# EXPRESS PUBLICATIONS (MADURAI) LTD. AND ANR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANR

- **Citation:** [2004] 2 S.C.R. 1098
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2004-03-11
- **Bench:** Y.K. Sabharwal, D.M. Dharmadhikari
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/express-publications-madurai-ltd-and-anr-v-union-of-india-and-anr-19892
- **Pages:** 24

## Headnote

Labour Laws:
Employees' Provident Fund Scheme, 1952:
Paragraph 80(2)-Excluded employees-Newspaper industryEmp/oyees of newspaper industry did not come in the category of "excluded
employees" and were entitled to all benefits of the Scheme irrespective of
pay-Test of income had been excluded by keeping the newspaper industry
D and employees as a class apart-Petitioners challenged the constitutionality
of Para 80(2) alleging that there was no valid basis to single out newspaper
industry for additional burden-Held: Para 80(2) which applied exclusively
to employees of newspaper industry did not suffer from the vice of
arbitrariness-Hence, it was not violative of Art. I 4 of the Constitution
although it singled out newspaper industry by excluding income test only with
E regard to the said industry-Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous
Provisions Act, 1952, Paras. 2(1), 2(/) and (5)-Working Journalists and
Other Newspaper Employees (Condition of Service) and Miscellaneous
Provisions Act, 1955.
F
Constitution of India, 1950:
Article 32-Writ petition-Delay and /aches-Effect of-Held: The
constitutional remedy under Art. 32 is discretionary-In one case Court may
decline discretionary relief if there is an inordinate delay-But, in another
case, the Court may ignore the delay and pronounce upon the invalidity of a
G provision-It will depend from case to case-On facts, writ petition challenging
benefit given to employees of newspaper industry in the year 1956 and
continuing till date was dismissed on the ground of long delay.
The petitioner filed the present writ petition under Article 32 of
the Constitution challenging the constitutionality of Paragraph 80(2) of
H
1098
--
--·
EXPRESS PUBLICATIONS (MADURAI) LTD. v. U.0.1.
I 099
the Employees' Provident Fund Scheme, 1952. The effect of the impugned A
paragraph was that the employees of the petitioner-newspaper industry,
for the purposes of the provident fund scheme, did not fall in the category
of excluded employees despite their pay being above the prescribed amount
as notified by the respondent from time to time.
The employees of the petitioner had not been included in the category B
of "excluded employee" as defined in Paragraph 2(t)(ii) of the Scheme for
the last more than 47 years. The effect of Paragraph S0(2) of the Scheme,
which came into force in the year 1956, was that the income ceiling had
not been applied to the employees of the newspaper establishments. The
result was that the newspaper establishments and newspaper employees C
did not -come in the category of 'excluded employee'. In other words,
irrespective of pay, all such employees were entitled to the benefit of the
Scheme.
On behalf of the petitioner, it was contended that only in case of
employees of the newspaper industry, the test of income had been excluded D
by keeping the newspaper establishments and employees as a class apart
which was wholly discriminatory; that there was no rationale or valid basis
for artificially treating newspaper establishments and employees as a
distinct class so as to make them ineligible. on the basis of income ceiling;
and that there was no valid basis to single out newspaper establishments E
for additional burden.
The following question arose before the Court:-
Whether the benefit given to the employees of the newspaper
industry in the year 1956 under Paragraph 80(2) of the Employees'
Provident Fund Scheme, 1952 and continuing till date could be challenged F
at this stage after a lapse of so many years by only one of the newspaper
establishments in the country?
Dismissing the petition, the Court
HELD: 1. Undoubtedly, the employees of the newspaper G
establishments are in a better position than the employees of other
establishments and industries since the newspaper employees, without any
income ceiling limit, are entitled to the benefits of the Employees'
Provident Funds altd Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 and Employees'
Provident Fund Scheme, 1952. That has been the position

## Text

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A
EXPRESS PUBLICATIONS (MADURAI) LTD. AND ANR.
B
c
v.
UNION OF INDIA AND ANR.
MARCH 11, 2004
[Y.K. SABHARWAL AND D.M. DHARMADHIKARI, JJ.]
Labour Laws:
Employees' Provident Fund Scheme, 1952:
Paragraph 80(2)-Excluded employees-Newspaper industryEmp/oyees of newspaper industry did not come in the category of "excluded
employees" and were entitled to all benefits of the Scheme irrespective of
pay-Test of income had been excluded by keeping the newspaper industry
D and employees as a class apart-Petitioners challenged the constitutionality
of Para 80(2) alleging that there was no valid basis to single out newspaper
industry for additional burden-Held: Para 80(2) which applied exclusively
to employees of newspaper industry did not suffer from the vice of
arbitrariness-Hence, it was not violative of Art. I 4 of the Constitution
although it singled out newspaper industry by excluding income test only with
E regard to the said industry-Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous
Provisions Act, 1952, Paras. 2(1), 2(/) and (5)-Working Journalists and
Other Newspaper Employees (Condition of Service) and Miscellaneous
Provisions Act, 1955.
