# Dwarka Dass Bhatia v. The State of Jamm11and Kashmir Jagannadhadas J

- **Citation:** [1956] 1 S.C.R. 956
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1956-05-31
- **Bench:** Bhagwati, Venkatarama Ayyar, s. K. DAS, GovINDA MENON
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/dwarka-dass-bhatia-v-the-state-of-jamm11and-kashmir-jagannadhadas-j-1288
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

Ind,istrial Dispute-Dismissal of Employee/or misconductOriminal prosecutir)n-Acquittal-Applicaticn for reinstatlm.ent and
• .-
compensation-Maintainability-Dismissed Emp/(Jyee, Meaninq ofDispute between employer and an individ1tal employee-Whether an
ind·ustrial dispute-Central Provinces and_ Berar Industrial Disp'ldes
Settlement Act, 1947 (0. P. and Berar XXIII of 1947), ss. 2(10),
(12) and 16-Industrial Disputes Act (XIV of 1947), s. 2(k).
In June, 1950, goods b~longing to the appellant company were
stolen and as the result of an enquiry the respondent was dismissed
on the ground of gross negligence and misconduct.
He was prosecuted on a charge of theft but was acquitted in March, 1952, and
thereupon he made an application before the Labour Commissioner
••
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
957
for reinstatement and compensation under s. 16(2) of the Central
7956
Provinces and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 194 7.
It
was contended for the appellant that the application was not main· Ce1ttral Prnvifices
tainable because (1) the respondent was not an employee on the Tra1tsj;ort Sen·ices
date of the application, having been dismissed Jong prior thereto
Ud.
and (2) his dispute was an individual and not an industrial dispute.
v.
,
Raghtmath 6opal
.Held, (1) that the definition of "employee' in s. 2(10) of the
Pattt'ardhcm
Act includes one who has been dismissed alld has ceased to be in
service, and that the inclusive clause therein was inserted ex abun·
danti cautela to repel a possible contention that employees discharged under ss. 31 and 32 of the Act would not fall withins. 2(10),
and cannot be read as importing an intention generally to exclude
dismissed employees from that definition.
Western India Aittomobile Association v. Industrial Trib11nal,
Bombay ([1949] F.C.R. 321), relied on.
(2) that a dispute between an employer and an employee who
bas been dismissed and who makes a claim for i·einstatement and
compensation, would be an industrial dispute within the meaning of
s. 2(12) of the Act, and s. 16 enables the employee-to enforce his
individual rights against an order of dismissal, discharge, removal
or suspension.
Qiiaere, whether a dispute simpliciter between an employer and
a workman would be an industrial dispute within s. 2(k) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 194 7 (XIV of 194 7).
C1v1L APPELLATE JuRISDIOTION: Civil Appeal No;
320 of 1955.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated October 19, 1954 of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India at Bombay in Appeal No. 76
of 1954.
H.J. Umrigar, E. J. Muharir and Rameshwar
Nath, for the appellant.
S. W. Dhabe and R. A. Govind, for the respondent.
1956.
November 6. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
VENKATARAMA AYYAR J.-The Central Provinces
Transport Services Ltd., Nagpur, was, at the material
dates, a public limited company, and the respondent was employed as a mechanic therein. In June
1950, goods belonging to the Company were stolen,
958
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956]
1956
and suspicion fell on the respondent.
There was an
C
l P
.
enqui:ry into the matter, and that resulted in his dis·
entra
rovince s
•
J
Transport Services missal on
une 28, 1950, on the ground of gross
ua.
negligence and misconduet. He was then prosecuted
v.
on a charge of theft, but that ended in his acquittal
Raghunath Gopal on March 3. 1952. Thereafter, he applied to the ComPatwardhan
pany to be reinstated, and failing to get redress, filed
Venkatarama
on October 1, 1952, an application before the Labour
Ayyar J.
Commissioner under section 16(2) of the Central
Provinces and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement
Act XXIII of 1947, hereinafter referred to as the Act.,
for reinstatement and compensation. The Company
resisted the claim on the ground, inter alia, that as
the applicant had been dismissed on June 28, 1950,
he was not an employee on the date of the application, that accordingly there was no "industrial dispute touching the dismissal of an employee" as required by s.

## Text

1956
Dwarka Dass
Bhatia
v.
The State of
Jamm11and
Kashmir
Jagannadhadas J,
1956
NOf.lembet' 6.
