# ere was no v. binding decision between the parties that the claim

- **Citation:** [1960] 2 S.C.R. 810
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1960
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 34 of 1956
- **Bench:** Jafer Imam, J. L. Kapur, K. Subba Rao
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/ere-was-no-v-binding-decision-between-the-parties-that-the-claim-1785
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

Arbitration-Award, Registration of-Power of court to extend
time for filing-The Arbitration Act, 1940 (X of 1940), s. 14(2)-
Jndian Ncgistration Act, (XV I of 1908), ss. 17, 49-Indian Limitation Act, (J X of 1908), Art. 178-Jndian Succession Act, 1925
(XXXIX of 1925), s. 192.
By means of a will the respondent's husband authorised her
to adopt the appellant, and the will was duly registered after the
death of the testator. The relevant portion of the will ran
thus:-
"Under this will, I am authorising the said Champalal
Ishv,:ardas to execute the same.
I have appointed him the
executor of this will.
Under the said will the said Champalal
alone shall be the full O\vner of my entire rnovable and immoveable property and the executor of. the will after my
•
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-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
811
death if I adopt him during my lifetime or even if my wife
r960
adopts him (after my death)."
Champa/al
The appellant applied for appointment of a curator under
v.
s. 192 of the Succession Act but subsequently the parties entered Mst. Samarath Bai
into an agreement for arbitration in the matter. Three arbitrators were appointed and the time for making the award was
extended by the Court on their application. The arbitration
agreement stated that the arbitrators had to decide what should
be the respective rights of the parties in the estate in case the
respondent adopted the appellant. An award was made and
filed in Court by the arbitrators to the effect that the respondent
should adopt the appellant according to Hindu Law within four
months failing which the appellant would be heir and executor
of the entire property of the deceased and the respondent would
be entitled to a maintenance of Rs. zoo per mensem.
But if in
spite of the respondent's readiness to adopt, the appellant refused
to be adopted within four months, he would not have any right
in the property nor would he be the executor.
The award was
at first unregistered and on being returned it was subsequently
registered and refiled in Court. The attorney of two of the
arbitrators furnished to the Sub-Registrar a list of the property
covered by the award. The proceedings under the Succession Act
and the Arbitration Act were then separated. The respondent
made an application under s. 14(2) of the Arbitration Act, and the
appellant applied for setting aside the award. The Court passed
a decree in terms of the award. The High Court on appeal by
the appellant .upheld the award.
On appeal by a certificate of the High Court the appellant
contended that being an executor he could not refer the matter
to arbitration,· that the award was not filed within the time
prescribed by the Limitation Act, that it was not registered
according to law, that the First Additional Judge had no jurisdiction to extend time for making the award, that the arbitrators
were guilty of misconduct and the award was in excess of the
power given to them and that even if the awarci"was proper and
legal the respond'"nt having refused to adopt the appellant the
decree should have been as provided by the award on the
happening of tlile contingency and the Court passing the decree
had no jurisdiction to take subsequent events into consideration.
Held, that the filing of the award by the arbitrators after
notice to the parties was not barred by limitation as Art. 178
of the Limitation Act applied to applications made by the
parties and not to the filing of the award by the arbitrators.
The award required registration but the filing of an un-·
registered award under s. 49 of the Registration Act was not
prohibited; what was prohibited was that it could not be taken
into evidence so as to affect immoveable property falling under
s. 17 of the Act.
Champalal
812
SUPREME lJOURT REPORTS [1960(2)]
The Court had jurisdiction to entertain the application for
filing the award and to extend time for filing it.
v.
By the will the appellant could not get the property of the
Mst. Samarath Bai testator nor \Vas he constituted an executor

## Text

810
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(2)]
r96o
the competence of the arbitrators. The High Court
., Ai-·r
, din appeal under the Letters Patent, did confirm the
""/S.
opi arsna
d
,
'd
h
d
b t th
a?td sans. Ltd. or er, setting as1 e t e awar ;
u
ere was no
v.
binding decision between the parties that the claim
The Union of Iudia described in Sch. B, that is, the claim for establishShah J.
January 2I
ment and contingency charges, was within the
competence of the arbitrators in reference under cl. 20.
It may be observed that according to the High Court
of East Punjab in the Appeal No. 31 of 1953, under
the Letters Patent, it was not necessary to express
any opinion whether the claim in Sch. U was within
the competence of the arbitrators, and the claims
described in Sch.]) does not appear to have been
agitated in the second arbitration proceeding.
We, accordingly, agree with the view of the High
.Court that the Award of the arbitrators was liable to
be set aside because of an error apparent on the face of
the award. In this view, the appeal fails and
i~ dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed,.