F
Constitution of India, 1950:
Article 32-Writ petition-Delay and /aches-Effect of-Held: The
constitutional remedy under Art. 32 is discretionary-In one case Court may
decline discretionary relief if there is an inordinate delay-But, in another
case, the Court may ignore the delay and pronounce upon the invalidity of a
G provision-It will depend from case to case-On facts, writ petition challenging
benefit given to employees of newspaper industry in the year 1956 and
continuing till date was dismissed on the ground of long delay.
The petitioner filed the present writ petition under Article 32 of
the Constitution challenging the constitutionality of Paragraph 80(2) of
H
1098
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EXPRESS PUBLICATIONS (MADURAI) LTD. v. U.0.1.
I 099
the Employees' Provident Fund Scheme, 1952. The effect of the impugned A
paragraph was that the employees of the petitioner-newspaper industry,
for the purposes of the provident fund scheme, did not fall in the category
of excluded employees despite their pay being above the prescribed amount
as notified by the respondent from time to time.
The employees of the petitioner had not been included in the category B
of "excluded employee" as defined in Paragraph 2(t)(ii) of the Scheme for
the last more than 47 years. The effect of Paragraph S0(2) of the Scheme,
which came into force in the year 1956, was that the income ceiling had
not been applied to the employees of the newspaper establishments. The
result was that the newspaper establishments and newspaper employees C
did not -come in the category of 'excluded employee'. In other words,
irrespective of pay, all such employees were entitled to the benefit of the
Scheme.
On behalf of the petitioner, it was contended that only in case of
employees of the newspaper industry, the test of income had been excluded D
by keeping the newspaper establishments and employees as a class apart
which was wholly discriminatory; that there was no rationale or valid basis
for artificially treating newspaper establishments and employees as a
distinct class so as to make them ineligible. on the basis of income ceiling;
and that there was no valid basis to single out newspaper establishments E
for additional burden.
The following question arose before the Court:-
Whether the benefit given to the employees of the newspaper
industry in the year 1956 under Paragraph 80(2) of the Employees'
Provident Fund Scheme, 1952 and continuing till date could be challenged F
at this stage after a lapse of so many years by only one of the newspaper
establishments in the country?
Dismissing the petition, the Court
HELD: 1. Undoubtedly, the employees of the newspaper G
establishments are in a better position than the employees of other
establishments and industries since the newspaper employees, without any
income ceiling limit, are entitled to the benefits of the Employees'
Provident Funds altd Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 and Employees'
Provident Fund Scheme, 1952. That has been the position for the last H
1100
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2004] 2 S.C.R.
A nearly half a· century. On the other hand, right since the inception of the
PF Act, the benefit of the Scheme has been denied to those employees who
have more than a specified income. The benefit has been extended to
weaker sections of employees of other establishments and industries and
not to all sections. The income ceiling has been amended by notifications
B issued from time to time. (1108-D-E)
2. In the present case, it is not the contention of the petitioner that
only temporary relief was granted to the employees of the newspaper
industry. Apart from this, the employees of the newspaper industry have
always been treated as a class apart. Moreover, the mere fact that similar
•C benefit, even after a lapse of about half a century, has not been given to
the employees of other industries will not make the benefit given to the
newspaper industry discriminatory. (1112-G-H[
In Re: The Special Courts Bill, 1978 [1979[ 1 SCC 381, followed.
D
Motor General Traders v. State of A.P., (1984) l SCC 222, Rattan Arya
v. State of T.N., (198,6) 3 SCC 385, Malpe Vishwanath Acharya v. State of
Maharashtra, (1998) /z SCC 1 and Chintapaa/li Achalah v. P. Gopalakrishna
Reddy, AIR (1966) AP 51, held inapplicable.
3.1. No hard-and-fast principle can be laid down that under no
IE circumstances delay would be a relevant consideration in judging the
constitutional validity of a provision. The constitutional remedy under
Article 32 is discretionary. In one case, this Court may decline
discretionary relief if a person aggrieved has slept over for long number
of years. In another case, depending upon the nature of violation, the court
may .ignore delay and pronounce upon the invalidity of a provision. It will
IF
depend from case to case. (1113-C-D)
Rabindra Nath Bose v. Union of India, [1970[ 2 SCR 697; Mis.
