# EARNEST JOHN WHITE v. MRS. KATHLEEN OLIVE WHITE AND OTHERS

- **Citation:** [1958] 1 S.C.R. 1410
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1957-12-20
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 19 of 1956
- **Bench:** Bhagwati, J. L. Kapur, Gajendragadkar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/earnest-john-white-v-mrs-kathleen-olive-white-and-others-1430
- **Pages:** 13

## Headnote

Divorce-Adultery-Standard of proof-Principle-Direct
evidence if imperative-Finding of fact when can be interferred
with-Divorce Act (IV of 1869), u. 14 and 1.
The appellant sued his wife for dissolution of marriage on the
ground of adultery.
·
On the evidence the trial coun found that it wa5 not possible
to bold that adultery had been committed, though it found that
one of the letters contained "a large substratum of truth". The
High Coun in appeal concurred with the decision.
On appeal to
the Supreme Coun it was contended for the appellant that the
finding of the courts below was vitiated because certain pieces of
evidence had been Misread, and some others ignored. As a matter
of legitimate and proper inference the Coun should not have
arrived at any other conclusion, but that the wife was guilty of
adultery with respondent No. 2. The evidence showed that the
wife went to Patna and stayed in a hotel with respondent No. 2
under an assumed name, that they occupied the same room in the
hotel, that the conduct of the respondent indicated a guilty inclination, and that so far as the wife was concerned, her conduct wa!
entirely consistent with her guilt:
Held, that, the nature of the evidence adduced was such a.s
would satisfy the requirements of s. 14 of the Divorce Act, and
that the finding of the Couns below that an inference of adultery
could not be drawn therefrom must. be set aside.
Although it is not usual for the Supreme Coun to interfere
S.C.R.
SUPREME- COURT REPORTS
1411
on questions of fact, w~ere, howe~er, the. cou~ .below i~ore or
1958
misconstrue important pieces of evidence m arnving at therr finding and this Court is of the opinion that no tribunal could have
Whit~-
coiiie to such a find on the evidence taken as a whole, such
v.
finding was liable to be interferred with by this Court.
Whitt
Held, further, that the words "satisfied on the evidence" in
s. 14 of the Divorce Act, 1869, imply that it is the duty of the
Court to pronounce a decree only when it is satisfied that the case
has been proved beyond reasonable <4>ubt as to the commission o[
a matrimonial offence.
The evidence must be clear and satisfactory beyond mere
balance of probabilities. It is not necessary and rarely possible.
to prove the issue by any direct evidence.
The rule laid down in Preston /ones v. Preston /ones, [1951]
A.C. 391, lays down the principle that should be followed by the
courts under s. 7 of the Divorce Act.
State of Madras v. A. Vaidanatha Iyer, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 61,
Purvez Ardeshir Poonawala v. The State of Bombay, Cr. A. 122
of 1954, decided on December 20, 1957, Stephen Seneviratne v.
The King, A.I.R. 193~.C. 289, Mordaunt v. Moncrieffe, (1874)
_30 I:.T. 649 and Gower v. Gower, [1950] 1 All. E.R. 804, referred._
to.
Loveden v. Loveden, (1810) 161 E.R. 648; (1810) 2 Hag.
Con. 1, 3, referred to.
·
Preston /ones v. Preston /ones, (1951] A.C. 391, relied upon.

## Text

1410
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958)
1958
title ~y a~verse possession. Intermittent working of
Silmmatl
the Illlfi:e m the m!lnner ~nd for the period described
K"'"' Bat
ab~ve is wholly u.1suffic1ent to establish possession
v.
which would constitute adverse possession or would
sodila Rani Ghos• lead to an inference of adverse possession and we are
and 011wr.r
in agreement with the view expressed by the High
Kap11r J.
1958
March 10 ..
Court and would therefore dismiss these appeals with
costs. . One set of costs between the two appeals
except as to Court-fees.
•
Appeals dismissed .
EARNEST JOHN WHITE
v.
MRS. KATHLEEN OLIVE WHITE AND OTHERS
(BHAGWATI, J. L. KAPUR and GAJENDRAGADKAR JJ.)
