# EDOCA'l'ION, u. P., ALLAHABAD v. GHAXSHY AM DAS GUPTA AND 0 J'HEH8

- **Citation:** [1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 36
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1962
- **Bench:** S. K. DAs, A. K. Sarkar, K. St:llBA ltAo, K. N. WA~uHoo, K. H..A.Jagopala Ayyanga.R
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/edoca-l-ion-u-p-allahabad-v-ghaxshy-am-das-gupta-and-0-j-heh8-2386
- **Pages:** 14

## Headnote

Exci1nination Cou11nittce-Cancelling 1'xauiination re.<iult.'i-
.• Vo opportunity yit·en to c.ram.inecs of being l1e11rcl-;,,Yatural
justice·if violated-Committee, if must act jut/icia/ly-U. P.
Int.rmediatc Education Act 1921 (l;. P. 2 of 1921), s. 15--
lieguli;itions, Cit. VI,, .. 1(1).'
~rhc three respondents were <lcclarc<l by the appcllaJtt
to have passed the Intermediate cxan1ination.
Thereafter
they prosecuted further studies and subsequently the fathers
and guardians of the respondents \vcre infnrnicd that the
Exainination Cu1nmittcc of the Board had cancelled the
examination results of the respondents and 1hal they \\'ere
debarred from appearing at the
next exan1inatio11.
The
respondents liled a ,,,rit petition
in the High Court of
Allahabad contending that since the Examination Con1mittei:
had never afforded any opportunity to
them tu rebut the
allegations made against thern the Examination Committee
had \'iolatcd the principles of natural justice.
They also
contended that the Cornn1ittee had violated the provisions of
the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921. The appellan:
while admitting that no opportunity had been afforded to the
respondents to rcLut the allegations against thetn, contended
that the Exan1ination Committee was onlv an administrative
body acting merely administratively and ,it \\'as not bound to
give a hearing to a party who n1ight be affected by its decision.
The Single .Judge who heard the writ petition held that the
Comrnittce was not bound to act judicially and there \vas no
statutory obligation on tl:e Committee to give an opportunity
to be heard. ·rhc respondent!! appealed to a J)ivision Bench
and one of the .Judges of Bench held that even though
the Cr1n1nittee was not Lound to a::t judicially or quasijudicially and it 'vas
acting administrati\•cly it. ought to
have givtn an opportuuily to the respondents of be111g heard.
The other Judge \vas of the opinion that since the committee
was acting only administratively it ,vas not boun.d to give
a
hearing. The matttr then went before a tlurcl Judge
who held that even though
the Committee
was acting
1nere)y adminis trtt tively the respondents \\'Crc entitl.ed to a
hearing. The appellant thereupon appealed to this Court.
The appellant contended that the Committee was only a body 1
)a mg administrativrly and that the principles of natura
-
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
37
justice, including the maxim audi alteram partem apply only
to judicial or quasi-judicial .bodies. The respondents contended that the High Court was wrong in holding that the
Committee was only an administrative body. It was further
submitted by them that the mere fact that there was nothing
express in the Act or the Regulations framed thereunder
which might make it obligatory for the Committee to call for
an explanation and to hear the examinee whose case it was
required to enquire . into was not wholly determinative of the
question whether a duty is cast on the Committee in cases like
this to act judicially.
lJ eld, that the :nference whether the authority acting
under a statute, where it is silent, has the duty to act judicially
wHI depend on the express provisions of the statute read along
with the nature of the rights affected, the manner of disposal
provided, the objective criterion if any to be adopted, the
effect of the decision on the persons affected and other indicia
afforded by the statute. The mere fact that the Act in
question or the relevant Regulations do not make it obligatory
on the Committee to call for an explanation and to hear the
cxamince is not conclusive on the question
whether the
Committee acts as a quasi-judicial body when exercising its
powers und<r Ch. VJ, r. l(l), of the Regulations. It is obvious
that the Committee when it proceeds to decide matters
covered by r. l(l) will have to depend upon materials placed
before it and before it decides to award any penalty it has to
come to an objective determination on certain facts and this
is the only mann

## Text

1962
36
SUPRE:IIE COURT REPoRTS [l!l62] SUPP.
