# ff RAM NARAIN MAHTO v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

- **Citation:** [1970] 2 S.C.R. 445
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1969-09-16
- **Bench:** J. C. Shah, V. Ramaswami, A. N. Grover
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/ff-ram-narain-mahto-v-state-of-madhya-pradesh-4841
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

S11/e of (iood.v Act, 1930 . .
~s. 18 and 21-lvfadhya Pradesh Abolition of
Pr1>perty Rights (Es1,1tes, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act I of 1950-Ja~ir
dar St'lling tiniber of specified {!irth tn be cut by buyer froni
standl~lg
rret .~-Jagir restinR in state 1111der }J.P. Act I of 1950--Jf buyer can claun
co111pr'll.\'fttion fo.1• logv not cut fro111 standing trees on date of vesting.
A Jagirdar executed a deed on August 5, 1949 in •favour of the appellant for the sale of logs of a spe<:ified girth to be obtained from cutting
th• trees in his forests.
On February 19, 1951 the Forest Oft!cer of the
r<!ipon<lent State prevented the appellant and the Jagirdar from cuttin11 the
tr.... On the coming into force of the Madhya Pradesh Act I al 1951,
the inlerest of the Jagirda·r in his estate vested in the respondent State.
The appellant instituted a suit in June 1954 against the respnndent State
and the Jagirdar for breach of contract and claimed compensation (i) for
le>g• 11 hicli were cut but which he could not remove; (ii) for logs which
were cut but were. stated to have been lost due to the negligence of the
respondent; and (iii) logs from the standing timber which had not been
cut or could not be cut by the appellant 'from the jagirdar's villages. The
respondent State contested the suit on the ground inter alia that the deed
coul<l not be enforced against it because of the vesting of the Jagir under
the Act in the State and that the contract created a mere personal liability
against the Jai:irdat. The Trial Court granted the appellant a decree for
compensation under all the beads claimed at a rate per log determined by
the Court. The High Court in appeal disallowed the appelhnt's claim
tinder items (ii) and (iii). In appeal to this Court by certificate it wa.
contended on behalf of the appellant that tlte rate of compensation determined was inadequate; that the High Court erred in disallowing compensal!on for the logs which were cut but were lost, and that it had wrongly
disallowed the claim for value cif logs of timber which the appellant was
entitled to, but could not cut because of the restrictions imposed by the
State.
HELD : Dismissing the appeal,
(i) On the evidence, the High Court had rightly disallowed the claim
in rc;pect of logs cut but which were stated to have been lost.
(ii) Where a thing is attached to, or forms part of, land at the time
of the contract and wbich is to be severed by the buyer, under s. 18 of
the Sale of Goods Act the property in the thing passes in the absence of a
contract to the contrary to the buyer on the severance cif the thing from
the land. Again under s. 21 of the Act, even. if there be a contract for
the sale of specific goods, but the seller is obliged under the terms of tile
con~t to do something to the goods for the purposo of putting them iato
a deliverable state, the property passes only when the thing agreed to be
done is done and the buyer is informed thereof. [453 DJ
·
In the present case the. contract by its terms was for the sale of log~
out of trees in the forest with a girth of two feet or more; but the timber
had to be cut and had to be put in a deliverable state.
Before the trees
446
SUPREME COUllT REPORTS
[1970] 2 S.C.lt
were cut and the logs
appropriated to the contract, the estate of the
A
Jagirdar vested in the State of Madhya Pradesh. The appellant's claim
to cut standing trees in the forests of the Jagir after they vested in the
State was therefore rightly negatived. [456 F-G]
Badische Anilill Fabrik v. Hickron, [1906) A.C. 419 at p. 421; Kursel/
v. Timber Operators and Comractors Ltd., [1927) 1 K.B. 298; Chhotabhai Jethabhai Patel & Company v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, [1953)
S.C.R. 476; Shrimati Shantabai v. State of Bombay & Ors. [1959) S.C.R.
C
265; Mahadeo v. The State of Bombay, [1959) Supp. (2) S.C.R. 339;
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Yakunuddin,
[1963)
S.C.R.
