# ELECTlON COMMISSION OF INDIA v. N. G. RANGA AND ORS

- **Citation:** [1979] 1 S.C.R. 210
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1978-08-17
- **Bench:** Y. \". Chandrachud, R. S. Sarkaria, N. L. Untwalia, B A. D. KosnAL, A. P. Sen
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/electlon-commission-of-india-v-n-g-ranga-and-ors-7574
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

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Constitution of India, 1950, Arts, 84, 101, 102, 103(2) and 104-Scope of- .
Powers of the Election Comn1ission under Sections 10A, 146(1) (2) of tile
Representation of the People Act, read with Art. 103(2) of the Constitution.
Respondent No. 2 who is a voter in the Srikakulam
Constituency. submitted a petition to the President of India under Articles 84, 101,
102,
103
and 104 of the Constitution Of India alleging tha·t respondent No. 1, a returned
candidate -to the Lok Sabha on April 28, 1967 in a bye-election from that constituency. had become subject to the disqua1ifications contained in Article 102(1 ).
The President, exercising his powers under Aricle 103(2) of the Constitution.
sought the opinion of the appellant by an order dated May 18, 1968. The
appellant issued a notice dated June 6, 1968 to respondent No. 1 Calling upon
him to submit his reply to the allegations contained in respondent's petition to
the Pmsident Earlier to this, the appellant condoned the delay in submissio1~
of account· of election expenses by respondent No. I.
On ]une 26, 1968, respondent No. l, therefore, filed a Writ Petition in lhc
Andhra Pradesh High Court asking for a writ of prohibition forbidding the
appe!laat from taking further action pursuant to the Notice dated June 6 and·
for .a declaration that the appellant bad no jurisdiction to inquire into the peti-
. tion submitted by respondent No. 2 to the President. The High Court allowed
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the petition and issued a writ of Prohibition. It has granted to the appellant
a certificate of fitness under Article 133(1)(c) of the Constitution.
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Allawing the appeal, the Court
HELD : 1. The President acted both in the exercise of constitutional authority and in the discharge of his constitutional obligation in referring the question raised by respondent No. 2's petition for .the opinion of the appellant.
Upon the presentation of a petition by respondent 2 to the President of Inrlia,
alleging that respondent 1 had become subject to the disqualifications
n1entioned in article 102(1) of the Constitution, a question clearly arose as
to·
whether respondent 1 had truly become subject to .any of the disqualifications,
mentioned in that article.
jly clause (2) of article !"03, the
President was
bound to obtain the opinion of the appellant before giving\ his decisiori on the
question.. Not only that, but the President was further bound to act according
to the opinion given by the appellant.
[2130-E]
2. The Election Commission, by reason of the provisions of Section 146(1)
and (2) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, had the power and'
authority to require respondent 1 to furnish information on matters which were
relevant to the subject matter of the inquiry, namely, the allegations contained!
in the ·petition presented by respondent 2 to the President of India. [2148-CJ
(a) The Representation of the People Act, 1951, confers extensive po:vers
on the Election Commission in regard to inquiries pertaining to the questions.
referred by tht' President for its opinion under Article 103 of the Constitution.
[213F-G]
..
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1'LEC. COM. OF .INDIA v. N. G. RANGA (Chandrachud, C.J.) 211
(b I Art. 103(2), as it stood then, required the President to
obtain the
A
opinion of the Election Commission before deciding the question referred to in
clause ( l ) of that article. The President was bound to act according to the
opinion given by the Commission.
By the Forty...gecond Amendment Article
103{2) requires the President to consult
the Election
Commission. The
Amendment Article expressly confers power on the Commission to make, for that
purpose, "such inquiry as it thinks fit'7.
The implication of the
unamendt:d
Article \vas in truth and substance the same namely, that since the Commission
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was charged with the obligation to tender its opinion to the President, it had
the power to make such inquiry as it thought,fit in order to enable it to ·express
its opinion, which under the law as it stood then, was b

## Text

2!0
A
ELECTlON COMMISSION OF INDIA
v.
N. G. RANGA AND ORS.
August 17, 1978
[Y. \". CHANDRACHUD, C.J., R. S. SARKARIA, N. L. UNTWALIA,
B
A. D. KosnAL AND A. P. SEN, JJ.]
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Constitution of India, 1950, Arts, 84, 101, 102, 103(2) and 104-Scope of- .
Powers of the Election Comn1ission under Sections 10A, 146(1) (2) of tile
Representation of the People Act, read with Art. 103(2) of the Constitution.
