# Euju KOJav1111 v. M. M. Pililip

- **Citation:** [1964] 3 S.C.R. 652
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1964
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 636 of 1962
- **Bench:** P. B. Gajendragadjur, K. N. Wanchoo, K. C. Das Gupta
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/euju-kojav1111-v-m-m-pililip-3013
- **Pages:** 14

## Headnote

Industrial Diapute-Dismissal
of workmen -
Enquiry
conducte.d by eye witness .. -Propriety-1/ vio/,af,e& principl• of
natural justice-Proper procedure in domeatic enquir11-Rult. of
•vidence -
Industrial
Diaputea Act,
1947
(U of 19117).
•· IO (1} D.
An industrial dispute arose in regard to the dismissal of
certain workmen. It was referred for adjudication to the
Industrial Tribunal. There were three domestic enquiries.
One of them was conducted by oificcn, who had thcmselv11
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1153
witnessed
the
alleged tnbconduct. The
enqumes were
challenged on the ground that thry were held in violation
ol
the
princip1e
of
natural justice and the procedure
adopted in conducting them was
not fair. The Industrial
Tribunal came to the conclusion that the enquiries were not
conducted
in accordance
with the principle of natural
justice.
Held (i) that the enquiry conducted by the eye witnesses
was not in accordance with the principles of natural justice
as the enquiry officers bad themselves witnessed the alleged
misconduct of the workmen.
Domestic enquiries should be
conducted by such officers of the employer who are not likely
to import their personal
knowledge
into
the
enquiry
proceedings.
(ii) That in domestic
the employer should
firstly lead evidence against the workman charged, give him
an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses and then the
workman should be asked to give an explanation if he so
desires in regard to the evidence led against him.
(iii) That the rule that a witness should not be disbelie·
ved on the ground of an inconsistency betwC"'en his statement
and that contained in a docuiftent unless he is given a chance
of explaining that document, cannot be treated as a mere
technical rule of evidence. The principle on which that rule
is based is one of natural justice.
(iv) That the evidence given in an enquiry against one
workman cannot be accepted as evidence in an enquiry against
another for the reason that the evidence given in the former
enqiry was not recorded in the presence of the workman
concerned with the second enquiry and he had no opportunity
to test that evidence by cross-examination.

## Text

1963
Euju KOJav1111
v.
M. M. Pililip
lfidayatul/oh J.
1963
M'!JI 8.
652 SUPREME COURT REPORTS . [1964] VOL.
We are satisfied that the exemption under the
Act has been duly proved in this case. Since Bhagavathi Valli was not subject to part IV of the Ezhava
Act, it is obvious that under the pure Marumakkathayam law, Meenakshi and Vesudevan were not her
heirs, but Bhagavathi Narayani and her daughter
Gouri. Of these Gouri Narayanijoined in executing
the document 'R' in favour of the answering respondent, which was executed by the legal representatives of
the original mortgagee. In our opinion, therefore, the
High Court was right in holding that the present
appellant was not entitled to redeem the otti, having
never enjoyed the jenmom rights.
The appeal,
therefore, must fail and is dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismis1ed.
ASSOCIATED CEMENT CO. LTD.
v.
THE WORKMEN AND ANR.
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADJUR, K. N. WANCHOO
and K. C. DAS GUPTA JJ.)
Industrial Diapute-Dismissal
of workmen -
Enquiry
conducte.d by eye witness .. -Propriety-1/ vio/,af,e& principl• of
natural justice-Proper procedure in domeatic enquir11-Rult. of
•vidence -
Industrial
Diaputea Act,
1947
(U of 19117).
•· IO (1} D.
An industrial dispute arose in regard to the dismissal of
certain workmen. It was referred for adjudication to the
Industrial Tribunal. There were three domestic enquiries.
One of them was conducted by oificcn, who had thcmselv11
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1153
witnessed
the
alleged tnbconduct. The
enqumes were
challenged on the ground that thry were held in violation
ol
the
princip1e
of
natural justice and the procedure
adopted in conducting them was
not fair. The Industrial
Tribunal came to the conclusion that the enquiries were not
conducted
in accordance
with the principle of natural
justice.
Held (i) that the enquiry conducted by the eye witnesses
was not in accordance with the principles of natural justice
as the enquiry officers bad themselves witnessed the alleged
misconduct of the workmen.