BOARD OF HIGH SCHOOL & IN'l'ERl\IEDIATE
EDOCA'l'ION, u. P., ALLAHABAD
v.
GHAXSHY AM DAS GUPTA AND 0 J'HEH8
(S. K. DAs, A. K. SARKAR,. K. St:llBA ltAo,
K. N. WA~uHoo and K. H..A.JAGOPALA AYYANGA.R, JJ.)
Exci1nination Cou11nittce-Cancelling 1'xauiination re.<iult.'i-
.• Vo opportunity yit·en to c.ram.inecs of being l1e11rcl-;,,Yatural
justice·if violated-Committee, if must act jut/icia/ly-U. P.
Int.rmediatc Education Act 1921 (l;. P. 2 of 1921), s. 15--
lieguli;itions, Cit. VI,, .. 1(1).'
~rhc three respondents were <lcclarc<l by the appcllaJtt
to have passed the Intermediate cxan1ination.
Thereafter
they prosecuted further studies and subsequently the fathers
and guardians of the respondents \vcre infnrnicd that the
Exainination Cu1nmittcc of the Board had cancelled the
examination results of the respondents and 1hal they \\'ere
debarred from appearing at the
next exan1inatio11.
The
respondents liled a ,,,rit petition
in the High Court of
Allahabad contending that since the Examination Con1mittei:
had never afforded any opportunity to
them tu rebut the
allegations made against thern the Examination Committee
had \'iolatcd the principles of natural justice.
They also
contended that the Cornn1ittee had violated the provisions of
the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921. The appellan:
while admitting that no opportunity had been afforded to the
respondents to rcLut the allegations against thetn, contended
that the Exan1ination Committee was onlv an administrative
body acting merely administratively and ,it \\'as not bound to
give a hearing to a party who n1ight be affected by its decision.
The Single .Judge who heard the writ petition held that the
Comrnittce was not bound to act judicially and there \vas no
statutory obligation on tl:e Committee to give an opportunity
to be heard. ·rhc respondent!! appealed to a J)ivision Bench
and one of the .Judges of Bench held that even though
the Cr1n1nittee was not Lound to a::t judicially or quasijudicially and it 'vas
acting administrati\•cly it. ought to
have givtn an opportuuily to the respondents of be111g heard.
The other Judge \vas of the opinion that since the committee
was acting only administratively it ,vas not boun.d to give
a
hearing. The matttr then went before a tlurcl Judge
who held that even though
the Committee
was acting
1nere)y adminis trtt tively the respondents \\'Crc entitl.ed to a
hearing. The appellant thereupon appealed to this Court.
The appellant contended that the Committee was only a body 1
)a mg administrativrly and that the principles of natura
-
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
37
justice, including the maxim audi alteram partem apply only
to judicial or quasi-judicial .bodies. The respondents contended that the High Court was wrong in holding that the
Committee was only an administrative body. It was further
submitted by them that the mere fact that there was nothing
express in the Act or the Regulations framed thereunder
which might make it obligatory for the Committee to call for
an explanation and to hear the examinee whose case it was
required to enquire . into was not wholly determinative of the
question whether a duty is cast on the Committee in cases like
this to act judicially.
lJ eld, that the :nference whether the authority acting
under a statute, where it is silent, has the duty to act judicially
wHI depend on the express provisions of the statute read along
with the nature of the rights affected, the manner of disposal
provided, the objective criterion if any to be adopted, the
effect of the decision on the persons affected and other indicia
afforded by the statute. The mere fact that the Act in
question or the relevant Regulations do not make it obligatory
on the Committee to call for an explanation and to hear the
cxamince is not conclusive on the question
whether the
Committee acts as a quasi-judicial body when exercising its
powers und<r Ch. VJ, r. l(l), of the Regulations. It is obvious
that the Committee when it proceeds to decide matters
covered by r. l(l) will have to depend upon materials placed
before it and before it decides to award any penalty it has to
come to an objective determination on certain facts and this
is the only manner in which it can carry out the duties imposed on it.
