# FARID AHMED ABDUL SAMAD & ANR v. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF AHMEDABAD & ANR

- **Citation:** [1977] 1 S.C.R. 71
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1976-07-29
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 431 of 1976
- **Bench:** Y. V. Cuandrachud, P. K. Goswami, P. N. Shinghal
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/farid-ahmed-abdul-samad-anr-v-municipal-corporation-of-the-city-of-ahmedabad-anr-6954
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

B
Bombay Provincial Municipal Cdrporations 1ct, as applied in
Gujarat
<(Born-' 59' of 1949), s. 284N-App/icabi!ity of s. SA, Land Acquisition Act.
Land Acquisition Act (1 of 1894), s. SA-If mandatory-Effect of nonJ
-compliance in case of beneficial scheme§.
Section 284 (I) of Chapter VI of the
Bombay
Provincial
Municipal
Corporations Act, 1949, as applied in Gujarat, provides that if the Corporation
C
is satisfied that within any area in any part of a city under the Act it is
expedient to provide housing accommodabion for the poorer classes, it shall
cause such area to be defined on a plan and pass a resolution authorising the
Commissioner ahd the Commissioner shal11 thereupon be empowered to provide
such accommodation. Section 284J(a) provides that the Commissioner may, for
such purposes, acquire any land including any buildings thereon. Section 284K ( 1)
provides that the Commissioner may, with the sanction of the Standing Committee, be authorised to acquire the land by means of a compulsory acquisition
order made and submitted to the State Govern.rnent and confirmed by it in
D
accordance with the provisions of Schedule C to the Act; ~d s. 284K(3)
provides that the provisions of Schedule B to the Act shall have effect with
respect to the validity and date of operation of the compulsory acquisition
order. Clause 2, Schedule C, provides that before submitting the order to the
State Government the Commissioner has to publish the order in the Official
'G>zette and in three or more newspapers. The Commissioqer · has also to
serve on persons specified in cl. 2(b) notices calling for objections etc. Clause 3
provides that upon compliance with the provisions of els. 1 and 2 the CommisE
sioner shall submit to the Standing Committee any objections received under cl. 2
and any suggestions he may wish to make in that respect.
Under , cl. 4, the
Standing Committee shall, after consideration of any such objections ind suggestions, make such modification in respect of such order ats it may think fit
and the Commissioner shall thereafter submit the order, as modified by the
Standing Committe~. to the State Government for confirmation.
Clause 2 of
Schedule B provides for an appeal to a Judge of the City Civil <:Court in
Ahmedabad and elsewhere to a Judge of the District Court against the order
of acquisition confirmed by the State Government. Section 284N referentially
F
incorporates in the Bombay Act certain provisions of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894, as detailed in Appendix I to the Bombay Act. Accordingly all the sections
in Part II of the Land •cquisition Act, except s. 4(1), s. 6 and s. 17(2)
are bodily incorporated in the Bombay Act. Hence, s. SA of the Land Acquisition
Act, which provide!> for personal hearing of the objectors to an acquisition, forms
part of the Bombay Act.
Jn pursuance of the authority of the Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad
G
the Commissioner passed an order of compulsory acquisition under s. -284J
published it in the Official Gazette and in local newspapers, and served individual
notices on the concerned parties. The appellants, who objected to the acguisition
were however, not given any personal hearing by tfue Commissioner in spite
of a request by them. The Commissioner submitted the objections with hi'
suggestions, to the Standing Committee, and the Committee approved the order
of compulsory acquisition. The State Government thereafter confirmed the
order .. The appellants preferred an appeal to the City Civil ·court on the basis,
inter alia, of the denial of personal hearing to them;
but the
Court held
H
that the principles of natural justice were saisfied, and the High Court confirmed
the order of the City Civil Court.
Allowing the appeal to this Court,
A
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72
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1977] 1 S.C.R.
HELD : Section 5A, Land Acquisition Act, is app1icable in the present case.
It is not a case of failure of the rules of natural justice but one of noncompliance with the mandatory provision in s.

## Text

FARID AHMED ABDUL SAMAD & ANR.
v.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF
AHMEDABAD & ANR.
