# FIRM GIRDHAR MAL KAPUR CHAND v. FIRM DEV RAJ MADAN GOPAL

- **Citation:** [1964] 1 S.C.R. 995
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1964
- **Bench:** P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. N. Wanohoo, M. Hidayatullah, K. c. DA8 GUPTA, J.C. Shah
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/firm-girdhar-mal-kapur-chand-v-firm-dev-raj-madan-gopal-2826
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

Partnership-Partnership regi.,tered
before partition of
India-Suit
by firm,
if barred-Indian Partnership Act,
(IX of 1932), 8, 69 (2).
Forward 'L'ransaction-Such tran.•aetion in cotton and edible
oil seeds, if prohibited by law-EMential Supplie., (TemJ>orary
Pow.er") Act, 1946 (XXIVof 1940), ''· 2, 3, 5--,--Cotton Options
(Fomard Contracts and Prohibition) Onler, 1.943-0il Seeds
(Forivard Contract" and Prohibition) Order, 1943-Defenc. of
India Rule.,, r. SJ.
The respondent, a partnership firm, brought a suit for
recovery of the amount with interest due to it on account of
the purchas.s and sales of cotton-seeds and bales of cotton 011
behalf of the appellant firm.
In contesting the suit the appellant while admitting trade relations with the plaintiff firm,
disputed the correctness of the accounts.
It was urged that the
transact ions were wagering contracts and so void in law, that
they being forward transactions wero prohibited by law and
that the plaintiff fmn which was registered at Lahore before the
partition of India ceased to be a registered firm thereafter for
purposes of the Indian Partnership Act.
The trial court accepted the plaintiffs story as regards the
transactions but held as regards the accounting that the plaintiffs were bound to give certain credits to the defendants and the
price of 2300 bags of cotton seeds and 50 bales of cotton on the
tmal sale was directed to be credited in favour of the defendant
at the market rate on May 28, 1917.
Other directions as
regards calculations of incidental charges and interest were also
given. The learned Judge passed a final decree in favour of the
plaintiff with appropriate costs.
Against this decree both the
respondent and the appellant appealed to the High Court. The
High Court dismissed the appellant's appeal and allowed the
respondent's appeal increasing the decretal amount.
Two
point• of law were rabed by the appellant in this Court, namely,
1963
__ ,
Firm Girilw M«I
K.p,,, Clumd.
v.
c
-- Firm De• R&j
· }.fado" G•,•l
.. 9!lG SUPREME COURT REPORTS [l!l64] VOL.
(i) the requirement of s. 69 (2) of the. Indian Partner.hip Act
was, not satisfied ·and (ii) the transaction being a forward
transaction in cotton and edible oil !!eeds \Vas illegal and thus
prohibited by faw.
·
·
.
He.lil,_ that once there was .re~istration undef the Indian
Partnership Act, it continues to be effective and valid under that
Act in the area to which it applied before the partition of India
so Ion~ as it\vas not cancelled in accordance with law.
'
41
•• 1
· Eombay Cuttmi Export & Import Co._v. Bharat Sarvodaya
·
Jfill Co., I. L. R. Dom. (1958) 1351, approved.
'
.
.
!
lleld, further, that the forward contracts . in cotton •ee<l•
v.rere not prohibited by la\v.
A1 cotton and cotton seeds are
not included in the definition of e5'ential commodity, any
previous order with respect to them will be inconsistent with
the new order and cannot continue under s. 5 of the fasential
Supplies Act, 1946.
. C1vIL APPELLATEjumsDICTION : Civil Appeal
No. 240 of HJGI.
-
·
. l
,
-
'
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated
November 21, Hl58, of the Punjab High Court.at
Chandigarh in Regular First Appeal . No. 266 of
Hl5l.
C; B. Agarwala and A. N. Goyal, ·for the
appellant.
.
A. V . .Viswanatha Sastri, 0. P •. Jlalhotra and
},Johan Behari Lal, for the respondent.
I
1963. February 11.
The Judgment of the
Court was delivered by
DAs Gu:rTA, J.-The respondent a partnership
firm carrying on business as commission agents in the
town of Khanna in Punjab brought the suit out of
which this appeal has arisen against the appellant
firm for recovery of Rs. 17,615/10/-claimed to. be due
to it on account of the purchases and sales made on
. behalf of the appellant firm. Between December 1946
·-
;
•
1
..
