# ECON ANTRI LTD v. ROM INDUSTRIES LTD. & ANR

- **Citation:** [2013] 14 S.C.R. 74
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2013-08-26
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 1079 of 2006
- **Bench:** P. Sathasivam, Ranjana Prakash Desai, RANJAN GOGOi
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/econ-antri-ltd-v-rom-industries-ltd-anr-29184
- **Pages:** 31

## Headnote

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - s.142(b} and s.138,
C proviso (c) - Cheque bouncing case- Complaint filed u!s.138
of NI Act - Limitation period - One month period prescribed
u/s. 142(b} of NI Act - Manner of calculation - Held: The
period should be reckoned by excluding date on which cause
of action arose - Where a particular time is given, from a
D certain date, within which an act is to be done, the day of the
date is to be excluded - Inapplicability of the Limitation Act
- General Clauses Act, 1897 - s.9 - Limitation Act, 1963.
Words and Phrases - words 'of, 'from' and 'after'.
E
The question for consideration before this Court
was: whether a complaint filed under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is within or beyond
time if it is not filed within one month from the date on
which the cause of action arose under clause (c) of the
F proviso to Section 138 of the NI Act. Reframed in simpler
language, the question for consideration was whether for
calculating the period of one month which is prescribed
under Section 142(b) of the NI Act, the period has to be
reckoned by excluding the date on which the cause of
G action arose.
H
Answering the Reference, the Court
· HELD:1.1. It is not possible to hold that the word 'of'
74
ECON ANTRI LTD. v. ROM INDUSTRIES LTD.
75
occurring in Section 138(c) and 142(b) of the Negotiable
A
Instruments Act, 1881 is to be interpreted differently as
against the word 'from' occurring in Section 138(a) of the
N.I. Act; and that for the purposes of Section 142(b),
which prescribes that the complaint is to be filed within
30 days of the date on which the cause of action arises,
B
the starting day on which the cause of action arises
should be included for computing the period of 30 days.
The words 'of', 'from' and 'after' may, in a given case,
mean really the same thing. The word 'of' is sometimes
equivalent of 'after'. Even though Limitation Act is held c .
to be not applicable to the NI Act, the above conclusion
can be reached on the basis of Section 9 of the General
. Clauses Act, 1897 and on the basis of a long line of
English decisions that where a particular time is given,
from a certain date, within which an act is to be done, the
D
day of the date is to be excluded. Section 9 of the General
Clauses Act, 1897 states that in any Central Act or
Regulation made after the commencement of the General
Clauses Act, 1897, it shall be sufficient to use the word
'from' for the purpose of excluding the first in a series of
E
days or any other period of time and to use the word 'to'
for the purpose of including the last in a series of days
or any other period of time. Sub-Section (2) of Section 9
of the General Clauses Act, 1897 states that this Section
applies to all Central Acts made after the third day of
January, 1868, and to all Regulations made on or after the
F
fourteenth day of January, 1887. This Section would,
therefore, be applicable to the N.I. Act. [Paras 22, 24 and
17) [95-A-C; 103-B-0; 104-B-C]
1.2. It is thus held that for the purpose of calculating
G
the period of one month, which is prescribed under
Section 142(b) of the N.I. Act, the period has to be
reckoned by excluding the date on which the cause of
action arose. [Para 25) [104-E]
H
76
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2013] 14 S.C.R.
A
Saketh India Ltd. & Ors. v. India Securities Ltd. (1999) 3
B
c
SCC 1: 1999 (1) SCR 963 - affirmed.
SIL Import, USA v. Exim Aides Silk Exporters, Bangalore
(1999) 4 sec 567: 1999 (2) SCR 958 - overruled.
Danial Latifi and Another v. U. 0.1. (2001) 7 SCC 7 40:
2001 (3) Suppl. SCR 419 - held inapplicable.
Vasantlal Ranchhoddas Patel & Ors. v. Union of India &
Ors. AIR 1967 Bombay 138 - approved.
Haru Das Gupta v. State of West Bengal (1972) 1 SCC
639: 1972 (3) SCR 329 and Tarun Prasad Chatterjee v.
Dinanath Sharma (2000) 8 SCC 649: 2000 (3) Suppl. SCR
634 --relied on.
D
Jindal Steel and Power Ltd. & Anr. v. Ashoka Alloy Steel
Ltd.
<~ Ors. (2006) 9 SCC 340; Subodh S. Salaskar v.
Jayprakash M. Shah

## Text

_Characters 0–39,767 of 59,521. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39767 for what follows._

A
B
[2013] 14 S.C.R. 74
ECON ANTRI LTD.
V.
ROM INDUSTRIES LTD. & ANR.
(Criminal Appeal No. 1079 of 2006)
AUGUST 26, 2013
[P. SATHASIVAM, CJI,, RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI
AND RANJAN GOGOi, JJ.]