13; referred
to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICT'')N:
Civil Appeal No, 1563
of 1966.
Appeal from the judgment an

## Text

A
B
c
D
E
F
G
ff
RAM NARAIN MAHTO
v.
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
September 16, 1969
[J. C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI AND A. N. GROVER, JJ.)
S11/e of (iood.v Act, 1930 . .
~s. 18 and 21-lvfadhya Pradesh Abolition of
Pr1>perty Rights (Es1,1tes, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act I of 1950-Ja~ir
dar St'lling tiniber of specified {!irth tn be cut by buyer froni
standl~lg
rret .~-Jagir restinR in state 1111der }J.P. Act I of 1950--Jf buyer can claun
co111pr'll.\'fttion fo.1• logv not cut fro111 standing trees on date of vesting.
A Jagirdar executed a deed on August 5, 1949 in •favour of the appellant for the sale of logs of a spe<:ified girth to be obtained from cutting
th• trees in his forests.
On February 19, 1951 the Forest Oft!cer of the
r<!ipon<lent State prevented the appellant and the Jagirdar from cuttin11 the
tr.... On the coming into force of the Madhya Pradesh Act I al 1951,
the inlerest of the Jagirda·r in his estate vested in the respondent State.
The appellant instituted a suit in June 1954 against the respnndent State
and the Jagirdar for breach of contract and claimed compensation (i) for
le>g• 11 hicli were cut but which he could not remove; (ii) for logs which
were cut but were. stated to have been lost due to the negligence of the
respondent; and (iii) logs from the standing timber which had not been
cut or could not be cut by the appellant 'from the jagirdar's villages. The
respondent State contested the suit on the ground inter alia that the deed
coul<l not be enforced against it because of the vesting of the Jagir under
the Act in the State and that the contract created a mere personal liability
against the Jai:irdat. The Trial Court granted the appellant a decree for
compensation under all the beads claimed at a rate per log determined by
the Court. The High Court in appeal disallowed the appelhnt's claim
tinder items (ii) and (iii). In appeal to this Court by certificate it wa.
contended on behalf of the appellant that tlte rate of compensation determined was inadequate; that the High Court erred in disallowing compensal!on for the logs which were cut but were lost, and that it had wrongly
disallowed the claim for value cif logs of timber which the appellant was
entitled to, but could not cut because of the restrictions imposed by the
State.
HELD : Dismissing the appeal,
(i) On the evidence, the High Court had rightly disallowed the claim
in rc;pect of logs cut but which were stated to have been lost.
(ii) Where a thing is attached to, or forms part of, land at the time
of the contract and wbich is to be severed by the buyer, under s. 18 of
the Sale of Goods Act the property in the thing passes in the absence of a
contract to the contrary to the buyer on the severance cif the thing from
the land. Again under s. 21 of the Act, even. if there be a contract for
the sale of specific goods, but the seller is obliged under the terms of tile
con~t to do something to the goods for the purposo of putting them iato
a deliverable state, the property passes only when the thing agreed to be
done is done and the buyer is informed thereof. [453 DJ
·
In the present case the. contract by its terms was for the sale of log~
out of trees in the forest with a girth of two feet or more; but the timber
had to be cut and had to be put in a deliverable state.
Before the trees
446
SUPREME COUllT REPORTS
[1970] 2 S.C.lt
were cut and the logs
appropriated to the contract, the estate of the
A
Jagirdar vested in the State of Madhya Pradesh. The appellant's claim
to cut standing trees in the forests of the Jagir after they vested in the
State was therefore rightly negatived. [456 F-G]
Badische Anilill Fabrik v. Hickron, [1906) A.C. 419 at p. 421; Kursel/
v. Timber Operators and Comractors Ltd., [1927) 1 K.B. 298; Chhotabhai Jethabhai Patel & Company v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, [1953)
S.C.R. 476; Shrimati Shantabai v. State of Bombay & Ors. [1959) S.C.R.
