# DURGABAI DESHMUKH MEMORIAL SR. SEC. SCHOOL & ANR v. J.A.J. VASU SENA & ANR

- **Citation:** [2019] 12 S.C.R. 881
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2019-08-21
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No.5926 of 2019
- **Bench:** Dr. Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, Aniruddha Bose
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/durgabai-deshmukh-memorial-sr-sec-school-anr-v-j-a-j-vasu-sena-anr-33153
- **Pages:** 34

## Headnote

Delhi School Education Rules, 1973 - r.105 - Probation -
Deemed confirmation of service - The first respondent joined service
on probation for a period of one year on 01.07.2008 - However,
she continued as a probationer for nearly five years - Thereafter,
she was discharged from service w.e.f 30.06.2013 - High Court
held that r.105 fixes a maximum probationary period of two years
and the continuation of service beyond the maximum period would
amount to a deemed confirmation of service by implication, even
without the issuance of an order of confirmation - On appeal, held:
It has emerged from the consistent line of precedent of Supreme
Court that where the relevant rule or the appointment letter stipulates
a condition precedent to the confirmation of service, there is no
deemed confirmation of service merely because the services of a
probationer are continued beyond the period of probation - It is
only upon the issuance of an order of confirmation that the
probationer is granted substantive appointment in that post -
R.105(2) stipulates the satisfaction of the appointing authority as a
condition precedent to the issuance of an order of confirmation -
In the instant case, there was no order of confirmation and the
appointment letter also did not stipulate that the first respondent
shall be confirmed upon the expiry of the probationary period -
Thus, the continuation of services beyond the period of probation
did not entitle the probationer to a deemed confirmation of service
- However, since respondent continued as a probationer for nearly
five years in the contravention of r.105 as well as the appointment
letter, the respondent granted an award of ex-gratia compensation
of Rs.5,00,000/- - Therefore, order of the High Court so far as, it
confirmed the services of the first respondent set aside.
[2019] 12 S.C.R. 881
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Delhi School Education Rules, 1973 - r.105 - "by another
year" - Meaning of - Held: The plain reading of the words "by
another year" implies that the appointing authority of an institution
may extend the period of probation by one additional year over
and above the mandatory year of probation with the prior approval
of the Director - R.105(1) of the 1973 Rules, therefore, stipulates a
limitation on the total probationary period to two years - The first
proviso stipulates that the prior approval of the Director shall not
be required in the case of a minority institution.
Interpretation of Statutes - Ordinary and literal construction
of the words - Held: It is a settled position of law that where the
words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, they must be
interpreted in their ordinary grammatical sense, unless the
interpretation leads to an absurd result - It is only where the language
of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction,
leads to a manifest contradiction, or to some inconvenience or
absurdity, hardship or injustice, that a construction may be put upon
it which modifies the meaning of the words.
Interpretation of Statutes - Objective of a proviso - Held: It
is a settled position of law that the objective of a proviso is to carve
out from the main section a class or category to which the main
section does not apply - A proviso must prima facie be read and
considered in relation to the principal matter to which it is a proviso
- It is not a separate or independent enactment.
The appellant-Delhi Administration aided school and a
linguistic minority institution appointed the first respondent on
probation to the post of PGI (English General) on 18.7.2008 for a
duration of one year. The respondent continued as a probationer
for nearly five years. Thereafter, she was discharged from the
service. Aggrieved, the first respondent filed an appeal before
the Delhi School Tribunal, which was allowed and order of
discharge was set aside. Appellants filed a writ petition before
the High Court. The High Court held that the co

## Text

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DURGABAI DESHMUKH MEMORIAL
SR. SEC. SCHOOL & ANR.
v.
J.A.J. VASU SENA & ANR.
(Civil Appeal No.5926 of 2019)
AUGUST 21, 2019
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD AND
ANIRUDDHA BOSE, JJ.]
Delhi School Education Rules, 1973 - r.105 - Probation -
Deemed confirmation of service - The first respondent joined service
on probation for a period of one year on 01.07.2008 - However,
she continued as a probationer for nearly five years - Thereafter,
she was discharged from service w.e.f 30.06.2013 - High Court
held that r.105 fixes a maximum probationary period of two years
and the continuation of service beyond the maximum period would
amount to a deemed confirmation of service by implication, even
without the issuance of an order of confirmation - On appeal, held:
It has emerged from the consistent line of precedent of Supreme
Court that where the relevant rule or the appointment letter stipulates
a condition precedent to the confirmation of service, there is no
deemed confirmation of service merely because the services of a
probationer are continued beyond the period of probation - It is
only upon the issuance of an order of confirmation that the
probationer is granted substantive appointment in that post -
R.105(2) stipulates the satisfaction of the appointing authority as a
condition precedent to the issuance of an order of confirmation -
In the instant case, there was no order of confirmation and the
appointment letter also did not stipulate that the first respondent
shall be confirmed upon the expiry of the probationary period -
Thus, the continuation of services beyond the period of probation
did not entitle the probationer to a deemed confirmation of service
- However, since respondent continued as a probationer for nearly
five years in the contravention of r.105 as well as the appointment
letter, the respondent granted an award of ex-gratia compensation
of Rs.5,00,000/- - Therefore, order of the High Court so far as, it
confirmed the services of the first respondent set aside.