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - s.142(b} and s.138,
C proviso (c) - Cheque bouncing case- Complaint filed u!s.138
of NI Act - Limitation period - One month period prescribed
u/s. 142(b} of NI Act - Manner of calculation - Held: The
period should be reckoned by excluding date on which cause
of action arose - Where a particular time is given, from a
D certain date, within which an act is to be done, the day of the
date is to be excluded - Inapplicability of the Limitation Act
- General Clauses Act, 1897 - s.9 - Limitation Act, 1963.
Words and Phrases - words 'of, 'from' and 'after'.
E
The question for consideration before this Court
was: whether a complaint filed under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is within or beyond
time if it is not filed within one month from the date on
which the cause of action arose under clause (c) of the
F proviso to Section 138 of the NI Act. Reframed in simpler
language, the question for consideration was whether for
calculating the period of one month which is prescribed
under Section 142(b) of the NI Act, the period has to be
reckoned by excluding the date on which the cause of
G action arose.
H
Answering the Reference, the Court
· HELD:1.1. It is not possible to hold that the word 'of'
74
ECON ANTRI LTD. v. ROM INDUSTRIES LTD.
75
occurring in Section 138(c) and 142(b) of the Negotiable
A
Instruments Act, 1881 is to be interpreted differently as
against the word 'from' occurring in Section 138(a) of the
N.I. Act; and that for the purposes of Section 142(b),
which prescribes that the complaint is to be filed within
30 days of the date on which the cause of action arises,
B
the starting day on which the cause of action arises
should be included for computing the period of 30 days.
The words 'of', 'from' and 'after' may, in a given case,
mean really the same thing. The word 'of' is sometimes
equivalent of 'after'. Even though Limitation Act is held c .
to be not applicable to the NI Act, the above conclusion
can be reached on the basis of Section 9 of the General
. Clauses Act, 1897 and on the basis of a long line of
English decisions that where a particular time is given,
from a certain date, within which an act is to be done, the
D
day of the date is to be excluded. Section 9 of the General
Clauses Act, 1897 states that in any Central Act or
Regulation made after the commencement of the General
Clauses Act, 1897, it shall be sufficient to use the word
'from' for the purpose of excluding the first in a series of
E
days or any other period of time and to use the word 'to'
for the purpose of including the last in a series of days
or any other period of time. Sub-Section (2) of Section 9
of the General Clauses Act, 1897 states that this Section
applies to all Central Acts made after the third day of
January, 1868, and to all Regulations made on or after the
F
fourteenth day of January, 1887. This Section would,
therefore, be applicable to the N.I. Act. [Paras 22, 24 and
17) [95-A-C; 103-B-0; 104-B-C]
1.2. It is thus held that for the purpose of calculating
G
the period of one month, which is prescribed under
Section 142(b) of the N.I. Act, the period has to be
reckoned by excluding the date on which the cause of
action arose. [Para 25) [104-E]
H
76
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2013] 14 S.C.R.
A
Saketh India Ltd. & Ors. v. India Securities Ltd. (1999) 3
B
c
SCC 1: 1999 (1) SCR 963 - affirmed.
SIL Import, USA v. Exim Aides Silk Exporters, Bangalore
(1999) 4 sec 567: 1999 (2) SCR 958 - overruled.
Danial Latifi and Another v. U. 0.1. (2001) 7 SCC 7 40:
2001 (3) Suppl. SCR 419 - held inapplicable.
Vasantlal Ranchhoddas Patel & Ors. v. Union of India &
Ors. AIR 1967 Bombay 138 - approved.
Haru Das Gupta v. State of West Bengal (1972) 1 SCC
639: 1972 (3) SCR 329 and Tarun Prasad Chatterjee v.
Dinanath Sharma (2000) 8 SCC 649: 2000 (3) Suppl. SCR
634 --relied on.
D
Jindal Steel and Power Ltd. & Anr. v. Ashoka Alloy Steel
Ltd.
<~ Ors. (2006) 9 SCC 340; Subodh S. Salaskar v.
Jayprakash M. Shah & Anr. (2008)13 SCC 689: 2008 (11)
SCR 681; State of Himachal Pradesh & Anr. v. Himachal
Techno Engineers & Anr. (2010) 12 SCC 210: 2010 (8) SCR
E 1025; The Member, Board of Revenue v. Arthur Paul Benthall
AIR 1956 SC 35: 1955 SCR 842; The Labour Commissioner,
Madhya Pradesh v. Burhanpur Tapti Mills Ltd. and others AIR
1964 SC 1687: 1964 SCR 484; B.R. Enterprises etc. V. State
of UP. & Ors. etc. (1999) 9 SCC 700: 1999 (2) SCR 1111;
F Kai/ash Nath Agarwal and ors. v. Pradeshiya Industrial &
Investment Corporation of U. P. Ltd. and another (2003) 4
SCC 305: 2003 (1) SCR 1159; DLF Qutab Enclave Complex
Educational Charitable Trust v. State of Haryana and others
(2003) 5 SCC 622: 2003 (2) SCR 1 and" Gopa/das Udhavdas
G Ahuja and another v. Union of India and others (2004) 7 sec
33; 2004 (2) Suppl. SCR 942 - referred to.
