# Firm Qulam Hunoin llaji Tabb~ Soni v. Buu o Roj"""4n

- **Citation:** [1963] 2 S.C.R. 255
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1963
- **Case number:** Writ Application No. 58 of 1957
- **Bench:** B. P. Sinha, P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. N. Wanchoo, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR a.nd T. L. VENKATARAMA AIYAR
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/firm-qulam-hunoin-llaji-tabb-soni-v-buu-o-roj-4n-2683
- **Pages:** 13

## Headnote

C'U8tom Duty-Export of Charcoal-Validity of State
Council Order imposing li"bility-Regency Act for the Sirohi
Minority Atiminiatration, 1947, a. 9-Rajaathan Ordinance (No .
16 of 1949), 1. 4(2).
·
The appellant firm was made liable to pay Rs. 24,395/·
as customs duty for exporting charcoal from the State Sirohi
and as it did not deposit the amount the collector of Sirohi,
on the requisition of the customs authorities. issued a notice
for r<covery of the· said amount und<r the Public Demands
Recovery Act. The appellant moved the High Court under
Art. •226 of the Constitution. Its case was that the order of
the Sirohi State Council levying customs duty on the export
of charcoal at the rate of /·BF per maund was invalid and ultra
virea. The case of the respondent was that the said duty had been
validly' levied by virtue of the resolution passed by the State
Council and approved by the Rajmata. The High Court held
in favour of the respondent and dismissed the petition. The
question was whether the impugned order dated May 31, 1948,
purported to have been passed in pursuance of the Council
Resolution dated May 15, 1948, imposing for .the first time
customs duty on export of charcoal, had .been validly iS!ued.
Held, that the State Council did not have legislative
power ; after the psssing of the Regency Act for the Sirohi
Minority Administration, 1947, it could pass a law only with
the approval of the Board of Regency of which the Rajmata
Saheba was the President ; since there was nothing to show
that the Board had approved of the order, it must be .held to
be invalid.
It 'was not correct to say that the Raj Mata could act
independently of the Board, it was the Board alone that could
collectively legislate or pass executive orders. The view of the
High Court that the Raj Mata could be treated as the de facto
Ruler as the State was clearlr erroneous,
1'61 --
April 19.
11111
Firm Qulam Hunoin
llaji Tabb~ Soni
v.
Buu o Roj"""4n
256
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1963]
Nor could the levy on the appellant be sustained under
the relevant provisions of Rajasthan Ordinance (No. 16 of
1949), which had no application.
CxvIL APPELJ,ATE JurusDICTION : Civil Appeal
No. 300 of tiO.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated
November 13, 1958, of the Rajasthan High Court
in D.B.C. Writ Application No. 58 of 1957.
Chand Mal LO<lha and Rrijbans Kish.ore. for
tho appellant.
S. K. Kopu.r and D. Gupta, for the respondent.
1962. April l!l. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
GoJnoJr•pdk• J.
GAJENDRAGADKAR, J .-The appellant, Firm
Ghulam Hussain Haji Yakoob & Sons, moved the
Rajasthan High Courf by a petition under Art~ 226
of tha Constitution for the iBBue of a writ in the
nature of prohibition or other writ or appropriate
order, declaring that it was not liable to pay the
customs duty sought to be levied on it by the
Controller of Sirohi bv his order of the 9th Feb.,
1956. It appears th~t one Mohammad Sagir had
taken a contract for cutting forest of Harani
Amrapura from tlie Thakur of Nibaj on the 12th
,July, 1!146.
Thti duration of this contract was five
years and tho purpose of the oontract was to enable
the contractor to prepare charcoal.
This contract
was subsequently transferred to the appellant by
the said Sagir on the 13th September, 1948. In due
course, the contra'lt was extended by the Thakur of
Nibaj by two years and on endorsement was made
on it to that effect on the 15th April, 1950. Under
this contract, the appellant prepared charcoal and
exported it out of the State of Sirohi. The ABflistant CommiBBioner, Customs and Excise, Sirohi,
took the view that the appellant was liable to pay
.,. .
·-·v
• •
(
-
...