Even though there is no lis in the present case in
the .sense that there are not two contending parties before it
the Committee should hear the examinees whose lives may be
seriously affected by its decision even subjecting them in some
cases to criniinal prosecution on charges of impersonation,
fraud and perjury. Though therefore there is nothing express
one way or other in the Act or the Regulation casting a
duty on the Committee to act judicially, the manner of the
disposal and the serious effects of the decision of the
Committee lead to the conclusion that a duty to act judicially
is cast on the Committee and the Committee when it acts
under r. 1 ( l) is acting quasi-judicially and the principles of
natural justice will apply to its proceedings.
Province of Bombay v. Kusaldas S. Ad1!ani, [1950] S.C.R.
621, Nagendranath Bora v. Commissioner of Hill.• Division &
Appeals, Assam, [1958] S. C. R. 1240. Shri Radlirshyam Khare
v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [!959] S. C.R. 1440, Gullapolli
Nageswara Rao v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, [1959] Supp. 1 S. C.R. 319 and S/iivji Nathubhai v,
Vnion of India, (1960) 2 s, C. R: 7751 followecj.
·
196$
Board of Hi1h S,hool
<h Interm1diate·'
EducatWtiJ U. P.,
Allahabad '
v.
Ghan'1&11111 Das
Gupta
J9r;t
B1.1erd of High Schc-oJ
4J ln~mutliatt
Eow:oJi>n u. P.,
Al/dab•d
Y.
tll:ana"yam Dar
Gup,.
Wmuhoo J.
38
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.
r--
Crv1L APPELLATE Jumsnrcnox: Civil Appeal
No. I :12 of I 95!J.
Appeal from the judgment. and decree dat<id
March t:J, 1956 of the Allahabad High Court in
Special Appeal No. 291 of 19;35.
Veda Vyasa and C. P. Lal, for the appellant.
J. P. G01jal, for the respondents.
1962. February 6. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
WANCJIOO, J.-This is an appeal on a certificate grant€d by the Allahabad High Court. The
brief facts nrcessary for present purpnses are these.
The three responde11ts were students of G. S. Hindu
Intermediate Colleg<' at Sikandrarao and appearrd
at the Intermediate (Commerce) Examinatfon conducted by tho appellant in the year I 954. On
June 12, 1954, the result of the examination was
publi~hed in llf>WSp·•pcrs and the three respondents
passed in the second division. Thereafter they
prosecuted further studies.
But in Decembe1 l!l54,
their fathern and guardians received information
from t.he Principal of the G. S. Hindu Intermediate College that th~ Examinations' Committee of
the appellant (hereinafter referred to as the Commi·
ttee) had cancelled tho result of tho respondents
for the examination of l!JM and further that thev
had been debarred from appearing at the examination of 1955.
Thereupon the respondents filed
a write petition in the High Court contending that
the Committee had never afforded any opportunity
to thl'm to rebut the allegations made against them
and that they were never informed about the nature
of the unfair means used by them in the said examination and the fir;;t thing they come to know wa8
the resolution of the Committee cancelling their
results and dcbaring them from appearing in the
examination of l !}();,,
They therefore contended
that the;Y were entitled to ap opportunity bein~
.> -
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
39
afforded to them to meet the ca~e against them of
using unfair means at the examination before
the appellant took action against them by cancelling their results and debarring them from appearing at the examination of 1955. The procedure
thus adopted by the appellant was said to he in
violation of the principles of natural justice inasmuch as they were given no opportunity whatsoever tG defend themselves and to show cause against the action contemplated against them. It was
further contended that the procedure adopted by
the appellant violated the provisions of the U. P.