H
The Goldsmiths' Company v. The West Metropolitan
Railway Company (1904) 1 K.B; Cartwright v. Maccormack
[1963] 1 All E. R. 11; Marren v. Dawson Bentley & Co. Ltd.
ECON ANTRI LTD. v. ROM INDUSTRIES LTD.
77
(1961) 20.B. 135; Radcliffe v. Bartholomew (1892) 1 A
Q.B.161; Stewart v. Chapman (1951) 2 KB 792; In re. North.
Ex parte Hasluck (1895) 2 Q.B. 264; Lester v. Garland 15
Ves. 248 and Ex parte Fallon (1793) 5 Term Rep 283 -
referred to.
B
Halsbury's laws of England 3rd Edn., vol. 37 p. 95 -
referred to.
Case Law Reference:
1999 (1) SCR 963
affirmed
Para 2
c
1999 (2) SCR 958
overruled
Para 3
1972 (3) SCR 329
relied on
Para 5
(2006) 9 sec 340
referred to
Para 5
D
2008 (11) SCR 681
referred to
Para 5
2010 (8) SCR 1025
referred to
Para 6
2000 (3) Suppl. SCR 634 relied on
Para 6
1955 SCR 842
referred to
Para 7
E
1964 SCR 484
referred to
Para 7
1999 (2) SCR 1111
referred to
Para 7
2003 (1) SCR 1159
referred to
Para 7
F
2003 (2) SCR 1
referred to
Para 7
2001 (3) Suppl. SCR 419 held inapplicable Para 7
(1904) 1 K.B
referred to
Para 10
G
[1963) 1 All E.R. 11
referred to
Para 11
(1961) 2Q.B. 135
referred to
Para 12
H
A
B
c
D
78
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2013] 14 S.C.R.
(1892) 1 Q.B.161
referred to
Para 12
(1951) 2 KB 792
referred to
Para 13
(1895) 2 Q.B. 264
referred to
Para 14
15 Ves. 248
referred to
Para 14
AIR 1967 Bombay 138
approved
Para 21
2004 (2) Suppl. SCR 942 referred to
Para 21
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 1079 of 2006.
From the Judgment & Order dated 09.08.2004 of the High
Court of Madhya Pradesh Bench at Gwalior in Miscellaneous
Cr. l\lo. 4385 of 2002.
Prerna Mehta, Ankur Mody, Vikas Mehta for the Appellant.
Sunil Gupta, Jasbir Singh Malike, Varun Punia, Kamakshi
S. Mehlwal for the Respondents.
E
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
(SMT.) RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J. 1. On 13/10/
2006, while granting leave in Special Leave Petition (Criminal)
No.211 of 2005, this Court passed the following order:
F
"In our view, the judgment relied upon by the counsel for
the appellant in the case of Saketh India Ltd. & Ors. v.
India Securities Ltd. (19991 3 SCC 1 requires
reconsideration. Orders of the Hon'ble the Chief Justice
may be obtained for placing this matter before a larger
G
Bench."
H
Pursuantto the above order, this appeal is placed before
us.
2. Since the referral order states that the judgment of this
ECON ANTRI LTD. v. ROM INDUSTRIES LTD.
79
[RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.]
Court in Saketh India Ltd. & Ors. v. India Securities Ltd. 1 A
("Saketh") requires reconsideration, we must first refer to the
said judgment. In that case, this Court identified the question
of law involved in the appeal before it as under:
"Whether the complaint filed under Section 138 of the NI 8
Act is within or beyond time as it was contended that it
was not filed within one month from the date on which the
cause of action arose under clause (c) of the proviso to
Section 138 of the NI Act?"
The same question was reframed in simpler language as C
under:
"Whether for calculating the period of one month which
is prescribed under Section 142(b}, the period has to be
reckoned by excluding the date on which the cause of D
action arose?"
3. It is pointed out to us that there is a variance between
the view expressed by this Court on the above question in
Saketh and in SIL Import, USA v. Exim Aides Silk Exporters,
Bangalore. 2 We will have to therefore re-examine it for the E
purpose of answering the reference. The basic provisions of
law involved in this reference are proviso (c) to Section 138 and
Section 142(b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 ("the
NI Act").
4. Facts o"f Saketh need to be stated to understand how
the above question of law arose. But, before we tum to the facts,
F
we must quote Section 138 and Section 142 of the N.I. Act. We
must also quote Section 12(1) and (2) of the Limitation Act,
1963 and Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, on which G
reliance is placed in Saketh.
Section 138 of the N.I. Act reads as under:
1.
(1999) 3 sec 1.
2
(1994) 4 sec 567.
H
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
80
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2013] 14 S.C.R.
"138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of
funds in the account. Where any cheque drawn by a
person on an account maintained by him with a banker for
payment of any amount of money to another person from
out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part,
of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid.
either because of the amount of money standing to the
credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque
or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that
account by an agreement made with that bank, such person
shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall,
without prejudice to any other provision of this Act, be
punished with imprisonment for a term which may be
extended to two years, or with fine which may extend to
twice the amount of the cheque, or with both:
Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply
unless-
(a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a
period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or
within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier;
(b) the payee or the holder in due course of the Cheque,
as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of
the said amou11t of money by giving a notice in writing, to
the drawer of the cheque, within thirty days of the receipt
of information by him from the bank regarding the return
of the cheque as unpaid; and
(c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment
of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case
may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within
fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice."