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
997
and February 3, 194 7, 7600 bags of cotton seeds
were, according to the plaint purchased by the
respondent on behalf of the appellant firm at various
rates, out of which 5300 bags are said to have b

## Text

1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
995
FIRM GIRDHAR MAL KAPUR CHAND
v.
FIRM DEV RAJ MADAN GOPAL
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. WANOHOO,
M. HIDAYATULLAH, K. c. DA8 GUPTA
and J.C. SHAH, JJ.)
Partnership-Partnership regi.,tered
before partition of
India-Suit
by firm,
if barred-Indian Partnership Act,
(IX of 1932), 8, 69 (2).
Forward 'L'ransaction-Such tran.•aetion in cotton and edible
oil seeds, if prohibited by law-EMential Supplie., (TemJ>orary
Pow.er") Act, 1946 (XXIVof 1940), ''· 2, 3, 5--,--Cotton Options
(Fomard Contracts and Prohibition) Onler, 1.943-0il Seeds
(Forivard Contract" and Prohibition) Order, 1943-Defenc. of
India Rule.,, r. SJ.
The respondent, a partnership firm, brought a suit for
recovery of the amount with interest due to it on account of
the purchas.s and sales of cotton-seeds and bales of cotton 011
behalf of the appellant firm.
In contesting the suit the appellant while admitting trade relations with the plaintiff firm,
disputed the correctness of the accounts.
It was urged that the
transact ions were wagering contracts and so void in law, that
they being forward transactions wero prohibited by law and
that the plaintiff fmn which was registered at Lahore before the
partition of India ceased to be a registered firm thereafter for
purposes of the Indian Partnership Act.
The trial court accepted the plaintiffs story as regards the
transactions but held as regards the accounting that the plaintiffs were bound to give certain credits to the defendants and the
price of 2300 bags of cotton seeds and 50 bales of cotton on the
tmal sale was directed to be credited in favour of the defendant
at the market rate on May 28, 1917.
Other directions as
regards calculations of incidental charges and interest were also
given. The learned Judge passed a final decree in favour of the
plaintiff with appropriate costs.
Against this decree both the
respondent and the appellant appealed to the High Court. The
High Court dismissed the appellant's appeal and allowed the
respondent's appeal increasing the decretal amount.
Two
point• of law were rabed by the appellant in this Court, namely,
1963
__ ,
Firm Girilw M«I
K.p,,, Clumd.
v.
c
-- Firm De• R&j
· }.fado" G•,•l
.. 9!lG SUPREME COURT REPORTS [l!l64] VOL.
(i) the requirement of s. 69 (2) of the. Indian Partner.hip Act
was, not satisfied ·and (ii) the transaction being a forward
transaction in cotton and edible oil !!eeds \Vas illegal and thus
prohibited by faw.
·
·
.
He.lil,_ that once there was .re~istration undef the Indian
Partnership Act, it continues to be effective and valid under that
Act in the area to which it applied before the partition of India
so Ion~ as it\vas not cancelled in accordance with law.
'
41
•• 1
· Eombay Cuttmi Export & Import Co._v. Bharat Sarvodaya
·
Jfill Co., I. L. R. Dom. (1958) 1351, approved.
'
.
.
!
lleld, further, that the forward contracts . in cotton •ee<l•
v.rere not prohibited by la\v.
A1 cotton and cotton seeds are
not included in the definition of e5'ential commodity, any
previous order with respect to them will be inconsistent with
the new order and cannot continue under s. 5 of the fasential
Supplies Act, 1946.
. C1vIL APPELLATEjumsDICTION : Civil Appeal
No. 240 of HJGI.
-
·
. l
,
-
'
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated
November 21, Hl58, of the Punjab High Court.at
Chandigarh in Regular First Appeal . No. 266 of
Hl5l.
C; B. Agarwala and A. N. Goyal, ·for the
appellant.
.
A. V . .Viswanatha Sastri, 0. P •. Jlalhotra and
},Johan Behari Lal, for the respondent.
I
1963. February 11.
The Judgment of the
Court was delivered by
DAs Gu:rTA, J.-The respondent a partnership
firm carrying on business as commission agents in the
town of Khanna in Punjab brought the suit out of
which this appeal has arisen against the appellant
firm for recovery of Rs. 17,615/10/-claimed to. be due
to it on account of the purchases and sales made on
. behalf of the appellant firm. Between December 1946
·-
;
•
1
..