Divorce-Adultery-Standard of proof-Principle-Direct
evidence if imperative-Finding of fact when can be interferred
with-Divorce Act (IV of 1869), u. 14 and 1.
The appellant sued his wife for dissolution of marriage on the
ground of adultery.
·
On the evidence the trial coun found that it wa5 not possible
to bold that adultery had been committed, though it found that
one of the letters contained "a large substratum of truth". The
High Coun in appeal concurred with the decision.
On appeal to
the Supreme Coun it was contended for the appellant that the
finding of the courts below was vitiated because certain pieces of
evidence had been Misread, and some others ignored. As a matter
of legitimate and proper inference the Coun should not have
arrived at any other conclusion, but that the wife was guilty of
adultery with respondent No. 2. The evidence showed that the
wife went to Patna and stayed in a hotel with respondent No. 2
under an assumed name, that they occupied the same room in the
hotel, that the conduct of the respondent indicated a guilty inclination, and that so far as the wife was concerned, her conduct wa!
entirely consistent with her guilt:
Held, that, the nature of the evidence adduced was such a.s
would satisfy the requirements of s. 14 of the Divorce Act, and
that the finding of the Couns below that an inference of adultery
could not be drawn therefrom must. be set aside.
Although it is not usual for the Supreme Coun to interfere
S.C.R.
SUPREME- COURT REPORTS
1411
on questions of fact, w~ere, howe~er, the. cou~ .below i~ore or
1958
misconstrue important pieces of evidence m arnving at therr finding and this Court is of the opinion that no tribunal could have
Whit~-
coiiie to such a find on the evidence taken as a whole, such
v.
finding was liable to be interferred with by this Court.
Whitt
Held, further, that the words "satisfied on the evidence" in
s. 14 of the Divorce Act, 1869, imply that it is the duty of the
Court to pronounce a decree only when it is satisfied that the case
has been proved beyond reasonable <4>ubt as to the commission o[
a matrimonial offence.
The evidence must be clear and satisfactory beyond mere
balance of probabilities. It is not necessary and rarely possible.
to prove the issue by any direct evidence.
The rule laid down in Preston /ones v. Preston /ones, [1951]
A.C. 391, lays down the principle that should be followed by the
courts under s. 7 of the Divorce Act.
State of Madras v. A. Vaidanatha Iyer, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 61,
Purvez Ardeshir Poonawala v. The State of Bombay, Cr. A. 122
of 1954, decided on December 20, 1957, Stephen Seneviratne v.
The King, A.I.R. 193~.C. 289, Mordaunt v. Moncrieffe, (1874)
_30 I:.T. 649 and Gower v. Gower, [1950] 1 All. E.R. 804, referred._
to.
Loveden v. Loveden, (1810) 161 E.R. 648; (1810) 2 Hag.
Con. 1, 3, referred to.
·
Preston /ones v. Preston /ones, (1951] A.C. 391, relied upon.
CIVIL
APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal
No. 19 of 1956.
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated
July 21, 1954, of the Patna High Court in Letters
Patent Appeal No. 24 of 1951, arising out of the
judgment and decree dated May 15, 1951, of the said
High Court in Matrimonial Suit No. 2of1950.
M. C. SetQJvad, Attorney-General for India, N. C.
Chatterjee and P. K. Chatterjee, for the
appellant.
Both the Courts below have failed to draw the proper
inference of the commission of adultery, which should
legitimately have been drawn from the facts proved.
Both the Single Judge and the~ppeal Court failed to
take into consideration some pieces of evidence and
certain other dieces of evidence which were equally
important ha been misread and misconstrued and
as a matter of legitimate and proper inference .thelower cour:ts. should not have arrived at any other
1958
White
v.
·White
1412
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
conclusion but that the wife was guilty of adultery
and in such case the interference with the finding of
facts below by the Supreme Court will be called for.
State of Madras v. A. Vaidanatha Iyer, A.LR. 1958
S.C. 61 and Stephen Seneviratne v. The King, A,I.R.
1936 P. C. 289.
N.C. Chatterjee c~ntinued. The judgment of the
High Court suffers from certain serious infirmities
and this Court should not act on the rigid principle that finding of fact should not be interfered with
in the final court of appeal.