Respondent No. 2 who is a voter in the Srikakulam
Constituency. submitted a petition to the President of India under Articles 84, 101,
102,
103
and 104 of the Constitution Of India alleging tha·t respondent No. 1, a returned
candidate -to the Lok Sabha on April 28, 1967 in a bye-election from that constituency. had become subject to the disqua1ifications contained in Article 102(1 ).
The President, exercising his powers under Aricle 103(2) of the Constitution.
sought the opinion of the appellant by an order dated May 18, 1968. The
appellant issued a notice dated June 6, 1968 to respondent No. 1 Calling upon
him to submit his reply to the allegations contained in respondent's petition to
the Pmsident Earlier to this, the appellant condoned the delay in submissio1~
of account· of election expenses by respondent No. I.
On ]une 26, 1968, respondent No. l, therefore, filed a Writ Petition in lhc
Andhra Pradesh High Court asking for a writ of prohibition forbidding the
appe!laat from taking further action pursuant to the Notice dated June 6 and·
for .a declaration that the appellant bad no jurisdiction to inquire into the peti-
. tion submitted by respondent No. 2 to the President. The High Court allowed
E
the petition and issued a writ of Prohibition. It has granted to the appellant
a certificate of fitness under Article 133(1)(c) of the Constitution.
G
ff
Allawing the appeal, the Court
HELD : 1. The President acted both in the exercise of constitutional authority and in the discharge of his constitutional obligation in referring the question raised by respondent No. 2's petition for .the opinion of the appellant.
Upon the presentation of a petition by respondent 2 to the President of Inrlia,
alleging that respondent 1 had become subject to the disqualifications
n1entioned in article 102(1) of the Constitution, a question clearly arose as
to·
whether respondent 1 had truly become subject to .any of the disqualifications,
mentioned in that article.
jly clause (2) of article !"03, the
President was
bound to obtain the opinion of the appellant before giving\ his decisiori on the
question.. Not only that, but the President was further bound to act according
to the opinion given by the appellant.
[2130-E]
2. The Election Commission, by reason of the provisions of Section 146(1)
and (2) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, had the power and'
authority to require respondent 1 to furnish information on matters which were
relevant to the subject matter of the inquiry, namely, the allegations contained!
in the ·petition presented by respondent 2 to the President of India. [2148-CJ
(a) The Representation of the People Act, 1951, confers extensive po:vers
on the Election Commission in regard to inquiries pertaining to the questions.
referred by tht' President for its opinion under Article 103 of the Constitution.
[213F-G]
..
I
..
.,
1'LEC. COM. OF .INDIA v. N. G. RANGA (Chandrachud, C.J.) 211
(b I Art. 103(2), as it stood then, required the President to
obtain the
A
opinion of the Election Commission before deciding the question referred to in
clause ( l ) of that article. The President was bound to act according to the
opinion given by the Commission.
By the Forty...gecond Amendment Article
103{2) requires the President to consult
the Election
Commission. The
Amendment Article expressly confers power on the Commission to make, for that
purpose, "such inquiry as it thinks fit'7.
The implication of the
unamendt:d
Article \vas in truth and substance the same namely, that since the Commission
B
was charged with the obligation to tender its opinion to the President, it had
the power to make such inquiry as it thought,fit in order to enable it to ·express
its opinion, which under the law as it stood then, was binding an the President.
The Forty-second amendment expressed clearly what w.ts necessarily implicit
in the old provision. If the Constitution envisages that the Commission should
ha\'e the power to make' such inquiry as it thinks fit even when its opinion is
not binding on the President who is merely required to "consult" the CommisC
sion, it cannot be that the Commission could tender its binding opinion ''"ith·
out the right and pny the duty, of making the necessary inquiry.
12140-(jl
(c) Article 103(1) gives finality to the President's decision which, wider
old provision, had to be in conformity with the opinion of lhe Election Comn1i.ssion.
Before giving an opinion which thus had finality, the Commission
acted but fairly in asking respondent 1 to submit his say.
In giving to respondent
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1 an opportunity to submit. his explanation, the appellant, far from acting beyond
the scope of the statutory and constitutional powers acted in conformity with the
principles of natural justice. [215B]
3. In the instant case, though respondent 2 was not in a position to make a
categorical assertion in his petition that respondent 1 had incurred a
specific
disqualification, he did make allegations, generally, in regard to disqualifications
said to have been incurred by respondent 1. Upon the making- of those· allegations a question arose as contemplated by Article tro(t)(a) of the Constitution and the President had to obtain the opinion of the Election Commission
on lhat question.
