# G. J. FERNANDEZ v. STATE OF MYSORE & ORS

- **Citation:** [1967] 3 S.C.R. 636
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1967-04-14
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 218 of 1967
- **Bench:** K. N. Wanchoo, V. Bhargava, G. K. Mitter
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/g-j-fernandez-v-state-of-mysore-ors-3980
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

8
Constitution of India, 1950, Arts. 14 and 162-Article 162, If confers power on State Government to make rules-Ad1ninirtrative instructions-Effect of violalion.
Sealed tenders were submitted to the Chief En.11ineer of the P.W.D.
of the respondent.State for a certain construction. The tender submitted
by the appellant was the !Qwest unconditional tender, wh~reas that of the
i.1ird respondent, though lower in amount was a conditional tender. None
C
of the tenders was accepted by the Chief Engineer. Instead, he wrote
to the third respondent asking him if be would withdraw bis conditions,
unri ·wrote to the other tenderers asking them if they would undennke the
work at the lowest amount, that is the amount tendered by the third respondent. The replies were to he submitted within a week of the receipt
of the letters bv the tenderers but the third respondent submitted his reply.:
withdrawing bis conditions, befond that time. The appellant wrote that
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his tender being unconditiona should have been accepted.
The Chief
Engineer again wrote to the appellant asking him to send a categorical
reply and the appellant replied that he was not prepared to reduce the
amount. The third respondent wrote thereafter asking for a higher payment, and so, the Major Irrigation Projects Control
Board, which was
the final accepting authority, directed that fresh negotiations should be
opened with all the tenderers. The Chief Engineer therefore again called
for renders and wrote to all the tenderers if they were prepared to reduce
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the amounts. The appellant did not send any revised quotations but protested against the action taken
by the Chief Engineer. As the offers
made by the others in their second tenders were not advantageous to the
Government, the Chief Engineer called a meeting of all the tenderel"
and asked them if they were prepared to make further reductions. The
appellant and some other tenderers stated that they had no further reduction to make, two of the tenderers said that they would write later,
while the third ·respondent wrote immediately reducing the amount of
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his tender. The Chief Engineer made a report to the Technical Subcommittee which made its recommendations to the
Board
and
the
Board accepted the third respondent's firal tender.
The appellant filed a writ petition challenging the grant of the contract to the third respondent on the ground• that : ( 1) the rules in the
Mysore Public Works Department Code were
not followed; and (2)
there was a violation of Art. 14 because, (a) the Chief Engineer acceptG
ed the first offer of the third re<nondent hcyond the prescribed period
of one week, and (b) the Chief Engineer favoured the third respondent
by entering into secret negotiations with him.
The High Court dismissed the petition.
In appeal to this Coun,
HELD : (i) There is no statute nor any Article of the Constitution
which confers any authority on the State Government to issue rules in
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matters with which the Code was concerned. Article 162 of the Constitution only provides that the State Government can take executive action
jn all maUers in which the legislature of the
State can pass Jaws.
But
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FERNANDEZ v. MYSORE (Wanchoo, C.J.)
637
the Article by itself does not confer any rule-making power on the State
Government. Therefore, the instructions in the Code were mere administrative instructions and even if there was a breach thereof the appellant
had no right to apply to the Court for quashing orders in breach of such
instructions. [6438-E]
(2) There was no discrimination by the Chief Engineer.
(a) The period of seven days fixed by the Chief Engineer for sendin~ the reply was not a period of limitation, no other tender's reply was
reiected on that ground, and even the appellant was given extended time
to reply, showing that the period was not meant to be rigid. [644A-C]
(b) There was no evidence of any secret negotiations
between the
Chief Engineer and the third respondent. [ 6440) ·

## Text

636
G. J. FERNANDEZ
v.
STATE OF MYSORE & ORS.
April 14, 1967
[K. N. WANCHOO, C.J., V. BHARGAVA AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.]
8
Constitution of India, 1950, Arts. 14 and 162-Article 162, If confers power on State Government to make rules-Ad1ninirtrative instructions-Effect of violalion.