C
265; Mahadeo v. The State of Bombay, [1959) Supp. (2) S.C.R. 339;
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Yakunuddin,
[1963)
S.C.R.
13; referred
to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICT'')N:
Civil Appeal No, 1563
of 1966.
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated December 23,
C
1960 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in First Appeals Nos. 67
and 70 of 1957.
Naunit Lal and Sharai Chandra Chaturvedi, for t!1e appellant.
I. N. Shroff, for respondent No. 1.
D
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Shah, J.
Thakur Randhirshah, Jagirdar or Sonpur Jagir
executed a deed dated August, 5, 1949 in favour of ,Ram Narain
Mahte>-hereinafter called 'the plaintiff'-relating to shle of
timber, for Rs. 51,501 a,nd received Rs. 15,000 in part payment.
E
On February 19, 1951, the Forest Officer of the State of Madhya
Pradesh prevented the plaintiff and the Jagirdar from c~tting the
trees.
On March 31, 1951, the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of
Proprietary Rights (Es.tales, Mahals, Alienated Lands) A.ct, 1950
(No. 1 of 1951) was brought into force and by virtue of that Act
the interest of the Jagirdar in the estate vested in the State.
On
June 14, 1954, the plaintiff instituted ati action in the Court of
F
the Aditional District Jud<!e,
Chhindwara, for a
decree for
Rs. 1,50,000 for breach of the contract of sale against the State
ot Madhya Pradesh and against the Jagirdar.
There were four
lleads of the claim for compensation :
(i) R<. 21,375
(;;) Rs. 30,000
(iii) Rs. 30,000
~(iv) Rs. 75,0iO
being the value of 4275 logs of timber which \Vere
cut but which the plaintiff cotild not rcn1ove ;
for 6,000 logs of timber which though rut were not
found on the spot and l:iome of which "'ere either
burnt or stolen ;
on account of 60,00 IO gs of timber from the standing
timber cf feur viJlagcs which had not been cut;
and
for 15,000 logs of timber which the plaintiff cculd
not cut from the remaining villages.
G
H
""
R. N. MAHTO v. M. P. STATE (Shah, J.)
H7
A
The plaintiff claimed compensation for the Jogs of timber at the
rate of Rs. 5 per log in the aggregate.
The State of Madhya Pradesh contended that the Jagirdar ~ad
started illegal cutting for which procee_dings were taken agamst
him and that he was prevented from cuttmg any umber; that somcB
ume thereafter the: logs of timber lying in the forest were 'hamme;-
marked" and the Jagirdar was permitted 10 remove the logs ~Ill
March 31, 1953
subject to certain conditions,
e.g.
obtaining
malguzari passes for the transit and submitting weekly statem~nt
of the removal, that the agreement dated August 5, 1949, b:mg
unregistered was inadmissible in evidence, and created no title,
that in any event the deed could not be enforced against the State
C 'because of the vesting of the Jagir under the Madhya Pradesh
Abolition of
Proprietary Rights (Estates,
Mahals,
Alienated
Lands) Act, 1950, in the State; that the contract created a mere
•)JCrsonal liability enforceable against the J agirdar; and that the
State was not the successor-in-interest of the Jagirdar but claimed
D
E
F
a right to the Jagir under a statute.
The Trial Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to value of
the logs of timber described under the four heads of his claim, at
the rate of Rs. 1/8/- per log.
Accordingly the trial Court determined the compensation payable to the plaintiff at Rs. 46,912
and after giving credit for Rs. 36,000 payable by the plaintiff to
the Jagirdar and to which the State became entitled, passed
a
decree for the balance of Rs. 10,912 and interest thereon.
The
plaintiff and the State appealed to the High Court.
The High
Court agreed with the Trial Court that the rate per log could not
exceed Rs. 1/8/-. The High Court disallowed the claim of the
plaintiff for items (ii), (iii) and (iv) and for item (i) the High
Court allowed Rs. 3,712 being the value of 2475 Jogs of timber
which had not boon removed.
The High Court held that out of
the amount awarded nothing was liable to be deducted towards the
alleged arrears due to the Jagirdar.