Respondent 2's petition could not have been rejected by the
President without reference to the Election Commission on the ground that the
allegations made by respondent 2 were unfounded or unsubstantial. The High
Court wa_., not correct when it held that the question whether respondent 1 had
bccon1e subject to any' disqualification under Section lOA of the Representa·
tion of the People Act did not arise on the facts st8!ted in the petition by
respondent No. 2.
[215H, 216A-B]
BJ·u1uleban Nayak v. Election Co1n1nissiun of India and Anr., [1965] (3)
S.C.R. 53; discussed and applied.
(b) By Section lOA of the Representation of the People Act, the Election
Commission has the power to declare a person to be disqualified if it is satis-
·fied that he has failed to lodge an account of election expenses within the time
and in the manner required by or under the Act and has no good reason or
justification for the failure. A declaration of disqualification made in pursuance
of pO\Ver conferred by section lO(A) is a declaration made by the Election Commission under a law made by Parliament. It, therefore, attracts Article 102(1)
( e) and consequently article 103 (1) of the Constitution. The High Court therefore mi'ldirected itself in reaching the conclusion that the appelant acted beyond
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[1979] 1 S.C.R.
its jurisdiction in issuing notice to respondent I in calling upon him to submit
his explanations in regard to the allegations made by respondent No. 2 in his
petition to the President. [215C-D, F-H]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISIDCTION : Civil Appeal No. 1265 of 1969.
From the Judgment and Order dt. 3-1-1969 of the Andhra Pradesh
High Court in Writ Petition No. 2763 of 1968.
S. V. Gupte, Att. General of India, K. N. Bhatt and R. N. Sachthey
for the Appellant.
P. A. Clwwdhary and B. Kanta Rao for Respondent No. !.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
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CHANDRACHUD, C.J.-Rrespondent 1, Shri N. G. Ranga, was declared elected to the Lok Sabha on April 28, 1967 in a bye-election from
Srikakulam Constituency, defeating respondent No. 3, Shri B. Rajagopalarao.
The Election Commission of India, the appellant herein,
called upon respondent 1 by a notice dated July 7, 1967 to show cause
why he should not be disqualified for failure to lodge the account of his
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election expenses within the time and in the manner required by law.
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Accepting the explanation submitted by Respondent 1, the appellant
condoned the delay caused in submitting the account of election expenses and sent a communication dated August 16, 1967 informing
respondent 1 that it was decided not to take any further action in
the matter.
Respondent 2, who is a voter in the Srikakulam constituency,
thereafter submitted a. petition to the President of India under Articles
84, 101, 102, 103 and 104 of the Constitution alleging that respondent 1, who was a sitting member of the Lok Sabha, had become
subject to the disqualification mentioned in Article 102 (1).
The
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President, exercising his powers under Article 103(2) of the Constitution, sought the opinion of the appellant by an order dated May
18, 1968. The appellant issued a notice dated June 6, 1968 to respondent 1 calling upon him to submit his reply to the allegations contained in respondent 2's petition to the President.
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On June 26, 1968 respondent 1 filed writ petition No. 2763 of
1968 in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh asking for a writ Prohibition forbidding the appellant from taking further steps pursuant
to the June 6 notice and for a declaration that the appellant had
no jurisdiction to inquire into the petition submitted by respondent 2
to the President of India.
By its Judgment dated January 3, 1969
the High Court allowed the writ petition and issued a writ of Prohibition as prayed for.
It bas granted to the Election Commission
a certificate of fitness under Article 133(l)(e) of the Constitution to
appeal to this Court.
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ELEC. COM, OF INDIA v. N. G. RANGA (Chandrachud, C.J.) 213
The narrow question for consideration is whether the appellant
had jurisdiction to issue the notice to respondent 1 calling upon him
to submit his explanation in regard to the allegations contained in the
petition presented by respondent 2 to the President of India who, in
turn, had referred the petition for the opinion of the appellant. Article
103 of the Constitution read thns at the relevant time :
"103 (1) If any question arises as to whether a member of
either House of Parliament has become subject to any of the
disqualifications mentioned in clause ( 1) of Article 102, the
question shall be referred for the decision of the President
and his decision shall be final.
(2) Before giving any decision on any such question,
the President shall obtain the opinion of the Election Commission and shall act according to such opinion."