Sealed tenders were submitted to the Chief En.11ineer of the P.W.D.
of the respondent.State for a certain construction. The tender submitted
by the appellant was the !Qwest unconditional tender, wh~reas that of the
i.1ird respondent, though lower in amount was a conditional tender. None
C
of the tenders was accepted by the Chief Engineer. Instead, he wrote
to the third respondent asking him if be would withdraw bis conditions,
unri ·wrote to the other tenderers asking them if they would undennke the
work at the lowest amount, that is the amount tendered by the third respondent. The replies were to he submitted within a week of the receipt
of the letters bv the tenderers but the third respondent submitted his reply.:
withdrawing bis conditions, befond that time. The appellant wrote that
D
his tender being unconditiona should have been accepted.
The Chief
Engineer again wrote to the appellant asking him to send a categorical
reply and the appellant replied that he was not prepared to reduce the
amount. The third respondent wrote thereafter asking for a higher payment, and so, the Major Irrigation Projects Control
Board, which was
the final accepting authority, directed that fresh negotiations should be
opened with all the tenderers. The Chief Engineer therefore again called
for renders and wrote to all the tenderers if they were prepared to reduce
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the amounts. The appellant did not send any revised quotations but protested against the action taken
by the Chief Engineer. As the offers
made by the others in their second tenders were not advantageous to the
Government, the Chief Engineer called a meeting of all the tenderel"
and asked them if they were prepared to make further reductions. The
appellant and some other tenderers stated that they had no further reduction to make, two of the tenderers said that they would write later,
while the third ·respondent wrote immediately reducing the amount of
F
his tender. The Chief Engineer made a report to the Technical Subcommittee which made its recommendations to the
Board
and
the
Board accepted the third respondent's firal tender.
The appellant filed a writ petition challenging the grant of the contract to the third respondent on the ground• that : ( 1) the rules in the
Mysore Public Works Department Code were
not followed; and (2)
there was a violation of Art. 14 because, (a) the Chief Engineer acceptG
ed the first offer of the third re<nondent hcyond the prescribed period
of one week, and (b) the Chief Engineer favoured the third respondent
by entering into secret negotiations with him.
The High Court dismissed the petition.
In appeal to this Coun,
HELD : (i) There is no statute nor any Article of the Constitution
which confers any authority on the State Government to issue rules in
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matters with which the Code was concerned. Article 162 of the Constitution only provides that the State Government can take executive action
jn all maUers in which the legislature of the
State can pass Jaws.
But
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FERNANDEZ v. MYSORE (Wanchoo, C.J.)
637
the Article by itself does not confer any rule-making power on the State
Government. Therefore, the instructions in the Code were mere administrative instructions and even if there was a breach thereof the appellant
had no right to apply to the Court for quashing orders in breach of such
instructions. [6438-E]
(2) There was no discrimination by the Chief Engineer.
(a) The period of seven days fixed by the Chief Engineer for sendin~ the reply was not a period of limitation, no other tender's reply was
reiected on that ground, and even the appellant was given extended time
to reply, showing that the period was not meant to be rigid. [644A-C]
(b) There was no evidence of any secret negotiations
between the
Chief Engineer and the third respondent. [ 6440) ·
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 218 of
1967.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated January 18,
1967 of the Mysore High Court in Writ Petition No. 2426 of
1966.
S. K. Venkatqranga Iyengar, Shyama/a Pappu
and Vineet
Kumar, for the appellant.
H. R. Gok/1ale, B. R. L. Iyengar, R. H. Dhebar and S. P.
Nayyar, for respondents Nos. I and 2.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Wanchoo, CJ. This is an appeal on a certificate granted by
the Mysore High Court and arises in the following circumstances.
Tenders were called for construction of the rtght bank
masonary dam called
"Hidkal Dam" by t11e Public Works
Department, Irrigation Projects, of the State of Mysore.
The
tenders were to be submitted to the Chief Engmeer of the
department.
Among the tenderers was the appellant.
Another
tenderer was respondent No. 3 before us.
Eventually the contract was granted by the Major Irrigation Projects Control Board
(hereinafter referred to as the Board) on November 5, 1966 to
respondent No. 3.