CHAMPALAL
v.
MST. SAMARATH BAI
(JAFER IMAM, J. L. KAPUR AND K. SUBBA RAO, JJ.)
Arbitration-Award, Registration of-Power of court to extend
time for filing-The Arbitration Act, 1940 (X of 1940), s. 14(2)-
Jndian Ncgistration Act, (XV I of 1908), ss. 17, 49-Indian Limitation Act, (J X of 1908), Art. 178-Jndian Succession Act, 1925
(XXXIX of 1925), s. 192.
By means of a will the respondent's husband authorised her
to adopt the appellant, and the will was duly registered after the
death of the testator. The relevant portion of the will ran
thus:-
"Under this will, I am authorising the said Champalal
Ishv,:ardas to execute the same.
I have appointed him the
executor of this will.
Under the said will the said Champalal
alone shall be the full O\vner of my entire rnovable and immoveable property and the executor of. the will after my
•
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-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
811
death if I adopt him during my lifetime or even if my wife
r960
adopts him (after my death)."
Champa/al
The appellant applied for appointment of a curator under
v.
s. 192 of the Succession Act but subsequently the parties entered Mst. Samarath Bai
into an agreement for arbitration in the matter. Three arbitrators were appointed and the time for making the award was
extended by the Court on their application. The arbitration
agreement stated that the arbitrators had to decide what should
be the respective rights of the parties in the estate in case the
respondent adopted the appellant. An award was made and
filed in Court by the arbitrators to the effect that the respondent
should adopt the appellant according to Hindu Law within four
months failing which the appellant would be heir and executor
of the entire property of the deceased and the respondent would
be entitled to a maintenance of Rs. zoo per mensem.
But if in
spite of the respondent's readiness to adopt, the appellant refused
to be adopted within four months, he would not have any right
in the property nor would he be the executor.
The award was
at first unregistered and on being returned it was subsequently
registered and refiled in Court. The attorney of two of the
arbitrators furnished to the Sub-Registrar a list of the property
covered by the award. The proceedings under the Succession Act
and the Arbitration Act were then separated. The respondent
made an application under s. 14(2) of the Arbitration Act, and the
appellant applied for setting aside the award. The Court passed
a decree in terms of the award. The High Court on appeal by
the appellant .upheld the award.
On appeal by a certificate of the High Court the appellant
contended that being an executor he could not refer the matter
to arbitration,· that the award was not filed within the time
prescribed by the Limitation Act, that it was not registered
according to law, that the First Additional Judge had no jurisdiction to extend time for making the award, that the arbitrators
were guilty of misconduct and the award was in excess of the
power given to them and that even if the awarci"was proper and
legal the respond'"nt having refused to adopt the appellant the
decree should have been as provided by the award on the
happening of tlile contingency and the Court passing the decree
had no jurisdiction to take subsequent events into consideration.
Held, that the filing of the award by the arbitrators after
notice to the parties was not barred by limitation as Art. 178
of the Limitation Act applied to applications made by the
parties and not to the filing of the award by the arbitrators.
The award required registration but the filing of an un-·
registered award under s. 49 of the Registration Act was not
prohibited; what was prohibited was that it could not be taken
into evidence so as to affect immoveable property falling under
s. 17 of the Act.
Champalal
812
SUPREME lJOURT REPORTS [1960(2)]
The Court had jurisdiction to entertain the application for
filing the award and to extend time for filing it.
v.
By the will the appellant could not get the property of the
Mst. Samarath Bai testator nor \Vas he constituted an executor except in the event
of his being adopted and therefore he could enter into the
arbitration agreement.
Kapur].
The agreement for arbitration having specifically stated that
the consequences of adoption or non-adoption \Vere to be decided
by the arbitrators, they rightly laid down what was to happen
if the adoption did not take place owing to the default of either
party, imposing a time limit was implicit in the terms of the
agreement and their award \Vas not in excess of the power given
to them by the arbitration agreement.
The award could not be treated as having perverted the
line of succession by merely stating that if the adoption did not
take place the respondent would receive l: share of the testator's
property and it would form her stridhan.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION:
Civil Appeal
No. 34 of 1956.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated
February 19, 1954 of the former Nagpur High Court,
in Misc. Appeal No. 164 of 1949, arising out of the
judgment and decree dated November 22, 1949, of the
First Additional District Judge, Akola, in Civil Suit
No. 12-A of 1948.
0. B. Agarwala and GanpaJ;
Rai, for the
appellant.
S. K. Kapur and B. P. Maheshwari, for the
respondent.