Intermediate Education Act, No. II of 1921 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and the U. P. Educa·
tion Code, and therefore, the resolution cancelling
their results and debarring them from appearing in
the later examination was without jurisdiction and
illegal. They therefore prayed for a proper writ
or order oanoelling the resolution of the appellant.
The appellant opposed the application and its
case was that the respondents had used unfair
means at the examination and their cases were
reported to the Committee under the Regulations
and the Committee had acted under the powers
conferred on it under the Act and the Regulations framed thereunder after a thorough inquiry.
It was not disputed, however, that no opportunity
had been afforded to the respondents to rebut the
allegations against them in the inquiry made by
the Committee which resulted in the resolution
cancelling the results of the examination.
A large number of contentions appear to have
been urged in the High Court; but we are here only
concerned with one of them, namely, whether the
respondents were entitled to a hearing before the
appellant decided to cancel the results. The contention on behalf of the respondents before the
learned Single Judge was that the appellant was
under a duty to act judiciall~ iw1d tijerefor\l tl:le
1962
Board of High Schoo
dJ Jntetmediate
Educati"on, U. P.,
Allahabad
v.
Ghanshyam Dail
Gupta
Wanchoa J.
J!JG2
Board of Hi1/a School
41 lntermidial6
Rduc•tio11 U. P.
Allahahu
, ..
Ghan1Jryam DtJJ
Gupta
W t111choo I.
40 SUPRE!\IE COURT REPORTS (1962) SUPP.
respondents should havo been givon. a hearing bcforo any order was passed against them. The
learned Single ,Judgo held that no duty was cast
on tho Committefl to act judicially and there was
no statutory obligation on the Committee to give
an opportunity to every cxaminec to be heard;
therefore he rejected the petition.
The respondent!i then went in appeal which
was heared by Dayal and Brijmohan Lall, JJ., who
however differed. Brijmohan Lall, J., was of opinion that the Committee was not required to act
judicially or quasijudicially
when
it considered cases of this kind and was acting merely
administratively;
he
nevertheless was of the
opinion
that.
on<>
of the
rules of
natural
justice contained
in
the maxim rtudi altera.m
pr1rtem would apply in this caRe, even though the
·Committee was acting administratively. He w•1s
therefore in favour of allowing the appeal.
Daval
.J., a.greed with thl' view of Brijmoh:in Lall, .J., thnt.
in the present case no duty w1iH cast on the Committee to a<:t judicially and that the action of the
Committee wa'" merely administrative.
He however did not :igree that the Committee acted in
violation of the principles of natural justice inasmuch as it clid not give a hearing to the respondents.
He was of the view t.hat as tho Committee
was acting merely administrativ,oly it waR not
bound to give a hearing, as the maxi1n awli alteram.
partem applied only to judicial or quasijudicial
tribunals. Tho two learned J11dgcs also differer!
on two other P"int~ with whid1 we arc not concerned.
Eventnnlly they reforred three questions
to be answered by another learned Judge and one
of these questions was whether the failure of th~
Committee to provide an opport11nity to the r<>spondents of being heard vit.iated its order, wl1ich
waH of an administrative nature.
The matter then came uofore a third learned
Judge, Agarwala, J. He was doubtful whet~er the
'
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
41
view of the Bench that there was no duty cast on
the Committee to act judicially in the present case
was correct; but as on that matter the two learned
Judges were in agreement, he dealt with the case
on the basis that the Committee was acting merely
administratively. Even so, he came to the conclusion that the respondents were entit.led to a hearing and agreed with the view of Brijmohan Lall,
.J.
Consequently, the appeal was placed before
the Bench again and in accordance with the opi·
nion of the third Judge it was allowed. Then
followed an application by the appellant for leave
to appeal to this court, which was granted; and
that is how the matter has come up before us.