July 29, 1976
71
A
[Y. V. CUANDRACHUD, P. K. GOSWAMI AND P. N. SHINGHAL, JJ.]
B
Bombay Provincial Municipal Cdrporations 1ct, as applied in
Gujarat
<(Born-' 59' of 1949), s. 284N-App/icabi!ity of s. SA, Land Acquisition Act.
Land Acquisition Act (1 of 1894), s. SA-If mandatory-Effect of nonJ
-compliance in case of beneficial scheme§.
Section 284 (I) of Chapter VI of the
Bombay
Provincial
Municipal
Corporations Act, 1949, as applied in Gujarat, provides that if the Corporation
C
is satisfied that within any area in any part of a city under the Act it is
expedient to provide housing accommodabion for the poorer classes, it shall
cause such area to be defined on a plan and pass a resolution authorising the
Commissioner ahd the Commissioner shal11 thereupon be empowered to provide
such accommodation. Section 284J(a) provides that the Commissioner may, for
such purposes, acquire any land including any buildings thereon. Section 284K ( 1)
provides that the Commissioner may, with the sanction of the Standing Committee, be authorised to acquire the land by means of a compulsory acquisition
order made and submitted to the State Govern.rnent and confirmed by it in
D
accordance with the provisions of Schedule C to the Act; ~d s. 284K(3)
provides that the provisions of Schedule B to the Act shall have effect with
respect to the validity and date of operation of the compulsory acquisition
order. Clause 2, Schedule C, provides that before submitting the order to the
State Government the Commissioner has to publish the order in the Official
'G>zette and in three or more newspapers. The Commissioqer · has also to
serve on persons specified in cl. 2(b) notices calling for objections etc. Clause 3
provides that upon compliance with the provisions of els. 1 and 2 the CommisE
sioner shall submit to the Standing Committee any objections received under cl. 2
and any suggestions he may wish to make in that respect.
Under , cl. 4, the
Standing Committee shall, after consideration of any such objections ind suggestions, make such modification in respect of such order ats it may think fit
and the Commissioner shall thereafter submit the order, as modified by the
Standing Committe~. to the State Government for confirmation.
Clause 2 of
Schedule B provides for an appeal to a Judge of the City Civil <:Court in
Ahmedabad and elsewhere to a Judge of the District Court against the order
of acquisition confirmed by the State Government. Section 284N referentially
F
incorporates in the Bombay Act certain provisions of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894, as detailed in Appendix I to the Bombay Act. Accordingly all the sections
in Part II of the Land •cquisition Act, except s. 4(1), s. 6 and s. 17(2)
are bodily incorporated in the Bombay Act. Hence, s. SA of the Land Acquisition
Act, which provide!> for personal hearing of the objectors to an acquisition, forms
part of the Bombay Act.
Jn pursuance of the authority of the Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad
G
the Commissioner passed an order of compulsory acquisition under s. -284J
published it in the Official Gazette and in local newspapers, and served individual
notices on the concerned parties. The appellants, who objected to the acguisition
were however, not given any personal hearing by tfue Commissioner in spite
of a request by them. The Commissioner submitted the objections with hi'
suggestions, to the Standing Committee, and the Committee approved the order
of compulsory acquisition. The State Government thereafter confirmed the
order .. The appellants preferred an appeal to the City Civil ·court on the basis,
inter alia, of the denial of personal hearing to them;
but the
Court held
H
that the principles of natural justice were saisfied, and the High Court confirmed
the order of the City Civil Court.
Allowing the appeal to this Court,
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
72
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1977] 1 S.C.R.
HELD : Section 5A, Land Acquisition Act, is app1icable in the present case.
It is not a case of failure of the rules of natural justice but one of noncompliance with the mandatory provision in s. 5A; and since no personal hearing
had been given to the appellants by the Commisisoner, the order of acquisition
and the confirmation by the State Government are invalid. [78 G-HJ
(1) The incorporated provisions of the Land Acquisition Act are subject to
the provisions of Chap. XVI of the Bombay Act; that is, if there is any inconsistency between a provision in Chap. XVI of the Bombay Act, and that of the
Land Acquisition Act, the former will prevail.