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
257
196!
Finn Gulam Hus1ain
Haji Yakub ch Sons
customs duty@ As. -/Bf- per maund on the quantity
of charcoal exported by it. The Asstt. Commis.sioner
found that the charcoal thus exported by the
appellant was 27, 003 mds.
Accordingly, the said
Asstt. Commissioner made a report to the Commissioner on the 11th

## Text

• -
2 S.C.R.
SUl'REME COURT REPORTS
FIRM GULAM HUSSAIN HAJI YAKUB &
SONS
fl.
STATE OFRAJASTHAN
255
(B. P. SINHA, c. J., P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR,
K. N. WANCHOO, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR
a.nd T. L. VENKATARAMA AIYAR, JJ.)
C'U8tom Duty-Export of Charcoal-Validity of State
Council Order imposing li"bility-Regency Act for the Sirohi
Minority Atiminiatration, 1947, a. 9-Rajaathan Ordinance (No .
16 of 1949), 1. 4(2).
·
The appellant firm was made liable to pay Rs. 24,395/·
as customs duty for exporting charcoal from the State Sirohi
and as it did not deposit the amount the collector of Sirohi,
on the requisition of the customs authorities. issued a notice
for r<covery of the· said amount und<r the Public Demands
Recovery Act. The appellant moved the High Court under
Art. •226 of the Constitution. Its case was that the order of
the Sirohi State Council levying customs duty on the export
of charcoal at the rate of /·BF per maund was invalid and ultra
virea. The case of the respondent was that the said duty had been
validly' levied by virtue of the resolution passed by the State
Council and approved by the Rajmata. The High Court held
in favour of the respondent and dismissed the petition. The
question was whether the impugned order dated May 31, 1948,
purported to have been passed in pursuance of the Council
Resolution dated May 15, 1948, imposing for .the first time
customs duty on export of charcoal, had .been validly iS!ued.
Held, that the State Council did not have legislative
power ; after the psssing of the Regency Act for the Sirohi
Minority Administration, 1947, it could pass a law only with
the approval of the Board of Regency of which the Rajmata
Saheba was the President ; since there was nothing to show
that the Board had approved of the order, it must be .held to
be invalid.
It 'was not correct to say that the Raj Mata could act
independently of the Board, it was the Board alone that could
collectively legislate or pass executive orders. The view of the
High Court that the Raj Mata could be treated as the de facto
Ruler as the State was clearlr erroneous,
1'61 --
April 19.
11111
Firm Qulam Hunoin
llaji Tabb~ Soni
v.
Buu o Roj"""4n
256
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1963]
Nor could the levy on the appellant be sustained under
the relevant provisions of Rajasthan Ordinance (No. 16 of
1949), which had no application.
CxvIL APPELJ,ATE JurusDICTION : Civil Appeal
No. 300 of tiO.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated
November 13, 1958, of the Rajasthan High Court
in D.B.C. Writ Application No. 58 of 1957.
Chand Mal LO<lha and Rrijbans Kish.ore. for
tho appellant.
S. K. Kopu.r and D. Gupta, for the respondent.
1962. April l!l. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
GoJnoJr•pdk• J.
GAJENDRAGADKAR, J .-The appellant, Firm
Ghulam Hussain Haji Yakoob & Sons, moved the
Rajasthan High Courf by a petition under Art~ 226
of tha Constitution for the iBBue of a writ in the
nature of prohibition or other writ or appropriate
order, declaring that it was not liable to pay the
customs duty sought to be levied on it by the
Controller of Sirohi bv his order of the 9th Feb.,
1956. It appears th~t one Mohammad Sagir had
taken a contract for cutting forest of Harani
Amrapura from tlie Thakur of Nibaj on the 12th
,July, 1!146.
Thti duration of this contract was five
years and tho purpose of the oontract was to enable
the contractor to prepare charcoal.
This contract
was subsequently transferred to the appellant by
the said Sagir on the 13th September, 1948. In due
course, the contra'lt was extended by the Thakur of
Nibaj by two years and on endorsement was made
on it to that effect on the 15th April, 1950. Under
this contract, the appellant prepared charcoal and
exported it out of the State of Sirohi. The ABflistant CommiBBioner, Customs and Excise, Sirohi,
took the view that the appellant was liable to pay
.,. .