The plaintiff appeals to this
Court with certificate granted by the High Court.
Counsel for the plaintiff urged that the Courts below were in
error in holding-( 1) that the rate per log of timber was Rs. 1/8/-;
G
(2) that the High Court erred in disallowing compensation for
6000 logs of timber which were cut and appropriated by the
plaintiff but which were on account of n-egligence of the servants
of the State either burnt or stolen; ( 3) that the High Court er<ed
in disallowing compensation for items (iii) and (iv) being the
value of logs of timber which the plaintiff was entitled to,
but
H
could not cut becauie of the restrictions imposed by the State.
On the first plea riot much need be said.
The Trial Cou1 t as
well as the High Court, on a consideration of the evidence held
' /
-
448
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1970] 2 S.C.R.
that the value of a log of timber did not exceed Rs. 1/8/-. That
is a concurrent finding of fact and this Court will not interfere
with that finding, unless it is shown to be based on no evidence or
is grossly erroneous or perverse .. · No such attempt is made
before us.
On the second plea also the plaintiff's claim must fail.
The
evidence led by the plaintiff relating to the cutting of 6000 logs of
timber and appropriation thereof is vague, and is not supported
by reliable evidence.
The books of account and the registers
maintained by th~ Jagirdar were not tendered in evidence. It
was said that they were burnt. The High Court has disbelieved
the story that the books of account and registers were burnt and
we see no reason
to disagree with. that finding.
The plaintiff
himself had no personal knowledge about the destination of the
logs of timber; he merely repeated what the Jagirdar's men had
told him.
He admitted that out of the logs of timber which were
cut, 4500 logs were "hammer-marked" by the Forest Department
and he was asked to remove them by the end of March 1953. The
testimony of witnesses Badrinarayan P.W. 4, Ramlal P.W. 5, and
Ramkesh P.W. 7 was found by the High Court to be unreliable.
We have been taken through the record of the evidence by coumel
for the plaintiff and we see no reason to disagree with the view
which appealed to the High Court.
The second claim must also
fail.
Then remain the claims for items (iii) and (iv) in the plaint.
The logs of timber under these claim were admittedly not cut.
There were standing trees.
The relevant terms of the deed dated
August 5, 1949, may, to appreciate the claim of the plaintiif, be
read:
"Deed of agreement in respect of ~elling of timber
of jungles of Sonpur Jagir.
Deed of agreement executed by Shri Thakur Randhirshah, J agirdar of SonQur . .
. . in favour of
Bhai Ram Narayanji Mahto, contractor of timber . . .
to the following effect :-
"!, the executant, have already taken Rs. 15,000
. . . . from the person, in whose favour the deed
of agreement has been executed, . . . . . I have
entered into a contract in respect of selling timber,
after getting logs 2. feet or more than that in girth cut
from my below mentioned 9 villages for Rs. 51,501
. . . and have sold the same subject to the following
conditions :-
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
R. N. MAHTO v. M. P. STATE (Shah, J.)
449
A
9 villages, timber of which l:\as been sold by me, are
B
as follows :-
(then follow the names of nine villages.)
In respect of cutting, I the executant, shall cut wood
at my expenses and the 'ame will be supplied to you in
the jungle.
- In respect of cutting (wood), I, th~ executant sh~!
be cutting wood from the below mentioned 111ng/es m
this way:-
C
(I) I shall supply wood from
the jungles of
Bambani, Kosami and Rajola Khapadhanna in first two
years (i.e. from August 1949 to July 1951).
D
E
F
G
II
(2) I shall supply wood from Gotikhere an~ Harai
from August J.951 to July 1952.
(3) I shall supply wood from Dulhadeo Baratmari
and Budena from August 1952 to July 1953.
(4) I shall supply wood from Sejwara Khalan from
August 1953 to 1954.
In respect of transport, if there is any delay in transporting contractor's
wood
during
that
period, the
executant, shall extend the time up to 6 months so as to
complete the t, ansportation.
(Then follows the manner in which the balance
amount of Rs. 36,501 was tu be paid.)