Tilokchand and Motichand v. H.B. Munshi, (1969) 1 SCC 110 and
Ramachandra Shankar Deodhar v. State of Maharashtra, [1974[ l SCC 317,
...., relied on.
J
3.2. In the present case, there is no satisfactory explanation for the
delay of over forty-five years. The petition can be rejected by declining
to exercise discretion in favour of the petitioners only on this count.
Further, a provision though constitutional when enacted, may with passage
:-I of time become unconstitutional, but the said principle has no applicability
-
EXPRESS PUBLICATIONS (MADURAI) LTD. v. U.0.1.
1101
-
to the present case. 11114-C)
A
4. In spreading information, the employees of newspaper industry
play a dominant role and considering the employees of newspaper industry
as a 'class', the benefit under the Scheme was extended almost at the same
time when the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees
B
(Condition of Service) and Miscellaneous Provision A;:t, 1955 was enacted.
..,.___
Thus, there can be no question of any adverse effect on the freedom of
press. The financial burden on the petitioners cannot be said to be a 'harsh
treatment'. The contention that now the petitioners are unable to bear the
financial burden, which they have been, bearing· for the last over fortyfive years is wholly irrelevant. It is for the petitioners to manage their c
affairs if they intend to continue with their activity as a newspaper
establishment. [1115-E-F) ·
Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, [1985]
1 SCC 685, Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (1962] 3 SCR 842 and
Bennett Coleman and Co. v. Union of India, [1972] 2 SCC 788, referred to. D
5. The definition of 'newspaper employee' in Section 2 of the
Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Condition of
Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955 takes into its fold all the
',.
employees who are employed to do any work in, or in relation to, any
newspaper establishment. To provide social welfare legislation and grant E
benefit, a beginning had to be made somewhere without embarking on
---
similar legislation in relation to other industries. The fact that even after
about. half a century similar benefit has not been extended to the employees
of any other industry will not result in invalidation of the benefit given to
the employees of the press industry. It is, therefore, not possible to accept F
the contention of the petitioner that the impugned provision is violative
of Article 14 on the ground that it singles out newspaper industry by
excluding income test only in regard to the said industry.
[1120-H; 1121-A-B]
Express Newspapers (Private) Ltd. v. Union of India, [1959] SCR 12, G
relied on.
Budhan Chaudhry v. State of Bihar, [1955] 1 SCR 1045, referred to.
-
Chiranjit Lal Chowduri v. Union of India, [1950] SCR 869, State of
Bombay v. F.N. Balsara, (1951] SCR 682, State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali H
1102
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2004] 2 S.C.R.
A Sarkar, [1952] SCR 284, Kathi Raning Rawat v. State of Saurashtra, [1952)
SCR 435, Lachmandas Kewa/aram Ahuja v. State of Bombay, (1952) SCR
710, Quasbn Razvi v. State of Hyderabad, (1953) SCR 581 and Habeeb
Mohamad v. State of Hyderabad, [1953) SCR 661, cited.
6. Apart from the fact that it may not be always possible to grant
B to everyone all the benefits in one go at the same time, it seems that the
impugned provision and the enacting of the Working Journalists and
Other Newspaper :t):mployees (Condition of Service) and Miscellaneous
Provisions Act, 1955 was part of a package deal and that probably is the
reason for other newspaper establishments not challenging it and the
C petitioners also challenging it only after a lapse of so many years. Further,
Sections 2(i), 4 and Schedule I of the Employees' Provident Funds and
Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, show how gradually the scope of the
Act has been expanded b:y the Central Government and the Act and the
Scheme made applicable to various branches of industries. From whatever
angle that one may examine, the attack on the constitutional validity based
D on Article 14 cannot be accepted. (1121-C-D]
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (C) No. 59 of2001.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.)
E
Anil B. Dewan, B. Raghavan, Ms. Nina Gupta, Mrs. Vanita Bhargav
and Ms. Bina Gupta for the Petitioners.
N. N. Goswami, S.W.A. Qadri and B.V. Bairam Das for the Respondents.
Arun Kathpalia, Amit Dhupar, Anant Kumar and Pradeep K. Baskhi
F for Intervenor.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Y.K. SABHARW AL, J. In this petition filed under Article 32 of the
Constitution of India challenge is to the constitutionality of paragraph 80(2)
G of the Employees' Provident Fund Scheme, 1952. The effect of the impugned
paragraph is that the employees of newspaper industry, for the purposes of
provident fund scheme, do not fall in the category of excluded employees
despite their pay being above prescribed amount as notified by Government
of India from time to time.
