# Educalion v. Rice, fl911J A.C. 179, Lor.alGovern U Boartlv - **Citation:** [1963] 2 S.C.R. 943 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 1963 - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/educalion-v-rice-fl911j-a-c-179-lor-algovern-u-boartlv-2557 - **Pages:** 11 ## Headnote • • • • -- -- ---~- -· · 2 s.c.R. SUPREME OOURT REPORTS 943 STA'.r.E OF MYSO~E v. S. S. :111AKAPUR ·(B. P. SINHA, . c. J., P. B. 'GA.JENDRAGADKAR; K. N. WANCHOO, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR · and T. L.VENKATARAllfA AIYAR, JJ.) · Governmenl Bervanl-'Enrruiry-Evidenc.s of witnesses in preliminary investigation brought on record~Witnesses tenc:lered ·.for croBS-examination-Prindple of natural justice if 1atisfieaB;nnbay Police Manual, s. 545(8). . . _ . . After an enquiry held under s. 545 of the Bombay Police Manual the pay of the respondent was· reduced from.125/· to Rs. 120/· per month. During the enquiry the witnesses who had been examined at the preliminary investigation wer.: ·recalled and their previous statements were brought on record and after putting few question to them they were tendered 'for cross·examination by the respondent and in fact •hat they ·were cross~examined in detail. The respondents appeal to the Deputy Inspector General of Police was not only dismissed but the officer in exercise of his powers in revision ordered his dismissal., The respondent filed a writ petition in the High Court of My;ore challenging the validity of the order of dismissal on the ground inter alia that the enquiry by the 'Deputy Superintendent of Police was conducted in disregard of the rules of natural justice. The High Court agreed with the above view and the order of dismissal was set aside. The High Court further held that s. 545(8) of the Bombay Police Manual was bad as it contravened principles of natural justice. The Mysore Government came up in appeal by special leave to the $upreme Court. H ela; that the purpose of an txamination in the presence of a party against whom an enquiry is made, is sufficiently achieved, when a witness who has give·n a priof. statement -- is recalled, th'it statement is put to him, and ·_made known to the opposite party, and the witness is tendered for cross exation by that party: Held, also, that tribunals exercising quasi-judicial func.; , dons arc not courts and that therefore they are not bound to f,ollow ~he procedure prr•cril:rd for trial of actions in cGμrts • ' . • • • 1 '1962 May3. . ' 11/U SU.1 oJ M,sor1 •• S. B. M alcapu• dj)'ar J. 944 · SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (1963] nor arc they bound by 1trict rules of evidence. They can unlike courts, obtain all informat~on material for the points under the cnquiryfrom all sources, and through all channels, without being fettered by rules and procedure, which govern ; proceedings in court. The only obligation which the law casts on them is that they should not act on any information which they may receive unless they put it to the party agaimt whom it is to be used and give him a fair opportunity to explain it. What is a fair opportunity depend on the facu circumstances of each case but where such an opportunity hu been given, the proceedings arc not open to attack on the ground that the enquiry was not conducted in accordance with •he procedure followed in courts. Held further, that cl. 8 of s. 545 of the Bombay Police Manual i; not bad as contravening the rules of the natural ..... justice. Uni-On of Jnaia v. T. R. Verma, (1958] S.C.R. 499, Btak oJ Bombay v. GajananMaluir J. 948 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (1963] What is a fair opportunity must depend on the facts and circumstances of each case but where snob an opportunity had been given, the proceed· ings al'o not open to attack on the ground that the enquiry wM not conducted in a.ocordance with the prooedure followed in courts. The question as to the content of the rules natural justice has been subject of numerous decisions in England and in this country. Dealing with this question Lord Loreburn, L. C., observed, in Board of Education v. Rice (') as foll owe : "In such Olll!e& the Board of Education will have to ascertain the law as also to ascertain the faots. I need not add that in doing either they must act in good faith and fairly listen to both sides, for that is a duty lying upon every 0ne who decides anything. But I do not think they are bound t<> treat such a question as though it were a trial. They have no power to administer an oath, and need not examine witne5ses. They can obtain information in any way they think beat, always giving a fair opportunity