# EMPLOYEES STA TE INSURANCE CORPORATION v. GNANAMBIGAI MILLS LTD

- **Citation:** [2005] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 738
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2005-07-19
- **Case number:** Civil Ap-peal No. 695 of2004
- **Bench:** S.N. V Ariav A, Dr. Ar. Lakshmanan
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/employees-sta-te-insurance-corporation-v-gnanambigai-mills-ltd-20830
- **Pages:** 5

## Headnote

Labour Law:
Employees State Insurance Corporation Act, 19481/ndustrial Disputes
C Act, 1948:
s.2(22)/s.10-B-"Wages"-Payments made to workmen in terms of order
made by State Government under s.10-B as introduced in State of Tamil
Nadu-Employees ' demand for increase in wages-Reference made to Special
D Tribunal-Government of Tamil Nadu-Orders dated 15. 7. 1985 and
29. 7. 1985-Directing certain payments tO be made to workmen pending the
dispute-Money so paid to be adjusted against the monetary benefits to be
awarded by Tribunal-Compromise between the emp/.oyer and employees
providing that the amount paid under the two orders to be treated as exgratia payment-Award made in terms of the compromise-~Held, the amounts
E paid under orders dated 15. 7.1985 and 29. 7.1985 were wages-They did not
cease to be wages after the award merely because in the compromise they
were termed as "ex-gratia payment"-Contributions will have to be made on
those amounts.
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G
H