1960. January, 21. The Judgment·of the Court
was delivered by
KAPUR J.-This is an appeal against the judgment
and order of the Nagpur High Court and arises out of
proceedings under the Indian Arbitration Act.
The appellant in this case is Champalal and the
respondent is Samarath Bai, the widow of Lal Chand.
The parties who are Jains belong to Balapur in the
district of Akola in the previous State of Madhya
Pradesh. The relationship of the parties is shown by
the following pedigree table : ·
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r
'
-
<
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
813
I
Nanak Chand
I
Bulakhidas=
Jivanbai
I
Babibai=
Rasiklal
Phool Chand
I
I
I
Khushal Chand
Sundarlal
I
Lalchand=
Samarathbai
I
I
Ishwardas ·
I
Champalal
I
Sakarchand
I
Ratanbai=
Vijay Kumar
I
Bag la!
I
I
I
Vinaychand
I
Deolal
I
I
I I
I
Digamber Das
I
Vimalchand
On September 14, 1944, Lal Chand made a will by
which he authorized his wife Samarath Bai to adopt
Champalal and made certain disposition of his
property. Lal Chand died on September 26, 1944.
On October 20, 1944, the appellant made an application under s. 192 of the Succession Act to the First
Additional District Judge of Akola for the appointment of a Curator. This was Misc. J udl. No. 3 of 1944.
Notices were issued to the respondent, Samarath Bai
and her daughters. The will was registered on December 2!J, 1944. On January 10, 1945, an arbitration
agreement was entered into between the appellant and
the respondent and on January 16, 1945, both parties
applied for stay of proceedings in the case (Misc. Judi.
No. 3of1944) and the case was adjourned to March 28,
1945, and then was adjourned to June 18, 1945. On
that date the arbitrators made an application to the
First Additional District Judge for extension of time
for four months for making the award. This application was opposed by the appellant but the court gave
three months' time on July 26, 1946. The award was
made on October 18, 1946. On October 21, it was
filed by the arbitrators in the court of the First Additiona.l Di,;trict Judge who on October 30, gave to the
parties ten days' time for objections, On November 15~
Champa I al
v.
Mst. Samarath /la1
Kapu1 J.
814
SUPREME COURT.REPORTS [1960(2))
'96°
1946, the appellant filed objections to the award and
on January 31, 1947, the respondent applied for a
Champalal
f
v.
judgment in terms o the ·award and for a decree .
• VI st. Samaratk Bai The award was unregistered and therefore at the
request of the respondent it was handed over for
Kapur J.
getting it registered to Mithulal who was an attorney
of two of the arbitrators Magandas and Sakarchand.
On February 7, 1947, he presented it for registration
to the Sub-Registrar but the Sub-Registrar returned
it as it was not accompanied by a list and particulars
of the property covered by the award. On February 15,
1947, the list and particulars signed by Mithulal were
supplied and the award was represented for registration by Mithulal. As he was an attorney of only two
of the three arbitrators the Sub-Registrar registered
the document on March 26, 1947, in regard to said
arbitrators and refused it qua the third arbitrator,
Bhogilal. But under the orders of the Registrar the
document was registered in regard to Bhogilal also
and it was refiled on July 21, 1948, in the Court of
the First Additional District Judge. He ordered the
two proceedings one under s. 192 of the Succession
Act and the other under the Arbitration Act to be
separated and the proceedings under the Arbitration
Act were ordered to be registered as a suit on
August 14, 1948, and on August 30, the court ordered
a proper application as required under the High Court
Rules to be filed. On September 15, 1948, an application under s. 14(2) of the Arbitration Act was filed.
On October 14, 1948, the appellant filed an application for setting aside the award and therein raised
various objections which were rejected and on November 22, 1949, a judgment was passed. in accordance
with the terms of the award followed by a decree.
Against this order the appellant took an appeal to
the High Court which was dismissed on February Hl,
1954.
The High Court held that the application filed
by the respondent dated September 15, 1948, under
s. 14(2) of the Arbitration· Act was not within time
but the original application filed by the arbitrators
on October 21, 1946, was within time; that no objection could be taken to the award on the ground that
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
815
there were two awards one by ;he arbitrators and
1 ~6°
the other by Mithulal who had added to the award
by giving the list and particulars; that the First . Cha.;:alat
·
. Additional District Judge was authorised to extend Mst. samarath Bai
time for making an award on the application of the
arbitrators and he was properly seized of the case ;
Kapur J.
that no misconduct had been proved and that no
illegality had been established and that the appellant :
did not get anything under the will except on adoption nor was he until then constituted an executor.
Against this judgment this appeal has been filed on a
certificate by the High Court.