The main contention on behalf of the appellant is that the High Court was wrong in the view
it took that an opportunity for hearing was necessary in this case even though the Committee acted
merely administratively. It is contended that
wheni. a body is acting merely administratively, it
is not necessary that it should give a hearing to a
party who might be affected by its decision and
that the principles of natural justice, including the
maxim, audi alteram partem, apply only to judicial
or quasi-judicial bodi'es, i.e., bodies on whom a duty
is cast to act judicially. It is submitted that where
no such duty is cast on a body and it is acting
merely administratively there is no necessity for it
to hear the person who might be affected by its
order. The respondents on the other hand contend
that though the final decision of the High Court is
correct, the High Court was not right in holding
that the Committee was aoting merely administrati~
vely in a matter of this kind; they contend that
comiidering the entire circumstances which operate
in c ises of this kind, the High Court should havo
held that there was a duty to act judicially and
therefore it was necessary to give an opportunity
to the respondents to be heard before action was
taken a~ainst them. It
is sqbmitted that tile
1962
Board of lligh Sch.ool
& /nltrmeditJle
Education, U. P.,
Allahabad
v.
Ghan shy om Das
liuptu
Wanchoo ./,
1962
Board of fiigh Scl1ool
c{• /nlttmtd1att
Ed1Jcation U P.,
Ali aha bad
v.
Ghar.shyam Da3
Gupta
11' M1choo J.
42 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1962) SUPP.
mere fact that there was nothing express in the Act
or the HPgul:1tions framed thereunder which might
make it obligatory for the Committee to call for an
explanation an<l to hear the examinees whose cases
it 1vas required to enquire into was not wholly
determinative of the question whether a duty was
cast on the Committee in cases like this to act
judicially.
The first question therefore which falls for
consideration is whether any duty is cast on the
Committee under the Act and Regulations to act
judicially and therefore it is a quasi·judicial hotly.
What constitutes "a quasi-judicial act" was discussed
in the l'rodnce of Bombay v. Kusakla.s S. Advani.( 1)
The principles have been summarised by Dus, J. (as
he was then), at p. 725 in these words:-
"The principles, as I apprehend them are:
(i) that if a statute empowers an authority,
not being a court in the ordinary sense,
to decide disputes arising out of a. claim
made by one party under the statute
which elaim is opposed by another party
anrl to determine tho respective rights of
the contesting parties who aro opposed
to each other, them is a li8 and prima
f acie and in the absence of any thing in the
statute to the contrary it is the duty of the
authority to act judicially and the clccision of the authority is a quasi· judicial
act ; and
(ii) that if a statutory authority has power
to do any act which will prejudicially
affect the su bjcct, then, although there
are not two parties apart from the a.uthority and tho contest is between the autho·
rity proposing t.o do the act and t~o 8~1b
jcct opposing 1t, tho final doterm111at1on
of the authority will yet be a quasi.
judicial act provided the a~th.o~ity is
required by the statute to act iud1c1ally.
(ll [1950] s.C.R, 621, 7?,5.
••
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
. 43
In other words, while the presence of two
parties besides the de.ciding authority will
prima fac•ie and in the absence of any other
factor impose upon the authority the duty
to act judicially, the absence of two such
parties is not decisive in taking the act of
the authority out of the category of quasijudicial act if the authority is nevertheless
required by the statute to act judicially."