. Wood sold docs not include the trees on
the bank of the river or padao or any such place, which
are prohibited to be cut according to law.
The 1Yood of
those pfoces has not been so;,;,
Under the deed all !mes standing in the forests in the nine villages were not agreed to be sold : it was provided that trees with
logs of "2 feet or more in girth" were to be cut and the logs were
to be supplied in four different periods set out in the deed. The
deed cr~ated by its own force no rig~ts in the standing trees, for
the Jagirdar was to cut the trees at his expense, and to supply the
11.)!'.!$.
'
450
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1970] 2 S.C.R.
By s. 3 of the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Ri~hts
(Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1950, (1 of 1951), insofar as it is relevant; it is provided :
"(l) Save as otherwiSe provided in this Act, on and
from a date to be specified by a notification by the State
Government in this behalf, all proprietary rights in an
estate, mahal, alienated village or alienated land, as the
case may be, in the area specified in the notification, vesting in a proprietor of such estate, mahal, alienated village, alienated land, or in a person having interest in such
proprietary right through the proprietor, shall pass from
such proprietor or such other person to and vest in the
State for the purpose of the State free of all encumbrances.
"
Section 4 provides, insofar as it is material :
"(!) When the notification under Sec. 3 in respect
of any area has been publisher1 in the gazette, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any contract, grant
or document or in any other law for the time being in
force and save as otherwise provided in this Act, the
consequences as hereinafter set forth shall, from the beginning of the date specified
in such
notification
. . . . . . ensue, nan1ely :-
(a) all rights, tjtle and interest vesting in the proprietor or any person having interest in such proprietary
right through the proprietor in such area including land
(cultivable or barren), grass land, scrub jungle, forest.
trees, .
.
.
. shall ce'ase and be vested in
the State for purposes of the State free of all encumbrainces:
"
The relevant provisions of the Sale of Goods· Act may also be
noticed.
Section 2(7) of the Sale of Goods Act defines "goods"
as meaning "every kind of movable property other than acti::mable
claims and money; and includes stock and shares, growing crops,
grass, and things attach~d to or forming part of the land which
are agreed to be severed before sale or under the contract of
sale". Trees from which Jogs of timber were agreed to be cut and
sold are things attached to or forming part of the land. The trees
were agreed to be severed under the contract of sale." A contract
for sale of Jogs is doubtless a contract for sale of goods. But in
view of the terms of the <leed the contract was not for sale of ascertained goods. Only logs with a girth not Jess than 2' were to
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
R. N. MAHTO v. M, P. Sl'l\TE (Shah, J.)
45 l
be supplied after the trees were cut by the Jagiraar.
This is not
a contract under which the trees of the entire forest in a parti£ullir
village were agreed to be sold. Goods to be sold were, therefore,
unascertained, and it is well settled that a contract for unascertained goods is not a complete sale, but only a promise to sell :
Badische Anilin Fabrik v. Hickson(') : it was said in that case :
"Where the goods are not ascertained or may not
exist at the time of the contract, from the nature of the
transaction, no property in the goods can pass to the
purchaser by virtue of the contract itself; but where certain goods have been selected and appropriated by the
seller, and have been. approved and assented to by the
buyer, then the case stands as to the vesting of the property very much in the same position as upon a contract for the sale of ·goods which are ascertained at the
time of the bargain."
Where a thing is attached to, or forms part of, land at the
time of the contract and which is to be severed by the buyer, the
property in the thing passes in the absence of a contract to the contrary to the buyer on the severance of the thing from the land. This
is clearly the effect of s. 18 of the Sale of Goods Act. For property to pass, the identity of the thing intended to be delivered
must be ascertained, and unless the parties are agreed as to what
goods are to pass under the terms of the contract, the property
will not pass. It is essential that the thing should be specific and
ascertained in the mann_er bindin_g upon the parties : unless that
be so, the contract cannot be construed as a contract for sale of
movable property. Again under s. 21 of the Sale of Goods Act
even if there be a contract for the sale of specific goods, but the
seller is oqliged under the terms of the contract to do something to
the goods for the purpose of putting them into a deliverable state,
the property passes only when the thing agreed to be done is done
and the buyer is informed thereof.