Domestic enquiries should be
conducted by such officers of the employer who are not likely
to import their personal
knowledge
into
the
enquiry
proceedings.
(ii) That in domestic
the employer should
firstly lead evidence against the workman charged, give him
an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses and then the
workman should be asked to give an explanation if he so
desires in regard to the evidence led against him.
(iii) That the rule that a witness should not be disbelie·
ved on the ground of an inconsistency betwC"'en his statement
and that contained in a docuiftent unless he is given a chance
of explaining that document, cannot be treated as a mere
technical rule of evidence. The principle on which that rule
is based is one of natural justice.
(iv) That the evidence given in an enquiry against one
workman cannot be accepted as evidence in an enquiry against
another for the reason that the evidence given in the former
enqiry was not recorded in the presence of the workman
concerned with the second enquiry and he had no opportunity
to test that evidence by cross-examination.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal
No. 636 of 1962.
Appeal by special leave from the award dated
July 13, 1960, of the Industrial Tribunal, Punjab
Patiala in Reference No. 16 of 1957.
'
R J. Kolah, J. B. Dadachanji, 0. C. Mathur
and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant.
J96!J
tfsto&iat d C1111111t
C11. Ltu.
••
K'1r.hi1.t
C1ment
Co LtJ.
v.
W01k•m
654
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
VOL.
K. T. Sule, Anand Swaroop and Janardan
Sharma, for respondent Ne. I.
1963. May 8.
The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
GAJENDRAGADKAR J. -This appeal arises out
of an industrial dispute between the appellant, the
Associated Cement Companies Ltd., and the respon·
dents, their workmen. The dispute was in regard to
the dismissal of five workmen employed by the
appellant at its Bhupendra Cement Works, Surajpur.
The said workmen are : ( 1) Mehnga Ram, Bar
Bender, (2) Janak Raj Soni, Store-Clerk, (3) Vishwa
Nath Bali, Painter, (4) Daulat Singh, Motor Driver
and (5) Malak Ram Khanna, Turner. The respondents contended that the dismissal of the said work·
men was unjustified, and they demanded that the
sairl dismissed workmen should be reinstated and
their wages for the period of enforced unemployment
,hould be paid to them. The Government of Punjab
referred this dispute for adjll'dication to the Industrial
Tribunal Punjab, Patiala, under section IO (I) (d) of
the Industrial Disputes Act (No. 14of1947).
It appears that on May 1, 1952, the appellant's management had arranged a cinema show in
the Club grounds at Surajpur for the entertainment
of its workmen.
At about 8 P. M. when the film
was being exhibited, confusion was created in the Hall
by some employees and shouts were raised. Amongst
the workmen who raised these shouts was Malak
Ram. Owing to the rowdyism thus created by the
workmen, the cinema show had to be cancelled.
It
was in respect of the misconduct alleged to have been
eommitted by Malak Ram on May 1, 1952 that a
charge-sheet was given to him and an enquiry held
against him.
On
August
12,
1952,
at
7 A.
M.,
Mehnga Ram, Janak Raj and Daulat Singh, it wa1
ill
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
!155
alleged, had stopped workmen from getting into the
factory and starting their work in time after they
had
punched their cards
and
taken
their
tokens.
The said three workmen are also alleged to
have shouted slogans causing cessation of work in the
factory for about half an hour. In respect of this
alleged misconduct of the said three workmen, charges
were supplied to them and an enquiry was held against
them.
On
October 14, 1952, at
4 P. M.,
Mehnga Ram and Janak Raj who were concerned
with the incident of August 12, are alleged to
have collected some workers in front of the main
office building on the way to the grain-shop and in
the meeting so organised they instigated their coworkers to go on strike and to resort to violence. In
consequence, some of the officers of the appellant
were abused and the noise created at the meeting
disturbed the office work.
This incident also gave
rise to charge-sheets against the said two workmen
and a subsequent enquiry.
On October 20, 1952, at about 7 A. M., Mehnga Ram, Janak Raj, Vishwa Nath and Daulat Singh
are alleged. to have stopped workmen at the Factory
Gate from entering the factory and to have prevented
them from going to their duties for some time. At
this time, the said workmen are also alleged to have
indulged in shouting hostile slogans. This incident
gave rise to charge-sheets and an enquiry.