[2019] 12 S.C.R. 881
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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Delhi School Education Rules, 1973 - r.105 - "by another
year" - Meaning of - Held: The plain reading of the words "by
another year" implies that the appointing authority of an institution
may extend the period of probation by one additional year over
and above the mandatory year of probation with the prior approval
of the Director - R.105(1) of the 1973 Rules, therefore, stipulates a
limitation on the total probationary period to two years - The first
proviso stipulates that the prior approval of the Director shall not
be required in the case of a minority institution.
Interpretation of Statutes - Ordinary and literal construction
of the words - Held: It is a settled position of law that where the
words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, they must be
interpreted in their ordinary grammatical sense, unless the
interpretation leads to an absurd result - It is only where the language
of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction,
leads to a manifest contradiction, or to some inconvenience or
absurdity, hardship or injustice, that a construction may be put upon
it which modifies the meaning of the words.
Interpretation of Statutes - Objective of a proviso - Held: It
is a settled position of law that the objective of a proviso is to carve
out from the main section a class or category to which the main
section does not apply - A proviso must prima facie be read and
considered in relation to the principal matter to which it is a proviso
- It is not a separate or independent enactment.
The appellant-Delhi Administration aided school and a
linguistic minority institution appointed the first respondent on
probation to the post of PGI (English General) on 18.7.2008 for a
duration of one year. The respondent continued as a probationer
for nearly five years. Thereafter, she was discharged from the
service. Aggrieved, the first respondent filed an appeal before
the Delhi School Tribunal, which was allowed and order of
discharge was set aside. Appellants filed a writ petition before
the High Court. The High Court held that the conduct of the
management in allowing the first respondent to continue in service
for nearly five years evidenced the satisfactory conduct of the
first respondent and resulted in a deemed confirmation of service.
Hence, the present appeal.
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Partly allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. Whether the words "by another year" appearing
in the principal part of Rule 105(1) of Delhi School Education
Rules, 1973 and in the first proviso to Rule 105 (1) limit the total
duration of permissible probation to two years
1.1 The words of a statute should be understood in the
sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the
enactment and the object which the legislature has in view. This
principle should be a useful guide in interpreting the provisions
of delegated legislation in this case, namely Rule 105. The
purpose of probation is to enable an assessment to be made of
the performance of an employee. It serves as an opportunity for
probationers to establish by the dint of their work which is
rendered during the period of probation, that they are suitable
for being retained in service. On the part of the employer,
probation enables the appointing authority to determine the
suitability of the probationer for retention in service.
[Para 23] [898-C-D]
1.2 The plain reading of the words "by another year" implies
that the appointing authority of an institution may extend the
period of probation by one additional year over and above the
mandatory year of probation with the prior approval of the
Director. Rule 105(1) of the 1973 Rules therefore stipulates a
limitation on the total probationary period to two years. The first
proviso stipulates that the prior approval of the Director shall
not be required in the case of a minority institution. [Para 25]
[899-B]
1.3 The appellant contended that the words "by another
year" in the first proviso to Rule 105(1) cannot be read as limiting
the total period of probation to two years. The contention urged
by the appellants cannot be accepted. The words "by another
year" appearing in the principal part of Rule 105(1) must be given
their plain and literal meaning to imply one additional year. The
appointing authority of an institution may extend the period of
probation by one additional year over and above the initial period
of one year. This equally applies to minority institutions. The first
proviso stipulates that the provisions of the sub-rule "relating to
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the prior approval of the Director" in respect of an extension of
the probationary period by another year by a minority institution
shall not apply. The proviso merely carves out an exception from
the principal provision to the effect that in the case of a minority
institution, the approval of the Director for the extension of
probation period by an additional year shall not be required. In
that view, the words "by another year" in Rule 105(1) of the 1973
Rules restrict the maximum permissible period of probation to
two years. This equally applies to minority institutions covered
by the first proviso to Rule 105. [Paras 29 and 33][902-A-C;
905-A]
2. Whether the 1973 Rules require the issuance of an order
of confirmation for a probationer to be confirmed in service.