Sir William Scott's dictum in Loveden v. Loveden,
(1810) 161 E.R. 648, as to "the guarded discretion of
a reasonable and just man" does not mean there
should be satisfactory evidence of the commission of
a matrimonial offence. Lord MacDermott has pointed
out in Preston Jones v. Preston Jones, L.R. [1951] A.C.
391, that if a judge is satisfied beyond reasonable
doubt as to the commission of the matrimonial offence
relied on by the petitioner as ground for .divorce, he
must surely be "satisfied" within the meaning of the
enactment, and no less so in cases of adultery where
the circumstances are such as t<> -involve the paternity
of a child. To succeed on an issue of adultery it is
not necessary to prove the direct fact of, or even all
act of adultery in time and place.; for if it were so, in
many few cases would that proof be attainable. It
has been pointed out in a number of cases that rarely
the parties are surprised in a direct act of adultery
and such evidence will have to be disbelieved.
Rydon
on Divorce, 6th Edn., P. 115; Douglas v. Douglas,
[1951] P. 85 : [1950] 2 All E.R. 748.
In nearly every
case the fact of adultery is inferred from circumstances
which lead to it by fair inference as a necessary conclusion. Unless it is so held there will absolutely be
no protection to marital rights. Allen v. Allen, [1894]
P. 248, approving Loveden v. Loveden.
Counsel then cited Davis v. Davis, [1950] P. 125 :
(1950) I All E.R. 40. In that case Bucknill, L. J., and
Somervell, L. J., held that when husband petitions for
divorce on the ground of wife's cruelty,
it is
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1413
'1nnecessary to introduce any question of the standard
of proof required of a criminal charge. Denning, L. J.,
emphasised that a suit for divorce is a civil and not
a criminal proceeding.
The same standard of proof
as that required in criminal cases is not .needed. The
stringency of proof required in a criminal court is not
m:cessarily called for in divorce suit. Lord Merriman's
dictum quoting Churchman v. Churchman, [1945] P. 44,
that the same strict proof is required in the case of
matrimonial offence as is required in connection with
criminal offence has been too widely expressed and
should be read in the light of later judgments.
Recent judgment of the Court of Appeal (Bucknill,
L. J., and Denning L. J.,) lays down the correct law
in Gowerv. Gower, [1950] 1 All E.R. 804, that the correct
approach has been laid down by Denning, L. J., who
observed that the court should not be irrevocably
committed to the view that a charge of adultery must
be regarded a criminal charge, to be proved beyondall reasonable doubt. All that the statute requires is
that the court must be satisfied on the evidence that
the case of the petitioner pas been proved and it is
submitted that Denning, L J., has enunciated the
correct principle and the statute lays down a standard
and puts adultery on the same footing as cruelty,
desertion or unsoundness of mind.
N. C. Chatterjee cited also Mordaunt v. Moncrieffe,
[1874] 30 I:,.T. 649.
.
.
S. P~ Varma, for-the respondent. The burden of
proof is on the person alleging adultery and there is
always ·a presumption of innocence. In any event on
a petition for divorce some strict proof is required of
adultery as is required in a criminal case before a
~rson is found guilty. Ginesi. v. Ginesi, [1948] P. 179 :
[1948] 1 All E.R. 373. Applying the dictum of Lord
Merriman in Churchman v. Churchman, [1945] P. 44,
the trial court was not satisfied of the guilt beyond
all reasonable doubt. It is for the trial judge to decide
an issue of fact; unless he has misdirected himself
his finding should not ·be disturbed.
R. Patnaik, for co-respondent No. 1. Submitted thai
1958.
White
v.
Whit~
"1958
WhUe
v.
H'hite
/<apur J.
1414
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
the evidence in the case falls far short of the standard
of proof required.
1958. March 10. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
KAPUR J.-This is an appeal with a certificate
under s. 56 of the Divorce Act (IV of 1869) (hereinafter
called the Act) against a judgment and decree dated
July 21, 1954, of the High Court of Patna dismissing
the husband's suit. The husband who is the appellant
sued his wife who is respondent No. 1 for dissolution
of marriage on the ground of her adultery with two
<:o-respondents now respondents Nos. 2 and 3. The suit
was tried in the High Court by Shearer J., who
dismissed the suit and this decree was on appeal
<:onfirmed by the Appeal Court. The question as to
the legality of the certificate granted was raised but
in the view that we have taken it is not necessary to
decide this question.
