# DURGI DEVI & ORS v. STATE OF U.P

- **Citation:** [1978] 3 S.C.R. 595
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1978-04-05
- **Bench:** R. S. Sarkaria. N. L. Untwalia, P. S. Kailasam
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/durgi-devi-ors-v-state-of-u-p-7366
- **Pages:** 13

## Headnote

B
U.l'. Z.-u1111u/ari Aholition and Land Refonns Act, 1950
Sections
39(1)
(e)(i) and Sertio11 44 read with Rule 34 of U. P. Za111i11dari Abolition & Land
Re_forms Rules 1951-Scope of-Whether the co111pe11sation officer is required
to apprafre the m11111al yield of the forests 011 the date of vesting and take sucfi
!'ield also, into consideration while assessifl? the average annual i11co1ne froni
the forests r111der clause (e) of Sec. 39(1)-Whether 15% deduction is per111issiblt~ by Wil) of 111a11age111ent expe11ses 1111der Section 44(c)-Period to be
taken into (01:s:deratio11 under sub clause ( 1) of sectio11 39( l) (e) of the Act,
what is-Co111p11tutio1I of con1pe11satio11.
On the issuance of a Notification under Section 4 of the U.P.
Zamindari
Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, all rights and interests of the intermediary Oand!orci) including the forests in village Dhalani and Soma, vested in
the State of li.P. \vith effect from the date of vesting i.e. July 1, 1952.
A draft
compensation Roll under Section 40 of the Act, \Vas prepared by the Compensation Officer in respect of the intermediary's interests in the said villages
and served upon the latter, who whereupon filed objections against the Roll.
The intermediary claimed Rs. 64,971-9-7 more than the one shown as due to
him in the draft roll.
Purporting' to act under Section 39(1) (c) (i) of the Act,
the Compensation Officer held that the sale proceeds of the forests in the area
of village Sorna during 35 years immediately preceding the date of vesting,
r1ggr~gated to Rs. 6,13,334-8-3.
He divided this figure by 35
and
took
the
resultant figure, i.e Rs. 17,524/- as the annual income from the forests
in
villag,;: Sorna.
But as Rs. 1775-14-6 had already been included in the gross
assets, he deducted this amount and thus fixed the annual income from
the
forests in the village, at Rs. 15,748-1-6.
From this figure, he further deducted
15% for nianagement cost and heir.I that the intermediary was
entitled to a
further sum of Rs. !3,471-11-6 over and above the one shown as due to him
in the draft Compensation Roll.
The intermediary filed an appeal in the High Court against the said findings which amounted to a decree under the Act, and the State filed its crossc1bjections.
The High Court held that the Compensation Officer in preparing
the Compensation Roll had committed tVt'O errors : Firstly, he completely excluded from consideration the provisions of sub-clause (ii) of clause (e)
of
Section 39(1) and did not either appraise the annual yield of the forests or
take the same into consideration.
Secondly, he did not give any reason for
taking the period of 35 years under Sub-Clause (i) of Section 39( 1) (e) as
the measure for calculating the annual average incoine from the forests. After
appraising the evidence on record, the High Court held that it was just and
proper that the number of years to be :idopted in calculating: the
average
annual income under sub-clause (i) of Section 39(1)(e) should be 20 years.·
On this basis, the J~igh Court divided the sum of Rs. 6,13,334-8-3 that had
been worked
out by the Compensation Officer in
respect
of
the
income
from sales of forests in Village Sorna, by 20, and
arrived at
the
figure
Rs.
3(),666-11-~. The High Court further held on an interpretation of clause
(e) of Section 39( I), that the Compensation Office: was bound to appra!~e
the annual yield of the forests on t~e date of v_esting un4er Sll;b-clause (n)
of Section 39(1) (e) and take such yield• also
into cons1derat1on.
Relying
mainly on the evidence of Shri D. D. Chopra (a retired Divisional Fc;irest Officer
examined by the intermediary), the .~igh Court fc;iund that the yield
of the
forest,
appra:..,ed
\Inder
clause.
(11)
of
Section
39(1)(e)
of
the
Act, would be Rs. 47,t28/- The High Court further appears to have added the
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1978J 3 S.C.R.
figures worked out by it under sub-clauses. (i) and (ii) of Section 39(1)(e)
and then d

## Text

_Characters 0–39,877 of 40,037. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39877 for what follows._

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595
DURGI DEVI & ORS.
A
v.
STATE OF U.P.
April 5, 1978
[R. S. SARKARIA. N. L. UNTWALIA AND P. S. KAILASAM, JJ.j
B
U.l'. Z.-u1111u/ari Aholition and Land Refonns Act, 1950
Sections
39(1)
(e)(i) and Sertio11 44 read with Rule 34 of U. P. Za111i11dari Abolition & Land
Re_forms Rules 1951-Scope of-Whether the co111pe11sation officer is required
to apprafre the m11111al yield of the forests 011 the date of vesting and take sucfi
!'ield also, into consideration while assessifl? the average annual i11co1ne froni
the forests r111der clause (e) of Sec. 39(1)-Whether 15% deduction is per111issiblt~ by Wil) of 111a11age111ent expe11ses 1111der Section 44(c)-Period to be
taken into (01:s:deratio11 under sub clause ( 1) of sectio11 39( l) (e) of the Act,
what is-Co111p11tutio1I of con1pe11satio11.