H
In order to appreciate the question involved, it is necessary to examine
--
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EXPRESS PUBLICATIONS (MADURAI) LTD. v. U.0.1. [SABHARWAL., J.]l} 03
certain provisiorts of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous A
Provisions Act, 1952 (for short, 'the PF Act').
The PF Act was passed by the Parliament in the year 1952 to, inter
alia, provide for the institution of provident fund for employees in factories
and other establishments. Sub-section (3) of Section 1, inter alia, provides
that the Act applies to every establishment which is a factory engaged in any B
industry specified in Schedule I and in which twenty or more persons are
employed and to any other establishment employing twenty or more persons
or class of such establishments which the Central Government may, by
notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf. The expression
"basic wages" is defined in Section 2(b) and the expression "scheme" in C
Section 2(1). 'Scheme' means the Employees' Provident Fund Scheme framed
under Section 5 of the PF Act. The Central Government has been empowered
to add to Schedule-I any other industry in respect of the employees whereof
it is of opinion that a provident fund scheme should be framed under the Act
and thereupon the industry so added shall be deemed to be an industry specified
in Schedule I for the purposes of the Act. Section 5, inter a/ia, provides that D
the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, frame
a Scheme to be called the Employees' Provident Fund Scheme for the
establishment of provident funds under the Act for employees or for any
class of employees and specify the establishments or class of establishments
to which the said Scheme shall apply and there shall be established as soon E
as may be after the framing of the Scheme, a Fund in accordance with the
provisions of the Act and the Scheme.
In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 5 of the PF Act, the
Central Government framed the Employees' Provident Fund Scheme, 1952
(for short, 'the Scheme'). The employees to whom the provisions of the F
Scheme and the Act would not apply are defined as "excluded employee" in
paragraph 2(f) of the Scheme. The said paragraph to the extent relevant for
present purposes reads as under :
"2(f) 'excluded employee' means -
(i) ...
(ii) an employee whose pay at the time he is otherwise entitled to
become a member of the Fund, exceeds six thousand and five
hundred rupees per month;
G
Explanation. - 'Pay' includes basic wages with dearness H
A
1104
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2004] 2 S.C.R.
allowance, retaining allowance (if any) and cash value of food
concessions admissible thereon;
The income ceiling mentioned in paragraph 2(f)(ii) has been substituted
and suitably increased from time to time by issue of notification by the
Central Government having regard to the fall in money value and increase in
B wages. The ceiling of Rs. 6,500 per month· was fixed by notification dated
4th May, 2001 w.e.f. 1st June, 2001. Earlier to 1st June, 2001, it was Rs.5,000
per month. Originally, an employee whose pay exceeded Rs.300 per month
was placed into the category of an 'excluded employee'. In 1957, the pay
ceiling was increased to Rs. 500 per month; in 1962, it was increased from
C Rs. 500 to Rs. 1,000; in 1976, it was increased from 1,000/- to Rs. l,600; in
1985, it was increased from 1,600 to Rs. 2,500; in 1990, it was increased
from Rs. 2,500 to Rs. J,500, in 1994, it was increased from Rs. 3,500 to Rs.
5,000; and lastly to Rs. 6,500 in the year 200 I.
In so far as the employees of the newspaper industries are concerned,
D they have not been included in the category of 'excluded employee' for the
last more than 47 years. By notification dated 4th December, 1956 issued by
the Central Government, Chapter X was inserted in the scheme incorporating
therein special provisions in the case of newspaper establishments and
newspaper employees. Paragraph 80 thereof, substituted the definition of
expression 'excluded employee' in relation to its application to newspaper
E establishments and newspaper employees. The relevant part of Paragraph 80
reads as follows :
F
G
H
"80. Special provisions in the case of newspaper establishment
and employees. The Scheme shall, in its application to newspaper
establishments and newspaper employees, as defined in Section 2 of
the Working Journalists (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous
Provisions Act, 1955, come into force on the 31st day of December,
1956 and be subject to the modifications mentioned below:
(I) In Chapters I to IX, references to 'industry', 'factories' and
'employees' shall be construed as references to 'newspaper
industry', 'newspaper establishments' and 'newspaper
employees', respectively:
(2) 'excluded employee' means, -
(i)
an employee who, having been a member of the Fund, has
withdrawn the full amount of his accumulations in the Fund
..
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EXPRESS PUBLICATIONS (MADURAI) LTD. v. U.0.1. [SABHARWAL, J.]l J 05
under clause (a) or (c) of sub-paragraph (I) of paragraph 69; A
(ii) an apprentice .