These principles have been acted upon by this
Court in latter rases: see Nagendra Nath Bora v. The
Commissioner of Hills Division &
Appeals, Assam(1),
Shri Radheshyam Khare v. The State of Madhya
Pradesh( 2), Gul/a,palli Nageswara Rao v. Andhra Pradesh
State Road Transport Corporation('), and Shivji N athubhai v. The Union of India('). Now it may be mentioned that the statute is not likely to provide in so
many words that the authority passing the order is
required to act judicially; that can only be inferred
from the express provisions of the statute in the
first instance in each case and no one circumstance
alone will be determinative of the question whether
the anthority set up by the statute has the duty to
act judicially or not. The inference whether the
authority acting under a statute where it is silent
has the duty to act judicially will depend on the
express provisions of the statute read along with
the nature of the rights affected, the manner of the
, disposal provided the objective criterion if any to
be adopted, the effect of the decision on the person
affected and other indicia afforded by the statute.
A duty to act judicially may arise in widely different circumstances which it will be impossible and
indeed inadvisable to attempt to define exhaustively:(vide observations of Parker, J. in R. v. Manchester Legal Aid Committee)(•).
(I) [1958] S.C.R. 1240.
(3) [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 319.
\5) [1952J 2 Q.B. 413,
(2) [1959] S.C.R. 144·0.
(4) [1960j 2 s,c.R. 775,
J!JC2
Boaid of High Schoo:
ch Intermediate
Education, U. P.,
Allahabad
v.
Ghans1!Yam Das
Gupta
W Jnchoo J.
1962
Bo~Td of High Schor.I
&• /11/nmedialc
Ed1J.ca1ion, U. P.,
A..Jla 11ahad
v.
Ghnn5/,yaT1 Dal
Gu/1/fl
IVa1:chon .J.
.4.4 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.
We must therefore proceed to examine the pro.
visions of the Act and tho Regulations framccl
thereunder in connection with matters of this kind
to d1·tcrmine whether the Committee can be said to
have tho duty to act judicially when it deals with
cases of examinees using unfair means in examination halls. Under s. 7 of the Act, the Roard cons ti·
tutc<l thereunder has inter alia powers to prescribo
courses of instruction, to grant diplomas and certi·
ficates, to conduct examinations to admit candida·
tcs to its examinations to publish the results of its
examinations, and to do all such things as may bo
requisite in order to further the objects of the Board
as a body constitut{)d for regulating and supervising
High School and Intermediate education. Under s. l :~,
the. Board has power to appoint and constitute variouR
committees, including the <~xiiminatious' committctl,
anrl under s. 14, the Board can delegate its power<
by Regulations to such committets. Section I ii
gives power to the Board to make Regulations with
i·cspect to the constit•1tion, powers and duties of
committees, the conduct of examinations, and all
matters which by the Act. may be provid<•d for by
!'tegulations. Section 20 gives power to th<i Board
and its committeos to make bye-lawR consist1:1.t
with the Act and the Rogulations.
It will be clear from the above that the .-\ct
makes no exprnss provisions as to the powers oft he
committees and the procedure to be adopted by
them in carrying out their dutie~, which an• left. to
b~ provided by Regulation<. and we have tl~orefure
to look to th11 l'tegulations framed under s. la t.o >'ee
what powcr8 and duties h:we bocn eonferrctl on
variou8 committees constituted under the Regula·
tions.
Section 13 (I) makca it incumbent on the
Board to appoint the Committeo and Ch,.p. Vf.of
the Recrulations deal~ with the powers and duties
of the° Committee. Rule I (I) of Chap. VI with
which we a.re ,particularly concerned reaq• 48
•
a s.d.R.
' '
..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
,,
45
follows:-
"It shall be the duty of the Examinations' Committee, subject to sanction and
control of the Board."
x
x
x
"(l) to consider cases where examinees
have concealed any fact or made a false statement in their application forms or a breach of
,rules and regulations to secure undue admission to an examination or used unfair means
or committed fraud (including impersonation)
at the examination or are guilty of a moral
offence or indiscipline and to award penalty
which may be one or more of the following :-
( 1) withdrawal of certificate of having
passed the examination ;
( 2)
cance!latio n of the examination;
(3)
exclusion from the examination."
There is however no provision ii;i Chap .. VI as to
how the Committee will carry out the duty imposed on it by r. 1 (1).
