining admission to
the
matriculation
examination
of the Madras
University as a private candidate producing to the
Registrar a certificate purporting to have been signed
by the headmaster of a 1·ccognized High School that
he was of good character and had attained his 20th
year. It was found in that case that the candidate
had fabricated the signature of the headmaster. The
court held that the accused was guilty of forgery.
White, C.J., observed :
"Intending to defraud means, of course, something more than deceiving."
He illustrated this by the following example:
"A tells B a lie and B believes him. B is deceiv·
ed but it docs not follow that A intended to
defraud B.
But, as it seems to me, if A tells
B a lie intending that B should do something
which A conceives to be to his own benefit or
advantage, and which, if done, would be to
the loss
or detriment of B, A intends to
defraud B."
The learned Chief J nstice indicated his line of
thought, which has some bearing on the question f\OW
raised, by the following observations :
"I may observe, however, in this ctlllncction
that by s. 24 of the Code a person docs a thing
dishonestly who does it with the intention of
causing wrongful gain or wrongful loss. It is
not necessary that there should be an intention
to cause both. On the analogy of this definition, it might be said that either an intention
(I) (100,,) I.L.R. 28 Mad. 99, 116, 97.
1962
Dr. Vimla
v.
Dclld Adminhtraliun
I!Jf2
Dr. Vim/a
v.
Ddhi Ad111inislralion
Subb:J RtJb~ J.
596 SUPREME CO ORT REPORTS [!963J SUPP.
to secure a benefit or advantage on the one
hand, or to cause Joss or detriment on the other,
bv means of deceit, is au intent to defraud."
nut, he found in that case that both the elements
were present.
Benson, .J., pointed out at p. 114 :
"I am of opinion that the act was fra11<lulc11L
not mere!)· bv reason of the advanta"e which
.
"
the accused intrndc<l lo secure for himself b)>
means of his deceit, but also by reason of the
injury which must necessarily result tu the
University
and, through it to the public
from such acts if unrcprcsscd. The University
is injured, if through the evasion of its byelaws, it is induced to declare that certain per·
sons have fulfilled the conditions prescribed fur
Matriculation and arc entitled to the bcnclits
of Matriculation, when in fact, they have not
fulfille<l those conditions, for the value of its
examinations is depreciated in the eyes 1.1f the
public if it is found that the certificate of the
University that they have passed its examinations is no longer a guarantee that they have in
truth fulfilled the conditions on which ;ilo11c
the Univcrisity profl·sscs to certify them as
passed, and to admit them lo the bc11dis of
1'vlatriculatio11."
Boddam, J., agreed with the learned Chief.Justice
and Benson, .J.
This decision accepts the principle
laid down by Stephen, namely, that the intention to
defraud is made up of two clements, first an intention
to deceive and second, the intention to expose some
person either to actual injury or risk of possible
iniurv; but the learned Judges were also inclined to
tiold 'on the ana lo~y of th~ dcfiui 1 io11 ul' "d isho11cstl y"
m s. 24 of the Code Lhat inlcnlion t<> l'.Ccurc a bcuelit
or adv;.intagc to the dC'ceiver satisties the second con-
<lition.
2. S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
597
The Cakutta High Court dealt with
lhi~
qnf'.stion in Suren.Im .:\'(Ith <ll1118t v.
Empunr (1).
There, the accused affixed hi$ sigr1<1ture to 11 knbufo1t,
which was nnl. rl'quired by law to be attested by
witnesses, after its execution and registration, below
the names of the attestings witncs'scs but without
putting a date or alleging actual presence at the time
of its execution. The court held that such an acr
wa~ not fraud within the first clause of s. 4(i4 of the
Peual Code inasmuch as it was not done dishonest! v
or fraudulently within the meaning of ss. 24 and !?i:J
thereof. Mookcrjee, J., defined the words "intention
to defraud" thus:
"The expression, "intent to defraud" implies
conduct coupled with intention to dccei\'c and
thereby to injure; in other words, "defraud"
involves two conceptions, namely, deceit and
injury to the person deceived, that is, infringement of some legal right possessed by him, but
not necessarily deprivation of property."
This view is in accord with
the
English
decisions and that expressed by the I1ull Bench of the
:l'.fodras High Court.
This decision docs not throw
any light on the other question whether advantage to
the deceiver without a corresponding loss lo the
deceived would satisfy the second ingredient of' the
expression "intent to defraud".
A di vision Bench of the Bombay High Court in
8w1ji·v Rritnapp<> '" Rmpcror (')had a'l~o, occasion to
consider the scope of the cxprC'ssion "fra11dulcntly''
iu s. 4(14 of the Penal Uodc. The court held that for
an act lo be fraudulent there must be some advantage
on the one side with a corresponding loss on the
other.
Adverting to the argument that an advantage
secured by the deceiver wou kl constitute fraud,
Broomfield, J., observed thus :
"l think in view of the Bombay decisions tu
which I have referred we must hold that that
(l) [19!0) U •• R. Sil C•I· 75, 89·90.