But there is no express provision
of the Chapter ousting the application of s. 5A of the Land Acquisition Act.
[76 D-E]
.
(2) Schedule C does not. even by necessary implication, rule out the right
to personal hearing.
On the other hand, since the Standing Committee is
entitled to have the Commissioner's properly considered suggestions which may
enable it even to modify the order of acquisition, it is necessary that the
Commissioner ~ives a personal hearing to the objectors before he makes his
suggestions worthy in the context of the objections lodged, for otherwise, his
suggestion~ will be devoid of much! practical utility to Committee. [77 C-DJ
(3) The appeal provided for under Schedule B is not a substitute for the
right to personal hearing.
The applicability of s. 5A is therefore not impliedly
ousted by the provision for appeal. [78 DJ
The appeal contemplated under Schedule B is only with regard ·:o the
examination of two aspects, namely, whether the order or approval nf the
plan is within the powers of the Bombay. Act; and whether the interests of the
appellant have been substantially prejudiced by any requirement of the Bt>mbay
Act not having been complied with.
But there may be other relevant objf ctions
which a person may be entitled to take before the Commissioner whrn the
whole matter is at large, such as, that the land is not suitable for the particular
purpose, that he himself belongs to a poor class and weuld suffer disadv:mtage
by the acquisition, or that there is a good alternative land available which
can be acquired without causing inconvenience to the occupants of land sought
to be acquired.
Hence, a personal hearing is necessary.
The appellate court
is not required to entertain such objections in view of its truncated scope and,
even assuming that all such objections could be entertained by it, the duty
of hearing objections under the Bombay Act is of the Commissioner ar d he
alone can hear them and not a Judge of the Civil Court. The acqui;ition
order muss be a valid order and the question of appeal arises only 1fter,
cohfirmation of such an order by the State Governme.nt. [77 G-H; 78 A. DJ
Shri Mandir Sita Ramji
v.
Lt. Gorernor of Delhi, [1975] 1 SCR 597
referred to.
( 4) Merely because Ul).der s. 284N ( 4) of the Bombay Act the acqui' ition
is treated to be under s. 17 (1), Land Acquisition Act, and since s. 17 (' ·) is
also applicable it could not be said that s. 5A is excluded by necessary imr lication; because, even under s. 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act the appropriate
Government has to direct, in a case of urgency. that the provisions of s. 5A
shall not apply. There is no automatic exclusion of the section even unde1 the
Land Acquisition Act. [78 E-F]
(5) If the order of acquisition is, at inception invalid, its invalidity ca mot
be cured by its approval by the Standing Committee or by its confirmatior by
the State Government. [79 Al
(6) The end does not always justify the means, and even beneficial schemes
under welfare legislation have to be executed in accordance with the approp1iate
law. It is no answer that the object of the scheme is such that it just'fies
the implementer of the Jaw to be absolutely oblivious of the . manner of
enforcement even though the manner is an integral part of the scheme, imprn:ing
under law, restrictions on the rights of individuals. [79 CJ
[Beneficial laws have to be simple and self-contained.
The introduction of
provisions of another Act referentially
in
vital
matters
creates
aveidable
difficulties and Irrigation. [79 DJ
FARID AHMED v. MUNICIPAL CORP. (Goswami, J.)
73
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 431 of 1976.
A
(Appeal by Special Leave from the judgment and order dated
31-3-1975 of the Gujarat High Court in Special Civil Application No.
2355 of 1974).
G. L. Sanghi, K. J. John, S. R. Kureshi and D. N. Mishra, for the
appellants.
I. N. Shroff and H. S. Parihar, for Respondent No. 1.
M. N. Shroff, for Respondent No. 2.
The Judgment of tlie Court was delivered by
GOSWAMI, J. The only question that arises in this appeal by special leave is whether the order of acquisition passed by the Municipal
Commissioner under section 284J of the Bombay Provincial Municipal
Corporations Act, 1949, as applicable to Gujarat, is invalid and void
for non-compliance with section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894.