956
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956]
In this case, the order of detention is based on the
ground that the petitioner was engaged in unlawful
smuggling activities relating to three commodities,
cloth, zari and mercury of which two are found not
to be essential articles. No material is placed before
us enabling us to say that the smuggling attributed
to the petitioner was substantially only of mercury
~-
.~
and that the smuggling as regards the other two commodities was of an inconsequential nature. On the
other hand the fact that the particulars furnished to
the detenue on the 31st May, 1956, relate only to cloth
and zari (we understand that tila referred to in paragraph 3 is zari) indicates.that probably the smuggling
of these two items was not of an inconsequential
nature.
We are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that the
order of detention in this case is bad and must be
quashed. We have accordingly quashed the order and
directed the release forthwith of the detenue on the
conclusion of the hearing on the 29th October, 1956.
Petition allowed.
CENTRAL PROVINCES TRANSPORT
SERVICES LTD.
. v.
RAGHUNATH GOPAL PATWARDHAN.
[BHAGWATI, VENKATARAMA AYYAR, s. K. DAS and
GovINDA MENON JJ.]
Ind,istrial Dispute-Dismissal of Employee/or misconductOriminal prosecutir)n-Acquittal-Applicaticn for reinstatlm.ent and
• .-
compensation-Maintainability-Dismissed Emp/(Jyee, Meaninq ofDispute between employer and an individ1tal employee-Whether an
ind·ustrial dispute-Central Provinces and_ Berar Industrial Disp'ldes
Settlement Act, 1947 (0. P. and Berar XXIII of 1947), ss. 2(10),
(12) and 16-Industrial Disputes Act (XIV of 1947), s. 2(k).
In June, 1950, goods b~longing to the appellant company were
stolen and as the result of an enquiry the respondent was dismissed
on the ground of gross negligence and misconduct.
He was prosecuted on a charge of theft but was acquitted in March, 1952, and
thereupon he made an application before the Labour Commissioner
••
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
957
for reinstatement and compensation under s. 16(2) of the Central
7956
Provinces and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 194 7.
It
was contended for the appellant that the application was not main· Ce1ttral Prnvifices
tainable because (1) the respondent was not an employee on the Tra1tsj;ort Sen·ices
date of the application, having been dismissed Jong prior thereto
Ud.
and (2) his dispute was an individual and not an industrial dispute.
v.
,
Raghtmath 6opal
.Held, (1) that the definition of "employee' in s. 2(10) of the
Pattt'ardhcm
Act includes one who has been dismissed alld has ceased to be in
service, and that the inclusive clause therein was inserted ex abun·
danti cautela to repel a possible contention that employees discharged under ss. 31 and 32 of the Act would not fall withins. 2(10),
and cannot be read as importing an intention generally to exclude
dismissed employees from that definition.
Western India Aittomobile Association v. Industrial Trib11nal,
Bombay ([1949] F.C.R. 321), relied on.
(2) that a dispute between an employer and an employee who
bas been dismissed and who makes a claim for i·einstatement and
compensation, would be an industrial dispute within the meaning of
s. 2(12) of the Act, and s. 16 enables the employee-to enforce his
individual rights against an order of dismissal, discharge, removal
or suspension.
Qiiaere, whether a dispute simpliciter between an employer and
a workman would be an industrial dispute within s. 2(k) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 194 7 (XIV of 194 7).
C1v1L APPELLATE JuRISDIOTION: Civil Appeal No;
320 of 1955.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated October 19, 1954 of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India at Bombay in Appeal No. 76
of 1954.
H.J. Umrigar, E. J. Muharir and Rameshwar
Nath, for the appellant.
S. W. Dhabe and R. A. Govind, for the respondent.
1956.
November 6. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
VENKATARAMA AYYAR J.-The Central Provinces
Transport Services Ltd., Nagpur, was, at the material
dates, a public limited company, and the respondent was employed as a mechanic therein. In June
1950, goods belonging to the Company were stolen,
958
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956]
1956
and suspicion fell on the respondent.
There was an
C
l P
.
enqui:ry into the matter, and that resulted in his dis·
entra
rovince s
•
J
Transport Services missal on
une 28, 1950, on the ground of gross
ua.
negligence and misconduet. He was then prosecuted
v.
on a charge of theft, but that ended in his acquittal
Raghunath Gopal on March 3. 1952. Thereafter, he applied to the ComPatwardhan
pany to be reinstated, and failing to get redress, filed
Venkatarama
on October 1, 1952, an application before the Labour
Ayyar J.