Upon the presentation of a petition by respondent 2 to the President of India, alleging that respondent 1 had becon1e subject to the
disqualifications mentioned in Article 102 ( 1) of the Constitution, a
question clearly arose as to whether respondent 1 had truly become
subject to any of the disqualifications mentioned in that Article. By
clause (2) of Article 103, the President was bound to obtain the
opinion of the appellant before giving his decision on the question.
Not only that, but the President was further bound to act according
to the opinion given by the appellant. The President therefore acted
both in the exercise of constitutional authority and in the discharge
of his. constitutional obligation in referring the question raised by
respondent 2's petition for the opinion of the appellant.
The next question for consideration is whether, on receiving the
President's communication asking for its opinion, the appellant committed any error of law or acted beyond its jurisdiction in seeking
the explanation of respondent 1.
The Representation of the People
Act 43·of 1951, "the Act", confers extensive powers on the Election
Commission in regard to inquiries pertaining to questions
referred
by the President for its opinion under Article 103 of the Constitution·.
Section 146(1) of the Act provides, in so far as material, that where
in connection with the tendering of any opinion to the President nnder
Article 103, the Election Commission considers it necessary or proper
to make. an inquiry and if it is satisfied that on the basis of documents
produced by the parties it cannot come to a decisive opinion on the
matter which is being inquired into, it shall have for the purposes of
inquiry the powers which a civil court has while trying a suit
in
respect, inter alia, of summoning and enforcing the attendance of
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1979] I S.C.R.
A any person, examining him on oath, the discovery and production of
any docum<:nt and receiving evidence on affidavits.
Sub-section ( 2)
of section 146 which is more to the point provides :
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"The Commission shall also have the power to require any
person, subject to any privilege which may be claimed by
that person under any law for the time being in force, to
furnish· information on such points or matters as in
the
opinion of the Commission may be useful for, or relevant to,
the subject matter of the inquiry."
We see no doubt that the Election Commission, by reason of these
provisions, had the power and authority to require respondent 1 to
furnish information on matters which were relevant to the subject
matter of the inquiry, namely, the allegations contained in the petition
presented by respondent 2 to the President of India.
Article 103 (2), as it stood then, required the President to obtain
the opinion of the Election Commission before deciding the question
D referred to in clause (1) of that Article. The President was bound to
act according to the opinion given by the Commission. By the Fortysecond Amendment, Article 103(2) requires the President to consult
the Election Commission.
The Amended, Article expressly confers
power on the Commission to make, for that purpose, "such inquiry
as it thinks fit".
The implication of the unamended Article was in
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truth and substance the same, namely, that since the Commission
was charged with the obligation to tender its opinion to the President,
it had the power to make such inquiry as it thought fit in order to
enable it to express its opinion, which under the law as it stood then,
was binding on the President. The Forty-second' amendment expressed
clearly what was necessarily implicit in the old provision. If the ConF
stitution envisages that the Commission should have the power to
make such inquiry as it thinks fit even when its opinion is not binding
on the· President who is merely required to "consult" the Commission,
it cannot be that the Commission could tender its binding opinion
without the. right and, nay the duty, of making the necessary
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inquiry.
Respondent 1 rushed to the High Court somewhat hurriedly,
thinking probably that the appellant having already condoned the delay
which had occurred in filing the return of the election expenses, he had
not incurred or become subject to any disqualification as mentioned
in Article 102(1) of the Constitution and therefore the appellant had
H no justification for calling upon him to submit his explanation. That
however is a different thing from saying that either the President of
India or the appellant exceeded his or its jurisdiction
when
the
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ELEC. COM. OF INDIA v. N. G. RANGI< (Chandrachud, C.J.) 215
former referred the matter for the opinion of the latter and the latter
•
sought an explanation from respondent 1. The appellant could and
should have in the first instance verified from its own record wlletber
there was any justification for the grievance made by respondent 2.
But in giving to respondent 1 an opportunity to submit his exp'lanation,
the appellaut, far from acting beyond the soope of its statutory and
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constitutional powers, acted in conformity with the
principles
of
natural justice. Article l 03 ( 1) gives finality to the President's decision which, under the old provision, had to be in conformity with the
opinion of the Electioo Commission. Before giving an opinion whicll
thus had finality, the Commission acted but fairly in asking respondent
l to submit his say. As stated above, it had the power to ascertain c
what explanation respondent l had to give an answer to respondent
2's allegations.