(2) .\.LR. 1932 Bom .. >15, 550,
1902
Dr. Vi.rnlij
••
Del/ii Administration
Suliha Rao, J.
1962
Dr. Vim/a
••
Delhi Administration
S11hba Rao, J.
598 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
is an essential ingredient in the definition of
forgery.
In the great majority of case~. tht"
point is not very material.. ............. But there
many occasionally be a case in which the element of loss or injury is absent and I think the
present is such a case."
This decision therefore does not accept the view
of White C. J ., of the Madras High Court.
A Division Bench of the Lahore High Court, in
Emperor v. Abdul Hamid (') had also expressed its
view on the meaning of the word "fraudulently."
The learned Judges accepted Stephen's definition but
proceeded to observe as follows :
"It may be noted in this connection that the
word "injury" as defined in s. 44, Penal Code,
is very wide as denoting "any harm whatever,
illegally caused to any person, in body, m;nd,
reputation or property."
The learned Judges were willing to assume that in
almost every case an advantage to one would result in
an injury to the other in the widest sense indicated by
s. ,i4 of the Penal Code.
The other decided case cited at the Bar accept
the necessity for the combination of a deceit by one
and injury to other constitute an act to defraud and
therefore, it is not necessary to multiply citations.
No other decision cited at the Bar throws any light
on the further question, namely, whether an advantage secured to the deceiver without a corresponding
loss to the deceived would satisfy the second condition
laid down by the decisions.
To
summarize : the
expression "defraud"
inoslvcs two elements, namely, deceit and injury to
the person deceived.
injury is something other thal)
(I) A.I.R. 19H Lah. 380. 382.
•
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
699
economic loss that is, deprivation of property, whether
movable or immovable, or of money, and it will
include any harm whatever caused to any person in
body, mind, reputation or such others. In short, it is
anon-economic or non·pccuniary loss.
A benefit or
advantage to the deceiver will almost always cause
loss or detriment to the deceived. Even in those rare
cases where there is a benefit or advantage to the
deceiver, but no co!Tesponding loss to the deceived,
•the second condition is satisfied.
Now let us apply the said principles to the facts
of the present case. Certainly, Dr. Vimla was guilty
of deceit, for though her name was Vimla, she signed
in all the relevant papers as Nalini and made the
insurance company beheve that her name was Nalini,
but the said deceit did not either secure to her
advantage or cause any non-economic loS> or injury
to the insurance company. The charge docs not
disclose any such advantage or injury, nor is there
any evidence to prove the same.
The fact that
Dr. Vimla said that the owner of the car who sold it
to her suggested that the taking of the sale of the car
in the name of Nalini would be useful for income-tax
purposes is not of any relevance in the present case,
for one reason, the said owner did not say so in his
evidence and for the other, it was not indicated in the
charge or in the evidence. In the charge framed, she
was alleged to have defrauded the insurance company
and the only evidence given was that if it was disclosed that
Nalini was a minor, the insurance
company might not have paid the money. But as we
have pointed ·out earlier, the entire transaction was
that of Dr. Vimla and it was only put through in the
name of her mad~ minor daughter for reasons best
known to herself. On the evidence as disclosed,
neither was she benefited nor the insurance company
incurred loss in any sense of the term.
In the result, we allow the appeal and hold that
the appellant was not guilty of the offence undrr
Dr. Jlimlu
v.
Delhi Administrntimi
Suhha Rao, J.
1962
nr. Vim/"
••
Dr/hi Adminirtratian
Subba Rao, J.
1.962
Not•ember, 29.
600 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
ss. 467 and 468 of the Indian Penal Code.
The conviction and sentence passed on her are set 11side.
Fine, if pJid, is directrd to be refunded tn the
appellant.
Appeal (11/ou·i•tl,
CITY OF NAGPUR CORPORATION
v.
JOHN SERV AGE PHILLIP & ANR.
(S. K. DAS, .J. L. KAPUR, A. K. SARKAR,
M. HIDAYATULLAII and RAOHUllAR DAYAJ,. JJ.)
Corporation-Power of .'fnding 1lelegalio11--Jurisdictio>t
of civil court-Power of corporation to providt for e:rpen•M of
delegation-The
city of
Naupur Corporation
Act, Jfl48,
(C.P. and Berai· II of 1950), 88, 58 (s), 88.
The appellant Corporation passed a resolution deciding
to send two of its 1nembers to a health conference at Harrbgate
in U.K.. On the application of the respondent, the High Court
of Bombay issued a write restraining the appellant from carrying
out the resolution.
Held, thats. 58 (s) of the Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948,
which gave power to the appellant Corporation to provide for
any matter likely to promote public health autholised the
resolution and it was for the appellant Corporation to decide
how a thing which it had the power to do was to be done.
It was not a case where it could be said that the delegation
would have been of no benefit to the appellant Corporation at
all and that was enough to prevent an interference by the Courts
in the method of the exercise of its undoubted power by the
appellant Corporation.
t'
Mayor etc. oj IV estminater v. Lont!on & ,.lnrtli 1Ve.•tm1
Rai'.lwa~t C0mpan11, p 905 A.C. 426] relier! upon.