Section 142 of the N.I. Act reads as under:
"142. Cognizance of offences: Notwithstanding anything
ECON ANTRI LTD. v. ROM INDUSTRIES LTD.
81
[RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.]
contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of
A
1974 ),-
(a) no court shall take cognizance of any offence
punishable under section 138 except upon a complaint, in
writing, made by the payee or, as the case may be, the
holder in due course of the cheque;
(b) such complaint is made within one month of the date
on which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the
proviso to section 138;
[Provided that the cognizance of a complaint may be taken
by the Court after the prescribed period, if the complainant
satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not
making a complaint within such period.]
B
c
(c) no court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or
D
a Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence
punishable under section 138."
Sections 12(1) and (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 reads
as under:
"12. Exclusion of time in legal proceedings.- (1) In
computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal or
application, the day from which such period is to be
reckoned, shall be excluded.
(2) In.computing the period of limitation for an appeal or
E
F
an application for leave to appeal or for revision or for
review of a judgment, the day on which the judgment
complained of was pronounced and the time requisite for
obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order G
appealed from or sought to be revised or reviewed shall
be excluded."
Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 reads as
unde~
H
A
B
c
82
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2013) 14 S.C.R.
"9. Commencement and termination of time.-
(1) In any [Central Act] or Regulation made after the
commencement of this Act, it shall be sufficient, for the
purpose of excluding the first in a series of days or any
other period of time, to use the word "from", and, for the
purpo,se of including the last in a series of days or any
other period of time, to use the word "to".
(2) This section applies also to all [Central Acts] made
after the third day of January, 1868, and to all Regulations
made on or after the fourteenth day of January, 1887."
5. In Saketh cheques dated 15/3/1995 and 16/3/1995
issued by the accused therein bounced when presented for
encashment. Notices were served on the accused on 29/9/
0
1995. As per proviso (c) to Section 138 of the NI Act, the
accused were required to make the payment of the said amount
within 15 days of the receipt of the notice i.e. on or before 14/
10/1995. The accused failed to pay the amount. The cause of
action, th~refore, arose on 15/10/1995. According to the
E complainant for calculating one month's period contemplated
under Section 142(b), the date '15/10/1995' has to be excluded.
The complaint filed on 15/11 /1995 was, therefore, within time.
According to the accused, however, the date on which the
cause of ac:tion arose i.e. '15/10/1995' has to be included in
the period of limitation and thus the complaint was barred by
F time. The accused, therefore, filed petition under Section 482
of the Codi~ of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ("the· Code") for
quashing the process issued by the learned Magistrate. That
petition was rejected by the High Court. Hence, the accused
approached this Court. This Court referred to its judgment in
G Haru Das Gupta v. State of West Bengal. 3 wherein it was held
that the rule is well established that where a particular time is
given from a certain date within which an act is to be aone, the
day on that date is to be excluded; the effect of defining the
H
3.
(1972) 1 sec 639.
ECON ANTRI LTD. v. ROM INDUSTRIES LTD.
83
[RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.)
period from such a day until such a day within which an act is
A
to be done is to exclude the first day and to include the last day.
Referring to several English decisions on the point, this Court
observed that the principle of excluding the day from which the
period is to be reckoned is incorporated in Section 12(1) and
(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. This Court observed that this
B
principle is also incorporated in Section 9 of the General
Clauses Act, 1897. This Court further observed that there is no
reason for not adopting the rule enunciated in Haru Das Gupta,
which is consistently followed and which is adopted in the
General Clauses Act and the Limitation Act. This Court went c
on to observe that ordinarily in computing the time, the rule
observed is to exclude the first day and to include the last.
Following the said rule in the facts before it, this Court excluded
the date '15/10/1995' on which the cause of action had arisen
for counting the period of one month. Saketh has been followed
D
by this Court in Jindal Steel and Power Ltd. & Anr. v. Ashoka
Alloy Steel Ltd. & Ors.4 In Subodh S. Salaskar v. Jayprakash
M. Shah & Anr., 5 there is a reference to Jindal Steel & Power
Ltd.
6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at some
E
length. We have also carefully perused their written
submissions. Ms. Prerna Mehta, learned counsel for the
appellant submitted that Saketh lays down the correct law. She
submitted that as held by this Court in Saketh while computing
the period of one month as provided under Section 142(b) of
F
the N.1. Act, the first day on which the cause of action has arisen
has to be excluded. The same principle is applicable in
computing the period of 15 days under Section 138(c) of the
N.I. Act. Counsel submitted that Saketh has been followed by
this Court in Jindal Steel and Power Ltd. and Subodh S.
G
Salaskar. Counsel also relied on Section 12( 1) of the Limitation
Act, 1961 which provides that the first day on which cause of
4.
(2006) 9 sec 340.
5.
(2008) 13 sec 689.