The record shows that three different Boards of
Enquiry were constituted to hold enquiries into the
several charge-sheets served on the different workmen
in question.
The first enquiry was about the incident of 1.5.1952 and it was confined to Malak Ram.
The second enquiry was about the incident of Aagust
12,_1952, and it _concerned Mehnga Ram, Janak
RaJ and Daulat Smgh; and the last enquiry was in
Ass•ci1t1d C1nu11i
C•. ..
Wotkrnen
/
.d11ociat1d
Co. Ltd.
••
Workmm
656
SUPREME COURT REPORTS(Ul64] VOL.
regard to the incidents which took place on
October 14, andl October 20, 1952-in regard to
the first of these Mehnga Ram and Janak Raj were
involved and in regard to the second one Mehnga Ram
Janak Raj, Vishwa Nath and Daulat Singh were
concerned. It is thus clear that Malak Ram was concerned with the
incident of May 1, 1952 and
Vishwa Nath with the incident of October 20,
1952. As a result of the findings recorded at the said
enquiries, the appellant dismissed all the five workmen concerned.
Before the Industrial Tribunal, it was urged by
the respondents that none of the three enquiries was
conducted according to. the principles of natural
justice, and so, the dismissals of the 5 workmen
which were based on the findings recorded at the
said enquiries could not be said to be legal or valid.
The appellant did not attempt to justify the dismissals by leading evidence before the Tribunal, but it
contented
with producing the evidence of the
enquiry proceedings and urged that the enquiries were
properly held and that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to sit in appeal over the findings recorded at
the said enquiries and the orders of dismissal passed
in consequence of the said findings. 'The Tribunal
has upheld the respondents' case that aH the three
enquiries were not conducted according to the principles of natural justice, and so, it has up held that the
dismissals of the five workmen were unjustified and
accordingly, an award has been made directing the
appellant to reinstate the five workmen with continuity of service, coupled with the direction that the
said workmen should be paid their full wages from
the date of their dismissal to the date oftheir reistatement as compensation for wrongful dismissal. It is
against this award that the appellant has come to
this Court by special leave.
In respect of Mehnga Ram, Janak Raj and
Daulat Singh, parties have agreed to take on order
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
657
by consent. It
is
agreed
that
the
award
passed by the Tribunal in respect of these three
workmen should be set aside, and the order of dismissal . against them should be treated as an order of
discharge simpliciter. Mr. Kolah for the appellant
has agreed to pay to each one of the said three workmen Ks. 3500/-, provided the amounts paid to them in
pursuance of the order passed by this Court in the
present appeal while granting stay are deducted.
Mr. Kolah has also agreed that the amount of gratuity and provident fund to which the said workmen
m:ty be entitled would be paid to them as well.
Mr. Sule for the respondents has agreed to these terms.
In view of this agreement between the parties, we
direct that the award in regard to these three work·
men should be set aiide and an order passed in terms
of this agreement. That leaves the question of two
workmen to be considered; they are Malak Ram and
Vishwa Nath.
In the case of Malak Ram, charge-sheet was
served on him on May 20, 1952, in which he was
told that he was found to be one of the persons who
had instigated, and who also took active part in,
rowdyism and hooliganism during the cinema show
on May I, 1952, and so, he was asked to see the
Manager of the Bhupendra Cement
Works on
May 2t, at 2.30 P. M. with his written explanation
as to why disciplinary action should not be taken
against him. Malak Ram did not appear before the
Manager on May 22, as required by the said
charge-sheet. That is why a further notice was
given to him on ] une 4, 1952 calling upon him to
show cause why disciplinary action should not be
taken against him, and it was added that his behaviour amounted to misconduct under Standing Order
No. 16, sub-clause (I). Thereupon, Malak Ram
gave his explanation on June 5, 1952. In this
explanation, he denied that he had taken part in
hooliganism as alleged in the charge-sheet and urged
IHI
c.,.,
Co. Ll4.
y,
Workfa11
•
)
..
1963
Associated Cement
Co. Ltd.
v.
Workmen
·· Gaj1ndragadkar J.
•
658
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL.
that he had in fact tried his best to control the disturbance at the cinema show. On the same day, another
notice was served on Malak Ram in which the
Manager stated "We are not prepared to accept all
that you have stated by way of explanation as it is
not borne out by all that we actually saw and also
all that was seen by other independent witnesses."