The Municipal Corporation of the city of Ahmedabad (briefiy the
Corporation) by its resolution of December 15, 1966, authorised its
Commissioner under section 2841 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal
Corporations Act 1949 (briefly the Bombay Act) to provide housing
accommodation for the poorer classes.
In pursuance of this authority
of the Corporation the Commissioner passed the impugned order of
compulsory acquisition on October 9, 1967, under section 284J of the
Bombay Act in respect of 33,357 sq. yds. of land final plots Nos. 11
to 25 of Town- Planning Scheme No. V of Dariaput, Kazipur Ward.
Out of this area the land belonging to the appellants measures about
1694 sq. yds. It is averred by the appellants that this area is "predominantly a commercial area and is almost fully built upon".
B
c
D
E
The aforesaid order of compulsory acquisition was published in the
official gazette of January 25, 1968 and in the local newspapers of
February 10/11, 1968. Individual notices were also served on the
F
concerned parties in accordance with law inviting objections from the
owners including the appellants which were lodged in due course.
These objections were submitted to the Standing Committee by the
Commissioner with his suggestions and the Committee by its resolution
No. 1942 of January 21, 1969, approved the said order of compulsory
acquisition.
The State Government thereafter confirmed
the
said
order on January 6, 1972.
G
The appellants had requested for a personal hearing with regard to
their objections and their grievance is that the same was denied to
them.
It is common _ground that no personal hearing w.as given to
the appellants with regard to their objections by the Commissioner.
Even so a period of nearly five years was taken in the process of finalising the order.
H
After confirmation of the order of acquisition by the Government
there is a provision for appeal under Schedule B to the Bombay Act.
7-1003 SCI/76
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74
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1977] 1 s.c.ll.
The appellants preferred an appeal to the City Civil Court at ~meda
bad and amongst several other grounds raised the question of the denial
of personal hearing to them.
The learned Judge of the City Civil
Court did not accede to the contention and by his order of April 10,
1974, held that the principles of natural justice were satisfied in this
case inasmuch as they had been given an opportunity to submit their
objections to the acquisition.
The appellants then took the matter to the High· Court of Gujarat
under article 227 of the Constitution where the same grievance as to
the denial of personal hearing was reiterated.
The High Court by its
order of March 31, 197S refused to interfere with the order holding
that section SA of the Land Acquisition Act was duly complied with.
The High Court also held that the City Civil Court Judge was right in
rejecting the submission since "no oral hearing was ever claimed in the
objection". Hence this appeal, by special leave, which was ordered
by this Court to be expedited.
From a perusal of the judgment of the City Civil Court as well as
that of the High Court we are of opinion that there was no proper
appraisal of the real issue in the matter. It appears that both the City
Civil Judge and the High Court were only concerned with whether the
rules of natural justice were complied with in the matter of acquisition
of the land in question. We think, as will be shown below, that the
City Civil Court and the High Court arc not right in their approach.
We find that there is reference to section SA of the Land Acquisition Act in the order of the High Court and it is apparently assumed
by the High Court. that the said section is applicable.
All the same
the High Court erroneously thinks that no personal hearing was necessary and the section is fully completed with by mere submission of the
written objection particularly because "no oral hearing
was
ever
claimed".
Mr. Sanghi submits that so far as the appellants are concerned they
did request for a personal hearing and that there is no denial by the
respondents of their averment to that effect in their special leave petition.
The City Civil Judge also noted in his judgment that "some of
the appellants had in terms demanded a personal hearing in their objections memorandum". Be that as it may section SA of the
Land
Acqusition Act does not rest on a person's demand for personal hearing.
The matter may be different if a person whose property is acquired abandons the right to a personal hearing with which aspect we are
not concerned in this appeal.
Although the judgment of the High Court, as stated earlier apparently rests on the asumption that section SA of the Land Acquisition
Act is applicable Mr. Shroff appearing on behalf of the respondents
submits that that section is unavailable in the case of acquisition under
the Bombay Act, Mr. Sanghi also, fairly enough, has not taken advantage of the assumption in the judgment and has submitted by drawing
our attention to the various provisions of the Act that section SA is
clearly attri).cted in a matter of acquisition under the Bombay Act.
( \.
.
.
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FARID AHMED v. MUNICIPAL CORP. (Goswami, J.)