On the issuance of a Notification under Section 4 of the U.P.
Zamindari
Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, all rights and interests of the intermediary Oand!orci) including the forests in village Dhalani and Soma, vested in
the State of li.P. \vith effect from the date of vesting i.e. July 1, 1952.
A draft
compensation Roll under Section 40 of the Act, \Vas prepared by the Compensation Officer in respect of the intermediary's interests in the said villages
and served upon the latter, who whereupon filed objections against the Roll.
The intermediary claimed Rs. 64,971-9-7 more than the one shown as due to
him in the draft roll.
Purporting' to act under Section 39(1) (c) (i) of the Act,
the Compensation Officer held that the sale proceeds of the forests in the area
of village Sorna during 35 years immediately preceding the date of vesting,
r1ggr~gated to Rs. 6,13,334-8-3.
He divided this figure by 35
and
took
the
resultant figure, i.e Rs. 17,524/- as the annual income from the forests
in
villag,;: Sorna.
But as Rs. 1775-14-6 had already been included in the gross
assets, he deducted this amount and thus fixed the annual income from
the
forests in the village, at Rs. 15,748-1-6.
From this figure, he further deducted
15% for nianagement cost and heir.I that the intermediary was
entitled to a
further sum of Rs. !3,471-11-6 over and above the one shown as due to him
in the draft Compensation Roll.
The intermediary filed an appeal in the High Court against the said findings which amounted to a decree under the Act, and the State filed its crossc1bjections.
The High Court held that the Compensation Officer in preparing
the Compensation Roll had committed tVt'O errors : Firstly, he completely excluded from consideration the provisions of sub-clause (ii) of clause (e)
of
Section 39(1) and did not either appraise the annual yield of the forests or
take the same into consideration.
Secondly, he did not give any reason for
taking the period of 35 years under Sub-Clause (i) of Section 39( 1) (e) as
the measure for calculating the annual average incoine from the forests. After
appraising the evidence on record, the High Court held that it was just and
proper that the number of years to be :idopted in calculating: the
average
annual income under sub-clause (i) of Section 39(1)(e) should be 20 years.·
On this basis, the J~igh Court divided the sum of Rs. 6,13,334-8-3 that had
been worked
out by the Compensation Officer in
respect
of
the
income
from sales of forests in Village Sorna, by 20, and
arrived at
the
figure
Rs.
3(),666-11-~. The High Court further held on an interpretation of clause
(e) of Section 39( I), that the Compensation Office: was bound to appra!~e
the annual yield of the forests on t~e date of v_esting un4er Sll;b-clause (n)
of Section 39(1) (e) and take such yield• also
into cons1derat1on.
Relying
mainly on the evidence of Shri D. D. Chopra (a retired Divisional Fc;irest Officer
examined by the intermediary), the .~igh Court fc;iund that the yield
of the
forest,
appra:..,ed
\Inder
clause.
(11)
of
Section
39(1)(e)
of
the
Act, would be Rs. 47,t28/- The High Court further appears to have added the
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1978J 3 S.C.R.
figures worked out by it under sub-clauses. (i) and (ii) of Section 39(1)(e)
and then d1v1ded the same by two.
By this process, considering all
the circumstances of the case, the High Court found that the fair amount to be fixed
as the average annual income from the forests in Village Sorna, would be
Rs. 40,000/-. It further held that no amount could be legally deducted under
Section 44 from this figure by way of management expenses or for any other
purpose. The Com,pensation Officer was directed to prepare finally the Compensation Roll on the basis of Rs. 40,000/- being the annual income from the
forests, after adding to it the average income from Sayar. Thus, the intermediary's appeal was partly allowed.
The cross-objections of the respondent·
Statee were dismi'ised.
Dismissing the appeals by certificate, the Court
HELD:
I. (a) Clause (l)(i) of Section 39(l)(e) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition
and Land Reforms Act, 1950 gives a discretion to the Compensation Officer
to take any figure from 20 to 40 agricultural years for the purpose of calcu!at·
ing the average annual income from the forests.
The words
"considered
reasonable'' in sub·clause (i) enjoin a duty on the
Compensation officer to
exercise this discretion reasonably and not arbitrarily.
Rule 34, gives
guide·
lines for determining the period for which average income shall be taken under
the aforesaid sub·clause (i). For determining such period, the Compensation
Officer has to take into consideration several factors, namely, the class of the
forest, the periodical fellings made therein during the 40 years preceding
the
vesting, the income received year after year during the 40 years preceding the
vesting the species of the trees in the forest and their age and class, the condi·
tion of forest etc.