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
997
and February 3, 194 7, 7600 bags of cotton seeds
were, according to the plaint purchased by the
respondent on behalf of the appellant firm at various
rates, out of which 5300 bags are said to have been
sold by it on behalf of the appellant firm between
the dates of January 2, I!J47 and February 3, 1947.
Thus, on February :J, l!l4 7, 2300 bags of cotton-seeds
were left on its hands.
In May 194 7 the market for
cotton seeds was falling and so the respondent firm
asked the appellant either to remove the goods within
48 hours on payment of the full price or pay some·
thing more by way of margin and informed them
that otherwise the goods would be sold.
As no reply
was received these 2300 bags were sold on May 24some at the rate of Rs. ll/ll/6 p~r maund and the
rest at the r:ite of Rs. 11/12/- per maund.
Apart
from these transanctions in cotton-seeds the respon'
dent firm, according to the plaint, also purchased
100 bales o'." cotton of which 50 bales were also sold
on behalf of the
appellant · firm, so that after
February U, l!J47, 50 bales of cotton purchased by
the appellant firm were lying with the respondent .
These 50 bales were aho sold by the respondent on
May 24, IH47 at the rate of Rs. 27/12/· per maund,
as the appellant took no action when the respondent
asked them either to take away these bales on pay·
ment nf the price or to put in more money by
way of margin.
On the accounts, it was said,
Rs. 15,5i'iti/ 10/· remained due to the plaintiff firm
from the dcfrnda1it firm.
The suit was brought for
the recovery of tltis amount together with interest.
In contesting the suit the
appellant while
admitting trade relations with the plaintiff firm dis·
puted the correctness of the accounts.
The plaintiff's
case __ about the purchase of cotton-seeds and cotton
bales and the fact that 2300 bags of cotton seeds and
. iO bales of rntton purchased by it remained with the
•
plaintiff firm was also denied. It was also urged that
the trapsactions were wagerin~ contracts, and so voiq
1963
Ffrm Girthtr Mol
Kapur Ch&ni
v.
Firm DIV &j
M.anG.p.t
Do Gupt•, J.
\ . 998 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [HHJ4j VOL.
,, ·1963 • ,
in law, that they being .forward transactions \\·ere
Pimi;;;;;::, ,;},1 _ prohibited by_ law danfid furthedr thaht th
1
e d~lainptiff firm
"•'"'Chand
was not a reg1stere
rm un er t e n 1an
artner-
•· .
ship Act, and therefore the suit did not lie.
• Firm Deo R1J.j -
. .\Iadm GtJfta'
Dils Gupla, /,
'
The Trial Court rejected all the_ contentions in I
law and accepted the plaintiff's story as regards the ·
transactions but held as regards the accounting, on a
consideration of the evidence, that the plaintiffs were
bound to give credit to the defendants for the sale of
2300 bags of cotton-seeds at the contract rate of
Rs. 14/5/- per maund even though these were actually
sold at a lower rate, and that the debit for the
purchase of 2300 bags would . be calculated at
the rate of Rs. 13/8/- and Rs. 13/D/- per maund, the
. rates at which they were actually purchased even .
· though they were agreed to be purchased at the rate
of Rs. 14/u/- per maund on February 3, 1:'47. The
price of 2300 bags of cotton seeds and 50 bale:I of '
cotton on the 'final sale was directed to be credited
in favour of the defendant at the market rate on
.l\fay 28, 1947.
Other directions as regards calculations of incidental charges and interest were also
given. The Court appointed an Advocate as Commissioner for the purpose of calculating the amount due
after ascertaining the market price.
After considera-
. tion of the report submitted by the Commissioner,
the learned Judge passed a final decree in favour of
the. plaintiff for Rs. 9, 749/3/9 with proportionate
costs.
·
Against this decree both the plaintiff and the
defendant appealed to the High Court of Punjab.
In the defendant's appeal it was contended that the
suit was not preperly entertained as the plaintiff
firm was not registered under the Indian Partnership
Act, 1932. It was also urged that the transactions
were illegal being forward transactions in cotton and
edible oil-seeds. and thus prohibited by law. Both ·
these ·contentions were rejected by the High Court.
Two other minor points , which were taken before
..
'
•
'
f
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
999
the High Court and were rejected by it have not
been repeated before us.