The husband was married to the wife at Kharagpur
on February 3, 1943, and there is no issue of the
marriage. The parties therafter resided at "Rose
Villa" at Samastipur and respondent No. 2 was
residing with his mother in an adjoining house called
"Sunny Nook". The husband alleged various acts
.of adultery between the wife and the other
two
repsondents. As regards allegations of adultery of the
wife with respondent No. 3, the High Court has found
.against the husband and these findings have not been
-challenged before us.
The allegations of adultery
between the wife and respondent No. 2 were also held
not proved. In appeal before us the h"tisband
has
confined his case to the acts of adultery alleged to
have been committed at the Central Hotel, Patna
where the wife and respondent No. 2 are alleged to
have resided together
between July 25, 1950 and
July 28, 1950, under the assumed names of Mr. and
Mrs. Charles Chaplin. The wife pleaded that she
came to Patna solely with the object of haviqg her
tooth extracted and returned to Samastipur tlie same
day and that she had to come alone as in spite of her
request the husband refused to accompany her.
'
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1415
Respondent No. 2 pleaded that he came to Patna with
his mother "in connection with seeking employment
under the Superintendent of Police, Anti-Smuggling
Department, also in connection with mother's tooth
trouble and for household shopping". He also pleaded
that he stayed with his mother in the same room
under his own name and not under an assumed'
name.
The trial judge found that the wife and respondent
No. 2 and the latter's mother stayed in two rooms iii
the Hotel Nos. 9 & 10 froni July 25, 1950 to July 28,
1950. He accepted the testimony of the Manager of
the Hotel, Cardoza P. W. 3 and also of the sweeper
Kira Ram P. W. 4. He found that the wife and
respondent No. 2 were seen by Kira Ram in room
No. 10 and also that the party, i.e., the wife, respondent
No. 2 and the latter's mother were served rooming tea
in one room which they had together but he did not
infer any acts of adultery from this conduct. The
document Ex. 8, dated November 22, 1950, but actually
'Written earlier was held by the learned Judge to
contain "a large substratum of truth". The Appeal
Court (S. K. Das C. J. and Ramaswami J.) agreed with
the findings of the trial judge but they also were
unable to draw the inference of the commission of
adultery from the evidence. In appeal it was contended
that the findings of the courts below were vitiated
bacause certain pieces of evidence had been misread,
some ignored and as amatter of legitimateandproper
inference the court should not have arrived at any
other conclusion but that the wife was guilty of
adultery with respondent No. 2.
This Court will not ordinarily interfere with :findings
of fact given by the trial judge and the Appeal Court
but if iii giving the :findings the Courts ignore certain
important pieces of evidence and other pieces
of
evidence which are equally important are shown to
have been misread and misconstrued and this Court
comes to the conclusion that on the evidence taken as
a whole on tribunal could properly as a matter of
legitimate inference arrive at the conclusion that it
has, interference by this Court will be called for. [See
1958
White
v.
· White
Kapur/.
1958
White
v.
iVhite
KapurJ.
'
1416
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19581
State of Madras v. A. Vaidanatha Iyer ('); Purvez
Ardeshir Poonawala
v.
The State of Bombay (2);
Stephen Seneviratne v. The King (')J.
The Central Hotel, Patna, which is alleged to be the
scene of adultery by the wife had only 10 rooms, which
were all single, but whenever necessary additional
beds were put in. At the relevant time M. C. Cardoza
P. W. 3 was employed as its Manager, Kira Ram
P. W.4 as a sweeper, Abdul Aziz P. W. 5 and Usman
Mian P. W. 6 as bearers. Kira Ram identified the
wife as the lady who had stayed at the hotel with
respondent No. 2 but the other hotel servants although
they were shown the photograph of the wife and also
saw her in court wereunable to recognise her as the
person who stayed with respondent No. 2.
But they
did. identify him as the gentleman who had stayed in
the hotel along with two ladies.
Examined by counsel Kira Ram stated:
Q. "(Pointing out to the wife) I ask you, do you
know this lady ? A. Yes. Q. Did they ever visit your
hotel ? A. Yes.