Malak Ram was accordingly required to meet the
Manager at 10. A. M. on June 11, 1952 to enable
him to hold the necessary enquiry .
On June, 11, 19521
an enquiry was held
by the Manager, the assistant Manager and 1he
Chief Engineer. This
enquiry
began
with the
examination of Malak
Ram
himself. He was
elaborately questioned about the allegations made
against him and after his
examination was over,
four other witnesses were examined against him.
When these four witnesses gave evidence, Malak Ram
was asked whether the wanted to cross.examiPe any of
them. He told the enquiry officers that he did not want
to cross-examine them. Then a 5th witness gave
evidence and that closed the enquiry.
As soon as
the 5th witness gave evidence and Malak Ram
protested that he had done nothing wrong and
urged that the evidence agaimt him was false, the
Manager observed that the evidence against him
was overwhelming and the three officers
made a
finding that "from the enquiry we are satisfied that
you were one of the ring leaders who instigated and
took active part in hooliq;anism and rowdyism during
the cinema show on the night of Ist May."
After this finding was recorded, the Manager
served an order on Malak Ram on
June, 12
1952. By this letter, Malak Ram was suspended
indefinitely from
.June 13, 1952 pending
final
action. While suspending him indefinitely,
the
Manager told Malak Ram in this letter that his
explanation was in variance with the
evidence
3 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
659
against him and also the evidence that the Assistant
Manager Mr. Mohan had been maltreated and
against what the enquiry officers had actually seen.
This order was, in due course, followed by the final
order of dismissal.
On these facts, the question which arises for
our decision is whether the Tribunal was justified
in holding that the enquiry was not conducted in
accordance with the
principles of natural justice.
It is tr11e that domestic enquiries need not be
conducted in accordance with the technical requirements of criminal trials, but they must be fairly
conducted and in holding them, considerations of
fair·play and natural justice must govern the conduct
of the enquiry officer.
In the present case, the first
serious infirmity from which the enquiry suffers
proceeds from the fact that the three enquiry officers
claimed that they themselves had witnessed the
alleged misconduct ot' Malak Ram. Mr. Kolah
contends tl)at if the Manager and the other officers
saw Malak Ram committing the act of misconduct,
that itself would not disqualify them from holding
the domestic enquiry. We are
not preparedlto
accept this
If an officer himself sees
the misconduct of a workman, it is desirable that
the enquiry should be left to be held by some other
person who does not claim to be an eye,witness
of the impugned incident.
As we have repeatedly
emphasised, domestic enquiries must be conducted
honestly and bona .fide with a view to determine
whether the charge framed
against a particular
employee is proved or not, and so, care must be
taken to
that these enquiries do not become
empty formalities, If an officer claims that he had
himself seen the misconduct alleged against an
employee, in fairness steps should be taken to see
that the task of holding an enquiry is assigned to
some other officer.
How the knowledge claimed by
the enquiry officer can vitiate the entire proceedings
l96J
Associated Cmient
Co. Ltd.
v.
W01kmm
G•jmdrqUkor j,
•
)
1963 -
Cmnenl
C•. Ltd.
...
Werkmen
1160
COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
of the enquiry is illustrated by the present enquiry
itself, We have already noticed
that when the
Manager rejected the written explanation given
by Malak Ram, he told him in terms that the said
explanation could not be accepted, because it was
contrary to what the Manager,
the
Assistant
Manager and the Chief Engineer had themselves
seen. He was also told that his explanation was
inconsistent with what other independent witnesses
had told tlie l\1anager. It is hardly necessary to
emphasise that these statements betray complete ignorance as to the requirements of a proper domestic
enquiry. In deciding the question as to whether
the explanation given by Malak Ram was true or
not, the enquiry officer should not have imported his
personal knowledge
and the knowledge of his
colleagues and should not have also relied on the
reports received from other witnesses.
We are
inclined to think that the injustice which is likely
to result if a domestic enquiry is held by an officer
who has himself witnessed the alleged incident, is
very eloquently illustrated by the statements contained in the Manager's letter to Malak Ram. That
is why we think it is desirable that the conduct of
domestic enquiries should be left to such officers of
the employer who are not likely to import their
personal knowledge into the proceedings which they
are holding as enquiry officers.
The other infirmity in the present proceedings
flows from the fact that the enquiry has commenced
with a close examination of Malak Ram himself.