2.1 Admittedly, the appointment letter does not stipulate
that the first respondent shall be confirmed upon the expiry of
the probationary period. Rule 105(2) stipulates that an order of
confirmation may be issued "if the work and conduct of an
employee during the period of probation is found to be
satisfactory". Rule 105(2) lays down a condition precedent to the
issuance of an order of confirmation. It is only if the appointing
authority is satisfied with the performance of the probationer that
an order of confirmation may be issued. Rule 105(2) contains an
explicit stipulation requiring the issuance of an order of
confirmation by the appointing authority upon its assessment that
the performance of the probationer has been satisfactory. The
mere continuation of the services of a probationer beyond the
period of probation does not lead to a deemed confirmation in
service. It is only upon the issuance of an order of confirmation
by the appointing authority that probationer is granted
substantive appointment in the post. [Para 35] [905-F-H; 906-A]
2.2 It emerges from the consistent line of precedent of
this Court that where the relevant rule or the appointment letter
stipulates a condition precedent to the confirmation of service,
there is no deemed confirmation of service merely because the
services of a probationer are continued beyond the period of
probation. It is only upon the issuance of an order of confirmation
that the probationer is granted substantive appointment in that
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post. Rule 105(2) stipulates the satisfaction of the appointing
authority as a condition precedent to the issuance of an order of
confirmation. The argument advanced by the learned counsel for
the first respondent that there is a deemed confirmation upon
the continuation of service beyond the expiry of the period of
probation is negatived by the express language of Rule 105(2).
In this view, the continuation of services beyond the period of
probation will not entitle the probationer to a deemed confirmation
of service. The High Court has erred in holding that there is a
deemed confirmation where the services of a probationer are
continued beyond the expiry of the probationary period.
[Para 38] [908-E-G]
3. In the present case, the appointment letter of the first
respondent dated 18 June 2008 clearly stipulated that the period
of probation shall be "one year from the date of joining." Rule
105 provides for the extension of the probationary period by
another year. The first respondent joined service on probation
for a period of one year on 1 July 2008. The period of probation
was to come to an end on 1 July 2009, which could be extended
by one year under Rule 105. The period of probation was
extended belatedly on 11 February, 2010 for another year on the
ground that the services of the first respondent were
unsatisfactory. On 30 November, 2011, the period of probation
was extended by another year. On 22 May, 2013, the Managing
Committee of the Education society discharged the first
respondent from service with effect from 30 June 2013.
[Para 47] [912-G-H; 913-A]
4. The first respondent was continued as a probationer for
nearly five years in contravention of Rule 105 of the 1973 Rules
as well as the appointment letter dated 18 June 2008. There was
no order of confirmation. Though the first respondent cannot claim
a deemed confirmation of service without the issuance of an order
of confirmation, the power of this Court to do complete justice
under Article 142 of the Constitution must be invoked in an
appropriate manner. While there can be no deemed confirmation
in the favour of the first respondent, the relief can be suitably
moulded by an award of ex-gratia compensation. A teacher who
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has spent five valuable years of her life and may now be overaged
to get suitable employment elsewhere must not be left in the
lurch. A management which has defied the law must be put to
terms, which this Court propose to do under Article 142.
[Para 48] [913-B-C]
Tahsildar Singh v. The State Of Uttar Pradesh [1959]
2 Suppl. SCR 875 ; GS Ramaswamy v. Inspector
General of Police [1964] 6 SCR 279 - followed.
High Court of MP v. Satya Narayan Jhavar (2001) 7
SCC 161 : [2001] 1 Suppl. SCR 532; Maharashtra
State Financial Corporation v. Jaycee Drugs and
Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd (1991) 2 SCC 637 : [1991] 1
SCR 480 ; State of HP v. Pawan Kumar (2005) 4 SCC
550; CIT v. Indo-Mercantile Bank Ltd. [1959] 2 SCR
Suppl. 256; Dwarka Prasad v. Dwarka Das Saraf
[1976] 1 SCR 277 ; Kedar Nath Bahl v. State of Punjab
(1974) 3 SCC 21; Head Master, Lawrence School,
Lovedale v. Jayanthi Raghu (2012) 4 SCC 793 : [2012]
2 SCR 492 - relied on.
State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh AIR 1968 SC 1210 :
[1968] SCR 1 - distinguished.