[603 G-H, 604 A]
(b) In the instant case, for fixing the number of years at 35 under Sub·
Clause (i) of Section 39(1)(e). the Compensation Officer had not given any
reason v.1batever related to the criteria in Rule 34(1). On the other band, the
High Court took due note of the factors in clauses (i), (ii), (iv) and (v) of
Rule 34(1), in determining the period of 20 years for calculating the average
annual income. In determining the period at 20 years. the High Court rightly
gave v.
1eight to the fact that its exploitation bad been scientific and prudent, and
it had started yielding income from sale of trees only during 10 or 11 years
preceding the date of vesting and even on the date of vesting its condition was
good.
Since the first fellings were within 20 years of the vesting, it \\as rea·
sonable to determine the period at 20, the same being the minimum fixed in the
st'l.tute.
Thus, the determination of such period as 20 years by the High Court,
in the facts of the case, comports best .with the guidelines
indicated in
Rule
34(1). [604 F-H]
2. A plain reading of clause ( e) of Section 39 ( 1) shows that its ~ub-clauses
(i) and (ii) do not provide for two alternative methods of
calculating
the
average annual income of the forest.
The conjunction "and'' at the end ot
sub·clause (i) cannot be read as "or''. It conjoins the hvo sub-clauses. and 10
effect, read in the context of "shall" in the opening part of clause (e), man·
dates the Compensation Officer to take both the factors into consideration in
assessing the average annual income from the forest.
The reason
v.-hy
the
Legislature has made compliance with the requirement of this Sub-Clause (ii),
also, obligatory, appears to be to ensure that the compensation assessed has a
reasonable nexus and proportion to the actual and potential value of the forest
as on the date of vesting.
If a forest has been repeatedly, wholly and indiscriminately exploited within forty years or less immediately before the vesting,
its actual and potential value as a forest on the date of the vesting might be
far less than the one calculated on the basis of its average annual income of
the preceding 20 to 40 years as the case may be.
In such a case, average
annual income calculated rnercfy on the basis of the incon1e for a period of
20 to 40 years preceding the vesting, may cause fortuitous inflation in the
assessment of con1pensation.
Conversely, if a forc5t has been very little ex·
ploited in the preceding forty years and is well-preserved and well-developed
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DURGI DEVI V. u. P. STATE (Sarkaria, J.)
597
on the date of vesting, then calculation cf its average annual income on the A
baSts of sub-clause (i) alone, without taking inlo account its potential yield on
the date of the vesting, will make the compensation assessed wholly iJTusory,
having no relation whatever to the value of the forest as at the date of vesting.
Entry of the appraised annual yield of the forest on the date of vesting, into
computation under clause (e), operates as a counterpoise against fortuitous
inflation or deflation in the assessment. [605 A-E]
3. (a) There is no warrant for reading ''and" in clause (c) of Section 44 B
as "or". The Legislature appears to have advisedly used the expression "cost
of management" in conjunction with the expression "Irrecoverable arrears of
rent". The former takes its colour from the latter in association with which
it occurs. From the context, it appears that.. the expression "cost of management" is confined to the cost of managem_ent
in
the
collection
of rents.
The Scheme c.f Section 44 also supports this
construction. Under
that
scheme a particular deduction is authorised with reference to
income from a
particular source.
A comparative study of Sections 39(1) and 44 would show
that there is no clause in the latter Section which specifically authorises deducC
tion of 15% iro1n the income referable to cluase (e) of the former. [606 D-FJ
(b) The High Court was, therefore, right in holding that 15% to\vards the
cost of management could not be deducted by the Compensation
Officer
in
'respect of the income from forest calculated under clause tc) of Sec. 39(1).
[607 C-D]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 2478-2479/ D
68
From the Judgment and Decree/Order dated 9-12-1973 of the
Allahaba<l High Court in First Appeal No. 503 of 1955.
V. S. Desai, K. I. John and A. K. (Mrs.) Verma for the Appellants
in C.A. 2479/68 and Respondents in C.A. 2479/68.
U. N. Dikshit, M. V. Goswami and 0. P. Rana for the Respondent
in C. A. 2478/68 for the Respondent in C. A. 2478/68 and appellant
i" C.A No. 2479168.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SARKARIA, J.-These two cross-appeals on certificate arise out of
a judgmeat, dated December 9, 1963, of the High Court of Jndieature at Allahabad.
·
The appellants in Civil Appeal 2478 of 1968 are the heirs and
legal representatives of Shri R. B. Jodha Mal Kuthiala, who was an
intermediary (landlord) in the State of Uttar Pradesh and possessed
two v;llages, Dhalani and Sarna.
There are huge tracts of forests in
E
F
tae area of these villages.
On the issue of a notification nnder SecG
tion 4 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950
(for short the Act), all rights and interests of the intermediary, indu<ling the forests in villages Dhalani and Soma, vested in the State
of U.P. with effect from the date of vesting, i.e. July 1, 1952.
A draft Compensation Roll purporting to be nuder Section 40 of
the Act was prepared in respect of the intermediary's interests in the H
said Villages, and served upon the intermediary who thereupon, filed
two objections against the Roll.