Commissioner under section 16(2) of the Central
Provinces and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement
Act XXIII of 1947, hereinafter referred to as the Act.,
for reinstatement and compensation. The Company
resisted the claim on the ground, inter alia, that as
the applicant had been dismissed on June 28, 1950,
he was not an employee on the date of the application, that accordingly there was no "industrial dispute touching the dismissal of an employee" as required by s. 16, sub-ss. (1) and (2) of the Act, and
that, in consequence, the proceedings under that sec·
tion were incompetent. The Assistant Labour Com·
missioner, before whom the matter came up for hear·
ing, agreed with this contention, and dismissed the
application. The respondent preferred a revision
against this order to the Provincial Industrial Court
under s. 16(5) of the Act, and by its order dated
February 5, 1954, that Court held that a dismissed
employee was an employee as defined in s. 2(10) of
the Act, that a dispute by such an employee was an
industrial dispute within s. 2(12) oflhe Act, and that
the application under s. 16(2) of the Act was therefore maintainable. In the result, the order of dis·
missal was set aside and the matter remanded for enquiry on the merits. Against that order, the Company appealed to the Labour Appellate Tribunal,
which by its order dated October 19, 1954, affirmed
the decision of the Provincial Industrial Court, and
dismissed the appeal. The Company has preferred
the present appeal against this order under Art. 136.
Pending the appeal to this Court, the Company went
into liquidation and has been taken over by the State
of Madhya Pradesh, and is now being run under the
name of Central Provinces Transport Services (under
/
$.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
959
Government ownership), Nagpur. On the application
of the respondent, the record has been suitably
amended.
The point for decision in this appeal is whether an
application for reinstatement and compensation by a
dismissed employee is maintainable under s. 16 of the
Act. That section, so far as is material to the present
question, runs as follows:
"(I) Where the State Government by notification so directs, the Labour Commissioner shall have
power to decide an industrial dispute touching the
dismissal, discharge, removal or suspension of an employee working in any industry in general or in any
local area as may be specified in the notification.
"(2) Any employee, working in an industry to
which the notification under sub-section (I) applied,
may within six months from the date of such dismissal, discharge, removal or suspension, apply to the
Labour Commissioner for reinstatement and payment
of compensation for loss of wages".
The argument of Mr. Umrigar for the appellant is
that it is a condition prerequisite to the entertainment of an application for rein~tatement under this
section that there should be an industrial dispute
touching the dismissal of an employee, that there was
none such in this case, because the respondent was
not an employee on the date of the application, having been dismissed long prior thereto and further because his dispute was an individual and not an indust.rial dispute.
It will be convenient at this stage to refer to the
relevant provisions of the Act, as they stood on the
material dates.
Section 2(10) defines an employee
as follows:
"employee" means any person employed by an
employer to do any skilled or unskilled manual or
clerical work for contract or hire or reward in any industry and includes an employee discharged on
account of any dispute relating to a change in respect
of which a notice is given under section 31 or 32
whether before or after the discharge".
Section 2(12) defines "industrial dispute" as meaning
1956
Central Provinces
Transport Serviced
Ltd.
v.
Raghunath Gopal
Patwardlian
V•11katarama
Ayyar J.
1956
Central Provinces
Tt'ansport Services
Ltd.
v.
Raghutiath Gopal
Patwardhan
Venkatarania
AyyarJ.
!)60
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956]
"any dispute or difference connected with an industrial matter arising between employer and employee
or between employers or employees". Under s. 2(13),
"industrial matter" means "any matter relating to
work, pay, wages, reward, hours, privileges, rights or
duties of employers or employees, or the mode, terms
and conditions of employment or refusal to employ
and includes questions pertaining to (a) the relationship between employer and employee, or to the dismissal or non-employment of any person .... "
It is not disputed that a question of reinstatement
is an industrial matter as defined ins. 2(13) of the Act.
The controversy relates to the question whether it is
an industrial dispute as defined ins. 2(12) of the Act.
The contention of the appellant is that it does not
fall within that definition, because the further condition prescribed by s. 2(12) that it must be between
an employer and employee is not satisfied. It was
argued by Mr. Umrigar that when the respondent was
dismissed on June 28, 1950, his employment came to
an end, and that he could not thereafter be termed an
employee, as that word is ordinarily understood, that
it could not have been the intention of the legislature
to include in the definition of an employee even those
who had ceased to be in service, as otherwise there
was no need for the further provision ins. 2(10) that
discharged employees would in certain cases be employees; and that, in any event, the inclusive portion
of the definition would, on the principle Expressio
unius est exclusio alterius, operate to exclude all exemployees, other than those mentioned therein.