·-·v
• •
(
-
...
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
257
196!
Finn Gulam Hus1ain
Haji Yakub ch Sons
customs duty@ As. -/Bf- per maund on the quantity
of charcoal exported by it. The Asstt. Commis.sioner
found that the charcoal thus exported by the
appellant was 27, 003 mds.
Accordingly, the said
Asstt. Commissioner made a report to the Commissioner on the 11th February, 1954. The matter was
then dealt with by the Dy. Commissioner, Customs
& Excise, and he passed on order that the appellant
had expor·ted charcoal without payment of duty.
This order was made on the 17th Dec~mber, 1954.
According to the finding made by the Dy. Commissioner, the charcoal exported by the appellant
after the 30th November, 1948, amounted to
48,650 maunds. On this basis, the appellant was
asked to pay Rs'. :!4,325/- on account of the duty
on export of charcoal @As. -/8/- a maund. The
appellant challenged the correctness of this order ·by
preferring an appeal to the Government, but its
appea.l was rejected on the 24th May, 1956. The
appellant came to know about this order on the
5th April, 1957, when it was asked by the Tehsildar
to deposit the dut.y assessed on it a.long with
interest. Since the appellant did not aeposit the
amount, the Customs authorities had, in the meanwhile, made a requisition to the Collector of Sirohi
for recovery of the said amount, and the Collector
had issued a notice on the appellant under the
Public Demand Recovery Act on the 9th February, .
1956. It is the validity of this notice that the
appellant challenged by its present writ petition.
The appellant's case was that the order purported
to have been passed by the State Council of Sirohi
by whioh the customs duty@ As. -/8/- was levied
on charcoal was invalid and ultra vires and so, it
was not competent to the Customs authorities to
levy any duty on the charcoal exported by the
appellant and it was not competent to the Collector
to issue a demand notice for the recovery of the said
duty under the Public Demand Recovery Act.
••
Stat1 of Rajaslhan
OJ) the other hand, the respondent, the State
IHI
Firm <J1llat Hwi. in
H•JI TaM di 8011S
••
Bt.1,of RajOJlilon
258 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1963]
of Rajasthan, disputed the correctness of the appellant's allegation that the duty had been illegally
levied. It was urged by the respondent that the said
duty had been levied validly by the resolution paBBed by the State Council whioh had been approved
by Her Highness Shri Rajmata Saheba, Since the
said resolution had been duly paBBed by a com·
patent authority, the levy of the duty imposed on
the appellant was valid and tho Collector was
juRtified in issuing the notice of demand under the
Public Demand Recovery Act.
The High Court has upheld the plea made by
the respondent, with tho result that the writ petition filed by the appellant has been dismiSBed with
costs. Tho appellant then applied for and obtained
a certificate from the High Court and it is with the
said certificate that it bas come to this Court by its
presont appeal.
The customs tariff had been prescribed in the
State of Sirohi by th'3 Sirohi Customs Act of 1941.
Section 14 of the said Act lays down that : "exoept
as hereinafter provided, customs duties shall be
levied at such rates as are prescribed in the Sirohi
Customs Tariff on all goods mtintioned therein, at
the time of import or tixport of goods (including
those belonging to the State) into or out of Sirohi
State by rail, road or air".
It would thus
be
seen
that s. 14 which is
the charging
section provides that customs duties shall be
levied
on
the
goods
mentioned
in
the
Tariff at the rates 'prescribed by it. The result
is that it is only in respect of goods mentioned in
tho Tariff and at the rates specified therein that.
customs duties could be leived.
Section 15 of the said Act conferred upon the
Darbar power to fix and alter tariff rates.
It says
that : the Darbs.r may, from time to time,
b,Y
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•
....