The appellant ehallenged the grant of con-,
tract to respondent No. 3 and prayed for quashing the resolution
of the Board mainly on two grounds, namely, (i) that the rules
in the ·Mysore Public Works Department Code (hereinafter referred to as the Code) were no: followed, and (ii) that there
was unequal treatment between the various tenderers which was
in violation of Art. 14 of the Constitution.
Most of the facts are not in disputi:. and we shall narrate
them in some detail as they are necessary for the purpose of
determining whether there was any breach of Art. 14 of the
Constitution.
A notification was issued on April 4, 1966 for
the contract on question calling for sealed tenders, the estimated
cost of the contract being 230.44 lakhs. The estimated quanti-
638
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1967] 3 S.C.R ·
ties of several items of work were stated in the tender documents and tenderers were required to quote their rates for various
items of work and the amount for each item on the basis of the
said estimated quantities.
The notification also said that conditional tenders were liable to be rejected at the discretion of the
competent authority without assigning any re;ison therefor.
The
notification further said that the competent authority reserved
the power to reject all or any of the tenders without assigning any
reason therefor.
Nine sealed tenders were received in response to this notification and they were opened on July 30, 1966 in the presence of the tenderers or their representatives.
The appellant's
tender was unconditional and was for a tota1 sum of Rs. 2,22. 72
lakhs, this being 3.64 per cent below
the
estimated <:ost.
Respondent No. 3 made a tender for Rs. 214.58 lakhs i.e. 7.16
per cent below the estimated cost but he had stipulated certain
conditions and his rates for excavating soft and hard rock were
rather strange. Another tenderer was the National Projects Construction Corporation Limited (hereinafter referred to as the
Corporation) and it submitted the tender for Rs. 229.34 lakhs
i.e. 0. 7773 per cent below the estimated cost. The Corporation
however did not furnish the earnest money demanded and prayed for exemption from such deposit, presumably on the ground
that it was a public corporation entirely owned by the Central
Government and State Governments. The Corporation also made
certain conditions to which it is unnecessary to refer,
We also
do not think it necessary to refer to other six tenderers in detail.
It is enough to say that five of them had made unconditional
tenders while the sixth had made a conditional tender, but the
amounts tendered by them were much above the amounts tendered by these three tenderers.
Soon thereafter on August 6, 1966, the appellant addressed
a letter to the Chief Engineer saying that his was the lowest unconditional tender and therefore the contract should be granted
to him.
The appellant also pointed out in this letter that the
tender of respondent No. 3 was conditional and the rates quoted
for excavation of soft rock and hard rock were speculative, and
therefore, that tender, though it was the lowest in amount
should be rejected.
None of these tenders was however accepted.
On August 10, 1966, the Chief Engineer addressed letters
to all the nine tenderers enquiring from all of them (except respondent No .. 3) if they would be agreeable to undertake the
work for the lowest amount tendered, namely, Rs. 214·58 lakhs.
They ,were requested to send their replies within a week and to
keep their tenders open till the end of November 1966. It was
also made clear in this letter that if no reply was
received in
time it would be unde.rstood that the tenderer was not prepared
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FERNANDEZ v. MYSORE (Wanchoo. C,J.)
63!>
to do the work at the rate indicated. The letter to respondent
No. 3 was however different inasmuch as his was
the lowest
tender and he was merely asked whether he was prepared to withdraw the conditions he had attached to the tender.
The appellant in his reply on August 16, 1966 contended
that his tender was the lowest as the tender of respondent No. 3
was liable to be rejected on the ground that it was conditional
and that there was no question therefore of asking him to reduce
the amount tendered by him to Rs. 214.58 laklJs.
Thereupon
he received a letter from
the Chief Engineer requesting him
again to give a categorical reply whether he was prepared to
reduce the amount to Rs. 214.58 lakhs and that this reply should
reach the Chief Engineer by August 31, 1966. Respbndent No. 3
received the letter of the Chief Engineer on August 19, 1966 and
he should have replied by August 26, 1966 but actually he sent
the reply on August 31, 1966 informing the Chief Engineer that
he had withdrawn his conditions and requesting that the work
might be entrusted to him.
The appellant's reply to the letter of
August 25, 1966 was not received by August 31, 1966. It was
received on September 10, 1966, and the appellant stated therein
that he was not prepared to reduce the amount tendered by him.