State of Rajasthan v. Babu Ram (2007) 6 SCC 55 :
[2007] 7 SCR 939; S Sundaram Pillai v. VR
Pattabiraman (1985) 1 SCC 591 : [1985] 2 SCR 643;
JK Industries Ltd. v. Chief Inspector of Factories and
Boilers (1996) 6 SCC 665 : [1996] 6 Suppl. SCR 798;
Holani Auto Links (P) Ltd. v. State of MP (2008) 13
SCC 185 : [2008] 7 SCR 168 ; Municipal Corporation,
Raipur v. Ashok Kumar Misra (1991) 3 SCC 325 :
[1991] 2 SCR 320; Jai Kishan v. Commissioner of Police
(1995) 3 Suppl. SCC 364 : [1995] 3 SCR 268; State
of Punjab v. Baldev Singh Khosla (1996) 9 SCC 190 :
[1996] 1 Suppl. SCR 600; Chief GM, State Bank of
India v. Bijoy Kumar Mishra (1997) 7 SCC 550 :
[1997] 4 Suppl. SCR 214 ; Dy. Director of Education
v. Veena Sharma (2010) 175 DLT 311 (DB); State of
UP v. C Tobit [1958] SCR 1275 ; Santasingh v. State
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of Punjab (1976) 4 SCC 190 : [1977] 1 SCR 229 ;
Mukesh Tripathi v. Senior Divisional Manager
(2004) 8 SCC 387 : [2004] 4 Suppl. SCR 127 ;
Commissioner of Customs (Import), Mumbai v. Dilip
Kuar and Company (2018) 9 SCC 1 : [2018] 7 SCR
1191 - referred to.
Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice
G P Singh, 14th Ed., at p. 91 - referred to.
Case Law Reference
[1968] SCR 1
 distinguished
Para 6
[2001] 1 Suppl. SCR 532 relied on
Para 6
[1958] SCR 1275
 referred to
Para 23
[1977] 1 SCR 229
 referred to
Para 23
[2004] 4 Suppl. SCR 127 referred to
Para 23
[1991] 1 SCR 480
 relied on
Para 28
(2005) 4 SCC 550
 relied on
Para 28
[2007] 7 SCR 939
 referred to
Para 28
[2018] 7 SCR 1191
 referred to
Para 28
[1959] 2 Suppl. SCR 875 followed
Para 31
[1959] 2 Suppl. SCR 256 relied on
Para 32
[1976] 1 SCR 277
 relied on
Para 32
[1985] 2 SCR 643
 referred to
Para 32
[1996] 6 Suppl. SCR 798 referred to
Para 32
[2008] 7 SCR 168
 referred to
Para 32
[1964] 6 SCR 279
 followed
Para 36
(1974) 3 SCC 21
 relied on
Para 36
[1991] 2 SCR 320
 referred to
Para 36
[1995] 3 SCR 268
 referred to
Para 36
[1996] 1 Suppl. SCR 600 referred to
Para 36
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[1997] 4 Suppl. SCR 214 referred to
Para 36
[2012] 2 SCR 492
 referred to
Para 37
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.5926 of
2019.
From the Judgment and Order dated 07.05.2018 of the High Court
of Delhi at New Delhi in LPA No.17/2018.
Yashobant Das, Sr. Adv., Rajesh Srivastava, Hanu Bhaskar,
Ms. Shubhangi Rathore, Ms. Suresh Kumari, Advs. for the Appellants.
Ms. Madhvi Divan, ASG D. Rama Krishna Reddy, Mrs. D.
Bharathi Reddy, Ms. Nivedita Nair, Ms. Manjula Gupta, B.V. Balaram
Das, Advs. for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.
1. The present appeal arises from a judgment of a Division Bench
of the Delhi High Court dated 7 May 2018 setting aside the judgment of
a learned Single Judge in a Letters Patent Appeal.1 The Division Bench
accepted the deemed confirmation of the services of the first respondent
who was a probationer in the school of the appellants.
2. Allowing the appeal filed by the first respondent, the Division
Bench held that under Rule 105(1) read with the first proviso of the
Delhi School Education Rules 1973,2 the maximum period of probation
permissible is two years. The High Court held that there is a deemed
confirmation of the services of a probationer who is continued in service
beyond the maximum period of probation, even without the issuance of
an order of confirmation by the appointing authority. Aggrieved, the
appellant school and the Andhra Education Society3 are in appeal before
this Court.