Further, there is no express
provision in the Act or the Regulations casting a
duty on the Committee to act judicially when exercising its powers under r. 1 (l); and the question whether the Committee has to act judicially
when exercising these powers will have to be deci'
ded on an examination of all the circumstances
relevant in the matter. At the same time, there is
nothing express in the Act from which it can be
said that the Committee is not under a duty to act
judicially. It is true that there is no procedure
provided as to how the Committee will act in exercising its powers under r. 1 ( 1) and it is further true
that there is no express provision in that rule
requiring the Committee to call for an explanation
from the examinees concerned and to hear the
examinees whose cases it
i~ required to consider.
But we are of opinion that the mere fact that the
Act or the Regulations do not make it obligatory
on the Committee to caU for an explanation and to
1962
Foard of High School
& Intern1ediate
Education, U. P.,
.Allahabad
v.
Ghansh)'am Das
Gupta
Wanchoo J.
1962
Board of Higlt. Schtol
U· l11te1mtdiatt
Edt1catinr1, U. P.,
ti l111hahad
v.
Ohc.rtJlnam DO.J
oUpta
J11anchoo J.
46 SUPRE:\1E COURT REPORTS
[1!16~) SUPP.
hear the examinee is not conclusive on the question
whether the Committee acts as a quasi-judicial body
in excrciRing
its powers under r. I (I). Evon
though calling for an explanation and hearing: tho
examinee may not have been made oxprnssly oblitory by the Act or the Regulations, it is obvious
that tho Committee when it proceeds to decide matters covered by r. I (I) will have to depend upon
materials placed before it, in coming to its decision.
Before the Committee decides to award any penalty
it has to come to an objective determination on
certain factR and onlv when it comes t-0 t.he conclu-
~ion that those facts.are established that it can pro·
ceed to punish the examinee concerned. The facts
which the Committee has to find before it takes
action are -
(i} whether the examinee has concealed any
fact or made a false statement in his
application form; or
(ii) whether the examinee has made a breach
· of tho Rules and Regulations to secure
undue admission to an examination ; or
(iii) whether the cxaminee has used unfair
means at the examination ; or
(iv) whether the examinee has committed
fraud (including impersonation) at the
examination ; or
(v) whether the examincc is guilty of moral
off'enee or indiscipline.
Until one or other of the five facts is established
before the Committee, it cannot proceed to take
action under r. l (I). In order to come to the conclusion that one or other of these facts is established, the Committee will have to depend upon materials placed before it, for in the very nature of
things it has no personal knowledge in the matter.
Therefore, though the Aet or the Regulationo do
3 s.d.h.
SUPl'tEME COURT REPORTS
47
not make it obligatory on the Committee to call for
an explanation and hear the examinee, it is implicit in the provisions of r. I (1) that the Committee
must satisfy itself on materials placed before it that
one or other of the facts is established to enable it
to take action in the matter. It will not be possible
for the Committee to proceed at all unless materials are placed before it to determine whether the
examinee concerned has committed some miscon-
. duct or the other which is the basis of the action to
he taken under r. 1 (1). It is clear therefore that
consideration of materials placed before it is necessary before the Committee can come to any decision in the exercise of its powers under r. 1 ( 1) and
this can be the only manner in which the Committee can carry out t,he duties impose~ nn it.
We thus see that the Committee can only
carry out its duties under r. l ( l) by judging the
materials, placed before it. It is true that there
is no lis in the present case, in the sense that there
are not two contesting parties before the Committee and the matter rests between the Committee
and the examinee; at the same time considering
that materials will have to be placed before the
Committee to enable it to decide whether action
should be taken under r. 1 ( 1 ),
it seems to us only
fair that the examinee against whom the Committee is proceeding should also be heard. The effect
of the decision of the Committee may in an extreme
case blast the career of a young student for life and
in any case will put a serious stigma on the examinee concerned which may damage him in later life.