In appeal before us counsel for the appellant raised
six points: (I) the filing of the award was not within
time as no application was made under s. 14 within
the time allowed by the Limitation Act; (2) that the
award required registration and was not registered in
accordance with law and the mere fact that it was
registered does not clothe it with legality ; (3) the :First
Additional District Judge had no jurisdiction to grant
three months' extension of time to the arbitrators for
. making the award which was granted on July 26,
1946; (4) that the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct; (5) that the award is in excess of the power
given to the arbitrators under the agreement of
arbitration and (6) even ifthe award was proper and
legal the respondent had refused to adopt the appellant and therefore the decree should have been as
provided by the award on the happening of that
contingency and in the alternative the First Additional District Judge who passed the decree had no
jurisdiction to take.subsequent events into consideration.
In our opinion points nos. I, 2 and 3 are wholly
without substance. The award was made on October
18, 1946, and the arbitrators filed it in the court of the
First Additional District Judge and they also gave
notice to the parties by registered post informing them
of the making of the award. It has not been shown
as to how the filing of the award is barred by limitation.
Article 178 of the Limitation Act which was
I Of
•
816
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(2)]
r9~o
relied upon by the appellant applies to applications
made by the parties and not to the filing of the award
Cha1npalal
v.
by the arbitrators.
Mst. Samarath Bai
The second question that the award required
registration and could not bet filed by the arbitrators
T<at·rir I
before it was registered is equally without substance.
The filing of an unregistered award under s. 49 of the
Registration Act is not prohibited; what is prohibited
is that it cannot be taken into evidence so as to affect
immoveable property falling under s. 17 of that Act.
That the award required registration was rightly
admitted by both parties. It was contended by
counsel for the appellant that under s. 21 of the
Registration Act and the rules made under s. 22 a
description of the property was necessary and as that
was supplied through Mithulal who, according to
counsel, did not have the necessary authority to do so,
the award must be taken to be an incomplete document
which could not be registered. The High Court has
found that in the circumstances of this case lists were
not necessary and therefore anything done by Mithulal
whether authorised or not will not affect the legality
of the registration. The third point that the First
Additional District Judge before whom the application
was made for extending the time for making the
award had no jurisdiction is also not sustainable. It
so happened thatthe court which had jurisdiction to
entertain applications for the filing of awarJs was the
same before whom the application under s. 192 of the
Succession Act had been filed. If that court was the
proper court in which such applications \\·ere to be
made then no defect can be found in the application
being made to that court or that court giving such
extension.
The ground on which the charge of misconduct
of the arbitrators was founded was that the arbitrators
had before hearing the parties decided amongst themselves that they would give a particular award. The
High Court has found that this charge has not been
proved. It was based on a statement of the appellant
that one of the arbitrators, Magandas, had suggested
to him that he, the appellant, should agree to give to
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T--
, .
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
817
the respondent an absolute estate in a portion of the
I96o
property and if that was done the dispute would be
settled, but he was agreeable only to giving a life
Champalal
estate and th.e arbitrators then told him that in that Mst. sa~~rath Bai
case they would give an absolute estate to the respondent. As the High Court has pointed out this fact
Kapur J.
was not pleaded in the first application of objections
filed by the appellant and it was in its opinion an
after-thought. Reliance was also placed · on the
following statement ofMagandas in cro~s-examination
asP.W.3:
"We had decided as to how the award was to be
made by us, but as these two persons did not come
we made the application to the Court for extension
of time".
But the explanation of the other arbitrators was that
they wanted to bring about an amicable settlement
and had gone to Balapar and then to Akola. The
appellant and his brother had promised to follow them
there but as they did not turn up an application was
made for extension of time. There is nothing wrong
in what the arbitrators did and it cannot be said that
any inference of misconduct can be drawn from this
·evidence.
It was then submitted that the award was in
excess of the powers given to the arbitrators and was
therefore invalid. This point was divided into three
points : (i) that the reference itself was invalid and
therefore the award was a nullity; (ii) that the award
was in excess of the powers given to the arbitrators
and (iii) the award was contrary to law on the face of
it. In support of point No. (i) it was submitted that the
appellant having accepted the office of an executor
could not enter into an arbitration concerning the
execution, authority to adopt or the property covered
by the will. It is unnecessary to decide the vitality of
this point because according to . the true construction
of the will the appellant was not to become the
executor till he had been adopted. Paragraph 10 of
the will was as follows :
"I have this day, made as above the will of my
estate. TJnder this will, I am authorising the said
818
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(2)]
r96o
Champalal Ishwardas to execute the same. I have
appointed him the executor of this will.