3. The appellant is a Delhi administration aided school and a
linguistic minority institution. Pursuant to an advertisement for the filling
of various posts in the appellant school, the first respondent was appointed
on probation to the post of PGT (English General) on 18 June 2008 for a
duration of one year. The period of probation was extended belatedly on
1 LPA No. 86/2018
2 1973 Rules
3 Education society
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11 February, 2010 for another year on the ground that the services of the
first respondent were unsatisfactory. On 30 November 2011, the period
of probation was extended by another year. On 22 May 2013, the
Managing Committee of the society which conducts the school discharged
the first respondent from service with effect from 30 June 2013.
4. The first respondent filed an appeal4 before the Delhi School
Tribunal5 challenging her discharge with a prayer for reinstatement with
consequential benefits and back wages. By its order dated 23 July 2015,
the Tribunal allowed the appeal and set aside the order of discharge with
a direction to the appellants to reinstate the first respondent with
consequential benefits. Assailing the order of the Tribunal, the appellants
filed a Writ Petition6 before the Delhi High Court.
5. The learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court allowed the
petition and held that no maximum period of probation was spelt out in
the letter of appointment or the 1973 Rules. Any confirmation of service
is subject to the work and conduct of the probationer being satisfactory.
Hence, the continuation of the services of the first respondent beyond
the period of probation was held not to result in a deemed confirmation
of service without the issuance of an order of confirmation by the
appointing authority.
6. The Division Bench of the High Court allowed the Letters
Patent Appeal filed by the first respondent and restored the order of the
Tribunal. The High Court took the view that:
(i) Rule 105 of the 1973 Rules fixes a maximum probationary
period of two years and the continuation of service beyond
the maximum period would amount to a deemed confirmation
of service by implication, even without the issuance of an
order of confirmation; and
(ii) The appointment letter dated 18 June 2008 stipulated a
probation period of one year. The conduct of the management in allowing the first respondent to continue in service for
nearly five years evidenced the satisfactory conduct of the
first respondent, and resulted in a deemed confirmation of
service.
4 Appeal No. 54/2013
5 Tribunal
6 WP (C) No. 10310/2015
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Relying on the judgment of a Constitution Bench of this Court in
State of Punjab v Dharam Singh7 ("Dharam Singh"), the High Court
held thus:
"We are, therefore, of the view that where the letter of appointment,
read in conjunction with the above Rules, fixes a maximum period
of two years of probation and where the appellant was permitted
to continue in the same post, beyond the maximum period, the
same would amount to a deemed confirmation by implication,
without the requirement of an express order of confirmation on
behalf of the Society"
The High Court concluded that the case of the first respondent
fell in the second category of cases enumerated by a three judge Bench
of this Court in High Court of MP v Satya Narayan Jhavar8 ("Satya
Narayan Jhavar"), to which we shall advert in the course of the
judgment.
7. Assailing the judgment of the High Court, Mr Yashobant Das,
learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants urged that:
(i) Rule 105 of the 1973 Rules does not envisage a deemed
confirmation of the services of a probationer. Sub-rule (2) of
Rule 105 provides that if the services of the probationer are
satisfactory, a confirmation will be issued upon the expiry of
the period of probation or the extended period of probation;
(ii) Rule 105(1) does not stipulate a maximum period of
probation. The continuation of the services of the first
respondent on probation without an order of confirmation
implies an extended period of probation. Under Rule 105(1),
the termination of service without notice during the period
of probation is legally permissible;
(iii) The proviso to Rule 105(1) merely exempts a minority
institution from seeking the prior approval of the Director9
for extending the period of probation by "another year". This
cannot be read as limiting the permissible extension of the
probationary period to only one year over and above the
mandatory period of probation. Any extension of the period
7 AIR 1968 SC 1210
8 (2001) 7 SCC 161
9 As defined under the Delhi Education Act 1973
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of probation beyond the mandatory year of probation shall
require the prior approval of the Director; and
(iv) The High Court failed to consider a binding precedent of a
Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Dy. Director of
Education v Veena Sharma10 holding that there is no fixed
period of probation under Rule 105 of the 1973 Rules and
that no question of a deemed confirmation of service arises.
8. On the other hand, Mr D Rama Krishna, learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the first respondent urged, in support of the
impugned judgment of the High Court, that:
(i) The proviso to Rule 105, in so far as a minority institution is
concerned, stipulates that the approval of the Director shall
not be required where the probation period has been extended
"by another year". Rule 105 of the 1973 Rules fixes a
maximum probationary period of two years and the
continuation of service beyond the maximum period would
amount to a deemed confirmation of service by implication;
(ii) There is no requirement for the issuance of an order of
confirmation under Rule 105 of the 1973 Rules. There is a
deemed confirmation of the services of a probationer upon
the expiry of the maximum prescribed period for probation.