(
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
259
notification in the Sirohi State Gazette, save in
emergency cases, alter the rates prescribed in the
Tariff and such altered rates shall come into force
froni the date mentioned in the notification, or, in
the evt>nt of the notification not reaching any
customs post concerned, on a subsequent date from
such date.'' The 1 effect of this section is that the
power to fix and alter tariff rates has been conferred on the Darbar which is required ordinarily
to issue a notification in that behalf.
The High
Court thought that as a result of reading sections
14 and 15 together, it was open to the Darbar not
only to alter rates at which customs could be
levied, but also to include new items under the
taxable articles mentioned in the Tariff. This view
is clear!; erroneous. The power conferred on the
Dar bar by s. 15 ia to fix and alter tariff rates, No
power has been conferred on the Darbar to add to
the list of taxable commodities in the Tariff itself.
The goods on which customs duties could be levied
have been specified in the Tariff attached to the
Act and no addition could be ma e to the said
Tariff in that behalf by the Darbar by virtue of
the authority conferred on it ~y s. 15. There is no
doubt about this position.
At this stage, it is relevant to add that in the
Tariff prescribed by the Act of 1944, charcoal is
included in the list of commodities, the import of
which is liable to pay the customs duty.
It is
however, not included in the list of commodities
the export of which is liable to pay
cu~toms duty.
This position is not disputed. Therefore, in order that
export of charcoal should be made liable to pay
t.he customs duty, the respondent ought to be able
to rely upon some legislative enactment in that
behalf.
It appears that in 1940,, the Ruler of the
Sirohi State brought into existence the Council of
Firm <lul•m Hua8•in
H llji T•1'W &: Sons
...
8t1ll1 •/ R•jcrthon
Gaiendniz•dl<"' .J.
IHZ
"irm Gulom Huuaitt
<Ho Ji r •llub "' s..,
••
Sui. of R•jaslh ..
Gojeatho111dk., J.
260
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
State and its functions and duties and its rights
wore duly notified in the State Gazette. The Council
which was designated as the Council
of State.
Sirohi, was to consist of His HighneBS as President,
tho Chief Minister as Vice-President and such other
member as His HigbneBS ma.y appoint from time
to ~ime; The general working of the Council bad to
be under the control of the President who, under
rule 9, was empowered, if the matter was urgent,
to a.ct on behalf of the Council, provided that the
Council was duly informed a.bout the action taken
by tbt'I President as soon as possible.
Rule 11 of
the notification provided that all cases of the kind
enumerated in Schedule I shall oo referred to the
Council for decision before final orders are passed,
save as provided in rule II.
Now, amongst the
matters specified in Schedule I is included the topic
of any new taxittion, or alteration or abolition of
taxation. This is entry 7 in the said SchAdule.
It would thus .. ppear that it. was within the competence of the Council to consider the proposal for
any new taxation or alteration or abolition under
rule II a.nd it was for the Ruler to pass final orders
in tho light of the decision by the Council on tha.t
point.
Rule 11 makes it clear that though it was
competent to the Council to reach a decision 9n
topics covered by entry 7 in Schedule I, it was for
the Ruler to pa.s9 imal orders which would make
the decision effective.
In other words, there ca.n
oo little doubt that the power of the Council in
respect of the matters covered by Schedule I were
no more than advisory ; it was always for the
Ruler to decide what final orders should be passed
in respect of the matters referred to the Council for
its decision. That is the nature and scope of
the power conferred on the Council.
Since the Ruler of the State, His HighueBB
Maharajadhiraja Maharao Taj Singhji Ba.hadur, was
-. ...,,. -
-
; ,
...
2 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 261
a minor in 1947, His Excellency the Crown Representative was pleased to sanction the passing of the
Regency Act for the Sirohi Minority Administration
on the 14th August, 1947.
.This Act provided that
it was tu come into force on the 14th August, 1947
and was to continue until the Ruler attained the
age of 18 years.
Section 3 of the Act prescribes
that for the purpose of the Constitution of the
Sirohi State, the word "Ruler" wherever occurring
in the Constitution shall be deemed to be the
Board of Regency.
Section 4 provided for the
constitution of the Board of Regency. It was to
consist of Her Highness the Dowager Maharani
Saheba of Sirohi, Maharana Shri
Sir Bhawani
Singhji Bahadur of Danta and Raj Saheban Shri
Bhopalsinghji of Mandar.