Under the
Cha111palal
1 h
1 b
h
v.
said wil , t e said Champalal alone shal
e t e full
Mst. Samarath Bai
owner of my entire movable and· immoveable
property and the executor of the will after my
Hapur J.
death if I adopt him during my lifetime or even if
my wife adopts him (after my death)."
The words "under the said will the said Champalal
shall be ............ the executor of the will after my
death if I adopt him during my lifetime or even if my
wife adopts him after my death" show that the
appellant was to become executor after his adoption
and as he was not adopted he cannot be the executor
and therefore the argument that an executor cannot
enter into arbitration does not arise and we do not
think it necessary to decide this matter beyond saying
that the a.ppellant was not constituted an executor
eo nominie but was to be an executor if he was adopted.
Similarly the question whether the appellant after
accepting the office of an executor had renounced it or
a discharge was necessary under s. 301 of the Succession Act does not arise.
Points (ii) and (iii) may be taken up together.
It was argued that the award is in excess of thepower given to th~ arbitrators because it determined
the rights of the appellant as an executor and becau~e
it was in excess of para. No. 1 of the arbitration
agreement which provided that the arbitrators should
maintain the gifts to charities and the gift in favour
of the testator's daughters and others. It is difficult
to see how the award has lost sight of this paragraph.
As a matter of fact the arbitrators have maintained
the gifts to charities and other gifts· made by the
testator in the will and they have clearly stated that
the person becoming the owner of the deceased's
property, will have to provide for the maintenance of
the persons named in the will and pay the charities
therein enumerated.
Another objection raised was that according to the
arbit.ration agreement the arbitrators had to enforce
the will and not to act outside it and also they could
not impose a limit of time for adoption. How they
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
819
have acted dehors the will has not been shown.
The
I960
. contention raised was that according to the arbitraChampalal
tion agreement the arbitrators had to decide in what
v.
proportion the parties to the dispute were to "enjoy "Mst. Samarath Bai
the estate of the testator and not that one of them
will get nothing at all. As we read paragraph IO of
Kapur J.
the will, and the High Court also so construed it, the
appellant could get the property of the testator only
if he was adopted by the testator or his widow, the
respondent. It is not correct, therefore, to read the
term of the arbitration agreement as meaning that
the appellant was to get at least some portion of the
property irrespective of his being adopted.
Paragraph 2 of the arbitration agreement shows
that they had also to decide that in c11se the respondent adopted the appellant what should be the
respective rights of the parties in the estate. The
arbitrators decided that the respondent should adopt
the appellant according to Hindu Law within four
months before February, 1947, and if the respondent
failed so to do within the time above specified the
appellant would be the heir and executor of the
deceased's entire property and the respondent would
be entitled to Rs. 200 per mensem as maintenance.
But if in spite of the respondent's readiness to adopt
the appellant refused to be adopted within four
months, he would not get any rights in the property
of the deceased nor would he be the executor. As it
was specifically stated in the arbitration agreement
that the consequences of the adoption or non-adoption
were to be decided by the arbitrators, they rightly
laid down what was to happen ifthe adoption did not
take place and also provided that if it was due to the
default of the appellant one consequence win follow
and if it was the default of the respondent another
corisequerrce would follow. The words of the agreement
" In the same way the arbitrators may also
decide that in case it is decided that the party No. 2
should adopt the party No. l anq. if that thing is
accepted by the pa.rty No. l and in case the adoption
takes place, what shall be the rights of both the
parties and how they will stand in respect of the
property .... , ....... _"
..
820
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(2)]
z96o
mean that the power to limit the time was implicit
because the happening of these events could not be
Champalal
l f" £
l
l
v.
e t or a imit ess period.
Mst. Samarath Bai
The courts below have found on the evidence that
the appellant was not prepared to be adopted. We
Kapur J.
have been taken through the evidence and we find no
reason to differ from the opinion of the High Court that
the appellant was not prepared to be adopted. His
attitude in regard to that matter is clear from ground
No. 37 of the Grounds of Appeal taken by him in the
High Court which was:-
"The lower Court erred in holding that Champalal
was not within his rights in consenting to get
adopted by Mt. Samarathbai within the time fixed
by the arbitrators without prejudice to his objections against the a ward "
and the courts have rightly come to that conclusion.
In this view of the matter the alternative argument
of taking subsequent events into consideration does
not arise.
It was also argued that by making the award the
arbitrators had perverted the line of succession. All
that the award has stated is that in case the adoption
takes place the respondent would receive ! share of
the property of the testator and it would form her
stridhana. How that has perverted the line of succession is difficult to understand.
There is no force in this appeal and it must there-
~
fore be dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.