The
intermediary
claimed Rs.
G4,97L'9/7 more than the one shown as due to him in the draft Roll.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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Pmportinl? to act under Section 39 (I) ( e) (i) of the Act, the Compensation Officer held that the sale proceeds of the forests in the area of
village Soma during 35 years immediately preceding the date
cf
vesti!'g, aggreg~ted to Rs. 6,13,334/8/3 (after deducting Rs. 22,000/-
rclattng to the mcome from the forests in village Dhalani). He divided this figure by 35 and took the resultant figure, i.e. Rs. 17,524/-
as the annual income from the forests in Village
Sorna.
But
as
Rs. 1,775/14/6 had already been included in the gross assets,
he
deductcll this amount and thus fixed the annual income from
the
forests in this Village, at Rs. 15,748/1/6.
From this figure, he further deducted 15% for management cost and held that the mtennediary was entitled to a further sum of Rs. 13,471/11/(1 over
·rnd
above the one shown as due to him in the draft Compensation Roll.
With these findings, the Compensation Officer disposed of the objections of the intermediary by his order. dated October 28. 1955.
Against this order of the Compensation OJ!iccr. which under the
Act amour.ts to a Decree, to aggrieved intermediary
preferred
an
appeal to the High Court.
The State also filed cross-objccticms.
The
High Court held that the Compensation Officer in preparing
the
Compensation Roll had committed two errors : Firstly, he compklely
excluded from consideration the provisions of sub-clause (ii) o[ clause
(c) of Section 39(1) and did not either appraise the annual yield
of the forests or take the same into consideration.
Sccondlv,
he
did not give any reason for taking the period of 35 years under ;ubclause (i) of Section 39 ( 1) ( e) as the measure for calculatin~ the
annual average income from the forests.
After appraising the evidence
on record, the High Court held that it was just and proper that the
numb(~ of years to be adopted in calculating the average annual income uncler sub-clause (i) of Section 39 (I) ( c) should be 20 years.
On this basis, the High Court divided the sum ot' Rs. 6.13.33;\/813
that had been worked out by the Compensation Otlicer in respect of
the income from sales of forests in Village Soma, by 20, am! lrrived
at the figure Rs. 30,666/11/3. The High Court further held on an
interpretation of clause ( e.) of Section 39 (1), that the Compensation
Officer was bound to appraise the annual yield of the forests on the
date of vesting under sub-clause (ii) of Section 39(1) (e) and take
such yield also into consideration.
Relying mainly on the evidence
of Shri D. D. Chopra (a retired Divisional Forest Officer examined
by the intermediary), the High Court found that the yield of the forest,
appraised under clause (ii) cf Section 39(1) (c) of the Act, would
be Rs. 47,128/-.
The High Court further appears to have added the
figures worked out by it under sub-clause's (i) and (ii)
of Section
391l)(e) and then divided the same by two.
By this precess. cc>nsidering all the circumstances of the case, the Hi~h Court held that
the fair amount to be fixed a~ the average annual income from the
forests in Villaee Soma, would be Rs. 40.000/-.
Tt further held that
no amount could be legally deducted under Section 44
frnm
this
figure oE the annual average income, by way of management expenses
or for any other pmpose.
The Compcnsa6on Officer was directed
to prepare finally the Compensation Roll on the basis of Rs. 41),000/-
teing the annual income from the forests, after adding to it the aver-
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OURGI DEVI ~· \J. P. STATE (Sarkaria, J.)
599
age income from Sayar.
Thus, the intermediary's appeal was partly
allowed.
The cross-objections of the respondent-State were dismissed.
Alter obtaining a certificate under Article
133 (!)(a)
of
the
Constitution (as it then stood), the heirs of the intermediary (since
deceased) aggrieved by the partial dismissal of their claim
by
the
High Court, have preferred Civil Appeal 2478 of 1968; while
the
State in the cross-appeal (C.A. 2479 of 1968) assail the judgment
of the High Court whereby the intermediary's claim was partly accepted.
Both the appeals will be disposed of by a common judgment.
Three questions fall to be considered in these appeals
: First,
whether the High Court was right in taking a period of 20 years only
under sub-clause (i) of Section 39( 1) (c) for the purpose of
calculating the average annual income of the fores'.s from Village Soma?
Second, whether the Compensation Officer was required to appraise the
annual yield of the forests on the date of vesting and take such yie~d,
also, into consideration while assessiag the average annual
income
from the forests under clause (e) of Section 39(1)? Th, 4, whether
under clause (c) of Section 44, 15% is deductible from the average
annual income from a forest worked out in accordance with
clause
(e) of Section 39(1)? The first is a mixed question of law and fact:
while the last two turn on an interpretation of Sections 39 and 44
of the Act and tl1e Rules framed thereunder. It will, therefore, te
appropriate to notice here the provisions material for our purpose.