· Some of the questions put to Malak Ram clearly
sound as questions in cross-examination.
It is
necessary to emphasise that in domestic enquiries,
the employer should take steps first to lead evidence
against the workman charged, give an opportunity
to the workman to cross-examine the said evidence
and then should the workman be asked whether he
wants to give any explanation about the evidence
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
661
led against him. It seems to us that it is not fair in
domestic enquiries against industrial employees that
at the very commencement of the enquiry, the employee should be closely cross-examined even before
any other evidence is led against him. In dealing
with domestic enquiries held in such industrial
matters, we cannot overlook the fact that in a large
majority of cases, employees are likely to be ignorant,
and so, it is necessary not to expose them to the risk
of cross-examination in the manner adopted in the
present enquiry proceedings. Therefore, we are
satisfied that Mr. Sule is right in contending that
the course adopted in the present enquiry proceedings
by which Malak Ram was elaborately cross-examined
at the outset consititutes another infirmity in this
enquiry.
It appears that before the enquiry was actually
held on June 11, 1952, notice was not given to
Ram telling him about the specific date of the enquiry. It may be that failure to intimate to the
workman concerned about the date of the enquiry
may, by itself, not constitute an infirmity in the
enquiry, but, on the other hand, it is necessary to
bear in mind that it would be fair if the workman
is told as to when the enquiry is going to be held so
that he has an opportunity to prepare himself to make
his defence at the said enquiry and to collect such
evidence as he may wish to lead in support of his
defence. On the whole, it would not be right that
the workman should be called on any day without
previous intimation and the enquiry should begin
straightaway. Such a course should ordinarily be
avoided in hoiding domestic enquiries in industrial
matters.
There is yet another infirmity in this enquiry
and that is furnished by the communication sent by
the Manager to Malak Ram on June 12; 1952. In
this letter •. the Manager told Malak Ram that his
1963
hsod•l•i c.m,..,
Co. lid.
v.
Wor!mn
1963
Ctm•nl
Co. Ltd.
••
Wof'km1n
662 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL.
version was inconsistent with the evidence that the
Asstt. Mana(ler Mr. Mohan had been maltreated and
with what the enquiry officers had themselves seen .
Mr. Mohan was one of the enquiry officers, so that
it is clear that what weighed with the enquiry officers
was the fact that Mr. Mohan had been maltreated
by Malak Ram and that Malak Ram's misconduct
had been seen by the enquiry officers themselves.
It
is thus obvious that in coming to the conclusion that
Malak Ram was guilty of the misconduct, the
enquiry officers have plainly relied upon their own
knowledge, and that is reasonably calculated to
create an impression in the mind of Malak Ram
that the present enquiry was nothing more than a
sham or an empty formality.
Therefore, we arc
satisfied that the view taken by the Tribunal that the
enquiry held against Malak Ram was not conducted
in accordance with the principles of natural justice,
cannot be successfully challenged by the appellant.
As we have already observed, the appellant did not
lead evidence before the Tribunal to justify the dismissal on the merits, and so, the Tribunal had no
alternative but to hold that Malak Ram's dismissal
was unjustified, and that inevitably led to the order
of reinstatement and payment of wages during the
period of the employee's enforced unemployment.
That takes us to the case of Vishwa Nath.
A
charge.sheet was
served on
Vishwa Nath on
October 21, 1952. This charge-sheet alleged that
on October 20, 1952, at about 7 A. M., Vishwa
Nath had stopped workmen entering the Works at
the Factory Gate and prevented them from going
on their respective duties for some time.
He was
also charged with having indulged in disorderly behaviour by shouting hostile ·slogans. The allegation
was that this conduct amounted to misconduct under
Standing Order.No. 16, sub-clause (ix). On receiving this charge-sht;et, Vishwa Nath gave his explanation .. 9n October 25, 1952, and atated .that on
3 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
663
October 20, 1952, he was not present at 7 A. M. and
had not shouted any hostile slogans and had not
prevented anybody from going to duty. Thereupon,
an enquiry was held on the same day. This enquiry
was conducted by the Manager and the Asstt.
Manager. At this enquiry also, Viohwa Nath was
first examined and then five witnesses gave evidence
in support of the charge.
After the enquiry was
over, the enquiry officers recorded their conclusions
that the misconduct alleged against Vishwa Nath
under Standing Order No. 16 (ix) was proved.