The absence of a stipulation requiring an order of confirmation in the Rules as well as the appointment letter leads to the
inevitable conclusion that there was a deemed confirmation
of service when the first respondent was continued in
service beyond two years, even without an order of
confirmation. Reliance was placed in this regard on the
judgment of this Court in Dharam Singh; and
(iii) The appointment letter of the first respondent dated 18 June
2008 stipulated a probationary period of one year. There was
neither a stipulation for the extension in the probationary
period nor a requirement of the issuance of an order of
confirmation.
9. The rival submissions now fall for our consideration.
10 (2010) 175 DLT 311 (DB)
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10. At the outset, it must be noted that Rule 105 of the 1973
Rules as submitted before this Court and the High Court by the contesting
parties reads thus:
"105. Probation (1) Every employee shall, on initial appointment,
be on probation for a period of one year which may be extended
by the appointing authority [with the prior approval of the Director]
and the services of an employee may be terminated without notice
during the period of probation if the work and conduct of the
employee, during the said period, is not, in the opinion of the
appointing authority, satisfactory:
[Provided that the provisions of this sub-rule relating to the prior
approval of the Director in regard to the extension of the period
of probation by another year shall not apply in the case of an
employee of a minority school:
...]
(2) If the work and conduct of an employee during the period of
probation is found to be satisfactory, he shall be on the expiry of
the period of probation or the extended period of probation, as the
case may be confirmed with effect from the date of expiry of the
said period."
11. It is on the basis of the above provision that the High Court, in
the impugned judgment and in judgments prior to the present case, has
concluded that there is a limitation on the extension of the probationary
period stipulated in Rule 105(1) of the 1973 Rules. On the record before
this Court, the words "by another year" appear only in the first proviso
to Rule 105 and not in the principal provision. The High Court, in the
present case and in cases prior to the present one, has failed to note the
amending history of Rule 105 of the 1973 Rules and has proceeded to
analyse an incorrect provision of law. It is pertinent here to advert to the
legislative and drafting history of the provision.
12. In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 28 of the
Delhi School Education Act 1973, the Administrator, with the previous
approval of the Central Government, enacted the 1973 Rules. The 1973
Rules were published in the Delhi Gazette11 on 31 December 1973 on
11 Delhi Gazette - PT 2- Jan- Dec 1973 at p. 685
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which date, they also came into force. Rule 105, as originally enacted,
read thus:
"105. Probation (1) Every employee shall, on initial appointment,
be on probation for a period of one year which may be extended
by the appointing authority by another year and the services of
an employee may be terminated without notice during the period
of probation if the work, and conduct of the employee, during the
said period, is not, in the opinion of the appointing authority,
satisfactory:
Provided that no termination from the service of an employee on
probation shall be made by a school, other than a minority school,
except with the previous approval of the Director.
(2) If the work and conduct of an employee during the period of
probation is found to be satisfactory, he shall be on the expiry of
the period of probation or the extended period of probation as the
case may be, confirmed with effect from the date of expiry of the
said period.
 (3) Nothing in this rule shall apply to an employee who has been
appointed to fill a temporary vacancy or any vacancy for a limited
period."
 (Emphasis supplied)
13. Rule 105 of the 1973 Rules, as originally enacted, stipulated
that an employee shall be appointed on initial probation for a period of
one year which may be extended by the appointing authority "by another
year". No separate provision was stipulated for minority institutions.
Two amendments were subsequently incorporated to the 1973 Rules.
On 30 January 1985, the Delhi School Education (Amendment) Rules
1984 were notified.12 By this amendment, Rule 110 of the 1973 Rules
was substituted.
14. On 23 February 1990, the Delhi School Education (Amendment)
Rules 199013 were notified.14 Clause 24 of the Amendment Rules 1990
amended Rule 105 of the 1973 Rules. Clause 24 Reads thus:
12 No. F. 5/15/72-Edn./573. in Delhi Gazette (Extraordinary -
Part - IV) - Jan-Dec 1985 at p. 2
13 Amendment Rules 1990
14 DSE (A) R, 1990; No. 1339/Act. in Delhi Gazette - Jan-Dec 1990 at p. 60
DURGABAI DESHMUKH MEMORIAL SR. SEC. SCHOOL v.
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"24. amendment of rule 105. - In rule 105 of the principal rules,-
(a) in sub-rule (1), after the words "another year", the words
"with the prior approval of the Director" shall be inserted;
(b) for the proviso to sub-rule (1), the following proviso shall be
substituted, namely:-
"Provided that the provisions of this sub-rule relating to the approval
of the Director in regard to the extension of the period of probation
by another year, shall not apply in the case of an employee of a
minority school:
Provided further that no termination from the service of an
employee on probation shall be made by a school, other than a
minority school, except with the previous approval of the Director."