75
We will, now, examine the rival contentions with regard
to the
A
applicability of section SA of the Land Acquisition Act.
The title of Chapter Xv1 of the Act is "Improvement
Schem~"
and opens with section 270.
There are various sub-headings in this
Chapter and we are concerned in this appeal with only a few sections
under the sub-title "Provision of housing accommodtion for the poorer
classes".
This sub-title in the Chapter opens with section 2841 :
B
2841 (1) "If the Corporation, upon consideration of a
representation from the Commissioner or other iriformation
in its possession, is satisfied that within any area in any part
of the City it is expedient to provide housing accommodation
for the poorer classes and that such accommodation can be
conveniently provided
without making an improvemt!nt
scheme, it shall cause such area to be defined on a plan and
pass a resolution authorising the
Commissioner
and the
Commissioner shall thereupon be empowered to provide such
accommodation-"
·
*
*
*
*
*
c
Section 2841 provides that "the Commissioner may for the_ purD
poses of the foregoing section on behalf of the Corporation (a) acquire
any land including any buildings thereon as a site for the erection of
buildings for the poorer classes".
*
*
*
*
*
Section 284K provides as follows :-
284K. (1) "Land for the purposes of the foregoing section may be acquired by the Commissioner by agreement
upon obtaining the requisite sanction under section 77, or he
may, with the sanction of the Standing Committee, be authorised to acquire land for those purposes by means of a compulsory acquisition order made and submtited to the State
Government and confirmed by it in accordance with the provisions of Schedule C to this Act.
*
*
*
*
*
(3) The provisions of Schedule B to this Act shall have
effect with respect to the validity and date of operation of a
compulsory acquisition order made 1;1nder this section".
*
*
*
*
*
The next important section is section 284N which reads as under :-
E
F
G
284N. "The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (in this and the
next succeeding sections referred to as 'the Land Acquisition
Act') shall to the extent set forth in Appendix I regulate and
apply to the acquisition of land under this Chapter, otherwise
H
than by agreement, and shall for that purpose be deemed to
form part of this Chapter in the same manner as if enacted
76
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1977] l S.C.R.
A
in the body thereof, subject to the provisions of this Chapter
and to the provisions following namely :-"
B
G
D
E
F
G
H
*
*
*
*
*
Thus, section 284N referentially incorporates in the Bombay Act
certain provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. as detailed in Appendix I to the Bombay Act.
Out of those provisions we are only concerned with Part II (Acquisition) of the Land Acquisition Act containing sections 4 to 17 including section SA.
According to Appendix
I all the sections in Part II of the Land Acquisition Act except subsection ( 1) of section 4, section 6 and sub-section (2) of section 17
are bodily incorporated in the Bombay Act.
Those provisions _ are
deemed to be part and parcel of the Bombay Act.
Hence section SA
is clearly a part of the Bombay Act in terms of Appendix I.
It is true section 284 N provides that the incorporated provisions
of the Land Acquisition Act are subject to the provisions of Chapter
IXVI and to those contained in section 284N itself.
That is to say,
if there is any inconsistency between a provision in Chapter XVI of the
Bombay Act or in section 284N itself and that in the Land Acquisition
Act, the former will prevail over the graft('.d provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act. This is, however, not to say that where section SA is
deemed to be part of the Bombay Act, there is a further requirement
to show in the Bombay Act an express provision for affording an opportunity of personal hearing. This is the error into which, earlier, the
City Civil Judge fell.
The heart of section SA of the Land Acquisition
Act is the hearing of objections and under sub-section (2) of that
section a personal hearing is mandatorily provided for. When, therefore, section SA of the Land Acquisition Act is applicable under
Appendix I of the Bombay Act and there is nothing to show expressly
or by necessary implication that the said section or any part of it is
excluded under section 284N or under any other provision in Chapter
XVI as a whole the right to personal hearing under the Bombay Act
cannot vanish or be defeated.