It appears that Vishwa Nath later moved the
enquiry officers for leave to ci1.e wimesses in his
favour and permissiou was given to him to examine
those witnesses.
Accordingly, Vishwa Nath examined four witnesses and after this evidence was
recorded, the enquiry officers noted their conclusions
on November 25, 1952. In recording these conclusions, the enquiry officers have given reasons why
they were not prepared to believe the evidence given
by the witnesses examined by Vishwa Nath. The
first reason is that in the original list of 43 witnesses
cited by Vishwa Nath, some were absent from duty
on October 20, 1952 and the enquiry officers thought
that that clearly showed that the person chargesheeted manouvered to produce false witnesses. The
other reason given for disbelieving the said evidence
was that out of the four
examined by
Vishwa Nath, Bakhtawar Singh was present on duty
on October 20, at 3 P.M., whereas he mentioned in
cross-examination that he came to
duty between
6.45 A.M. and 7.0 A. M.
There is yet another
reason which was given for disbelieving the said
evidence and this reason was that whereas Vishwa
Nath's witnesses denied that there was any gathering at 7 A.M. on October 20, at the Factory Gate,
witness:s who were produced in defence by Daulat
Smgh aga1!1st whom a separate enquiry was held,
clearly admitted that there was a gathering at the
1963.
As.sociate.i Cement
Co. Ltd.
v.
U'orkmtn
Cajtnd111gadkar J.
1163
.du1ei.i1• C111J111I
C..1.Ji.
••
War.Im,.
664
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL.
gate and that Daulat Singh did address the gathering .
It would be noticed that each one of the 'three
reasons set out in the report in support of the conclusion that the version of Vishwa Nath's
witnesses
could not be believed, introduces a serious infirmity
in the enquiry and the report. The first reason
refers to the fact that some of the witnesses cited by
Vishwa
Nath were
absent
from
duty
on
October 20, 1952. Now, it is plain that this fact had
been ascertained by the officers from the attendance
register and Vishwa Nath was not given an opportunity to give his explanation and a chance to
produce the said witnesses to say what they had to
say on the point. Besides, it is not unlikely that even
if the witnesses may not have attended duty, they
may have
been able to depose to what happened
near the gate on October 20, at 7 A.M. Therefore,
the first reason on which the enquiry officers relied
is based on information receivey by them from
a register without notice to Vishwa Nath.
The second reason
is also open to serious
challenge. When Bakhtawar Singh was examined,
he was not asked why he was shown as on duty
at 3 P. M. when in fact he claimed that he came to
duty between 6.45 A. M. and 7 A.M.
The rule that
a witness should not be disbelieved on the ground of
an inconsistency between his statement and another
document unless he is given a chance to explain the
said document, cannot be treated as a technical rule
of evidence, The principle on which the said rule
is based is one of natural justice, and so, it seems,
that in disbelieving Bakhtawar Singh on a ground
not put to him, the enquiry officers acted unfairly
against Vishwa
The third reason given in the report for disbelieving Vishwa Nath's witnesses is based on the
evidence recorded by the enquiry officers in the
I
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 665
enquiry held against Dau lat Singh. If one enquiry
had been held against Daulat Singh and Vishwa
Nath, it would have been another matter; but if
two separate enquiries were held against the two
workmen, it would, we think, be very unfair to rely
upon the evidancc in the enquiry against
Daulat
Singh when the officers were dealing with the ca,c
of Vishwa Nath. The evidence given in Daulat
Singh's enquiry was not recorded in Vishwa Nath's
presence and Vishwa Nath had no opportunity to
test the said evidence by cross examination. Therefore, it is plain that the final conclusion of the
enquiry officers is based on grounds which have
introduced an element of unfairness in the whole
enquiry. We are, therefore, satisfied that the Tribunal was right in holding that the report made by
the enquiry officers against Vishwa Nath cannot be
accepted as a report made after holding a proper
enquiry in accordance with the principles of natural
justice. That being our view, we must confirm the
orderpassed by the Tribunal in respect of Vishwa
Nath.
The result is, the award is set aside in respect
of the three workmen, Mehnga Ram, Janak Raj and
Daulat Singh in terms of compromise arrived at
between the parties before the Court, and the award
made in respect of Malak Ram and Vishwa Nath
is confirmed. There would be no order as to costs.
196J
A11t1ei•t1i Cammi
Co. Lti.