 (Emphasis supplied)
15. By virtue of the Amendment Rules 1990:
(i) The words "with the prior approval of the Director" were
inserted after the words "by another year" in the principal
part of Rule 105. The prior approval of the Director was
made mandatory where the period of probation is extended
"by another year"; and
(ii) The first proviso granted an exemption to the appointing
authority of minority institutions from seeking the prior
approval of the Director for extending the period of probation "by another year".
 The amending history of the 1973 Rules shows that the
words "by another year" appearing in the principal part of
Rule 105 has not been omitted. The High Court has, in the
present case and prior cases failed to take note of the correct
provision as amended from time to time.
16. Rule 105 of the 1973 Rules, as on date, reads thus:
"105. Probation (1) Every employee shall, on initial appointment,
be on probation for a period of one year which may be extended
by the appointing authority by another year [with the prior
approval of the Director] and the services of an employee may
be terminated without notice during the period of probation if the
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work and conduct of the employee, during the said period, is not,
in the opinion of the appointing authority, satisfactory:
[Provided that the provisions of this sub-rule relating to the prior
approval of the Director in regard to the extension of the period
of probation by another year shall not apply in the case of an
employee of a minority school:
...]
(2) If the work and conduct of an employee during the period of
probation is found to be satisfactory, he shall be on the expiry of
the period of probation or the extended period of probation, as the
case may be confirmed with effect from the date of expiry of the
said period."
 (Emphasis supplied)
It is on the basis of the above provision that we proceed to the
task of interpretation relevant to the present dispute.
17. It is appropriate to note the view of a three judge Bench of
this Court in Satya Narayan Jhavar. Surveying the precedent, the Court
held thus:
"11. The question of deemed confirmation in service jurisprudence,
which is dependent upon the language of the relevant service
rules, has been the subject-matter of consideration before this
Court, times without number in various decisions and there are
three lines of cases on this point.
One line of cases is where in the service rules or in the letter of
appointment a period of probation is specified and power to extend
the same is also conferred upon the authority without prescribing
any maximum period of probation and if the officer is continued
beyond the prescribed or extended period, he cannot be deemed
to be confirmed. In such cases there is no bar against termination
at any point of time after expiry of the period of probation.
The other line of cases is that where while there is a provision in
the rules for initial probation and extension thereof, a maximum
period for such extension is also provided beyond which it is not
permissible to extend probation. The inference in such cases is
that the officer concerned is deemed to have been confirmed
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upon expiry of the maximum period of probation in case before its
expiry the order of termination has not been passed.
The last line of cases is where, though under the rules maximum
period of probation is prescribed, but the same requires a specific
act on the part of the employer by issuing an order of confirmation
and of passing a test for the purposes of confirmation. In such
cases, even if the maximum period of probation has expired and
neither any order of confirmation has been passed nor has the
person concerned passed the requisite test, he cannot be deemed
to have been confirmed merely because the said period has
expired."
The High Court was of the view that the case of the first respondent
fell in the second category of cases enumerated in Satya Narayan
Jhavar, while the appellant contended that the case of the first respondent
falls within the first category of cases.
18. The points of law that arise for determination in the present
appeal are: (i) whether the words "by another year" appearing in the
principal part of Rule 105(1) and in the first proviso to Rule 105 (1) limit
the total duration of permissible probation to two years; and (ii) whether
the 1973 Rules require the issuance of an order of confirmation for a
probationer to be confirmed in service.
19. The appointment letter of the first respondent dated 18 June
2008, in so far as it is relevant, reads thus:
"ANDHRA EDUCATION SOCIETY
Smt. Durgabai Deshmukh Memorial Senior Secondary School
1, Deen Dayal Upadhaya Marg, New Delhi- 110002
I.D. No. 2127081
Ref. No. AESSSS/2008-09/DR/112
Date: 18th June, 2008
MEMORANDUM
With reference to her interview held on Dt. 24.5.2008 for the post
of P.G.T. English (General) in the Andhra Education Society Smt.
Durgabai Deshmukh Memorial Senior Secondary School, 1,
D.D.U. Marg, New Delhi-110002, Smt. J.A.J. Vasu Sena is
hereby informed that the she has been selected for the post of
P.G.T. English under the following terms and conditions:-
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1.
...
2. She will be on probation for a period of one year from the date
of joining.
3. During the period of probation her services are liable for termination with one month's notice on either side.
4.
...
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...
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...