H
84
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2013) 14 S.C.R.
A action arises is to be excluded. In this connection counsel relied
on State of Himacha/ Pradesh & Anr. v. Himachal Techno
Engineers & Anr., 6 where it is held that Section 12 of the
Limitation Act is applicable to the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996 (for short, "the Arbitration Act"), which is a statute
B providing for its own period of limitation. Counsel submitted that
the N.I. Act is a special statute and it does not expressly bar
the applicability of the Limitation Act. Counsel submitted that if
this Court reaches a conclusion that the provisions of the
Limitation Act are not applicable to the N.I. Act, it should hold
c that Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 covers this
case. Counsel submitted in Tarun Prasad Chatterjee v.
Dinanath Sharma7 Section 12 of the Limitation Act is held to
be in pari materia with Section 9 of the General Clauses Act.
Counsel submitted that in the same judgment this Court has
0
held that use of words 'from' and 'within' does not reflect any
contrary intention and the first day on which the cause of action
arises has to be excluded. Counsel submitted that in the
circumstances this Court should hold that Saketh lays down
correct proposition of law.
E
7. Shri Sunil Gupta, learned senior counsel for the
respondents, on the other hand, submitted that the provisions
of the N.I. Act provide for a criminal offence and punishment
and, therefore, must be strictly construed. Counsel submitted
that it is well settled that when two different words are used in
F the same provision or statute, they convey different meaning.
[The Member, Board of Reverwe v. Arthur Paul Bentha/18, The
Labour Commissioner, Madflya Pradesh v. Burhanpur Tapti
Mills Ltd. and others9, B.R. Enterprises etc. V. State of U.P.
& Ors. etc. 10, Kai/ash Nath Agarwal and ors. v. Pradeshiya
G
6.
(2010) 12 sec 210.
7.
(2000) 8 sec 649.
8.
AIR 1956 SC 35.
9.
AIR 1964 SC 1687.
H
10. (1999) 9 sec 700.
ECON ANTRI LTD. v. ROM INDUSTRIES LTD.
85
[RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.]
Industrial & Investment Corporation of UP. Ltd. and another11 ,
A
DLF Qutab Enclave Complex Educational Charitable Trust
v. State of Haryana and others12]. Counsel pointed out that
Section 138(a) provides a period of 6 months from the date
on which the Cheque is drawn, as the period within which the
Cheque is to be presented to the bank. Section 138(b) provides
B
that the payee must make a demand of the amou(lt due to him
within 30 days of the receipt of information from the bank.
Section 138(c) uses the words 'within 15 days of the receipt
of notice'. Using two different words 'from' and 'of' in the same
Section at different places clarifies the intention of the
C
legislature to convey different meanings by the said words.
According to counsel, seen in this light, the word 'of' occurring
in Section 138(c) and Section 142(b) is to be interpreted
differently as against the word 'from' occurring in Section
138(a). The word 'from' may be taken as implying exclusion of D
the date in question and may well be governed by the General
Claus13s Act, 1897. However, the word 'of' is different and
needs to be interpreted to include the starting day of the
commencement of the prescribed period. It is not governed by
Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Thus, for the
purposes of Section 142(b), which prescribes that the complaint
E
is to be filed within 30 days of the date on which the cause of
action arises, the starting date on which the cause of action
arises should be included for computing the period of 30 days.
Counsel further submitted that Section 138(c) and Section
142(b) prescribe the period within which certain acts are
F
required to be done. Section 12(1) of the Limitation Act cannot
be resorted to so as to extend that period even by one day. If
the starting point is excluded, that will render the word 'within'
of Section 142(b) of the N.I. Act otiose. Counsel submitted that
the word 'within' has been held by this Court to mean 'on or
G
before'. [D<:nial Latifi and Another v. U. 0./.13] Therefore, the
11. c2003) 4 sec 305.
12. c2003) 5 sec s22.
13. c2001i 7 sec 740.
H
86
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2013] 14 S.C.R.
A complaint under Section 142(b) should be filed on or before
or within, 30 days of the date on which the cause of action under
Section 138(c) arises. Counsel submitted that there is no
justification to exclude the 16th day of the 15 day period under
Section 138(c) or the first day of the 30 days period under
9 Section 142(b) as has been wrongly decided in Saketh. This
would amount to exclusion of the starting date of the period.
Such exclusion has been held to be against the law in SIL Import
USA. Counsel further submitted that the provisions of the
Limitation Act are not applicable to the N.I. Act as held by this
C Court in Subodh S. Salaskar. Counsel pointed out that by
Amending Act 55 of 2002, a proviso was added to Section
142(b) of the N.I. Act. It bestows discretion upon the court to
accept a complaint after the period of 30 days and to condone
the delay. This amendment signifies that prior to this
amendment the courts had no discretion to condone the delay
D or exclude time by resorting to Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
The statement of objects and reasons of the Amending· Act 55
of 2002 confirms the legal position that the N.I. Act being a
special statute, the Limitation Act is not applicable to it. Counsel
submitted that the judgment of this Court on the Arbitration Act
E is not applicable to this case because Section 43 of the
Arbitration Act specifically makes the Limitation Act applicable
to arbitrations. Counsel submitted that in view of the above, it
is evident that Saketh does not lay down the correct law. It is
SIL Import USA which correctly analyses the provisions of law
F and lays down the law. Counsel urged that the reference be
answered in light of his submissions.