The High Court misdirected itself in reaching the conclusion that
the appellant acted beyond its juirisdiction in issuing the notice to
respondent l calling upon him to submit his explanation in regard to
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the allegations made by respondent 2 in his petition ta the President.
According to the High Court, "facts leading to disqualification under
section lOA" of the Act, "cannot be the §nbject matter of inquiry and
decision under Article 103 of the Constitution". It is impossible to
accept this statement of Jaw in view of the. express provision contained
in Article 103(1) (a) that if any question arises as to whether a memE
ber of either House of Parliament has become subject to \!DY of the
disqualifications mentioned in Article 102(1), the question shall be
referred for the decision of the President. Article 102 ( 1) provides by
sub-clause ( e) that a person shall be disqualified for being chosen as,
and for being, a member of either House of Parliament if he is so
disqualified by or under any law made by Parliament.
By section
lO(A) of the Act, the Election Commission has the power to declare
a person to be disqualified if it is satisfied that he, has failed to lodge
an account of election expenses within the time and in the manner
req,uired by or under the Act and has no good reason or justification
for the failure.
A declaration of disqualification made in pursuance
of power conferred by section lO(A) is a declaration made by the
Election Commission under a law made by Parliament. It, therefore,
attracts Article 102 ( 1 )( e) and consequently Article l 03 (l) of the
Constitution.
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The High Court thereafter proceeded to hold .that the question
whether respondent l had become subject to any disqualification under
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section lO(A) of the Act did not arise on the facts stated in the petition by respondent. We do not see our way to accepting this statemem.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1979] l S.C.R.
Though respondent 2 was not in a position to make a categorical
assertion in his petition that respondent 1 had incurred a specific disqualification he did make allegations generally in regard to disqualifications said to have been incurred by respondent I. Upon the making of these allegations a question arose or contemplated by Article
103(1) (a) of the Constitution and the President had to obtain the
opinion of the Election Commission on that question.
Respondent
2's petition could not have been rejected by the President without
reference to the Election Commission on the ground that the allegations made by respondent 2 were unfounded or unsubstantial.
A similar question arose before this Conrt in Brundaban Nayak
v. Election Commission of India and Anr. (1) Article 191 (1) o( the
Constitution provides that a person shall be disqualified for being
chosen as, and for being, a member of the Legislative Assembly or
Legislative Council of a State if, inter alia, he is so disqualified by or
under any law made by Parliament. Article 192(1), as it then stood,
provided that if any question arises as to whether a member of a
House· of the Legislature of a State has become subject to any of the
disqualifications mentioned in clause ( 1) of Article 191, the question
shall be referred for the decision of the Governor and his decision
shall be final.
By Article 192(2) ihe Governor had to obtain the
opinion of the Election Commission before giving his decision and
he was also nnder an obligation to act according to the Commissipn's
opm10n.
These provisions correspond to Articles 102 and 103 respectively with which we are concerned. While dealing with an argument as to whether it could be said that the question as contemplated
by Article 192(1) had arisen, Gaj~ndragadkar, C.J.
speaking
on
behalf of the Court observed that the first clause of Article 192 ( 1)
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did not permit of any limitations and that all that the clause required
was that a question should arise. How the question arose, by whom
it was raised and under what circumstances it was raised were not
relevant for the purpose of the application of the clause.
The Court
took notice of the fact that complaints made to the Governor could
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be frivolous or fantastic, but it held that'if they were of such a character, the Election Commission would have no difficulty in expressing
its opinion that they should be rejected. That however did not mean
that a question as contemplated by Article 192(1) did
not arise.
Lastly it was urged in that case that it is the Governor arid not the
Election Commission who had to hold the enquiry since the ConstituH
tion required the Governor to decide the particular question.
This
contention was rejected on the ground that it was the opinion of the
(!) [1965] (3) S.C.R. 53.
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ELEC, COM. OF INDIA v. N. G. RANGA (Chandrachud, C.J.) 217
Election Commission which in substance was decisive and therefore
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it was legitimate to assume that when the complaint received by the
Governor was forwarded by him to the Election Commission, the
latter had the power and the jurisdiction to go into the matter which
meant that it had the authority to issue notice to the person against
whom the complaint was made, calling him to file his statement and
produce evidence in support of his case.
The High Court was in
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error in seeing "nothing" in this decision which was contrary to its
view.
For these reasons we allow the appeal filed by the Election Commission and direct that the writ petition filed in the High Court by
respondent 2 shall stand dismissed.
There will be no order as to
costs.
S.R.
Appeal allowed.
1s-s20 SCJJ78