We may indicate here that one of the arguments before us is that
there was discrimination inasmuch as the Chief Engineer accepted
the reply of respondent No. 3 on August 31, 1966 even though
it did not come within 7 days as required. It may be added that
this point was not apparently taken up before the High Court in
this form.
On September 12, 1966, respondent No. 3 wrote a letter to
. the Chief Engineer saying that he should be paid rupees seven
lakhs more above his tender in view of the fact that the requisite
quality of sand was not available at the site and had to be brought
from some distance. On September 21, 1966, a meeting of the
Board was held and the Board directed that fresh negotiations with
all the tenderers should be made to arrive at the rate most favourable to Govern!llent. In consequence of this, letters were addressed to all the nine tenderers by the Chief Engineer on September
27, 1966. In this letter, the Chief Engineer suggested to the nine
tenderers whether they were prepared to accept one of two alternatives namely-(i) to limit the overall cost of tender to
Rs. 214.58 lakhs and so arrange the internal item rates that they
sh~uld not be too speculative, i.e., too far above or below the
es~11!Ulted rates in the tender documents, or
(ii) to confirm in
wntmg whether the tenderer was prepared to reduce his overall
rates by 7 .16 per cent below the estimated rates pro rata on all
items and thus bring the tendered amount down to Rs. 214.58
lakhs. The tenderers were also requested to indicate (in case they
were ,not prepared to re~luce the tendered rate by 7 .16 per cent)
the highest figure by which they would be prepared to reduce the·
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1967] 3 S.C.R.
rate bdow the estimated cost.
Finally tenderers were requested
to submit sealed tenders by October 12, 1966.
On October 4,
1966 the tenderers were infom1¢ that scaled tenders would be
-0pened on October 15, 1966.
The appellant did not send revised quotations and protested
.against the negotiations sought to be carried on by the Chief
Engineer with the tenderers and accused the Chief Engineer of
trying to favour respondent No. 3. In that connection the appellant addressed letters to the Chief Minister, the Minister for Public
Works, the Chief Secretary to Government and the Secretary to
the Government, Public Works Department, complaining that the
Chief Engineer was acting contrary to rules and illegally with
regard to the appellant's tender and starting negotiations with the
tcndercrs.
On October 12, I 966, respondent No. 3 replied that
it was extremely difficult for him to re-arrange the internal item
rates or to reduce overall rates by a certain percentage, as suggested in .the circular letter, and pleaded that his tender coupled with
the withdrawal of conditions might be accepted without modification.
We now come to what happened on October 15, 1966 for the
main plank of the appellant in support of his case for contravention of Art. 14 is bused thereon.
The appellant's case is
that after the t.znders had been opened on October I 5, 1966,
the Chief Engineer carried bn secret negotiations with respondent No. 3 whom he was fa,l/ouring and acc~pted from him a
letter secretly on t)lat date by which respondent No. 3 quoted
an overall reduction of 4 per cent below the estimated rates.
The suggestion of the appellant is that this was done to brill)!
down the reduction by respondent No. 3 to a little above 3.64
per cent below the estimated cost which was what he had tendered from the very beginning and thus the
Chief Engineer
'helped· respondent No. 3 to quote rates which became the lowest by a paltry amount and eventually succeeded in getting them
approved by the Technical Sub Committee and the Board.
It
may be mentioned that before the Board considers any matter,
there is a Technical Sub Committee which considers that
matter and makes recommendation to the Board which is the final
accepting authority subject to confirmation by Government.
Jt
may also be mentioned that at one stage in September
l 966,
the Technical Sub Committee had accepted the tender of the
Corporation, but on September 22, 1966 the Board had turned
down that tender as it was unduly high and ordered fresh negotiations.
On November 2, 1966 the Chief Engineer made a
report which was placed before the . Technical Sub Committee
on November 3, 1966. Eventually the. Board
accepted
the
tender of respondent No. 3 at 4 per cent below the estimated
cost.
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FERNANDEZ v. MYSORE (Wanchoo, c. J.)
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We may indicate here the second ground in support of the
contention that there was discrimination and this is based on what
happened on October 15, 1966 after the sealed tenders were opened at 4 p.m.