8. It is necessary to first refer to SIL Import USA on which
heavy reliance is placed by the respondents as it takes a view
G contrary to the view taken in Saketh. In SIL Import USA, the
complainant-Company's case was that the accused owed a
sum of US $ 72,075 (equivalent to more than 26 lakhs of rupees)
to it towards the sale consideration of certain materials. The
accused gave some post-dated Cheques in repayment thereof.
H Two of the said Cheques when preser;ited on 3/5/1996 for
ECON ANTRI LTD. v. ROM INDUSTRIES LTD.
87
[RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.]
encashment were dishonoured with the remark "no sufficient
A
funds". The complainant sent a notice to the accused by fax
on 11 /6/1996. On the next day i.e. 12/6/1996 the complainant
also sent the same notice by registered post which was served
on the accused on 25/6/1996. On 8/8/1996 the complainant
filed a complaint under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. Cognizance
B
of the offence was taken and process was issued. Process was
quashed by the Magistrate on the grounds urged by the
accused. The complainant moved the High Court. The High
Court set aside the Magistrate's order and restored the
complaint. That order was challenged in this Court. The only c
point which was urged before this Court was that the Magistrate
could not have taken cognizance of the offence after the expiry
of 30 days from the date of cause of action. This contention
was upheld by this Court. This Court held that the notice
envisaged in clause (b) of the proviso to Section 138
D
transmitted by fax would be in compliance with the legal
requirement. There was no dispute about the fact that notice
sent by fax was received by the complainant on the same date
i.e. 11/6/1996. This Court observed that as per clause (c) of
Section 138, starting point of period for making payment is the
E
date of receipt of the notice. Once it starts, the offence is
completed on failure to pay the amount within 15 days
therefrom. Cause of action would arise if the offence is
committed. Thus, it was held that since the fax was received
on 11/6/1996, the period of 15 days for making payment
expired on 26/6/1996. Since amount was not paid, offence was
committed and, therefore, cause of action arose from 26/6/
1996 and the period of limitation for filing complaint expired
F
on 26/7/1996 i.e. the date on which period of one month
expired as contemplated under Section 142(b). The complaint
filed on 8/8/1996 was, therefore, beyond the period of G
limitation. The relevant observations of this Court could be
quoted hereunder:
"19. The High Court's view is that the sender of the notice
must know the date when it was received by the sendee,
H
A
B
c
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[2013] 14 S.C.R.
for otherwise he would not be in a position to count the
period in order to ascertain the date when cause of action
has arisen. The fallacy of the above reasoning is that it
erases the starting date of the period of 15 days envisaged
in clause (c). As per the said clause the starting date is
the date of "the receipt of the said notice". Once it starts,
th13 offence is completed on the failure to pay the amount
within 15 days therefrom. Cause of action would arise if
the offence is committed.
20. If a different interpretation is given the absolute interdict
incorporated in Section 142 of the Act that no court shall
take cognizance of any offence unless the complaint is
made within one month of the date on which the cause of
action arises, would become otiose."
D
9. Undoubtedly, the view taken in SIL Import USA runs
counter t<> the view taken in Saketh. What persuaded this Court
in Saketh to take the view that in computing time, the rule is to
exclude the first day and include the last can be understood if
we have a look at the English cases which have been referred
E
to in the passage quoted therein from Haru Das Gupta.
F
10. We must first refer to The Goldsmiths' Company v.
The West Metropolitan Railway Company. 14 In that case, under"
a special Act, a railway company was empowered to take lands
compulsorily for the purpose of its undertaking, and the powers
of the company for this purpose were to cease after the
expiration of three years from the passing of the Act. The Act
received the Royal assent on 9/8/1899. On 9/8/1902 the railway
company gave notice to the plaintiffs to treat for the purchase
of lands belonging to them which were scheduled in the special
G Act. The question was whether the notice was served on the
plaintiffs within three years. It was held that the notice was
served within the prescribed. ,time because the day of the
H
14. (1904)1 K.B,atp.1,5.
ECON ANTRI LTD. v. ROM INDUSTRIES LTD.
89
[RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.]
passing of the Act i.e. 9/8/1899 had to be excluded. The
A
relevant observations of the Court may be quoted as under:
"The true principle that governs this case is that indicated
in the report of Lester v. Garland15, where Sir William
Grant broke away from the line of cases supporting the
8
view that there was a general rule that in cases where time
is to run from the doing of an act or the happening of an
event the first day is always to be included in the
computation of the time. The view expressed by Sir
William Grant was repeated by Parke B. in Russell v.
C
Ledsam16, and by other judges in subsequent cases. The
rule is now well established that where a particular time
is given, from a certain date, within which an act is to be
done, the day of the date is to be excluded."