Granting that the contract was for sale of specific goods, 'tKat
is, it was a contract for rnle of logs out of trees in the forest with
a girth of two feet or more, the timber had to be cut and had to
be put in a deliverable state. The Jagirdar did not by the deed
sell the trees of his forests.
The plaintiff had no right even to
cut the trees. The logs of timber agreed to be supplied had no
existence as individual chattel, until the trees were cut and severed
from the land, and logs of the specifications were separated. But
before the trees 'Vere cut and the logs appropriated to tlie contract, the estate of the Jagirdar vested in the State of Madhya
Pradesh. It is true that the provisiom of the Sale of Goods Act,
(I) [1906] A.C. 419 at p. 421.
452
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1970] 2 S.C.R.
.especially ss. 18 to & 4 are rules of construction of contracts for
determining the int.erest of the parties. If there be a contract that
the property is to pass even before the property is put into a deliverable state, the property may, pass. But in the contract executed by the Jagirdar no such intention appears.
It is not necessary to refer to the large number of cases cited
at the Bar-:-except a few.
In Kurse// v. Timber Operators and
Contractors Ltd.(') under a contract the vendors agreed to sell and
the purchasers agreed to purchase a][ the merchantable timber
growing in ·a forest in the Republic of Latvia.
Merchantabk
timber was therein defined to be "all trunks and branches of trees
but not seedlings and young trees of Jess than six inches in diameter
at a height of four feet from the ground".
Timber was to be cut
subject to certaiin conditions.
After the contract was entered into
the Latvian Assembly passed a law by which the forest became
the property of the Latvian State and the contract stood annulled
.and all property and rights of vendors and purchasers in the forest
were confiscated.
It was held by the Court of Appeal that the
contract was not a contract for the sale of specific goods in a
deliverable state within the meaning of s. J 8 r. 1 of the Sale of
Goods Act, 1893; that the goods in question were neither identified
nor agreed upon; that it was not every tree in the forest which
passed, but only those complying with certain measurements not
then made; that the timber was not in a deliverable state Uintil the
purchasers had severed it and that they could not under the ddinition in the rule be bound to take delivery of an undetennined part
of a tree not yet identified, and accordingly the propetry in the
timber had not passed under s. 18 r. I.
Several cases have arisen in this Court in which the breach of
a claim to a fundamental right of the purchaser who had entered
into a contract for purchasing standing trees before the enactment
of the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates,
Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1950, was set up.
These cases
may be briefly noticed.
In Chhotabhai l•thabhai Patel & Co111pcmy v. The State of Mad/1ya Pradesh(') this Court held that th~
rights conferred upon the contractors under agreements with the
proprietors of the estates before the date or. which the estntes vested
in the State, under which they were entitled to pluck, c01lect and
carry away tendu leaves, to cultivate, culture and acquire iac, anJ
to cut and carry away teak and timber and other specks of trees
were merely rights of licence, and that the contractors were not
proprietors nor persons having any interest in the proprietary rights
through the proprietors, within the meaning of the Act. The rights
of th" contractors were also held not to be encumbrnnccs within
the meaning of the expression "free from encumbrances" in s. 3(1}
(I) [1927] t K..B. 298.
(Z) [1951] S.C.R. 476.
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
•
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
R. N. MAHTO \'. M. P. STATE (Shah, J.)
453
of the Act.
The contractors .were held entitled to a writ against
the State prohibiting the State from interfering with the rights of
the contractors under the contracts which they had entered into
with the proprietors. In that case the Court held that the estate
vested in the State by virtue of ss. 3 and 4 of the Madhya Pradesh
Act, and the right to the trees also vested in the State, but the State
had no right to obstruct the contractors in exercise of the rights
under the contracts and on that ground a writ of prohibition was
issued. It was held that the contractors had no proprietary rights
nor did they possess any interest in the proprietary rights through
the proprietors to the trees and the leaves, and on that account
the rights of the contractors did not vest in the State. It was assumed, without indicating the ground on which it was so assumed.
that the contractual obligations which
were undertaken by the
Jagirdal's were enforceable against the State after the estate vested
in it. It was observe\( at p. 483 :
"The petitioners are neither proprietors within the
meaning of the Act nor persons having any interest in
the proprietary right through the proprietors. There is
no provision in the Act which extinguishes their rights
in favour of the State."