7. If the offer of appointment is acceptable she must report to
duty on 1st July 2008.
8.
...
9.
..."
20. Rule 105(1) of the 1973 Rules mandates that every employee
shall be appointed on probation for a period of one year. The appointing
authority may extend the period of probation "by another year" with the
prior approval of the Director. Rule 105(1) also stipulates that if the
work and conduct of the probationer during the probationary period is
found unsatisfactory, the appointing authority may, without notice,
discharge the probationer from service. The first proviso to Rule 105(1)
stipulates that where the appointing authority of a minority institution
extends the probationary period "by another year", the prior approval of
the Director shall not be required. This Court is required to construe
whether the words "by another year" appearing in Rule 105(1) and the
first proviso of Rule 105 imply one additional year, or one year at a time
without any limit.
21. According to the Cambridge English Dictionary, the word
"another" means "one more person or thing or an extra amount."
Webster's Dictionary defines the word "another" as "an additional
one of the same kind: one more".15 According to Collins Dictionary of
the English Language, the word "another" implies "one more".16
Similarly, according to Lexico Dictionary, the word "another" is "used
to refer to an additional person or thing of the same type as one already
mentioned or known about; one more."17
22. The consistent meaning imparted to the word "another" is a
single addition or one more. The ordinary and literal construction of the
15 Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1976), p. 89
16 Collins Dictionary of the English Language (1983), p. 58
17 Lexico Dictionary Online (Oxford University Press)
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words "another" read with the words "for a period of one year" in Rule
105(1) implies that the appointing authority may extend the period of
probation by one additional year. The contention that the words "by
another year" imply that the appointing authority can extend the period
of probation by one year at a time without any limit cannot be accepted
as this would amount to rewriting the provision by substituting the words
"by another year" with the words "by one year at a time", which is
impermissible in law. Further, had the delegate of the legislature intended
that there is no limit on the permissible probationary period, the words
"by another year" would have been omitted.
23. The words of a statute should be understood in the sense in
which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the
object which the legislature has in view.18 This principle should be a
useful guide in interpreting the provisions of delegated legislation in this
case, namely Rule 105. The purpose of probation is to enable an
assessment to be made of the performance of an employee. It serves as
an opportunity for probationers to establish by the dint of their work
which is rendered during the period of probation, that they are suitable
for being retained in service. On the part of the employer, probation
enables the appointing authority to determine the suitability of the
probationer for retention in service.
24. The limit placed on the permissible extension of the probationary
period draws a balance between the opportunity that must be afforded
to a probationer to modify and improve the quality of service and a
mandate that the appointing authority of an educational institute hires
qualified teachers. To impart a meaning to the words "by another year"
that the appointing authority may extend the probationary period one
year at a time without a limit will allow an appointing authority to extend
the probationary period, with the prior approval of the Director, of a
probationer ad nauseum. This would allow an appointing authority to
convert a period of probation, which serves the limited and time bound
purpose of ascertaining suitability, into a temporary appointment and defeat
the purpose of probationary service in educational institutions. Though
the legislature or the delegated authority is empowered in a given case
to stipulate that there is no bar on the period of probation, the interpretation
18 State of UP v C Tobit 1958 SCR 1275; Santasingh v State of Punjab (1976) 4
SCC 190; Mukesh Tripathi v Senior Divisional Manager (2004) 8 SCC 387.
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that we have adopted is supported by the words of Rule 105(1) and the
ordinary meaning imparted to the word "another".
25. The plain reading of the words "by another year" implies that
the appointing authority of an institution may extend the period of
probation by one additional year over and above the mandatory year of
probation with the prior approval of the Director. Rule 105(1) of the
1973 Rules therefore stipulates a limitation on the total probationary period
to two years. The first proviso stipulates that the prior approval of the
Director shall not be required in the case of a minority institution.
26. The principle which we have adopted accords with a consistent
line of precedent of this Court. It is a settled position of law that where
the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, they must be
interpreted in their ordinary grammatical sense, unless the interpretation
leads to an absurd result. It is only where the language of a statute, in its
ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, leads to a manifest
contradiction, or to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice,
that a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the
words.
27. Justice G P Singh, in his seminal book Principles of Statutory
Interpretation19, states thus:
"The words of a statute are first understood in their natural, ordinary
or popular sense and phrases and sentences are construed
according to their grammatical meaning, unless that leads to some
absurdity or unless there is something in the context, or in the
object of the statute to suggest the contrary."
Craies in his Treatise on Statute Law,20 states thus:
"The cardinal rule for the construction of Acts of Parliament is
that they should be construed according to the intention expressed
in the Acts themselves.