Q. How long ago ? A. About 9 or
10 months ago. Q. How long did they stay there ?
A. About 4 or 5 days. Q. What room did they
occupy?
A. Room No. 10".
He was unable to say as to the number of beds in
room No. 10 nor is there any other evidence in regard
to this.
He also stated :
'
Q. "During their stay for these 4 or 5 days in your
hotel, did you go to clean their bath room ? A.
Yes. Q. Did you see them in that room whenever you
went ? A. Yes, whenever I used to go to sweep the
room I found Memsaheb and Saheb there."
Questioned by the Court the witness said :
Q. "Can you remember was there any other
Memsaheb with these two ? A. There was another
Memsaheb who lived in room No. 9.
Q. What was she like young Memsaheb or what ?
A. She was not very old, but she was old."
(1) A. I. R. 1958 S.C. 61, 64.
·
(2) Cr. A. 122 of 1954, decided on December 20, 1957.
{3) A. I. R. 1936 P .C. 089, 099.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1417
'
· And this obviously refers to respondent No. 2's
mother. The evidence of Kira Ram therefore shows
that the wife and respondent No. 2 ·occupied one
room, room No. 10. No question was put to this witness as to his hours of duty nor was the manager
Cardoza asked anything about it but another witness
Abdul Aziz bearer P.W. 5, was
~ked about it as
follows :
Q. "What are the hours of work of the sweeper ?
A. He comes at 7 a.m. and he leaves in the evening.
He sometimes goes away at about 11 and 11-30 a.m.
or 12 noon".
Similarly no questions were put to Kira Ram about
the state of habillement of the wife and respondent
No. 2 and the witness never deposed about this fact.
The learned trial Judge erroneously thought that when
Kira Ram spoke of the wife and respondent No. 2 he
"speaks as if 'they' were fully dressed and not en
deshabille" and the Appeal Court took this finding to
be "as if this witness's evidence showed that both of
them were fully dressed". The Appeal Court also seems
to have misdirected ·itself in regard to the duty hours.
It said "the sweeper concedes that he was on duty
from 6 a.m. to 11 a.m." There is also evidence which
has not been rejected that morning tea Was served to
all the three, i.e., the wife, respondent No. 2 and the
mother of the latter in the same room. The statement
of Kira Ram that the wife and respondent No. 2
occupied the same room receives corroboration from
Ex. 6 the hotel bill and receipt dated July 29, 1950
for room No 10 in the name of Mr. and Mrs. Charles
Chaplin. This document even though
contempo~
raneous with the events under consideratiOn
and
strongly corroborative of Kira Ram's evidence and of
the statement of Cardoza that when Mr. and Mrs.
Charles Chaplin "stayed in the hotel, they stayed in
their own room" does not seem to have been brought
to the notice of either of the Courts below. Because
of the infirmities pointed out above the import of the
testimony of Kira Ram which has in the main been
accepted by both the Courts below has been missed
and its necessary consequences ignored.
M2SC/61PX-5
1958
White
v.
White
Kapur/.
1958
White
v.
White
KapurJ.
1418
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
/
[1958J
Then there. is the evidence as to disappearance of
the entry in the Hotel Visitor's Book which was in
the handwriting of respondent No. 2. This entry was
in the assumed name of Mr. and Mrs. Charles Chaplin
from Hong Kong but when he (respondent No. 2) was
asked to fill in the Foreigner's form the entry was
changed from Hong Kong to Samastipur. The entry
itself could not be produced in Court because as
deposed by Cardoza, respondent No. 2 came to the
hotel and by managing to send the hotel servant away
from the room where the Visitor's Book was kept, he
tore off . the pages containing this entry. This fact
receives support from the complaint which Cardoza
made to the police on December 5, 1950, and the entry
in regard to this complaint made in the Station House
Diary of the same date. Both these documents have
been produced as Exs. 1/1 and 1/2. The significance
of this piece of evidence lies in the fact that it
was
done after the husband started collecting evidence of
adultery and after he and his sister had inspected
the entry which according to his statement was in the
handwriting of respondent No. 2.