In the plaintiff's appeal, it was urged that the
Trial Court had erred in its directions as regards
the debits and credits for 2300 bags of cotton seeds
for the purchases and sales on February 23, 1947.
The High Court accepted the plaintiff's contention
in part and held that the plaintiff was entitled to an
extra amount of Rs. 3,244/12/-.
In the ·result, the
High Court dismissed the defendant's appeal but
allowed the plaintiff's appeal to the extent that the
decretal amount was increased by Rs. 3,244/ 12/· thus
making the decree one for Rs. 12,694/.
On the strength of the certificate granted by
the High Court under Art. 133 ( 1 )(a) of the Cons ti·
- tution; the defendant firm has preferred the present
appeal.
The appellant's first contention is, as in the
courts below, that the suit should have been dismissed altogether. Two grounds of law are urged in
support of this. The first is based on the requirement
of s. 69(2) of the Indian Partnership Act. It is no
longer disputed that the firm was registered by the
Registrar of Firms, Punjab, on August 16, 1946,
under the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, as it stood
on that date.
That was an order made before the
partition of India took place. The entire Province
of Punjab was then within British India; there was
one Registrar for the entire Province and it is not.
disputed
that
that
registration
made
by the
Registrar whose
office
was at Lahore was up to
August 14, 194 7 good registration for the whole of
what was then British India. The appellant contends
that as soon as the partition of India took place that
registration caused to be effective for that part of the
old British India which became the Dominion of
d1ia and it so continued to be ineffective for this
Firm Girrllucr A:a;
K•~ur Chcnd
v.
Firm Del! !.·;,'
M1icn G1/1t11
D1J r.u;rc, J.
1963
Fi'm Girdh111 AttJl
i:•p:1r ChffTld
y,
Firnt D11 Ra/
MUt1rc G1,ai
Das Gupta, J.
1000 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984] VOL.
entire area also after the Constitution of India came
into force. It is argued that the Registrar of the
Punjab, within his office at Lahore, ceased to be a
Registrar under the Indian Act, when on the parti·
tion of India
Lahore became part of a foreign
cot1ntry.
So, it is said, the registration became the
regi~tration of a foreign country and thus ceased to
be a registration for India.
In our opinion, this
argument is
wholly
unsound.
Once there was
registration under the Indian Partnership Act that
registration, in our opinion, continues to opr.ratc as
registration under that Act and continues to be
effective-in other words, valid registration in the
eye of law as administered in India so long as the
registration is not cancelled in accordance with law.
In coming to this conclusion, we have. not
overlooked the fact that difficulties mav in certain
circumstances arise a5 regards the recording of alterations in the firm
name or its principal place of
business (s. 60); noting of closing and opening of
branches (s. 61 ); noting of changes in the name and
address of partners (s. 62); recording of changes on
dissolution of a firm and recording withdrawal of a
minor from the firm (s. 6:!); rectification of mistakes
in the register
(s. 64); and amendment of register
by order of court (s. 6;)), by the fact of the Register,
on whom duties are laid by these sections in connection with the above matters,
bein~ now at Lahore,
that is, outside India. \Ve have not thought it
n<;cessary however to investigate in the, present case
as to what arrangements have been made to cope
with these difficulties.
For, it is clear to us that the
presence
of such difficulties cannot in any way
change the legal position that registration that was
good registration under the Indian Act does not
cease to be good registration under the same Act.
so long- as it is not cancelled in accordance with law.
This view of law was taken
by the
Bombay
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1001
High Court in Bombay Cotwn Export re Import Co.,
~ v. Bharat lfarvoday11 1lfill Co., ('), and is, in our
opinion, the only possible view.
It is unnecessary for us to consider, for the
purpose of the present appeal, whether such a registration would be effective registration, in an area
which was outside British India, at the time of the
registration; and on that we express no opinion.
For his next legal contention, viz., that the
transactions were prohibited by law, Mr. Aggarwala
argued, first that forward contracts in cotton as also
oil seeds were prohibited by the order> made in 194:>
under the Defence of India Rules and these prohibitions remained effective up to the date of the
contracts in the present case by virtue of s. 5 of the
Esiential Supplies (Temporary
Powers) Act, 1946
(Act XXIV of t\J41l).
fhat these
were forward
contracts is not disputed.