The case of the appellant was that thereafter the
Chief Engineer carried on secret negotiations with respondent
No. 3 and managed to get from him the letter reducing the rates
by 4 per cent below the estimated cost so that his became the
lowest tender and that no such opportunity was given to other
tenderers. The case of the State on the other hand was that the
Chief Engineer called a meeting of all the tenderers at 7 p.m. on
October 15, 1966, as in his opinion the offers made in the second
tenders were in no way advantageous to Government and had not
shown any substantial improvement over the earlier tenders.
At
that meeting the Chief Engineer asked all the tenderers if they
wanted to make any further reductions or withdraw any condi·
tions, if so they should immediately give it in writing. Thereupon
only two tenderers, namely, the Corporation and one other, said
that they would write again while the appellant and five others said
lb.at they had no further reduction to make. Respondent No. 3
immediately thereafter wrote the letter which was. received that
very evening stating that he would be prepared to take the contract
unconditionally at 4 per cent below the estimated cost. The
Chief Engineer also denied that there were any secret negotiations, opened by him with respondent No. 3 on October 15
1966 or that he was favouring respondent No. 3 or that he had
not· invited all the tenderers to make the reduction if they
could.
The grievance of the appellant was that he would have
been equally prepared to reduce his tender by the paltry percentage of . 36 per cent and to take the contract at 4 per cent
below the estimated cost if that was all that·was required. But
he contended that things were so manipulated in favour of respondent No. 3 that he was eventually granted the tender at only
a little less than what the appellant had offered
and
much
above what the respondent No. 3 had originally offered.
So
o'! November 14, 1966 the appellant filed the writ petition in the
High Court based on the two points already indicated.
The
State repudiated both the contentions. The High Court dismissed the petition holding firstly that there was no breach of
the conditions of tender contained in the Code, and secondly
that there was no discrimination which attracted the application
of Art. 14.
The same two contentions have been urged on behalf of the
appellant before us. The first is that the way in which tenders
were dealt with from July 30, 1966 right up to October 15,
1966 showed that the rules contained in the Code relating to·
tenders were not followed.
Secondly, it is urged that in any
L 1 Sup. C.1./67-1 I
642
SUPllBMB OOUllT llBPORTS
[1967] 3 S.C.R.
case there was discrimination between the appellant and respondent No. 3.
Taking first the contention with respect to the code not
being followed in the matter of tenders, the question that arises
is whether this Code consists of statutory rules or not. The
High Court has observed that the so-called rules in the Code
are not framed ei!her under any statutory enactment or under
any provision of the Constitution.
They are merely in the
nature of administrative instructions for the guidance of the
department and have been issued under the executive power of
the State. Even after having said so, the High Court has considered whether the instructions in the Code were followed in the
present case or not. Before however we consider the question
whether instructions in the Code have been followed or not, we
have to decide whether these instructions have no statutory
force.
If they have no statutory · force,
they
confer
no
right
on any body
and
a
tenderer
cannot
claim
any rights on the basis of these administrative instructions. If
these are mere administrative instructions it may be open to
Government to take disciplinary action against its servants who
do not follow these instructions but non-observance of such
administrative instructions does not in our opinion confer any
right on any member of the public like a tenderer to ask for a
writ against Government by a petition under Art. 226.
The
matter may be different if the instructions contained in the Code
are statutory rules. Learned counsel for the appellant is unable
to point out any statute under which these instructions in the
Code were framed.
He also admits that they are administrative
instructions by Government to its servants relating to the Public
Works Department.
But his contention is that they are rules
issued under Art. 162 of the Constitution.
Now Art.
162
provides that "executive power of a State shall extend to the
matters with respect to which the legislature of the State has
power to make Jaws".
This Article in our opinion merely indicates the scope of the executive power of the State; it does not
eonfer any power on the State Government to issue rules thereunder.
As a matter of fact wherever the Constitution envisages
issue of rules it has so provided in specific terms. We may,
for example, refer to Art. 309, the proviso to which Jays down
in specific terms that the President or the Governor of a State
may make rules regulating the recruitment and the conditions
of service of persons appointed to services and posts under the
Union or the State. We are therefore of opinion that Art. 162
does not confer any power on the State Govemme.nt to frame
rules and it only indicates the scope of the executive power of
the State.