Those provisions are extracted hereunder :
"39. Gross assets of a mahaJ.-( l) Gross assets as respects
a mahal shall be the aggregate gross income of the Ja'iid or
estate comprised in the mahal and such income shall comprise-
(a) rents including ccsses and local rates payable by or
on behalf of the tenants, under-proprietors, sub-proprietors permanent tenure-holders, permanent lessees
in Avadh, grantees at a favourable rate of rent
or
grove-holders-
(i) in cash, and
(ii) where rent is payable in kind or partly in cash
or partly in kind the rent computed in accordance with the provisions of the United Provinces Tenancy Act, 1939, and (where the
said
Act does not provide for such computation, ;n
the manner prescribed),
(iii) where rent is payable, but has not been determined at ex-proprietary rates in the
ease of
under proprietors and
ex-proprietary
tenants
and at hereditarv rates in all other cases except
grove-holders.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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Expkmation.-In this clause the word "tenants"
includes
persons deemed to be hereditary tenants under Sections 12,
13, 14 and 16 but does not include any other tenant of
sir,
(b) the amount computed at the rates applicable to exproprietary tenants of similar land for land in the
personal cultivation of or held
as
intermediary's
grove, khudkasht or sir by all the intermediaries in
the estate in which hereditary rights do not accrue,
and, in the case of the sir-
(i) in which hereditary rights accrue, at hereditary
rates, and
(ii) referred to in Section 17, the rent payable by
the tenant therefor,
( c) sayar, including income from hats, bazars, melas vested in the State under clause (a) of Section 6 and
fisheries which shall be an amount equal to
onetenth of the total income therefrom during the
agricultural years preceding the date of vesting;
"Explanation !.-'Total income' from sayar under this
sub-clause shall be calculated on the basis of
entries
in
khatauni which shall be deemed to be correct unles's proved
to the contrary by entries in any public document.
Explanation ll.-For purposes of this section 'sayar' as
respects an intermediary's grove shall not include income
from the sale of wood, flowers or fruit.
(d) average annual income during the four agricultural
years immediately preceding the date of vesting from
rents of building sites vested in the State;
( e) average annual income from forests, which shall be
computed-
(i) on the basis of the income for a period of twenty
to forty agricultural years immediately preceding the date of vesting; as the
Compensation
Officer may consider reasonable, and
(ii) on the appraisement of the annual yield of the
forest on the date of vesting;
(f) where royalties
are payable on account of mines
and minerals the average income on account of royalties calculated on the basis of the annual returns
filed by the intermediary for the assessment of cess
or income-tax during the period of twelve agricultural
years preceding the agricultural year in which
the
date of vesting falls or any shorter period for which
such retnrns have been filed;
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DURGI DEVI v. u. P. STATE (Sarkaria, !.)
601
(g) where royalties are not payable and mines are worked
directly by an intermediary,
the
average annual
income from such mines calculated on same basis as
specified in clause (f).
(2) Where the mahal is comprised of an area situate in
more than one village, the provisions of sub-section
(1)
shall apply as if the portions situate in each village were a
separate mahal.
"44. Net assets of an intermediary. -For purposes of
Section 40, the net assets of an intermediary in respect of a
mahal shall be computed by deducting from his gross assets
the following, namely -
(a) any sum which was payable by him in the previous
agricultural year to the State Government or superior
landholder on account of land revenue or rent and
cesses or local rates in respect of his share or interest
in the mahal;
(b) an amount on account of agricultural income-tax, if
any, paid or to be paid for the previous agricultural
year by the intermediary in respect ·of his share or
interest in the mahal calculated in the manner prescribed;
( c) cost of management and irrecoverable arrears of rent
equal to fifteen per centum of-the gross assets;
( d) where the intermediary holds any land in his personal
cultivation or as khudkasht, intermediary's grove or
sir in (other than sir in which hereditary rights
accrue), an amount computed at ex-proprietary rate's,
less the deductions (i) to (iii) hereinafter mentioned,
for such portions only of the land in his personal
cultivation or held as khudkash\, grove-land or sir
as is mentioned in Section 18;
(i) the agricultural income-tax,
if any,
payable
therefor in the previous agricultural year in respect of the land to be ascertained in the prescribed manne.r;
(ii) the land revenue, cesses and local rates payable
therefor in the previous agricultural year to be
ascertained in the prescribed manner, and
(iii) fifteen per centum of such amount on account
of matters referred to in clause ( c);
" ( e) the average of the income-tax paid in respect of the
income from royalties mentioned in clause
(f) of
Section 39 computed over the period mentioned in
the said clause and the cost of collection at such rates
as may be prescribed;
4-315SCI/78
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1978] 3 S.C,R,
(f) ninety-five per centum of the gross income determined
under clause (g) of Section 39,
which shall be
deemed to be the part of the income reserved to him
in respect of the rights contained in Chapter VI.
Explanation.-For the purpose~ o fthis Section, land
revenue which has been assigned, released, compounded, or
redeemed by reason of any grant or confirmation made by or
011 behalf of the State or any other competent authority in
favour of such intermediary shall not be deemed to be a sum
payable as land revenue to the State Government."