Explanation. - 'Apprentice' means a person who, according to
the standing orders applicable to the newspaper establishment
concerned, is an apprentice or who is declared to be an apprentice
by the authority specified in this behalf by the appropriate B
Government."
The aforesaid paragraph came into force on 31st December, 1956.
Therefore, since the said date, instead of paragraph 2(f), the employees of the
newspaper establishments have a separate and distinct definition. The effect C
of definition as contained in the impugned paragraph 80(2) is that since
I 956, the income ceiling has not been applied to the employees of newspaper
establishments. The result is that newspaper establishments and newspaper
employees do not come in the category of 'excluded employee'. In other
words, irrespective of pay, all such employees are entitled to the benefit of
the scheme.
D
The main attack of the petitioners to the constitutional validity of
Paragraph 80(2) is that only in case of employees of newspaper industry, the
test of income has been excluded by keeping the newspaper establishments
and employees as a class apart which is wholly discriminatory. There is no
rationale or valid basis for artificially treating newspaper establishments and E
employees as a distinct class so as to make them ineligible on the basis of
income ceiling. The impugned definition of 'excluded employee' in paragraph
80(2) suffers from the vice of arbitrariness and offends Article 14 of the
Constitution of India apart from imposing a serious financial burden only on
newspaper establishments. According to the petitioners, there is no valid
basis to single out newspaper establishments for additional burden.
F
The petitioners have tried to explain that though the impugned provision
came into effect in 1956, they tried to bear the burden with equanimity and
with a certain sense of rectitude but, with passage of years, there has been
severe setback to the newspaper industry in general and the petitioners' G
organization in particular and, therefore, this challenge at this stage. In this
regard, it has been pointed out that the recent trends have witnessed a recession
of several financial crises in newspaper industry as a result of decline in their
revenue from advertisements because of diversion of advertisements to
electronic media. The inroads made by Television is said to have taken the
sheen off the print media. In any case, delay in such matters, when H
1106 .
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2004] 2 S.C.R.
A constitutional validity is in issue, cannot be of any consequences, is the
submission of Anil Dewan, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioners. It
has been further submitted that the mere fact that other newspaper
organizations have not challenged the impugned provision is also of no
consequence.
B
In order to appreciate the challenge in question, it is also necessary to
examine certain provisions of the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper
Employees (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955
(for short, 'the Working Journalists Act').
The Working Journalists Act was enacted to regulate certain conditions
C of service of working Journalists and other persons employed in the newspaper
establishments. "Newspaper Employee" means any working journalist, and
includes any other person employed to do any work in, or in relation to, any
newspaper establishment [Sec.2(c)]. The expression 'newspaper establishment'
is defined in Section 2(d). The expression 'non-journalist newspaper employee'
D is defined in Section 2( dd). The working journalists and those who are not
journalists but are employed to do any work in, or in relation to, any newspaper
establishment, are newspaper employees. Chapter II of the Working Journalists
Act, inter alia, deals with conditions of service of working journalists,
incorporating therein special provisions in respect of certain cases of
retrenchment, payment of.gratuity, hours of work, leave, fixation or revision
E of rates of wages, constitution of a Wage Board, Tribunal etc. Chapter IIA,
inter alia, provides for fixation or revision of rates of wages of non-journalist
newspaper employees, constitution of Wage Board for fixing or revising their
rates of wages, constitution of Tribunal etc. Section 15 of the Working
Journalists Act, inter alia, stipulates that the PF Act, ;:is in force for the time
p being, shall apply to every newspaper establishment in which twenty or more
persons are employed on any day, as if such newspaper establishment were
a factory to which the aforesaid Act had been applied by a notification of the
Central Government under sub-section (3) of Section l thereof, and as if a
newspaper employee were an employee within the meaning of that Act. The
applicability_ of the PF Act to the employees of the newspaper establishments
G is not in issue. The issue here is about not subjecting the employees of the
newspaper establishments to income ceiling whereas employees of all other
establishments and industries to which the PF Act is applicable, are subjected
to income ceiling.
H
The Constitutional validity of certain provisions of the Working
-
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EXPRESS PUBLICATIONS (MADURAI) LTD. v. U.0.1. [SABHARWAL . .l.]1107
Journalists Act was examined in the celebrated decision of the Constitution A
Bench in Express Newspapers (Private) Ltd. and Anr. v. The Union of India
and Ors., [1959] SCR 12, and one of the questions was about violation of
equality clause. We will revert to the said decision a little later.