The question whether a dismissed employee is an
employee as defined in s. 2(10) of the Act must be
held to be practically concluded by the decision
of the Federal Court in Western India Automobile
Association v. Industrial Tribunal, Bombay('). There,
the point for determination was whether a claim for
reinstatement by a dismissed workman was an industrial dispute as defined in s. 2{k) of the Industrial
Disputes Act XIV of 1947.
It was held that the
definition ins. 2(k) including as it did, all disputes or
(1) [1010) F.C.R. 321.
•
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
961
differences in connection with employment or non1956
employment of a person was sufficiently wide to Central Provmces
include a claim for reinstatement by a dismissed workTransport Sertices
man. Counsel for the appellant sought to distinguish
Lttl.
that decision on the ground firstly, that it was given
v.
on a statute different from what we are concerned Raghunath <Sopaz
with in this appeal, and secondly, that the reference
Patwardhan
there, included other items of dispute, which unVenkataramti
doubtedly fell within the Act, and the question of
Ayyar J.
reinstatement took its complexion from those items.
We do not see any force in either of these contentions. Section 2(12) ands. 2(13) of the Act are substantially in pari materia with s. 2(k) of Act XIV of
1947, and the ratio of the decision in Westet·n India
Automobile Association v. Industrial Tribunal, Bombay (supra) will be as much applicable to the one
enactment as to the other. Nor does it make any
difference that there were comprised in the reference
other items which fell within the definition under s.
2(k), because if the Government had no jurisdiction
under the Act to refer the question of reinstatement
· of dismissed employee for adjudication, then the
reference must, to that extent, be treated as a nullity,
and it would be immaterial that it was intra viru as
regards the other items of dispute.
We are also·unable to accede to the contention of
the appellant that the inclusive clause in s. 2(10) of
the Act is an indication that the legislature did not
intend tu include within that definition those who
bad ceased to be in service. In our opinion, that
clause was inserted ex abundanti cautela to repel a
possible contention that employees discharged under
ss. 31and32 of the Act would not fall withins. 2(10),
and cannot be read as importing an intention generally to exclude dismissed employees from that definition. On the other hand, s. 16 of the Act expressly
provides for relief being granted to dismissed employees by way of reinstatement and compensation,
and that provision must become useless and inoperative, if we are to adopt the construction which the
appellant seeks to put on the definition of employee
ins. 2(10).
We must accordingly hold agreeing with196
1956
Central Provinces
Transport Services
Ud,
v.
J?c1ghunat1i Gopal
Patward1,an
Venkatarama
Ana• J.
962
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1956)
the decision in Western India Automobile Association v.
Industrial Tribunal, Bombay (supra) that the definition of "employee" in the Act would include one who
has been dismissed and the respondent cannot be
denied relief only by reason of the· fact that he was
not in employment on the date of the application.
It was next contended that even assuming that • -
the respondent was an "employee" as defined in s. 2
(10) of the Act, his dimissal could not be held to be
an industrial dispute as defined ins. 2(12), because
that term properly meant that the dispute was one
between employer on the one hand and the industry
represented by its workmen as a class on the other,
and that a dispute between the employer and a single
employee would be an individual dispute and would
therefore be outside the purview of s. 2(12). It was
argued in support of this contention that the object
of all labour legislation was not so much to deal with
individual rights of wokmen, for the enforcement of
which there was an appropriate forum in the ordinary
courts of the land, as to regulate the relation between
capital and la\Jour, treating them as distinct entities,
so that public peace and order might not be disturbed
and production might not suffer, and for that end, to
recognise the right of labour to speak and act as a
body for the protection of its common interests and to
provide a machinery for speedy settlement of disputes
which that body might raise; and that it could not
have been the intention of the legislature, where the
above considerations did not operate, to interfere
with the normal relations between empioyer and employee under the law and to provide an additional
-
forum to the employee to vindicate his rights. ReY
_
Hance was placed in support of this contention on
decisions of the Madras, Calcutta and Patna High
Courts and of Industrial Tribunals.