The material part of Rule 34 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition &
Land Reforms Rules, 1952, framed under the Act, runs as follows :
"34. Section 39 (e ). -(1) The Compensation Officer
shall. for the purpose of determining the period for which
average shall be taken under sub-clause (i) of clause ( e)
of Section 39 of the Act, call upon the intermediary
to
furnish within a period to be fixed
a written
statement
showing-
(i) the class of forest (e.g. high forest,
coppice with
standards, scrub, etc.);
(ii) the periodical fellings made therein during the 40
years immediately preceding the date of vesting;
(iii) the income received year after
year
during
the
40 years immediately preceding the date of vesting;
(iv) the principal species of trees in the forest and their
approximate age and class;
( v) the condition of the forest at the date of vesting and
any other particulars which may be material for determining the period aforesaid.
"(2)
"(3) After considering the report of the officer of
the
Forest Department and hearing the intermediary and
such other persons as he may like to be heard, the
Compensation Officer shall make an order determining the period and the average annual income from
the forest and shall record his reasons therefor."
The facts revelvant to the first question may now be noted. According to the "written statement" of the intermediary, the annual income
received from the forests during the 40 years immediately preceding
the date of vesting from Village Soma, was as follows :
"1942-43.-For lumpsum sale for Rs. 25,000/- .ballies
for supply (based on information received from our predecessor in title Mr. E.C. Thatcher).
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DURGI DEVI v. u. P. STATE (Sarkaria, !.)
1946-47.-Rehrapur Rs. 4209-8-3.
1948-49.-Lumpsum sale of coppice with standard unregulated fellings Rs. 3,01,000-0-0.
1949-50.-Lumpsum sale,
selection fellings
Rs. 2,47,000-0-0.
603
1951-52.-Lumpsum sale, coppice with standard regulated fellings Rs. 81,125-0-0.
Note :-Dobri and Dha!ani Estates were purchased in
Jan. 1948 and Rehrapur was purchased in 1946. Hence the
figures prior to these dates are not available."
TI1e Compensation Officer and the High Court have not accepted
the sale for Rs. 25,000/-, because neither Mr. Thatcher, who was the
then owner of the forest, had been. examined, nor had any agreement
between him and the suppposed purchaser been filed.
No accounts
of the sales were furnished.
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The only contention of Mr. V. S. Desai, appearing for the appellant
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(intermediary), is that this item of sale in 1942-43
was
wrongly
excluded.
We find no merit in this contention.
This is a concurrent finding
of fact and we see no reason to disturb it. There is no dispute with
regard to the remaining four items of income from sales in 1946-47,
1948-49. 1949-50 and 1951-52. The total of these four items comes
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to Rs. 6,35.334-8-3. It is further common ground that out of these
items, Rs. 22,000/- pertain to the sale of forests in Village Dha!ani.
After deducting the same, the balance comes to Rs: 6,13,334-8-3.
The issue before the Compensation Officer was : What should be
the number of years by which this figure of the total income, was to
be divided to ascertain the average annual income of the forest
in
Village Sarna? The contention of the intermediary was that for this
purpose it should be divided by the number of sale-years only. This
contention was rejected-and we think rightly-by
the
Compensation Officer . But he wrongly fixed this number at 35.
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Clause (l)(i) of Section 39(1)(e) gives a discretion to the ComG
pensation Officer to take any figure from 20 to 40 agricultural yearc;
for the purpose of calculating the average annual income from
the
iorests.
The words "considered reasonable" in sub-clause (i) enjoin
a dnty on the Compensation Officer to exercise this discretion reasonably and not arbitrarily.
Rule 34, extracted above, gives guidelines
for determining the period for which average income shall be taken
under the aforesaid sub-clause (i). For determining such period. tLc
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Compensation Officer has to take into consideration several factors,
namely, the class of the forest, the periodical fellings made therein
during the 40 years preceding the vesting, the income received year
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1978] 3 S.C.R.
after year. during the 40 yeai:s preceding the vesting, the species of
the trees m the forest and their age and class, the condition of forest,
etc.
Mr. Dikshit contends that the factors enumerated in sub-clauses
(iv) and. (v) o_f Rule 34(1) furnish more important criteria than
tho.se md1cated m 1:11" other sub-clauses for determining the period for
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wh1c11 the average 1s to be taken. It is pointed out that the Uttar
Pradesh Legi~lative ~sse~bly h~d passed. a resolution on August ?•
.1946 to .abolish Zamwdan qr big estates m the State; that since this
rnte1medmry had purchased the forest in question in 1948, he must be
presumed to be fixed with the knowledge that the days of the Zamindari '.'hich he was purchasing were numbered. With this background
-proceeds the argument -the intermediary must have mercilessly
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exploited the forest, leaving nothing to be acquired under the Act,
1950, excepting stumps or small saplings of tender age. We are afraid
this argument is not based on any evidence, whatever.
Mr. Dikshit
referred to the evidence of Babu Singh (D. W-4.) to show that the trees
left in this forest at the date of vesting were hardly 3" in diameter.