Section '6 of the Act
pr9vi9ed that the Board of Regency shall be legal
guardian of the Ruler. After this Act was passed,
the functions of the Ruler were dischP.rged by the
Board of Regency which, for a.II constitutional .and
legal purposes, represented the Ruler during his
minority.' In pursu•mce of the material provisions
of this Act, notification was issued on the same day
constituting the Board of Regency. Thus, it would
be clear that when the impugned order .levying a
duty on coal was passed on the 31st· May,
1948, the constitutional position
was that the
governance of the State was entrusted to the Board
of Regency; and U:nder the Board of Regency was
functioning the State Council which had been
constituted by the previous Ruler in 1940. It is
in the light of thia constitutional position that the
question about the validity of the impugned levy
of customs duty on the appe!Ia.nt has to be judged,
On the 31st May, 1948, an order was passed
which purports to have been issued in pursuance of
the Council Resolution dated 15th May, 1948.. for
which approval had been obtained from Her
Highness Shri Raj Mata Saheba. As a result of
this Order, the duties imposed or. goods specified
1962
Firm Gul·• Huuain
Haji T•ltu6 &> S..,
y,
S1111 of Rajasl/ltJn
Gojt' dragadtar ,/ 1
I Ht
Finn Gulan Huss•in
H.,;i YaAub d: S•n•
v.
Slul1 of RajaJflwn
Gajmdrotcdkar J.
262
SUl>REME COURT REPOM'S [1963]
in the Tari!f attached to the earlier Act wore enhanced in respect of bones, wool, timber and fire wood,
and a. fresh duty wa.e imposed in respect of export
of charcoal. ThiH duty was imposed @ As. -/8/- per
maund.
As we have already soon, it is common
ground that according to t,he Ta.riff presoribed by the
Act of 1944, charcoal wa.e not included in the list of
articles, the export of which was liable to custOiQs
duty. The·question which calls for decision in the
present appeal is whether the order thus issued is
valid; and the answer to this question depends upon ·
whether or not the imposition of the customs duty
on charcoal has been levied by an authority which
was legislatively competent to issue such an order. If
the levy has been ordiired only by the State Council
without the approval of the Boa.rd of Regency, then
it would be invalid because it wa.A not competent
to the State Council to pass a. law. It was open to
the State Council to reach a decision
on the
question about the imposition of customs duty on
any new article, but that decisim> had to be approved
and accepted by the Boa.rd of Regency which alone
was clothed with the requisite legislative power.
Therefore, the validity of the order can be sustained
only if it is shown that it has been paesed with the
approval of the Board of Regency of which Shri
Raj Ma.ta Sa.heba was the President.
In dealing with this question, it is nece88ary
to bear in mind the.t the order does not formally
recite that Shri Raj Mata Sa.heba had approved of
the order as the President of the Board of Regency.
The order he.a been issued by the Secretary of the
State Council and does not purport to he.vo been
issued by the executive officer of the Boa.rd of
Regency. The order does not refer to the Boe.rd
of Regency a.t all and does not purport to say that
Shri Rajmata Sa.hebe., when she gave her approval,
was a.oting on behalf of the Boa.rd.
If the
order bad formally been
passed a.s on behalf
-
I
/
' '
i-f
""'
I
~ s.c.R.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
263
of the Board of Regency, it would have been open
to the respondent to contend that the assumption
should be that it was duly passed by the Board of
Regency and has been promulgated according to
the rules of business prescribed by the said Board.
But since the order does not purport to have been
issued either on behalf of the Board of Regency or
on behalf of Shri Raj Mata Saheba acting for the
Board of Regency, it is necessary to enquire whether,
in fact, the Board of Regenoy bas approved of this
·order, and it appears that so far as this enquiry is
concerned, the respondent has placed no material
before the Court which would assist it in coming to
the conclusion in favour of the validity of the
impost.