The question whether a dispute by an individual
workman would be an industrial dispute as defined in
s. 2(k) of the Act XIV of 1947, has evoked considerable conflict of opinion both in the High Courts and
in Industrial Tribunals, and three different views have
been expressed thereon: (I) A dispute which concerns
t-
•• ,_
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
963
1956
Ce·utral Provinces
Transport Se• vices
Ud.
only the rights of individual workers, cannot be field
to be an industrial dispute. That was the opinion
expressed in Kandan Textiles v. Jndustrial Tribunal(1).
There, Rajamannar 0. J. observed that though the
language of the definition in s. 2(k) was wide enough
v.
to include such a dispute, the provisions of s. 18 Raghunath Gopal
suggested that something more than an individual
Patwardhan
dispute bP.tween a_ worker and the employer was meant
by an industrial dispute. The other learned Judge,
Mack J., was more emphatic in his opinion, and
observed that the Act was "never intended to provide
a machinery for redress by a dismissed workman".
It became, however, unnecessary to decide the point,
as the court came to the conclusion that the reference
itself was bad for the reason that there was no material on which the Government could be satisfied
that there was a dispute. The views expressed in
Kandan Textiles v. Industrial Tribunal (supra) were
approved in Manager, United Commercial Bank Ltd.
v. Commissioner of Labour(i); but hPre again, the
observations were obiter, as the point for decision was
whether a right of appeal conferred by s. 41 of the
Madras Shops and Establishments Act XXXVI of
1947 was taken away by implication by Act XIV of
19!7. The question, however, arose directly for decision in J. Chowdhury v. M. 0. Banerjee(3), in which
the order of the Government referring the dispute of
a dismissed employee to the adjudication of a Tribunal was attacked as incompetent, and it was held by
Mitter J., following the observations in Kandan Textiles v. Industrial Tribunal (supra) that the dispute
in question was not an industrial dispute, and that
the reference was, in consequence, bad.
(If). A dispute between an employer and a single
employee can be an industrial dispute as defined in
s. 2(k). That was the dPcision in Newspapers 'Ltd.,
Allahabad v. State Industrial Tribunal, U.P.( 4). In that
case, a reference of a dispute by a dismissed employee
and the award of the Tribunal passed on that refer111 (1949) 2 M.L.J. 789: A.IR. 1961 Mad 611.
(2) A.I.R. 1961 Mad. 141.
18) [1961) 66 0. W.N. ~66.
(4J 4.I.B. 1904 All. 61(1.
Venkatarama
Ayyarj.
964.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956)
1956
ence were attacked as bad on the ground that the
c
P
.
dispute in question was not an industrial dispute
2.;;:;;!,;;.;;,,::: withins. 2(k) of Act XIV of 1947, and it was held
Ud.
by Bhargava J., that an industrial dispute could come
v.
into existence even if the parties thereto were only
Raghunath GoJ>al the employer and a single employee and that the rePatwardhan
ference and the award were, in consequence, valid.
1•
""
Venkatarama
A similar decision was given by a Full BPnch of t.he
AyyarJ.
Labour Appellate T,ribunal in Swadeshi Cotton Mills
Company Ltd. v. Their Workmen(').
(Ill) A dispute between an employer and a single
employee cannot per se be an industrial dispute, but
it may become one if it is taken up by the Union or
a number of workmen. That was held by Bose J., in
Bilash Chandra Mitra v. Balmer Lawrie & Co.("), by
Ramaswami and Sarjoo Prasad JJ., in New India
Assurance Co. v. C-.ntral Government Industrial Tribunal(') and by Balakrishna Ayyar J.,. in Lakshmi
Talkies, Madras v. Munuswami and others(') and by
the Industrial Tribunals in Gordon Woodroffe & Co.
(Madras) Ltd. v. Appa Rao(') and Lynus & Co. v.
Hemanta Kumar Samanta(').
The preponderance of judicial opinion is clearly in
favour of the last of the three views stated above,
and there is considerable reason behind. it. Notwithstanding that the language of s. 2(k) is wide enough
to cover a dispute between an employer and a single
employee, the scheme of the Industrial Disput.es Act
does appear to contemplate that the machinery provided therein should be set in motion, to settle only
disputes which involve the rights of workmen as a
class and that a dispute touching the individual rights
of a workman was not intended to be the subject of '
an adjudication under the Act, when the same bad
not been taken up by the Union or a number of workmen. If that were the correct position, the respondent was not entitled to apply under s. 16(2) of the
Act as the workmen in the industry had not adopted
his dispute as their own and chosen to treat it as
(1\ [1915-~] l L.L.J. 757.