The contention is that the impugned provision which applies exclusively
to the employees of newspaper industry suffers from the vice of arbitrariness B
because there is no rational or distinctive basis for culling out a separate class
called "newspaper establishment and newspaper employees" and to provide
for a harsher and more financially crippling measure by providing a special
definition thereby totally eliminating the income test. There is no valid
classification to split the employers into newspaper organizations and non- C
newspaper organizations for different and discriminatory treatment in the
matter of Provident Fund Contribution. It has also been contended that as a
matter of fact the extent of financial power available to newspaper industry
is much less than many other industries like Steel, Heavy Engineering and
other cash rich industries and if, at all, there is a case for providing a lesser
burden it is newspaper industry which deserves it as a class. Instead of that, D
a heavy burden has been imposed upon a weaker section of the industries,
viz., newspaper industry. The petitioners have also faintly suggested violation
of right of freedom of speech and expression as guaranteed under Article
19(l)(a) contending that in view of additional burden, it becomes very difficult
to maintain price line by keeping the price of the newspaper at certain level E
without increasing it and even a marginal increase would affect the number
of readers, particularly, in a country like India with a large number of
economically weaker sections. This reduction in the access of newspapers to
the members of the public is a matter that is fraught with serious consequences
because it not merely affects the fundamental rights of the petitioners to
disseminate the news freely but it also affects the right of the members of the F
public to know, which is the essence of democracy. The contention is that
any action which has effect of increasing the price of newspaper has very
serious ramifications. It is claimed that the effect of the impugned provision
is to place additional financial burden which is hardly conducive to the
furtherance of the freedom of press and there is no warrant for providing
harsh· special impositions which are not applicable to other business G
organizations. The continuation of such a definition year after year would
result in petitioners' totally going out of business since the amount involved
have become astronomical.
The stand of the respondent in brief is that having regard to various H
1108
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2004] 2 S.CR.
A considerations concerning newspaper establishments, the Government has
distinguished the said establishments from non-newspaper establishments.
The impugned provision is a welfare legislation made for the welfare of the
employees of the newspaper establishments so as to cover a wider range of
employees and grant to them the benefit of the beneficial legislation. Such a
legislation is in furtherance of the freedoi;n of press enshrined in Article
B 19(l)(a) of the Constitution oflndia. The Journalist and the rersons working
in the newspaper establishments fonn as much integral part of freedom of
press as the establishment itself and it is to promote and protect the journalist
and other employees of newspaper establishments who also fonn the bed
rock of freedom of spe~ch and expression that the benefit of Provident Fund
C to even those who draw higher pay has been extended.
Undoubtedly, the employees of the newspaper establishments are in a
better position than the employees of other establishments and industries
since the newspaper employees, without any income ceiling limit, are entitled
to the benefits the PF Act and the Scheme. That has been the position for the
D last nearly half a century. On the other hand, right since inception of the PF
Act, the benefit of the Scheme has been denied to those employees who have
more than specified income. The benefit has been extended to weaker sections
of employees of other establishments and industries and not to all sections.
The income ceiling has been .amended by notifications issued from time to
E time as already noticed.
F
G
H
The question for detennination also is whether this benefit given to the
employees of newspaper industry in the year 1956 and continuing till date
can be challenged at this stage after lapse of so many years by only one of
the newspaper establishments in the country.
The principles under Article 14 of the Constitution are well settled. It
is not necessary to burden this judgment with various decisions on the subject
of arbitrariness and the classification, except to notice the principles laid In
Re The Special Courts Bill, 1978 [1979] I SCC 381 as under:
"(5) By the process of classification, the State has the power of
determining who should be regarded as a class for purposes of
legislation and in relation to a law enacted on a particular subject.
This power, no doubt, in some degree is likely to produce some
inequality; but if a law deals with the liberties of a number of welldefined classes, it is not open to the charge of denial of equal protection ···-
on the ground that it has no application to other persons. ClassificatiQn
-
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~-
' --
EXPRESS PUBLICATIONS (MADURAI) LTD. v. U.0.1. [SABHARWAL. J.D 109
thus means segregation in classes which have a systematic relation,
usually found in common properties and characteristics. It postulates
a rational basis and does not mean herding together of certain persons
and classes arbitrarily.
(6) The law can make and set apart the classes according to the needs
and exigencies of the society and as suggested by experience. It can
recognise even degree of evil, but the classification should never be
arbitrary, or evasive.
(7) The classification must not be arbitrary but must be rational, that
is to say, it must not only be based on some qualities or characteristics
which are to be found in all the persons grouped together and not in
others who are left out but those qualities or characteristics must have
a reasonable relation to the object of the legislation. In order to pass
the test, two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (1) that the
classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which
distinguishes those that are grouped together from others and (2) that
differentia must have a rationa,l relation to the object sought to be
achieved by the Act.