Indeed, the plea taken by the respondent is
disputing the correctness of the appellant's claim
before the High Court, was that Shri Raj· Mata
Saheba was the President of the Board of Regency
and that whenever shti acted, she did so on behalf
of the Board and it was for her to take counsel
from the other members. It was, therefore, urged
that 'in the circumsUU!cee, it would be presumed that
she has passed the orders in consultation with other
members till the contrary is proved. It is significant that this plea proceeds on the assumption that
it was at the option of Shri Raj Mata Saheba either
to consult the Board of Regency or D<>t.
The
respondent's case appears to be that the Ra:j Mata
bE)ing
the
President
of
the
Board
of
Regency could act on her own in matters relating
to the government of the State either exeoutively
or legislatively and that it was for her to decide
whether she should consult the other members of the
Board or not. The case set out by the respondent
is not that the Raj Mata as the President of the
Board always consulted the Board before she acted
"°'·
on its behalf. On the contrary, the plea taken
seems to. suggest that the Raj Mata was not bound
Fim Gultun llussait1
Haji t"ahib d: 80111
v.
Blatt of Rajutlio:n
1961
,.imt Gul1111 H1111oi11
Hoji Yabb « SonJ
••
SC.te of Rajaslhm
Goj<Mtogodkar J,
264 SUPREME COURT REPOR~ (1913]
to consult the Board and could have acted independ~ntly of the Board in passing orders either
executive or legislative. That being the plea, it is
Jifficult for us t-0 accept the argument that the
approval of the Raj Mata to which the impugned
order makes a refer<>noe, can be safely taken to be
the approve.I of tho Raj Mata after she had consulted
the Board in that behalf.
There is no doubt that
as a result of the Sirohi Regency Act, the governance
of the State was left in the hands c;f the Boa.rd of
Regency a.nd it was the Boe.rd of Regency alone
acting collectively that could legislate or paae
executive orders. If the Raj Mata. took the view
that she could a.ct on her own without consulting
the Board, that waa clearly inconsistent with the
ma.teria.l provisiollB of tho Act. Therefore, we are
not inclined to a.ocept the conclusion of the
High Court that the impugned order can be said
to have been pae1ed aa a result of the decision
of the Board of Regency, since the Board of Regency
a.lone we.a clothed with the necessary legislative
authority. UrileBs the Board passed the resolution,
it could not take effect aa a law in the State of
Sirohi. The approval of the Raj Mata to the
resolution paascd by the State Council cannot cure
infirmity arising from the fact that the State Council
had nu legislative power.
The High Court seems to have ta.ken the view
that since the Raj Mata entered into the agreement
of merger, she can be treated at the de facw. Ruler
··--.,--
of the State and as such, ehe was competent to
exercise the necessary legislative power to p888
the impugned order. we are not inclined to accept
this view. It is clear that the document of merger
has been signed by the Raj Mata describing her110lf
aa the' President of the Regency Board; but the
High Court thought that since the document had .-'
not been signed by the Board itself, the Raj Mata
could be treated as the de facto Ruler oft.he State.
\
2 S.C.R..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
265
This view is clearly erroneous. Sinoe the Raj Mata
was the President of the Board of Regency, it was
competent to her to sign the document on behalf
of the Board and she purported to sign it as the
President of the Board of Regency obviously because
she had consulted the Board and it was as a result
of the decision of the Board that she proceeded to
execute the document and sign it as the Board's
President. Therefore, there is no substance in the
contention that the Raj Mata alone,
without
the concurrence of the Board, could have validly
· given sanction to the passing of the impugned
order. In the result, we must hold that the im·
pugned order has not been validly passed and no
levy of customs duty can be legally imposed on
the appellant in regard to the charcoal which it
has exported out of the State of Sirohi.
It is, however, urged that the duty levied
against the appellant for the export of charcoal
can be sustained under the provisions of Ra.jasthan
Ordinance
(No.16 of 1949).
Section 4(2) of the
said Ordinance authorised
the Government to
issue any revised tariff and in exercise of this
power, the Government of Rajasthan has issued a
notification No. 211/SRD on the 10th August, 1949,
whereby a revised ta.riff was imposed and it was
directed that the duties of customs shall be levied
and collected in accordance with the said revised
Tariff. According to item No.367 in the said Tariff,
export duty on charcoal was As.-/8/-per maund.