to those who are parties in the controversy for correcting or contradicting any relevant statement prejudicial to their view. This statement of the law was adopted again by the House of Lords in Local Government Board v. Arlidge (2). This question has also been coneidered by this Court in several decisions. One of the ear Ii est of them is the decision in New Prakash. Transport C(}1Tlpany. Ltd. v. New Suwarna Tra11-.9port Company Ltd ('). There the facts were that a Tribunal conetituted under the Motor Vehicles Act had (I) (1911) A.C. !79, 182. (2) \I ·IS) I ;...c. 120. (S) ( 19S7) S.C..lll. lie. , ' • .. • +- -· 2 S.C.R. SUPREME OOURT REPORTS 949 refused to grant a permit to a company to run a bus on a certain route. __ Then the company filed a writ application in the High Court of Nagpur, attacking the order refusing the permit on the ground, int.er alia, tha~ the Tribunal had acted on a police report which was produced at the time of the hearing without giving the petitioner sufficient opportunity to nien of India v. T.R. Verma (1). That arose -out of a Writ Petition filed by a Government servant in the High Court of Punjab, calling in question an order of dismissal passed against ilim, on the ground that the enquiry which resuHed in the order had not been conducted in - . accordance with the rules of natural justice. The facts were that when the petitioner, and his witnesses appeared for giving evidence, the enquiring officer took their examination on hand . himself, put them questions, and after he had finished, asked them to make their statements. The complaint of the petitioner was that he and his witnesses should have been allowed to give their own evidence, and than cross-examined, and that the departure from the normal procedure in taking evidence, was a viola_tion of the rules of natural justice. In rejecting this contention this Court observed as follows : "Stating it broa'dly and without intending it to be exhaustive, it-ma:y be obse"ed (1) (111118) S.C,R. 5 19811 Seate of M,iore v. S. S, Malapur Jf6f Stale of MysDrt. •• s. s . .:J"'atu' Ai.ar J, 950 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963) that rules of natural justice require that a party should have the opportunity of adducing all relevant evidence on which he relies, that the evidence of the opponent ~hould be taken in his presence, and that he should be given the opportunity of orossexa.mining the witnesses examined by that party, and that no materials should be relied on against him without his being given an opportunity of explaining them. If these rules are sati~fied, the enquiry is not open to attack on the ground that the procedure laid down in the Evidence Act for taking evidence was not strictly followed. Vide the recent decision of this Court in New Prakash Transport Co. v. New Suwarna Transport Co., wher.e this question is discussed." It is on the observation that "the evidence of the opponent should be taken in his presence'' that thl' decision of the learned Judges that thll evidence of witnesses should bJ recorded in the presence of the person against whom it is to be used is based. Read literally the passage quoted above is eusceptible of the construction which the learned Judges have put on it, but when read in the context of the facts stated above, it will be clPar that that is not its true import. No question arose there as to the propriety admitting in evidence the statement of a witness recorded behind the back of a party. '1 he entire oral evidence in that case was reco. rded before the enquiring officer, and in the presence of the petitioner. ::-o there was no question of a cont·.·ast between evidence recorded behind a party and admitted in evidence against him, and evidencP recorder! in his presence. What was actually nnder consideration was the procedure to be followed by quasi-judicial bodies in holding enquiries, and the decision was that they were not hr>llnd to adopt the procedure followed in Courts, aud that it was -· ' • ·-,. • .. >, - • -Y- ' ., 2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 951 only necessary that rules of natural justice should be observed. Discussing. next what those rules required, it was observed that the person against whom a charge is made should know th<' evidence which is given. against him, so that he might be in a position to give his explanation. When the e-v;idence is oral, normally the examina.tion of the . witness will in its entirety, take place before the party charged, who will have full opportunity of cross-examining him The position is the same when a witne~ is called, the statement. given previously by