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We have gone through the evidence of Babu Singh (D.W.4). Far
from suppor\ing Mr. Dikshit's contention, it knocks the bottom out of
it.
Babu Singh was a forest contractor. Babu Singh testified that he
had purchased one coupe of the forest in Village Sorna for Rs. 53,000/-
from the Forest Department of the State for the year ending· March
1953. This means he purchased this coupe after the date of vesting.
He stated thaJ the trees purchased by him were of diameter's varying
from 4" to 12". The forest had a larger number of Kokath trees and
less of Sal. The very fact that soon after the vesting, sale of one coupe
of the forest fetched Rs. 53,000/-, shows that it had not been mercilessly exploited. This fact of sale of one coupe of this forest by the
State soon after the vesting, rather lends great strength fo the finding
of the High Court that its average annual income, estimated under
clause (e) of Section 39(1) would not be less than Rs. 40,000/-. By
no stretch of imagination, Babu Singh's evidence could be read as
showing that the ~nual yield from the forest on the date of vesting,
was negligible.
For fixing the number of years at 35 under sub-clause (i) of Section 39 (1 )( e), the Compensation Officer had not given any reason
whatever related to the criteria in Rule 34 ( 1). On the other hand.
the High Court took due note of the factors in clauses (i), (ii), (iv)
and (v) of Rule 34(1 ), in determining the period at 20 years for calculating the average annual income.
In determining this period at
20 years, the High Court rightly gave due weight to the fact that its
exploitation had been scientific and prudent, and it had started yielding
income from sale of trees only during 10 or 11 years preceding the
date of vesting and even on the date of vesting its condition was good.
Since the first fellings were within 20 years of the vesting, it was reasonable to determine the period at 20, the same being the minimum fixed
in the statute. Thus, the determination of such period as 20 years by
the High Court, in the facts of the case, comports best with the guidelines indicated in Rule 34(1).
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DURGI DEVI v. u. P. STATE (Sarkaria, J.)
605
T.lie, Compensation Officer, as mentioned earlier, did not appraise
the annual yield of the forest on the date of vesting. A plain reading
of clause (e) of Section 39(1) shows that its sub-clauses (i)
aud
(ii) do not provide for two alternative methods of calculating the
average rumual income of the forest.
The conjunction "and" at the
end of sub-clause (i) cannot _be r~ad as "or". It conjoins the two subclauses, and in effect, read in the context of "shall" in the opening part
of clause ( e), mandates the Compensation Officer to take both the
factors into consideration in assessing the average rumual income from
the forest. The reason why the Legislature has made compliance with
the requirement of this sub-clause (ii), also, obligatory, appears to be
to ensure that the compensation assessed has a reasonable nexus and
proportion to· the actual and potential value of the forest as on the
date of vesting. If a forest has been repeatedly, wholly and indiscriminately exploited within forty years or less immediately before the vesting, its actual and potential value as a forest on the date of the vesting
might be far less than the one calculated on the basis of its average
annual income of the preceding 20 to 40 years as the case may be. In
such a case, average annual income calculated merely on the basis of
the income for a period of 20 to 40 years preceding the vesting, may
cause fortuitous inflation in .the assessment of compensation. Conversely,
if a forest has been very little exploited in the preceding forty years
and is well-preserved and well-developed on the date of vesting, then
calculation of its average annual income on the basis of sub-clause
(i) alone, without taking into account its potential yield on the date of
the vesting, will make the compensation
assessed wholly illusory,
having no relation whatever to the value of the forest as at the date of
vesting. Entry of the appraised annual yield of the forest on the date
of vesting, into computation under clause ( e), operates as a counterpoise against fortuitous inflation or deflation in the assessment.
In the view we take we are fortified by a decision of this Court
in Ganga Devi v. State of Uttar Pradesh, where it was pointed out
· that in computing the average annual income under clause ( e) of
Section 39 ( 1). the Compensation Officer has to refer to both these
sub-clauses (i) and (ii). He cannot adopt either of these sub-clauses.
It was also pointed out that under sub-clause (ii) the annual yield on
the date of vesting is to be appraised by taking iuto consideration,
inter aiia, the number and age of the 'trees, the area under forest and
the produce. The High Court in the instant case, while determining
the yield under sub-clause (ii) has relied upon the evidence of Mr.
Chopra, a retired Forest Officer, who took all the relevant factors
into consideration. The High Court also accepted the evidence of
Chaudhri Babu Singh, Forest Contractor, which was to the effect that
for the year ending March 1953, the sale of one coupe of this forest
by the Forest Department of the State, fetched
Rs. 53,000/-. No
fault therefore, can be found with the High Court'~ finding that on the
date of vesting, the annual yield of the forest, appraised under subclause (ii) of clause (e) was not less than Rs. 47,128/.
The figure worked out by the High Court under sub-clause (i) by
dividing the total income of sales during the preceding 10 or 11
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1978] 3 S.C.R.
years, i.e. Rs. 6,13,334-8-3 by 20, was Rs. 30,666-11-3. The total
of these figures thus worked out under sub-clauses
(i) and (ii),
comes to Rs. 77,794/-. If this figure is divided by 2, the average
annual incomy under clause (e) would come to Rs. 38,897/-. The
High Court rounded off and raised this figure to Rs. 40,000/-.