11. The second case referred to is Cartwright v.
MacCormack17. In that case, the plaintiffs met with an accident
at 5.45 p.m. on 17/12/1959. He was run into by the defendant
driving a motor car. He issued his writ in this action claiming
damages for personal injuries. The defendant initiated third
party proceedings against the respondent insurance company,
alleging the company's liability to indemnify him under an
instrument called a temporary cover note admittedly issued by
the insurance company on 2/12/1959. The insurance company
inter alia contended that the policy had expired before the
accident happened. The insurance company succeeded on this
point. On appeal the insurance company reiterated that the
cover note issued by the insurance company contained the
expression 'fifteen days from the date of commencement of
policy'. On the same note date and time were noted as 2/12/
1959 and 11.45 a.m. It was argued that the fifteen days started
at 11.45 a.m. on 2/12/1959 and expired at the same time on
15. 15 Ves. 248; 1 O R.R. 68.
16. 14 M. & W. 574.
17. [1963] 1 All E.R. 11
D
E
F
G
H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2013) 14 S.C.R.
A
17/12/1959. The accident occurred at 5.45 p.m. on 17/12/1959
and, therefore, it was not covered by the insurance policy. The
Court of Appeal treated the expression 'fifteen days from the
commencement of the policy' as excluding the first date and
the cover note was held to commence at midnight of that date.
B
It was observed that the policy expired fifteen days from 2/12/
1959 and these words on the ordinary rules of construction
exclude the first date and begin at midnight on that day,
therefore, the policy would cover the accident which had
occurred at 5.45 p.m. on 17/12/1959.
c
12. The third case referred to is Marren v. Dawson Bentley
& Co. Ltd. 18• In that case on 8/11/1954 an accident occurred
whereby the plaintiff was injured in the course of his
employment with the defendants. On 8/11/1957, he issued a
writ claiming damages for the injuries which he alleged were
D caused by the defendants' negligence. The defendants
pleaded, inter alia, that the plaintiffs cause of action, if any,
accrued on 8/11 /1954 and the proceedings had not been
commenced within the period of three years thereof contrary
to Section 2( 1) of the Limitation Act, 1939. It was held that the
E
day of the accident was to be:excluded from the computation
of the period within which the action should be brought and,
therefore, the defendants' plea must fail. While coming to this
conclusion reliance was placed on passages from Halsbury's
laws of England19. It is necessary to quote those passages:
F
G
"207. The general rule in cases in which a period is fixed
·within which a person must act or take the consequences
is that the day of the act or event from which the period
runs should not be counted against him. This rule is
especially reasonable in the case in which that person
is not necessarily cognisant of the act or event; and
further in support of it there is the consideration that in
case the period allowed was one day only, the
18. (1961) 2 Q.B. 135.
H
19. 2"' ed.,. vol 32 p. 142.
ECON ANTRI LTD. v. ROM INDUSTRIES LTD.
91
[RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.]
consequence of including that day would be to reduce to A
a few hours or minutes the time within which the person
affected should take action.
208. In view of these considerations the general rule is
that, as well in cases where the limitation of time is 8
imposed by the act of a party as in those where it is
imposed by statute, the day from which the time begins
to run is excluded; thus. where a period is fixed within
which a criminal prosecution or a civil action may be
commenced, the day on which the offence is committed C
or the cause of action arises is excluded in the
computation."
Reliance was also placed in this judgment on Radcliffe v.
Bartho/omew2°. In that case on June 30 an information was laid
against the appellant therein in respect of an act of cruelty D
alleged to have been committed by him on May 30. An objection
was taken on the ground that the complaint had not been made
within one calendar month after the cause of the complaint had
arisen. it was held thatthe day on which the alleged offence was
committed was to be excluded from the computation of the E
calendar month within which the complaint was to be made; that
the complaint was, therefore, made in time.
13. The fourth case referred to is Stewart v. Chapman21 •
In that case, an information was preferred by a police constable F
that Mr. Chapman had on 11/1/1951 driven a motor car along
a road without due care and attention contrary to Section 12 of
the Road Traffic Act, 1930. At hearing, a preliminary objection
was taken that the notice of intended prosecution had not been
served on the defendant within fourteen days of commission of
offence in accordance with Section 21 of the Road Traffic Act, G
1930, inasmuch as although the alleged offence was committed
at 7.15 a.m. on 11/1/1951, the prosecutor did not send the
20. (1892) 1 Q.B. 161.
21. (1951) 2 KB 792.
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[2013) 14 S.C.R.
A
notice of intended prosecution by registered post; until 1.00 p.m.
on 1 '1/1/1951 and it was not delivered to the defendant until 25/
1/1951 at about 8.00 a.m. This submission was rejected
observing that in calculating the period of fourteen days within
which the notice of an intended prosecution must be served
B
under Section 21 of the Road Traffic Act, 1930, the date of
commission of the offence is to be excluded.