## Text

A
EMPLOYEES STA TE INSURANCE CORPORATION
v.
GNANAMBIGAI MILLS LTD.
JULY 19, 2005
B
(S.N. V ARIAV A AND DR. AR. LAKSHMANAN, JJ.]
Labour Law:
Employees State Insurance Corporation Act, 19481/ndustrial Disputes
C Act, 1948:
s.2(22)/s.10-B-"Wages"-Payments made to workmen in terms of order
made by State Government under s.10-B as introduced in State of Tamil
Nadu-Employees ' demand for increase in wages-Reference made to Special
D Tribunal-Government of Tamil Nadu-Orders dated 15. 7. 1985 and
29. 7. 1985-Directing certain payments tO be made to workmen pending the
dispute-Money so paid to be adjusted against the monetary benefits to be
awarded by Tribunal-Compromise between the emp/.oyer and employees
providing that the amount paid under the two orders to be treated as exgratia payment-Award made in terms of the compromise-~Held, the amounts
E paid under orders dated 15. 7.1985 and 29. 7.1985 were wages-They did not
cease to be wages after the award merely because in the compromise they
were termed as "ex-gratia payment"-Contributions will have to be made on
those amounts.
- F
G
H
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Ap-peal No. 695 of2004.
From the Judgment and Order dated 7.8.2002 of the Madras High Court
in C.M.P. No. 12630/98 in W.A.S.R. No. 49808of1998.
C.S. Rajan, V.J. Francis, Anupam Mishra and Jenis with him for the
Appellant.
E.C. Agrawala for the Respondent.
The following Ord~r of the Court was delivered :
738
EMPLOYEES STA TE INSURANCE CORPN. v. GNANAMBIGAI MILLS LTD.
739
ORDER
A
This Appeal is against the Judgment of the Madras High Court dated
7th August, 2002. Briefly stated the facts are as follows:-
·
The Employees of Respondent Company raised a demand for increase .
of wages. The · dispute was referred to the Special Tribunal, Madras for B
adjudication. By virtue of Section 10-B, Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which
had been introduced in the State of Tamil Nadu, the Government passed
orders dated 15th July, 1985 and 29th July, 1985 directing certain payments
to be made to the workmen pending the disputes. Both orders contained a
clause that any money paid in pursuance of the order could be deducted by
the employer from out of the monetary benefits to which the employee would C
become entitled under the Award which may be passed by the Tribunal.
At this stage, it would. be convenient· to set out Section 10-B of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, under which the Orders were passed. Section
10-B reads as follows:-
"10-B Power to issue order regarding terms and conditions of
· service pending settlement of disputes. -
D
( 1) Where an industrial dispute has been referred by the State
Government to a Labour Court or a Tribunal under sub-section (1) of
Section JO and if, in the opinion of the State Government it is i:iecessary E
or expedient so to do for securing the public safety or convenience
or the maintenance of public order or supplies and services essential
to the life of the community or for maintaining employment or industrial
peace in the establishment concerning which such reference has been
made, it may, by general or special order, make provision, -
F
(a) for requiring the employer or workman or both to observe such
terms and conditions of employment as may be specified in the order
or as may be determined in accordance with the order, including
payment of money by the employer to any person who is or has been
a Workman;
·
G
(b) for requiring any public utility service not to close or remain
closed and to work or continue to work on such terms and conditions
as may be specified in the order; and
(c) for any incidental or supplementary matter which appears to H
740
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. I S.C.R.
. A
it to be necessary or expedient for the purpose of the order;
Provided that no order made under this sub-section shall require
any employer to observe tenns and conditions of employment less
favourable to the workman than those which were applicable to them
at any time within three months immediately preceding the date of the
B
order.
c
D
E
F
G
H
Explanation. - For the purpose of this sub-section, "public utility
service" means -
(i)
any section of an industrial establishment on the working of
which the safety of the establishment or the workman employed
therein depends;
(ii)
any industry which supplies power, light or water to the pubic;
(ili) any industry which has been declared by the State Government
to be a public utility service for the purpose of this Act.
(2) An order made under sub-section (1) shall cease to operate on the
expiry of a period of six months from the date of the order or on the
date of thf! award of the Labour Court or the Tribunal, as the case may
be, whichever is earlier.
(3) Any money paid by an employer to any person in pursuance of .
an order under sub-section ( 1 ), may be deducted by that employer
from out of any monetary benefit to which such person becomes
entitled under the provisions of any award passed by the Labour
Court or the Tribunal as the case may be."
The Respondent paid the amounts as directed by the Government.
Ultimately, the Respondent Company entered into a Memo of Compromise
with the employees and in tenns of the Memo of Compromise an Order was
taken from the Special Tribunal which reads as follows:-
"To the workmen in the textile mills falling in Group (D) the relief
granted shall be in the tenns contained in Annexures I and III to the
memorandum of compromise, dated 21st March, 1986 (Appendix III),
which have been adopted by me as my own findings and adjudication
on the relevant issues and the same, shall be effective from lst May,
1986."
Thus, the Special Tribunal never went into the question and did not
..
EMPLOYEES STATE INSURANCECORPN. v. GNANAMBIGAI MILLS LTD.
7 41
decide whether or not the amounts paid (under the Government order) were A
wages or not. It merely gave its imprimatur to a compromise arrived at between
the parties. Clause 3(c) of the Memorandum of Compromise, which has been
strongly relied upon, reads as follows:-
"It is agreed that the lump sum payment of Rs. 500, Rs. 260 and Rs.
75, Rs. 65 per month, as the case may be paid or payable to the B
workmen upto April 30, 1986 as per the Government orders No.1399,
dated 15th July, 1985 and No.1546, dated 29th July, 1985 under Section
IO~B of the Industrial Disputes Act and consent letter, dated 14th
February, 1986 by the Special Industrial Tribunal, be treated as an exgratia payment and shall not be adjusted against the future benefits C
covered under this settlement."
The Employees State Insurance Corporation claimed contributions, on
the amounts paid under the afore-mentioned two Government orders. The
Employees State Insurance Corporation then sought to recover the
contribution. A Writ Petition was thus filed before the High Court. A Single D
Judge of the High Court held that the amounts paid did not amount to
"wages". The LPA filed by the Corporation has been dismissed ·by the
impugned Judgment. The Judgments of the High Court proceed on the footing
that the amounts paid under the orders of the Government would be "wages"
within the meaning of the definition of the term "wages" as given under
Section 2(22) of The Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948. However, they E
conclude that as the Award of the Tribunal terms these payments as "exgratia payments", therefore they cannot now be considered to be 'wages'.
We have heard parties at great length. In our view, the High Court was
absolutely right in concluding that the payments made pursuant to the orders
of the Government were 'wages' within the meaning of the term as defined F
under The Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948. We are unable to agree with
the submissions made on behalf of the Respondent that even at that stage·
these were not 'wages'. The term 'wage' as defined in Section 2(22) reads as
follows:-
"2(22) "wages" means all remuneration paid or payable in cash to an
employee, if the terms of the contract of employment, express or
implied, were fulfilled and includes [any payment to an employee in
respect of any period of authorised leave, Jock-out, strike which is not
illegal or lay-off and] other additional remuneration, if any, [paid at
G
intervals not exceeding two months], but does not include -
H
742
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005) SUPP. l S.C.R.
A
(a) any contribution paid by the employer to any pension fund or
B
provident fund; or under this Act;
(b) any travelling allowance or the value of any travelling ·
concession;
(c) any sum paid to the person employed to defray special expenses
entailed on him by. the nature of his1 employment; or
( d) any gratuity payable on discharge;"
Thus, any remuneration paid or payable in cash· to an employee if the terms
of the contract of employment, express or implied, are fulfilled would be a
'wage'. The Government order clearly indicates that the payment was to be
adjusted towards the 'wages' after the Award is passed. By virtue of the
Government order it_ is a payment in terms of the co~tract of employment and
therefore it would be a wage.
D
In our view the High Court has gone completely wrong in concluding
that by virtue of the A ward it ceases to be wages. As stated above, the
Tribunal has not applied its mind as to whether or not the payments were
wages. All that the Tribunal did was to give its imprimatur to a compromise
between the parties. Merely because the parties in their compromise chose
to term the payments as 'ex-gratia payments' does not mean that those
E payments cease to be wages if they were otherwise wages. As stated above,
t~ey were wages at the· time that they were paid. They did not cease to be
~ages after the Award merely because the terms of Compromise termed them
as 'ex-gratia payment'. We are therefore unable to accept the reasoning of the
Judgments of the High Court. The Judgment of the Division Bench as well
F as that of the Single Judge ac.cordingly stand set aside. It is held that the
amounts paid are wages and contribution will , have to· be made on those
amount~ also. We, however, make it clear that payments of the interest will
·. be as per the statutory provisions. ·
In this view of the matter, the Appeal Stands allowed. There will be no .
G order as to costs.
RP.
Appeal allowed.