The reason of the wife's visit to Patna was tooth
trouble. After her tooth was extracted she did not
see her Dentist again even though he had asked her to
do so. Her version is that she returned to Samastipur
the same evening which the Courts below have not
accepted. Thus it shows that she stayed on at the
Central Hotel, Patna for four days with respondent
No. 2 without any reason being given by her and so
far as the hotel bill and receipt Ex. 6 goes, the hotel
charges for her stay were paid by "Charles Chaplin",
i.e., respondent No. 2 and not by her. This fact has
again escaped the notice of both the Courts below.
And this is more in consonance with guilt than .innocence of the wife.
There are then the statements of J. A. Baker P.W. 8
and T. H. O'Connor P.W. 9 to the effect that in September 1950, at the house of O'Connor respondent
No. 2 in the presence of these two witnesses boasted
of his having had a good time with the wife and that
"she was a remarkable lady". Respondent No. 2
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1419
had also love letters purporting to be from the wife,
parts of which he read out to these witnesses. They
repeated the story to the husband which set him thinking. Shearer J. held this part of the evidence to be
true and the Appeal Court also accepted it b~t construed it as showing that there was no adulterous connection at that time, i.e., in September or it had ended
at the instance of the wife. Even as it is this finding
is not destructive of the husband's case as to adultery
at Patna in the month of July; on the other hand it
supports adulterous relations.
The presence of the mother of respondent No. 2
might have been, a shield against the commission of
adultery at Patna but the document Ex. 8 which has
been accepted by the Courts below to have a substratum
of truth just strip~ it away. This document is indicative of the mother's attitude towards the wife. The
following extract from this document is relevant as
showing that she wanted the wife for her son:
" 'How nice it would have been if you had married
my :;on David'. On another occasion while having
tea along with her she begged me to leave my
husband and go away with her son who was ruining
his life and health and could not settle down to a
job as he could not bear to see me married to another
man."
The presence of the mother would thus be no impediment to adulterous relations between the two. The
wife in the witness box wholly denied the episode of
the Central Hotel including her stay there, which has
deprived the Courts of her explanation. We are,
therefore.. unable to get any assistance from her or . as
a matter of that from respondent No. 2 ai to what
happened in the hotel at Patna.
The appellant contends that the only conclusion to
be arrived at upon the evidence taken as a whole is
that the wife was guilty of adultery with respondent
No. 2. In other words the evidence was ia quality
and quantity such that it satisfies the requirements of
s. 14 of the Act which provides :
S. 14 "In case the Court is satisfied on the
195S
White
v.
White
KapurJ.
1958
White
v.
White
Kapur J.
1420
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958)
evidence that the case of the petitioner has been
proved ....................................................................... ".
The important words requiring consideration are
"satisfied on the evidence". These words imply that
the duty of the Court is to pronounce a decree if
satisfied that the case for the petitioner has
been
proved but dismiss the petition if not so satisfied. In
s. 4 of the English Act, Matrimonial Causes Act of
1937 the same words occur and it has been there held
that the evidence must be clear and satisfactory beyond
the mere balance of probabilities and conclusive. in
the sense that it will satisfy what Sir William Scott
described in Loveden v. Loveden ('), as "the guarded
discretion of a reasonable and just man". Lord
MacDermott referring to the description of Sir
\Villiam Scott said in Preston Jones v. Preston Jones (2):
"The jurisdiction in divorce involves the status
of the parties and the public interest requires that the
marriage bond shall not be set aside lightly or without strict enquiry. The terms of the statute recognise
this plainly, and I think it would be quite out of keeping with the anxious nature of its provisions to hold that
the court might be "satisfied" in respect of a ground
for dissolution, with something less than proof beyond
reasonable doubt. I should, perhaps, add that I do
not base my conclusion as to the appropriate standard
of proof on any analogy drawn from the criminal law.
I do not think it is possible to say, at any rate since
the decision of this House in Mordaunt v. Moncrieffe(')
that the two jurisdictions are other. than distinct.
The true reason, as it seems to me, why both accept
the same general standard-proof beyond reasonable
doubt-lies not in any analogy but in the gravity and
public importance of the issue with which each is
concerned."