14. In re. North. Ex parte Hasluck22 , the execution creditor
obtained judgment on 19/5/1893. An order was made
authorizing sale of the bankrupt's goods. The purchase money
C
thereunder was paid to the sheriff on July 18. The sheriff
retained the money for fourteen days in compliance with Section
11 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1890. In August, the solicitor of the
execution creditor paid over the said money to the execution
creditor. Application was filed by the trustee in bankruptcy for
D
an order calling upon the execution creditor and his solicitor to
pay over to the trustee, the proceeds of an execution against
the bankruptcy goods on the ground that at the time of the sale
they had notice of prior act of bankruptcy on the part of the
bankrupt. Under Section 1 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1890, a debtor
E
commits an act of bankruptcy if execution against him has been
levied by seizure of his goods, and the goods have been held
by the sheriff for twenty one days. The time limit of twenty one
days was an allowance of time to the debtor within which to
redeem if he can. It was under these circumstances it became
F
necessary to ascertain whether there was, in fact, a holding by
the sheriff for twenty one days prior to the sale. If there was,
then neither the execution creditor, nor his solicitor could be
heard to say that they had no notice of such possession and
the act of bankruptcy thereby constituted. Vaughan Williams,
G J. held that if the goods were seized on June 27 and sold on
July 18, if June 27 is excluded, there was no holding by the
sheriff for 21 days and consequently there was no act of
bankruptcy and therefore execution creditor is not bound to
hand over the money on the ground that he received it with
H
22. (1895) 2 Q.B. 264.
ECON ANTRI LTD. v. ROM INDUSTRIES LTD.
93
[RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.]
notice of an act of bankruptcy. On appeal the same view was
A
reiterated. Rigby L.J referred to Lester v. Garland23 where Sir
W. Grant expressed that if there were to be a general rule, it
ought to be one of exclusion, as being more reasonable than
one to the opposite effect.
15. We shall now turn to Haru Das Gupta, where this Court
has followed the law laid down in the above judgments. In that
case, the petitioner therein was arrested and detained on 5121
1971 by order of District Magistrate passed on that day. The
order of confirmation and continuation, which has to be passed
within three months from the date of detention, was passed on
5/5/1971. The question for decision was as to when the period
of three months can be said to have expired. It was contended
B
c
by the petitioner that the period of three months expired on the
midnight of 4/511971, and any confirmation and continuation of
aetention thereafter would not be valid. This Court referred to
D
sev~ral English decisions on the point apart from the above
decisions and rejected,this submission holding that the day of
commencement of detention namely 5/2/1971 has to be
excluded. Relevant observations of this could read as under:
"These decisions show that courts have drawn· a
distinction between a term created within which an act
may be done and a time limited for the doing of an act.
The rule is we/I-established that where a particular time
E
is given from .a certain date within which an act is to be
F
done, the day on that date is to be excluded. (See
Goldsmiths Company v. the West Metropolitan Railway
Company). This rule was followed in Cartwright v.
Maccormack where the expression "fifteen days from the
date of commencement of the policy" in a cover note
G
issued by an insurance company was construed as
excluding the first date and the cover note to commence
at midnight of that day, and also in Marren v. Damson
Bentley & Co. Ltd. a case for compensation for injuries
23. 15 Ves. 248.
H
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[2013] 14 S.C.R.
A
received in the course of employment, where for
purposes of computing the period of limitation the date
of the accident, being the date of the cause of action, was
excluded. (See also Stewart v. Chadman and In re North,
Ex parte Wasluck). Thus, as a general rule the effect of
B
defining a period from such a day until such a day within
· which an act is to be done is to exclude the first day and
to include the last day. [See Halsbury's Laws of England,
(3rd Edn.). Vol. 37, pp. 92 and 95.} There is no reason
why the aforesaid rule of construction followed
c
consistently and for so long should not also be applied
here."
16. We have extensively referred to Saketh. The reasoning
of this Court in Saketh based on the above English decisions
and decision of this Court in Haru Das Gupta which aptly I~
D down and explain the principle that where a particular time is
given from a certain date within which an act has to be done,
the day of the date is to be excluded, commends itself to us
as against the reasoning of this Court in SIL Import USA where
there is no reference to the said decisions.
E
17. It was submitted that in Saketh this Court has
erroneously placed reliance on Section 12(1) and (2) of the
Limitation Act, 1963. Section 12 (1) states that in computing
the period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application, the
F day from which such period is to be reckoned, shall be
excluded. In Section 12(2) the same principle is extended to
computing period of limitation for an application for leave to
appeal or for revision or for review of a judgment. Our attention
was drawn to Subodh S. Salaskar wherein this Court has held
G that the Limitation Act, 1963 is not applicable to the N.I. Act. It
is true that in Subodh S. Salaskar, this Court has held that the
Limitation Act, 1963 is not applicable to the N.I. Act. However
even if the Limitation Act, 1963 is held not applicable to the
N.I. Act, the conclusion reached in Saketh could still be reached
H with the aid of Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897.
ECON ANTRI LTD. v. ROM INDUSTRIES LTD.
95
[RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.]
Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 states that in any
A
Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of the
General Clauses Act, 1897, it shall be sufficient to use the word
'from' for the purpose of excluding the first in a series of days
or any other period of time and to use the word 'to' for the
purpose of including the last in a series of days or any other
B
period of time.