Mr. Shroff fairly and, fa our opinion, rightly concedes that there is
no express ouster of section SA of the Land Acquisition Act under the
provisions of Chapter XVI of the Bombay Act. He, however, submits
that there is a special rnachinery under section 284K of the Act disclosed in Schedule C and in Schedule B attached to the Bombay Act
and since section 284N is subject to the provisions of Chapter XVI
these Schedules form part of the Chapter. Assuming that Schedule C
and Schedule B are part of Chapter XVI we are unable to read in the
provisions contained in these two Schedules any exemption from the
right to personal hearing mandatorily required under section SA of the
Land Acquisition Act.
It is true that the mode of acquisition of land for housing accommodation is provided for under section 284K and that the order of compulsory acquisition made by the Commissioner has to be confirmed by
the State Government in accordance with the provisions of Schedule
C to the Bombay Act. Broadly, clause 2 of Schedule C provides that
before submitting the order to the State Government the Commissioner,
FARID AHMED v. MUNICIPAL CORP. (Goswami, J.)
77
inter alia, has to publish the order in the official gazette and in three
or more newspapers. The Commissioner has also to serve on persons
specified in clause 2 (b) notices calling for objections, etc. Clause 3
provides that upon complianc~ with.the pro~isions of ~lauses 1 an~ 2
the Commissioner shall submit to the Standmg Committee any ob1ections received under clause 2 and any suggestions he may wish to make
in that respect.
Under clause 4 tl!e Standing Committee shall after
consideration of any such objections and suggestions make such modification in respect of such order as it may think fit and the Commissioner
shall thereafter submit the order as modified by the Standing Committee to the State Government' for confirmation. It is manifest that the
procedure under the scheme of Schedule C will be breached if the
Commissioner does not afford a personal hearing to the objectors even
in order to be able to fortify his suggestions which he has to submit to
the Standing Committee along with the objections. Since the Standing
Committee is entitled to have his properly considered suggestions which
may enable it even to modify the order of acquisition it is necessary
that the Commissioner gives a personal hearing to the objectors before
he is able to make his suggestions worthy in the context of the objections
lodged. Otherwise it will be only an empty formality and the suggestions will be devoid_of much of practical utility to the Committee.
Schedule C, therefore, does not even by necessary implication rule out
a right to personal hearing.
Clause 2 of Schedule B provides for an appeal to a Judge of the
City Civil Court [n Ahmedabad and elsewhere to a Judge of the
District Court whose decision shall be final. Mr. Shroff submits. that
provision for an appeal against the acquisition order after confirmation
by the State Government provides for appropriate remedy before a
· judicial Tribunal.
This also, says Mr. Shroff, goes to indicate, by
necessary implication, that personal hearing required under section SA
of the Land Acquisition Act is dispensed with and the remedy provided
for under the provisions of the Bombay Act read with the two Schedules is exhaustive and necessarily excludes the application of section
SA of the Land Acquisition Act and with it the right of personal bearing provided thereunder.
We should make it clear that provision for appeal is not a complete
substitute for a personal hearing which is provided for under section
SA of the Land Acquisition Act. This will be evident from a perusal
of clause 3 of Schedule B itself. The character of the appeal contemplated under clause 3 (ii) of Schedule B is only with regard to the
examination of the following aspects :-
( 1) whether the order or approval of the plan is within
the powers of the Bombay Act, and
(2) whether the interests of the appellant have been substantially prejudiced by any requirement of this Act
not having been complied with.
A
B
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G
The appeal is confined under clause 3 of Schedule B to the examinaH
tion of only the twin aspects referred to above. There is no provision
for entertainment of any other relevant objection to the acquisition of
A
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78
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1977] 1 s.c.R.
land. For example a person whose land is acquired may object to the
suitability of the land for the particular purpose acquired.
He may
again show that he will be at an equal disadvantage if his land and
house have to be acquired in order to provide accommodation for the
poorer people as he himself belongs to the same class of the indigent.
He may further show that ther~ is a good alternative land available and
caa be acquired without causing iii.convenience to the occupants of
the houses whose lands and houses are sought to be acqLJired. There
may be other relevant o~jections which a person may be entitled to
take before the Commissioner when the whole matter is at large. The
Commissioner wi11 be in a better position to examine those objections
and consider their weight from all aspects and may even visit the locality
before submitting his report to the Standing Committee with his suggestions.