It
does
appear that
'" forward contracts in cotton and in oil-seeds including
cotton seeds were prohibited by the Cotton Options
(Forward r.ontracts and prohibition) Order, 1943 of
May l,
I 94:l and oilseeds
(Forward Contracts
and l'rohibitio1·) Order, 194:3 of
May 29, 1943
respectively. The Defence of India Rules under
which these orders were made had however ceased
to be in force long before the date of the contracts
in the present case.
Unless therefore the prohibition
' orders were kept alive by some other provision of
law the present transactions would not be hit by the
prohibitory orders.
To show that they had been
kept alive, Mr. Aggarwal a relied on s. 5 of the
Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Ordinance,
1946 and the same section of the Essential Supplies
(Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 by which it was
-replaced. The section is in these words : -
"5. Continuance in force of
e;~fating orders.
Until other provisions are made under this
(l) l.L.R. Bom. (1~58) 1351.
1963
Firm Girihar Mal
Jrapur Chand
v.
Firm Dev Raj
Matan GojHJI
Das Gupta, J ,
J9GJ
Firm Girdluu Mol
Kapur Chnrnl
v.
Fi1m Dt1· Raj
.Hatlnn G'•/IJ~
Do$ (,'up1a 1 J
1002 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964] VOL.
Ordinance any order, whether notified or not,
made by whatever authority under rule 80·B,
or sub-rule (2) or sub-rule (:3) of rule 81 of the
t
Defence of India Rules,
iu
respect of any
matter sp .. cilicd in s. 3, which w:is in force
immcdiatelv before the commeucemcnt of the
Ordinance shall, notwithstanding the expiration
of the said rules, continue in force as far as
consistent with this Ordinance and 1.ie deemed
to be an order made under s. :l; and all appointments made, lircnces or permits granted and
directions issued under any such order and in
force immediately before such commencement
shall likewise continue in force and be deemed
to be made, granted or issued in pursuance of
this Ordinance."
The Act continued the same phraseology.
These
provisions of the Ordinance or the Act, are however
clearly of no assistance to Mr. Aggarwala's arguments. It is clear that before
the order made
under rule 81 of the Defence of India Rules continues in force notwithstanding the expiration of the
Defence of India Rules, it is necessary that the order
must be in respect of any matter specified in s. 3.
Section 3 empowers the Central Government to make
various orders but only in connection with es<;ential
commodities.
No order can therefore be considered
to be "in respect of any matter specified in s. 3"
unless it is in respect of an essential commodity.
"Essential Commodity" is defined in s. 2 to
mean any of the following classess of comm0Ciities :-
(i) foodstuffs, (ii) cotton and woollen textiles, (iii)
paper, (iv) petroleum and petroleum products, (v)
spare parts of mechanically propelled vehicles, (vi)
coal, (vii) iron and steel and (viii) mica, "Foodstuffs"
was also defined thus : "Foodstuffs" shall include
)"
edible oilseeds and oils." Cotton seed is an oilseed
but it cannot be for a moment be suggested that itis
1 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT :KEl'URTl:i iooa
fit for hu!llan consumption. So, clearly, it is not an
oilseed which is edible. Mr. Aggarwala as a last
rc~ort argutd that what "edible oil seed" means is a
seed from which edible oil can be prepared. Such
an argument has only to be mentioned to deserve
rcjecti-00. The phrase "ediUe oil-seed" can never
mean what the learned Counsel suggests and can and·
does mean only an oil seed which is edible as an oil·
seed. Cotton-seed, not being edible, falls outside
the class of "edible oil-seed" and so is not foodstuff
within the meaning of s. 2 of the Ordinance or the
Act of 1946. The Cotton Seeds Order of 1943 which
has been mentioned above is therefore not in respect
of a matter specified in s. 3 of the Ordinance or the
Act and so was not kept alive by s. 5. The Cotton
Order has also not been kept alive, for raw cotton
is not one of the articles included in the definition of
"e>sential commodity" in s. 2. It may be added
that s. 5 continues only such previous Orders as are
consistent with the new law and clearly, a' cotton
and cotton-seeds are not included in the definition of
Essential Commodity, any previous Order with respect to them will be inconsistent with the new Order
and cannot continue under s. 5.