(8) The differentia which is the basis of the classification and the
object of the Act are distinct things and what is necessary is that there
must be a nexus between them. In short, while Article 14 forbids
class discrimination by conferring privileges a imposing liabilities
upon persons arbitrarily selected out of a large number of other persons
similarly situated in relation to the privileges sought to be conferred
or the liabilities proposed to be imposed, it does not forbid
classification for the purpose of legislation, provided such classification
is not arbitrary in the sense above mentioned."
We will now examine other cases on which reliance has been placed by
Mr. Anil Dewan in support of challenge to the impugned provision.
A
B
c
D
E
F
Motor General Traders and Anr. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors.
[1984) l sec 222:· has been relied in support of the contention that the mere G
fact that the discrimination is allowed to be continued for a long time is not
a ground to dispel the attack and also that what may have been once a nondiscriminatory piece of legislation, in course of time, can become
discriminatory. Motor General Traders' case is a case under Rent Laws where
challenge was to the constitutional validity of clause (b) of Section 32 of H
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(2004] 2 S.C.R.
A Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960
which exempts all buildings constructed on and after 26th August, 1957 from
the operation of the Act. The provision was enacted to provide an incentive
to the house building activity to meet the shortage of accommodation and
encourage new constructions. The effect of the impugned provision was that
the Act was not to apply to any building constructed on and after 26th
B August, 1957. Earlier, when the constitutionality of the said provision was
questioned before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh on the ground that it
violated Article 14 of the Constitution, the petition was dismissed by the
High Court [Chintapalli Achaiah v. P. Gopalakrishna Reddy, AIR (1966) AP
51] observing that the hardship caused to the tenants by the exemption given
C in the case of buildings constructed after 26th August, 1957 was short-lived
and the concession should be tolerated for a short while. This Court noticed
that the exemption had continued for more than a quarter of a century and
~e landlords who earned their exemption under Section 32(b) had continued
to enjoy for a long number of years the freedom to indulge in malpractices
which the Act intended to check while others are governed by the Act.
D
In view of Section 32(b) of the Andhra Pradesh Act, there were two
sets of buildings in every area in which the Act applied (I) those to which
the Act applied; and (2) those which are exempted under Section 32(b). It
was noticed that the buildings to which the Act was applicable are aged more
E than 26 years and those to which it was not applicable are aged about 26
years or less. During these 26 years from August 26, 1957, thousands of
buildings may have been constructed and all of them are continuing to enjoy
the immunity from the provisions of the Act. It was contended in that case
that the result was that there were two class of landlords one class governed
by the Act and the other not. There were also two class of tenants as wellF one having the protection of the remedial provision of the Rent Act and the
other not having such protection. The contention that was urged in support
of challenge to the constitutional validity of Section 32 (b) was that whatever
may have been the position in the first few years, after the Act was passed,
there is no justification for continuing the exemption for all time to come. It
was observed that the object of granting exemption was only to provide an
G incentive to the building activity and also that even the State Government
was not quite satisfied with the existing law. The question of discrimination
was determined having regard to these factors. The classification of buildings
for purposes of Section 32(b) was held not to have satisfied the true tests of
classification. It was observed that while it may be that there is some
H justification for exempting new buildings say which are five, seven or ten
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EXPRESS PUBLICATIONS (MADURAI) LTD. v. U.0.1. [SABHARWAL. J.Jl J 11
years old from the Act, in order to provide an incentive to builders of new A
buildings, there is hardly any justification to allow buildings which were
constructed more than ten years ago to remain outside the scope of the Act.
The landlords of such buildings, it was noticed, must have realized a large
part of investment made on such buildings by way of rents during all these
years. The Court took into account that owing to continuous influx of B
population into urban areas in recent years the rates of rents have gone up
everywhere and that the landlords of such buildings have been able to take
advantage of the situation created by the shortage of urban housing
accommodation which is now a universal phenomenon. Under these
circumstances, it was held that there was no longer any need to continue the
exemption. It was said that there cannot be any valid justification to apply the C
Act to a building which was 27 years old and not to apply it in the case of
a building which is 26 years old. It was held that the classification of buildings
into two classes for purposes of Section 32(b) of the Act, therefore, does not
any longer bear any relationship to the object, since the buildings which are
exempted have already come into existence and their owners have realised a
major part of their investment.