The nature of misconduct which the Committee has
to find under r. 1 (I) in some cases is of a serious
nature, for example, impersonation, commission of
fraud, and perjury; and the Committee's decision in
matters of such seriousness may even lead in some
cases to the prosecution of the examinee in courts.
Considering therefore the serious effects following the
'
1962
Board of High Sehool
& lntt"TMdiate
Education, U. P.,
Allahabad
v.
Ghanshyam Das
Gupta
Wanchoo J.
19G2
BoMd of High School
ct Jrdermcdialt
FAiu cation, U. P .,
All'lhahad
..
Ghansl:yan1 Das
Gupta
W01.choo J.
48 SUPREME COURT HEI'ORTS (1962] SUPl'.
decision of the Committee and the serious nature of
the misconduct which may be found in some cast's
under r. I (I), it seems to us that the Committee
must be held to act judicially in circumstances as
these.
Though therefore there is nothing express
one way or \he other in the Act or the Regulations
casting a duty on the Committee to act judicially,
the manner of the disposal, based as it must be on
materials placed before it and the Rerious effects of
the decision of the Committee on the examincA
concerned, must lead to the conclusion that a dutv
is cast on the Committee to act judicially in this
matter particularly as it has to decide objeotiYely
certain facts which may seriously affect the rights
and careers of examinees, hdore it can take any
action in the e:irercise or its power under r. l (I). We
are therefore of opinion that the Committee when
it exercises its powers under r. J (I) is acting quasijudicially and the principles of natural justice which
require that the other party, (namely, the examinee
in this case) must be heard, will apply tu the proceedings before the
Committee. This view was
taken by the Calcutta High Court in Dipa I'al v.
University of Calcutta, (l) and B. C. Das Gupta v.
Bijoyranjmi Rakohit, (2 ) in similar circumstances and
is in our opinion correct.
It is urged on behalf of the appellant that
there are a large number of cases which come up
before the Committee under r. I (I); and if the
Committee is held to act judicially as a quasijudicial tribunal in the matter it will find it impossible to carry on itH task. This in our opinion is no
criterion for deciding whether a duty ie cast to act
judicially in view of all the circumstances of the
case. There is no doubt in our mind that considering the totality of circumstances the Commit.tee
has to act judicially when taking action under
r. 1 ( 1).
As to the manner in which it should givo
an opportunity to the examinee concerned to be
'
(I) A. I. R. 1952 Cai. 594.
(2) A. I. R. 1953 Cal. 212.
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
49
heard, that is a matter which can be provided by
Regulations or Bye-laws if necessary.
As was
pointed out in Local Government Board v. Alridge, (1)
all that is required is that the other party should
have an opportunity of adequately presenting his
case. But what the procedure should be in detail
will depend on the nature of the tribunal. There
is no doubt that many of the powers of the
Committee under Chap. VI are of administrative
nature; but where quasi-judicial duties are entrusted to administrative body like this it becomes a
quasi-judicial body for performing these duties and
it can prescribe its own procedure so long as the
principles of natural justice are followed and
adequate opportunity of presenting his case is given
to the examinee. It is not however necessary to
pursue this matter further, for it is not in dispute
that no opportunity whatsoever was 11iven to the
respondents in this case to give an explanation and
present their case before the Committee. We are
therefore of opinion that though the view of the
High Court that the Committee was acting merely
administratively when proceeding under r. 1 (1) is
not correct, its final decision allowing the writ
petition on the ground that no opportunity was
given to the respondents "to put forward their cases
before the Committee is correct. We therefore
dismiss the appeal. No order as to, in the circumstances.
Appeal dismissed.
(I I [1915] A. C. 120. _
J9(i'J.
Board of Hieh School
& lntermediate
Education, U.P ,
Allahabad
v.
Ghan.dryam Das
Gupta
Wanchoo J.