him behind tb.e back of the party is put to him, and admitted in evidence, a copy thereof is given to tb.e party, and he is given an opportunity to cross-examine him. To require in that case that the OQntents of the previous statement should be repeated by the witne~s word. by word, and sentence'by sentence, is to insist on bare technicalities, and rules of natural justice are matters not of fro'f!l bu,t of subs· tanQe. In our opinion they are .. sofficiently complied with when previous statements gi,ven by wi~nesses are read over to them, marked on their admission, copies ther,eof given to the p11rson charged, and he is given an opportunity'to cross-examine them. This question came up for con.sideration . by this Court more recently in Plwlbari Ten, Estate v. · !ta W o/kmen( 1 ). Thtlre t,he fr,qta w~re that one of tP,e. workmen, B. N. Das Wl!-8 disuUs!96d. by the ~gement as the re~lt of an eI\quiry into ii. oha.rBe of theft. The lndu,stri.41 Tribunal 1!6t aside tbiil orrler on the. groJμld t.b,at ther.e had be.en. no proper enquiry. What had hapJ>E!neu• 952 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963) We.JI in acoord&noe with rules of natural justice. In answering it in the negative, Wancboo, J, speaking for the Court, observed that the admission in evidence of the prior statements under the circu1119t:mces stated above, wa.s not in oonsona.noe with the principles of natural justice laid down in the Union of India v. ']'. R. Verma('). This decision iii clearly of no a.ssistance to the respondent. Relia.noe was also placed on the following observations by Chagla., C. J., in the State of &mhay v. Gajanan MahadetJ (') • "Even assuming that a. statement of such a. witnesa is furnished to the Government eerve.nt, it is a sound rule that courts of law follow and which even domestic tribunals should follow that a.JI evidence must be given in the presence of an accused person and in the preaenoe of a. person against whom action is proposed to be taken. It is one thing to make a statement behind the back of person; it is entirely a. different thing to make a. statement in front of the Court or a. domestic tribunal a.Iid in the presence of a. person a.gs.inst whom you · a.re going to make serious oha.rges." But in our opinion, the purpose of an examination in the presence of a. party against whom a.n enquiry is ma.de, is sufficiently achieved, when·a witneea who ba.s given a. prior statement is recalled, that statement is put to him, and made known to the opposite party, and the witnesa is tendered for crose-exa.mina.tion by that party. In this view we must bold that the order dated July 5, 1956, is not lie.hie to be set a.side on the ground that the procedure followed a.t the inquiry by the Deputy Superintendent of police w&11 in violation of the rules of natural (I) (1958) S.C.R. 49l1. (2) (1954) 1.1..11.. Bom. 915. .• ' • • _, l , , . \c • • l 2 s.c.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 953 justice. It is hardly necessary to add that cl. 8 of s. 545 of the Bombay Police Manual ca.n not be held to be b1.d a.s contravening the rules of natural justice. 'fhis finding however does not dispose of the entire matter. It is the contention of the respondent that the Deputy Inspector Genera.I of police was not entitled in revision to enhance the punishment and this question has not been decided by the learned Judges. It is therefore necessary to remand this case for hearing on this a.nd a.11 other issues whioh might a.rise for decision. We accordingly set a.side the order in appeal and remand the oa.se for hearing on the other points in· this oase. Coats of this appeal will a.bide the result of the hearing in the Court below. Gase remanded • M/S. AMARCHAND LALITKUMAR .v. SHREE AMBICA JUTE MILLS LTD. (S. K. DAS, M. HmA.YA.TULLA.B a.nd J. c. SRA.H, JJ.) ..4.rbitration-Reoooation-Pt1Wtr of Ouurt-Periotlic fluctWJtion of price, if an emergency~:A.rbitralion Act, 1940 (10 of 1940), 88. 6,34-Worlcing Manval ofllie lilaetlndia Jute and Heenan lil:rcliange, Oh. IX. paMB. 7(c), 11. The appellants as sellers of raw jute entered into forward contracts with the respondent jute mills to sell such jute to thCDI. The contracts.being transferable specific delivery contracts, were entered into . in the standard printed forms of'the ~t India Jute & Hessian Exchange Ltd., which was an association rCcognised under the Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1912, and thus were subject to the rules and bye-Jaws made by the &change which provided for arbitration of .dispu!CI by the tribllll&I of· Arbitration of the 198B Slate of My•or1 v 8, S. Matap., 1981 Ma, a.