For this purpose also a personal hearing is necessary.
The
appeal court under the Schedule B to the Bombay Act, on the other
hand, is not required under clause 3 to entertain all kinds of objections
and it-may even refuse to consider the objections mentioned earlier in
view of the truncated scope of the hearing under clause 3(ii) as noted
above.
We are, therefore, unable to accept the submission that the
appeal provided for under Schedule B is a complete substitute for a
right to personal. hearing and as such by necessary implication ousts
the applicability of Section SA of the Land Acquisition Act.
Mr. Shroff further submits that under the Appendix I, inter alia,
section 17 ( 4) of the Land Acquisition Act is made applicable in an
acquisition proceeding under the Bombay Act. It is, therefore, submitted that under section 284N, sub-section ( 4) any acquisition under
the Bombay Act is treated as an acquisition under section 17 ( 1) of the
Land Acquisition Act and since section 17 ( 4) of the Land Acqui.sition
Act is also brought in under the said Appendix, section SA of the Land
Acquisition Act, by necessary implication, should be held as excluded
from· the purview of the Bombay Act. We are unable to accept this
submi~sion. Even under section 17 ( 4) of the Land Acquisition Act
the appropriate Government has to direct, in a case oflurgency, that the
provisions of section SA shall not apply. There is no automatic exclusion of section SA even under the Land Acquisition Act. That being
the position there is no substance in the contention that because of subsection ( 4) of section 284N, section SA should be held inapplicable in
the case of an acquisition proceeding under the Bombay Act.
We arc clearly of opinrion tpat section SA of the Land Acquisition
Act is applicable in the matter of acquisition of land in this case and
since no personal hearing had been given to the appellants by the Commissioner with regard to their written objections the order of acquisition
and the resultant confirmation order of the State Government with
respect to the land of the appellants are invalid under the law and the
same are quashed. It should be pointed out, it is not a case of failure
of the rules of natural justice as such as appeared to be the only concern of the High Court and also of the City CiV!il Court. It is a case of
absolute non-compliance with a mandatory provision under section SA
of the Land Acquisition Act which is clearly applicable in the matter
of acquisition under the Bombay Act.
(
1 '_.
I
\-
FARID AHMED v. MUNICIPAL CORP. (Goswami, J.)
79
We should also point out that the acquisition order must be an
.order valid under the law and the question of appeal arises only after
.confirmation of the order by the State Government. If the order is, at
inception, invalid, its invalidity cannot be cured by its approval of the
Standing Committee or by its confirmation of the State Government.
Besides, hearing of objections under section SA of the Land Acquisition Act to be given by the Commissioner under the Bombay Act cannot be replaced by a kind of appeal hearing by the City Civil Judge.
The Bombay Act having assigned the duty of hearing objections to the
Commissioner, -he alone can hear them and not the City Civil Judge
even assuming that all objections could be entertmined by him in appeal.
{See Shri Mandir Sita Ramji v. Lt. Gov~rnor of Delhi· & Ors.(1)].
Beneficial schemes under welfare legislation have to be executed in
accordance with law which creates the schemes. The end does not
always justify the means and it is no answer that the object of the
scheme is such that it justifies the implementer of the law to be a_bsolutely
oblivious of the manner of enforcement even though the manner is an
integral part of the scheme, imposing under the law, restrictions on the
rights of individuals. Beneficial 'Jaws have to be simple and self-contained.
To introduce provisions of a·nother Act referentially in vital
matters creates avoidable difficulties and litigation highlighted by the
case in hand.
It is refreshing that this Court disposed of this matter within about
four· months of granting. of special leave.
In the result the appeal is allowed and the judgment of the High
Court is set aside' and with it the appellate order of the City Civil Judge
a·lso falls. , The Commissioner shall give a personal hearing to the
.appellants as required under .sub-section (2) of section SA of the Land
Acquisition Act and, ther~after, dispose of the matter in accordance
with Jaw. In the circumstances of the case we will, however, make no
-0rder as to costs in this appeal.
·
V.P.S.
Appeal allowed.
(1) [1975] 1. S.C.R. 597.
A
B
c
D
E