But this case was dissented from in a later decision of this Court in
Shrimati Shantibai v. State of Bombay & Ors.('). In that case
under an unregistered instrument a contractor was granted a right
to take and appropriate all kinds of wood from certain forests in
the Zamindari. After the enactment of the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act,
1950, all proprietary rights in land veGted in the State and the
contractor could no longer cut any wood.
The petitioner applied
to the Deputy Commissioner and obtained from him an order under
s. 6(2) of the Act permitting her to work the forest and start cutting the trees. The Divisional Forest Officer later passed an order
directing that her name may be cancelled and materials cut by her
forfeited.
A petition for a writ was then moved in this Court.
This Court held that the contractor had no right in the forest or
the trees. The Court observed that if it was a right in immovable
property, it could not be enforced because there was no registered
instrument : if it was claimed that a profit-a-prendre was transferred by it, it was still unenforceable because the instrument granting
the right was unregistered : if it was a contract giving rise to a
purely personal right, assuming that the contract was property wi.thi n the meaning of Art. 19(1) (f) and Art. 31 ( 1) of the Consutt.-
tion, the State had not acquired or taken possession of that propeny. The. Court declined to follow the earlier judgment of this
Court in Chhotabhai Jethabhai Patel & Company's case(").
ll1 [19591S.C.R.265
L:!Sqpc.CT.17() -17
(2) [l95J] S.C.R. 476.
454
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1970] 2 S.C.R.
In Mahadeo v. The State of Bombay('), again, ·;i similar question was raised by a contractor who had purchased the right to
reove ~orest produce-mainly tendu leaves, from the forests included in the Zamindari belonging to the proprietors prior to the
enactment of the Madhya Pr'adesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights
(Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1950.
The Court in
that case held that the contracts were unenforceable, because they
were not registered and that in any event the agreements did not
amount to grant of any proprietary right by the proprietors to the
contn1ctors and their remedy was not against the Jltate because the
State had rlot taken of such contracts or licenses.
In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Y akunuddin (2 ) the contractors'
right derived from the Jagirdar prior to the enactment of the
Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals,
Alienated Lands) Act, 1950, to cut and remove the trees was held
not enforceable against the State.
In all these cases there had been a partial examination of the
problem in the light of a claim to an existing and enforceable fundamental right vested in the contractor. In the first case Chhotabhai Jethabhai Patel & Company's case(') the Court held, without
disclosing the ground for so holding, that the fundamental right
of the contractor was enforceable against the State.
In Shrimati
Shantabai's case(4 ) 'ard Mahadeo's case(') the Court held that
there was no infringement m any f~damental right and in Yakinu,
ddin's case(') which reached this Court in appeal from an order
held that the rights were not enforceable against the State.
The present case arises out of a suit instituted for recovery
of compensation by a contractor who was prevented from ~nforc
ing his claim in respect of the forest trees under the terms of the
contract entered into with the Jagirdar. The contract was one relating to sale of future goods, but it was not a contract for sale of
specific property in a deliverable state. Title to the'logs which the
plaintiff had agreed to purchase did not vest in him at the· date
on which the estate vested in the State of Madhya Pradesh. On
that ground the· plaintiff's. claim to cut standing trees in the forests
of Sonpur Jagir after they vested in the State was rightly negatived.
The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
R,K.P.S.
(I) [1959) Supp. 2 S C.R. 339.
0) j!953j S.C.R. 476.
Appeal dismissed.
(2) [1963] 3 S.C.R. !J·
(4) (1959) S.C.R. 265.
A
B
c
D
E
F
G