Mr. Aggarwala drew our attention to a Notifi·
cation by the Central Government
dated on
November 4, 1949 by which cotton seed was "'xcluded from the operation of the Oilseeds Forward
Contracts Prohibition Order, 1943, by omitting it
from the schedule to the order,
Mr. Aggarwala
rightly contends that such exclusion would be
unnecessary unless as a result of s. 5 of the Essential
Supplies (Temp-orary Powers) Act, 1946, the Oilseeds
Order had remained alive up to November, 1949.
We do not know what led the Central Government
to make this Notification. It is not improbable that
~ a question having arisen before the Government
whether or not forward contracts in cotton seeds
continued tO be prohibited, in view of the prGvisions
1963
Firm GirdMr Mal
K.purCha.O
v.
Fi11n Div Raj
MaJ<n a.pa.
DaJ Gupta, J,
196J
Firm Girdlw Mtl
,. • ., Cli111d
y,
Firit D11 Raj
Nu.Ji c.;.1
1004 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (11164] VOL.
of s. 5 of the Ordinance or the Act as mentioned
above, the Government thought it proper to put the
matter beyond doubt by making the notification
excluding cotton seeds altogether from the Schedule
to the Prohibition Order. It is unnecessary for us to
investigate the circumstances under which the order
was made.
For, the fact that Government thought
that the effect of s. 5 was to keep alive the Oilseeds
Forward Contracts Prohibition Order, 1943 is not
relevant at all.
For the reasons mentioned earlier,
we are clearly of opinion that s. 5 cannot have that
effect.
Mr. Aggarwala's contention that the Forward contracts in cotton.seeds which are the subject
matter of the present litigation were prohibited by
law has therefore no substance.
This brings us to the question whether the
High Court erred in allowing the plaintiff's appeal in
increasing the amount decreed by Rs. a,244/12/-. It
appears that before the High Court it was urged on
behalf of the plaintiff that there had been a clerical
error in preparing the statement Ex. P-8, an extract
from the Saudabahi-in that the purchase price and
sale price for the transactions of February 3, 19•7
was shown as Rs. 14/f>/-and Rs. 14/8/-instead of
the correct
figures
which were,
according to
Saudabahi Rs. 13/5/·and Rs. 13/8/-. It is obvious that
this mistake would not affect the result as the difference between the credit entry and the debit entry
for these transactions would remain the same. What
the Trial Court did was that it took the sale price
for February 3, tram~·;tion to be Rs. 14/li/-as shown
in Ex. P-8; but for the purchase price which had to
be debited against the defendant it rejected the figure
of Rs. 14/Si - shown in Ex. P-8 but took the figure of
Rs. 13/8/-and Rs. 13/10/- as shown in the plaintiff's
account book. It seems to us likely that the arrangement between the parties was that the debits and
credits in the running account should be on the basis
of the rate at which the purchases and· ·talcs were
)
,.
1 S.C.k.
SU1'REME COUR't RE1'0R1'S 1005
'
actually made and not at the rate mentioned in the
Saudaba11i.
This is clear from the fact that for both
"\
the sale and the purchase the account b'.)ok ~hows the
actual rates at which the purchases and sales were
made (the purchase price
being at the rate of
Ks. l:l/8/- and Rs. 13/10/-per maund and sales being
at th'' rate of R~. 13/5/- and Rs. 13/7/- per maund).
It is difficult to understand why the Trial Judge,
though making the debits against the defendant at
the lower rate of actual purchase thought it fit to
accept the Suudabahi rate for the sale. If for both
l
debits and credits the actual rates at which the purclia!eS and sales were effected are accepted, it is clear
that the Tria Court's direction had resulted in crediting the defendant with Rs. 3,244/12/-more than
what was the correct figure.
The High Court was
therefore right in increasing the decretal amount by
this sum of Rs. 3,244/12/-.
It may be pointed out that if the actual rates of
purchases and sales in respect of these transactions
of February 3, 194 7 for 2300 bags of cotton-seeds are
rejected and the Saudabahi rates {according to
Ex. P-8) of Rs. 14/5/- for the sale and Rs. 14/8/- for
the purchase are accepted as the basis for making the
credits and debits, as Mr. Aggarwala asks us to do,
the defendant would gain nothing at all.
We have therefore come to the conclusion tha*
the High Court was right in allowing the plaintilf'w
appeal in part and increasing the decretal amount by
Rs. 3,244/12/-.
The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.
Appeal diBmiBsed.
1963
Firm Girdhat Mal
Kap.r Girand
v.
Firm Dtv Ra/
Madan Gap.I
Das Cupto, /,
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