D
In Motor General Traders' case, two answers were given to the
contention that since the impugned provision has been in existence for over
23 years and its validity has once been upheld by the High Court, this Court
should not pronounce upon its validity at this late stage. First, the very fact E
that nearly 23 years are over from the date of enactment and the discrimination.
is allowed to be continued unjustifiably for such a long time is a ground of
attack pointing out that what should have been just an incentive has become
a permanent bonanza in favour of those who constructed building subsequent
to August 26, 1957; there being no justification for the continuance of the
benefit to a class of persons without any rational basis whatsoever, the evil F
effects flowing from the impugned exemption have caused more harm to the
society than one could anticipate. What was justifiable during a short period
has turned out to be a case of hostile discrimination by lapse of nearly a
quarter of century. The second answer given was that mere a lapse of time
does not lend constitutionality to a provision which is otherwise bad.
Rattan Arya and Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu and Anr., [1986] 3 SCC
385 again is a decision in which a provision of the Rent Act exempting from
protection of the Act residential buildings paying monthly rent exceeding Rs.
G
400 whereas no such restriction was imposed in respect of tenants of nonresidential buildings was struck down being violative of Article 14, following H
I I I 2
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[2004] 2 S.C.R.
A the Motor General Traders' case (supra).
In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and
Anr., [ 1998] 2 SCC I challenge was to the validity of certain provisions of
the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 insofar
the same provided that the landlords cannot charge rent in excess of the
B standard rent. It was held that there is considerable judicial authority for the
proposition that with the passage of time, a legislation which was justified
when enacted may become arbitrary and unreasonable with the change of
circumstances. A three Judge Bench said that :
c
D
"It is true that whenever a special provision, like the Rent Control
Act, is made for a section of the society it may be at the cost 'of
another section, but the making of such a provision or enactment rriay
be necessary in the larger interest of the society as a whole but the
benefit which is given initially if continued results in increasing
injustice to one section of the society and an unwarranted largess or
windfall to another, without appropriate corresponding relief, then
the continuation of such a law which necessarily, or most likely,
leads to increase in lawlessness and undermines the authority of the
law can no longer be regarded as being reasonable. Its continuance
becomes arbitrary."
E
None of the aforesaid decisions, in our view, have any applicability to
the case in hand for various reasons. The aforesaid decisions were concerned
with validity of provisions which intended to grant only a temporary benefit
having regard to the prevailing conditions but were continued for long number
of years without review of change of conditions and as purpose had been
achieved, the provisions were held to be violative of equality clause. Further,
F after coming to the conclusion as above that the impugned provisions have
become discriminatory, this Court rejected the contention that since the
provisions had been unsuccessfully challenged earlier and held the field for
a long time, the same do not deserve to be invalidated. In the present case
it is not the contention that only temporary relief was granted to the employees
of the newspaper industry. Apart from this, the employees of newspaper
G industry have always been treated as a class apart, an aspect which we have
dealt in later part of the judgment. Moreover, the mere fact that the similar
benefit even after lapse of about half a century has not been given to the
employees of other industries will not make the benefit given to the newspaper
industry discriminatory. The principle that a provision which may be
H constitutional when enacted may become unconstitutional later due to changed
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EXPRESS PUBLICATIONS (MADURAI) LTD. v. U.0.1. [SABHARWAL. J.p 113
scenario, has no applicability whatsoever to the present case.
A
Undoubtedly, the classification cannot be arbitrary. It has to be rational
and must have a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved. The
classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia. There is no
difficulty in accepting these principles relied upon by Mr. Dewan. The
difficulties generally do not arise in formation of principles under Article 14. B
--
But at times, difficulties do arise in the application of such principles to
concrete cases.
We may also notice the aspect of long delay in laying challenge to the
validity of the impugned provisions. No hard and fast principle can be laid C
down that under no circumstances delay would be a relevant consideration in
judging constitutional validity of a provision. It has to be remembered that
tQ.e constitutional remedy under Article 32 is discretionary. In one case, this
Court ~ay decline discretionary relief if person aggrieved has slept over for
long number of years. In another case, depending upon the nature of violation,
court may ignore delay and pronounce upon the invalidity of a provision. It D
will depend from case to case. In Rabindra Nath Bose and Ors. v. Union of
India and Ors., [1970] 2 SCR 697, the extreme proposition that this court has
no discretion and cannot dismiss a petition under Article 32 on the ground
that it has been brought after inordinate delay, was not accepted by the
Constitution Bench. The plea to reconsider law laid down in Mis. Ti/okchand
and Motichand and Ors. v. HB. Munshi and Anr., [1969] 1 SCC 110 did not E
succeed. It was held that:
"But after carefully considering the matter, we are of the view that no
relief should be given to petitioners who, without any reasonable
explanation, approach this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution F
after inordinate delay.