\8) A.I.R. 1958 Patn• S~!.
(51 [1965] 2 L.L J. 541.
I~) A.I.R. 1953 Cal. 613
Ii• [19M] 2 L.L.J. !177.
(6) [1956) 2 L.L.J. 89.
$.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
965
their casus belli with the Company. But then, we are
1956
directly concerned in this appeal not with the Indus- c t
1 P
•
.
ctz ra
rot"tnces
trial Disputes Act XIV of 1947 but with the Central Trnnsport Services
Provinces and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement
Ltd.
Act XXIII of 1947, and in the view which we take of
v.
the rights of the respondent under that statute, there Ragl111nath Gopal
'
d
fi
1
· ·
th
t'
Putu·ardhan
is no nee to express a na op1mon on
e ques 10n
whether a dispute simpliciter between an employer
Venkatarama
and a workman would be an industrial dispute within
Ayyar J.
s. 2(k) of Act XIV of 1947.
Now, the Central Provinces and Berar Industrial
Disputes Settlement Act XXIII of 1947 with which
we are concerned, is not in pari materia·with Act XIV
of 1947. It no doubt covers the ground occupied by
that Act, and contains provisions relating to arbitration, adjudication, awards, strikes and lock-outs. But
it contains more. It enacts in Ch. IV provisions which
are intended to regulate the contract of employment
between employer and workmen, a subject whic:h is
covered by a distinct piece of Central legislation, Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act XX of
1946. The object of that Act was, as appears from
the preamble thereto, "to require employers in industrial establishments formally to define conditions of
employment under them'', whereas the object of the
Industrial Disputes Act XIV of 1947 is, as set out in
its preamble, "to make provision for the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes and for
certain ot.her purposes". Thus, even though the two
ena(}tmehts are pieces of what is termed labour legislation, their objects and their vision are different.
While Act XIV of 1947 may be said to be primarily
concerned with disputes of labour as a class, Act XX
of 1946 is directed to getting the rights of an employee
under a contract defined.
Now, as the Central Provinces and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act
XXIII of 1947 covers the ground occupied by both
Act XX of 1946 and Act XIV of 1947, it would be
proper to interpret the expression "industrial dispute"
therein in a. sense wider than what it bears in Act
XIV of 1947, so as to cover not only disputes of
workmen as a class but also their individual disputes.
96fl
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956)
r955
And this view receives considerable support from other
C
I
l-P 1
provisions of the Act. Section 41 enacts that an ap·
<nra
rovnccs
1.
.
d
h
. .
b
d
,
Transport Services p 1cat10n un er t at section can e ma e either by an
ua.
employer or employee concernPd or by a rrpresentav.
tive of the employees concerned. Section 2(24) defines
R,,giu.,.ath Gopal "representative of employees" as•meaning a union or
JJat;:c•ardhatt
h
h
•
•
l
--
W ere t ere 1s no un10n, persons e ected by the em-
;.
Vrnkatarama
ployees not exceeding five.
Thus, there is a clear reAyyarJ.
cognition of the rights of an individual employee as
distinguished from a class of employees, to move for
redress. It is argued by Mr. Umrigar that this re-
/.
cognition is only for the purpose of s. 41 and that no
inference can be drawn therefrom that the employee
._
has a similar right to appl,Y under s. 16(2). But the
importance of s. 41 consists in this that it indicates
that the Act has in contemplation the enforcement of
individual rights of workmen also.
Then we have
s. 53, which runs as follows:
"Save with the permission of the authority
holding any proceeding under this Act, no employee
shall be allowed to appear in such proceeding except
through the representative of employees:
Provided that w.here only a single employee is
concerned he may appear personally".
This section again recognises the rights of employees
: to agitate their individual rights under tbe provisions
of the Act. Section 16· is intended, in our opinion, to
enable an employee to enforce his individual rights
-
when there is an order of dismissal, discharge, removal or suspension, and in the context, "industrial
dispute" must be interpreted as including the claim
of an employee who has been dismissed, for reinstatement and compensation.
J'
The view taken by the Industrial Court and the
Labour Appellate Tribunal as to the meaning of "industrial dispute" in the Central Provinces and Berar
Industrial Disputes Settlement Ant XXIII of 1947"
is therefore correct, and this appeal must be dismissed
with costs.
Appeal dismissed.