The Act lays down in s. 7 that Courts in all suits
and proceedings under the Act shall act and give relief
on principles and rules which in the opinion of the
(1) (1810) 161 E. R. 648, 649; (1810) 2 Hag. Con. 1, 3.
(2) [1951] A.C. 391, 417.
(3) (1874) 30 L.T. 649.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT.REPORTS
1421
Court are as nearly as may be conformable to the
principles and rules on which the Court for Divorce
and Matrimonial Causes in England for the time being
acts and gives relief. In our opinion the rule laid
down by the House of Lords would provide the principle and rule which Indian Courts should apply to
cases governed by the Act and the standard of proof
in divorce cases would therefore be such that if the
judge is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt as to the
commission of the matrimonial offence he would be
satisfied within the meaning of s. 14 of the Act. The
two jurisdictions, i.e., matrimonial and criminal are distinct jurisdictions but the terms of s. 14 make it plain
that when the Court is to be satisfied on the evidence
in respect of matrimonial offences the guilt must be
proved beyond reasonable doubt and it is on that
principle that the Courts in India would act and the
reason for adopting this standard of proof is the grave
consequence which follows a finding of guilt in matrimonial causes.
Gower v. Gower (1) was pressed before us by counsel
for the appellant as to the approach that the court
should have to a matrimonial offence. But in view
of the decision in Preston Jones Case (2) it is unnecessary to discuss that case.
In a suit based on a matrimonial offence it is not
necessary and it is indeed rarely possible to prove the
issue by any direct evidence for in very few cases can
such proof be obtainable.
The question to be decided
in the present case therefore, is whether on the evidence which has been led, the court can be satisfied
beyond reasonable doubt that adultery was committed
by the wife with respondent No. 2 at Patna between
July 25, 1950, and July 28, 1950. In our opinion the
facts proved are quantitatively and qualitatively sufficient to satisfy the test laid down by the House of
Lords in Preston Jones Case (2). · The wife went to
Patna and stayed with respondent No. 2 under an
assumed name. They occupied the same room, i.e.,
room No. 10. There was undoubtedly a guilty inclination and passion indicated by the conduct of respondent No. 2 and there is no contrary indication as to
(I) [•!)50) I All E. R. 804.
(~) [1951) A. c. 391, 417,
1958
White
v.
White
KapurJ.
1958
JVlrlle
v.
White
K(:pur J.
1958
March 11.
1422
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1958]
the inclination and conduct of the wife. On the otaer
hand her conduct as shown by the evidence is so entirely consistent with her guilt as to justify the conclusion of her having committed adultery with respondent No. 2 and therefore the finding of the Courts
below as to the guilt should be reversed.
We would therefore, allow this appeal, set aside
the judgment and decree of the High Court and pass
a decree nisi for dissolution of marriage. As adultery
has been proved respondent No. 2 shall pay the costs
in this Court and in the Courts below.
Appeal allowed.
M. P. V. SUNDARARAMIER & CO.
v.
THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH
& ANOTHER
(with connected petitions)
(S. R. DAS C. J., VENKATARAMA AlYAR, S. K. DAS,
A. K. SARKAR
and
VIVIAN
BosE JJ.)
Sales Tax-Inter-State sales-Sale outside State but goods
delivered for consumption within State-Competence of States to
levy tax-Conditional legislation-Power of Parliament to authorise such· taxation-President's Adaptatiori Order-Scope of-
}
Nature of-Retrospective operation-Enactment unconstitutional
in part-Effect-Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939 (Mad. 9
of 1939), as adapted to Andhra, ss. 2(h), 22-.Sales Tax Laws
Validation Act, 1956 (7 of 1956), s. 2-.Constitution of India,
Arts. 246, 286, 301, 372, Sch. VII, List I, Entry 42, List II,
Entry 54.
The petitioners were dealers cai;rying on business in the City
of Madras in the sale and purchase of yarn. The dealers in the
State of Andhra used to place orders for the purchase of yarn
with the petitioners in Madras, where the contracts were concluded
and the goods were delivered ex-godown at Madras and thereafter
despatched to the purchasers who would take delivery of them
within their State. The present dispute related to sales in which
property in the goods sold passed outside the State of Andhra,
but the goodi theiruelves were actually delivered as a result