We
do not want to disturb that approximation because the sale of a
coupe of the forest for the year immediately following the 'esting,
showed th'!! the appraised yield of the forest on the date of vesting
could be around Rs. 50,000/-.
The last question that remains to be considered is, whether the
High Court was right in holding that the Compensation Offic~r was
not competent to deduct under clause ( c) of Section 44, 15 'it from
the estimated 'income of the forest, for management expenses.
Mr. Dikshit contends that the word "and" in clause (c) of Section 44 should be read disconjunctively so as to convey the sense ot
"or". If it is so construed proceeds the argument-15% for management cost has got to be deducted from the "gross assets" calculilted
under Section 39(1) from each of the sources indicated therein, focluding the income from forests ~ssessed under clause
( e) of that
Section.
We are unable to accept this argument.
There is no warrant for reading "and" in clause ( c) of Section
44 as "or". The Legislature appears to have
advisedly used fhe
expression "cost of management" in conjunction with the expression
"irrecoverable arrears of rent". The former takes its colour from the
latter in association with which it occurs.
From the context it
appears that the expression "cost of management" is confined to the
cost of management in the collection of rents.
The scheme of Section 44 also supports this construction. Under
the scheme of Section 44, a particular deduction is authorised with
reference to income from a particular source.
A comparative study
of Sections 39(1) and 44 would show that there is no clause in the
latter Section which specifically authorises deduction of 15% from
the income referable to clause (e) of the former.
To elaborate the
point, deduction under clause ( d) of Section 44 is relatable to income
coming under clause (b) of Section 39.
Sub-clause (iii) of clause
(d) of•Section 44 specifically imports and applies the deduction under
the preceding clause ( c), to the income from the land in the personal cultivation of the inte.rmediary.
Clause ( e)
of
Section 44
specifically refers to clause (f) of Section 39 and makes the cost of
collection of income from royalties deductible at such rates as may
be prescribed.
Again, the deduction under clause
(g) of Section
44, has by specific reference, been made applicable to the income from
the source under clause (g) of Section 39 (1). Had Mr. Dikshit's
argument, that clause (c) of Sec~iori 44 contemplates an omnibus
deduction which encompasses all the sources of income assessed under
clauses (a) to (g) of Section 39(1) been correct, there was no neces-
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DURGI DEVI v. u. P. STATE (Sarkaria, J.)
'607
sity to specify the quantum and nature of deductions separately in
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clauses ( e) and (f) of Section 44 and then relate them by specific
reference to sources of income under clauses (f) and (g) of Section
39 ( 1). If clause ( c) of Section 44 were applicable proprio v,igore
to income from Khudkasht land, there was no necessity to incorporate
it by specific reference in clause ( d) (iii) of the same Section.
In
other words, the deduction mentioned in clause
( c) of Section 44
could have no. application to the income assessed from
the source
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under clause (b) of Section 39, but for the special provision made
in sub-clause (iii) of clause (d) o( Section 44. Construed coilS!stently with the context and scheme of Section 44, it appears that the
deduction mentioned in clause ( c) of Section 44 was not intended
to apply to the income from forest assessed under clause ( e) of Section 39(1). The deduction under clause (c) of Section 44 appears
to be confined to the rental income assessed under clause (a) of
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Section 39(1), or the income from Khudkasht lands assessed under
clause (b) of Section 39(1) to which it has been notionally applied
by specific incorporation in sub-clause (iii) of clause ( d) of Section
44.
The High Court was, therefore, right in holding that 15 % towards the cost of management could not be deducted by the ComD
pensation Officer in respect of the income from forest calculated under
clause (e) of Section 39(1).
Nor could the words "gross assets"
occurring at the close of
clause (c) in Section 44, be divorced from the context oI rents a-nd
construed in the spacious sense in which they have been used in Section 39. Their meaning and scope in the context is confined to the
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income from rents. If these words are torn out of the context and
interpreted in the comprehensive sense in which they are
used in
Section 39, this will lead to wholly unreasonable oppressive
and
absurd results.
This was demonstrated by the learned Judges of the
High Court, with reference to the income from mines worked directly
by an intermediary, calculated under clause
(g) of Section 39(1).
Clause (f) of Section 44 provides that 95 per centum of the gross
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income determined under clause (g) of Section 39 would be deductible
for the purpose of computing the net assets of the intermediary from
this source. If the contention of Mr. Dikshit, that 15 % deduction
under clause ( c) of Section 44 is applicable to all sources of income,
including from the mines under clause (g) of Section 39(1) is correct, then the income from mines directly worked by the intermediary
will suffer a double deduction 95% plus 15% under clauses (f) and
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( c) of Section 44.
This means, instead of paying any compensation
to the intermediary, an exaction of 10 per cent will be made from
him. Such could never be the intention of the Legislature. We have
therefore no hesitation in repelling this contention of Mr.