The respondtnt's argument was tbat when Sirohi
became a part of Rajasthan, the Ordinance in
question applied to Sirohi and so, the claim for
the customs duty made against the appellant was
justified under the relevant, provisions of the said
Ordinance. This Ordinance came into force on the
4th August, 1949.
In our opinion, this argument is not wellfounded. When Ordinance XVI was passed and
11H
Firm Gui.,. Huu11
Haj; l"aku~ "1 s,.
••
State of B•Jutk.
Gaj,nd'f4ltulk.r J
Pl,.n Gu/am !furs nn
H oji Y Jfub ~ So:u
..
$1414 of Rojost114h
GopnJro:odbr J.
286
SUPRKME OOURT REPORTS [1963]
ca.me into foroe, it no doubt applied to the whole
of Ra.jastha.n as it was then constituted, but the
State of Sirohi was at the relevant time not a.
pa.rt of Raja.stha.n and it became a part of Ra.jastha.n as from the 25th January, 1950. It appears
that the Ministry of Sta.tee issued a notification on
the 24th January, 1950, in Eoxercise of the powers
conferred on the Government of India by subsection (2) of section 3 of the Extra.-Provincia.l
JuriBdiotion Act 1947 (47 of 1947) a.nd it was as a
result of. this notification that the Central Government delegated to the Government of the United
States of Raja.stha.n the extra-provincial jurisdiction
inoluding the power conferred by seotion 4 of thi:i
aa.id Aot to make orders for the effective exercise
of that juriadiotion. It is thus clear that until
the 25th, January, 1950, Sirohi wa.s not a. pa.rt of
Rajaatha.n and was not amenable to the application
of the Ordinance in question. The respondent attempted to suggest that as soon a.s Sirohi beoame a.
pa.rt of Raja.sthan, the Ordinance in question
applied to it. This argument is obviously falla.-
oious. When Sirohi beoa.me a. pa.rt of Raja.etha.n,
the laws a.pplioa.ble to Ra.ja.stha.n prior to the merger of Sirohi could be
made a.pplica.lile to
Sirohi only after a.n a.ppropria.te legislation had
bean pa.saed in that behalf. In fa.ct, in 1953, the
Ra.jastha.n La.ws (Application to Sirohi) Act (No.III
of 1953) was p1111&ed to deola.re that certain Raja.sthan la.ws applied to Sirohi. Section 3 of this
Aot provided that the R aja.stha.n la.ws specified in
the Schedule to the Act she.II, in so far a.s they
relate to any of the ma.ttel"B enumerated in Lists
II and ID in the Seventh Schedule to the Con.st.itution of India., apply, a.nd as from the appointed day, be deemed to have applied to Sirohi not.-
withstanding a.ny thing to the contra.I}' contained
in the Sirohi Administration Order, 1948, ot in any
other law, or i.netrument. There is a. proviso to this
•
;j
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
267
section with which we are not conoerned for the
purposes of the present appeal. The Ordinace in
question is not included in the Schedule and so, it
is clear that the said Ordin1mce was not intended
· to apply to Sirohi. It is not
suggested that auy
. other law passed by the Raja.stjian State or a.ny
, other instrument executed in that behalf made
the ·Ordinance in question applicable to Sirohi.
Therefore, we are satisfied tltat the respondent
cannot rely upon the relevant provisions of the
Rajasthan Ordinance .1949 to support the demand
for customs duty against the State of Sirohi.
In the result, the appeal must be allowed and
the :writ issued in favour of the appellant declaring t,hat the appellant is not liable ·to pay the
customs duty in question and qu~Ehing the orders
passed by the Dy. Commissioner, Customs & Excise
as well as the Minister of Excise & Taxation and
the d.emand notice issued by the Collector at the
instance of the excise authorities. The appellant
. would entitled to its cost throughout .
.A.ppwZ allowed.
I96B
Firm G~l'f'! .Hustaio
H.ji Y okiib cl: 8Mu
v.
Slat1 of R'jMthtn