Of course, under such executive power, the Sta~e
can give administrative instructio11s to its servants ho~ to ac.t m
certaiit circumstances; but that will not make such instructions
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statutury rules which are justiciable in certain circumstances. In
order that such executive instructions have the force of statutory
rules it must be shown that they have been issued. either under
the authority conferred on the State Government by some statute
or under some provision of the Constitution providing therefor.
It is not in dispute that there is no statute which confers any authority on the State Government to issue rules in matters with
which the Code is concerned; nor has any provision of the Constitution been pointed out to us under which these instructions
can be issued as statutory rules except Art. 162. But as we
have already indicated, Art. 162 do.es not confer any authority
on the State Government to issue statutory rules. It only provides
for the extent and scope of the executive power of the
State Government, and that coincides with the legislative
power of the State legislature. Thus
under
Art.
162,
the State Government can take executive action in all matters
in which the legislature of the State can pass laws.
But
Art. 162 itself does not confer any rule making power on the
State Government in that behalf.
We are therefore of opinion
that instructions contained in the Code are mere administrative instructions and are not statutory rules. Therefore even
if there has been any breach of such executive instructions that
does not confer any right on the appellant to apply to the court
for quashing orders in breach of such instructions. It is unnecessary for us to decide whether there has been in fact a
breach of any instruction contained in the Code with respect to
tenders and we do not therefore so decide. But assuming that
there has been any breach that is a matter between the State
Government and its servants and the State Government may
take disciplinary action against the servant concerned who disobeyed these instructions. But such disobedience did not confer
any right on a person like the appellant, to come to court for
any relief based on the breach of these instructions. It is for
this reason that we are not referring to the Code, though the
Hjgh Court did consider whether there was any breach of th~se
administrative instructions and came to the conclusion that there
was no breach.
In the view we take it is unnecessary for us to
consider this, for we are of opinion that no claim for any relief
before a court of law can be founded by a member of the
public, like the appellant, on the breach of mere administrative
instructions.
Coming now to the argument under Art. 14, the first con·
tention is that though seven days' time had expired on August
26, 1966, the Chief Engineer took info account the letter of resp~nd;-nt ~o._ 3. which came to him on August31, 1966 ·and that
this 1s d1scnmmatory.
We have already indicated that no such
argument was apparently put forward in the High Court; nor
do we think that there is any substrum: therein. The seven. days
644
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1967] 3 S.C.R.
period given is not a period of limitation and it cannot be said
that it was not open to the Chief Engineer to take into account
a letter which came a few days later.
There might have been
some case of discrimination if at that stage i.e. on August 31,
1966, the Chief Engine.er had rejected any other tenderers reply
on the ground that it was beyond seven days or if some one's
conditional tender was rejected on the ground that it was not
made unconditional by August 31, 1966.
But no such thing
happened and therefore there can be no question of discrimination on the ground that the letter of August 31, 1966 written
by respondent No. 3 was acted upon by the Chief Engineer.
Besides, it appears that in a letter dated August 25, 1966 the
appellant was asked to reply by August 31, 1966 and so it seems
th.at the seven days time fixed by the Chief Engineer for reply was
not absolutely rigid and that explains why he wrote to the appel~
!ant also to send a final reply by August 31, 1966. We are therefore of opinion that the fact that the Chief Engineer acted on the
letter of respondent No. 3 which came to him on August 31, 1966
cannot be said to amount to discrimination.
The other discrimination alleged is about what happened on
October 15, 1966. The case of the appellant is that some negotiations were carried. on by the Chief Engineer with respondent
No. 3 alone after sealed tenders were opened at 4 p.m. on October
15, 1966. But the Chief Engineer has clearly denied that and his
care is that all the tenderers were called by him at 7 p.m. and he
asked them all whether they were prepared to make any further
reduction. His case further is that six of them were not prepared
to make any change while two said that they would send a reply
later.
His case further is that respondent No. 3 sent a letter the
same day reducing the rates 4 per cent below the estimated cost
The High Court has accepted the Chief Engineer's version. The
appe~lant does not deny that there was a meeting with the Chief
Engineer after the tenders were opened at 4 p.m. on October 15,
1966. His first affidavit on this point was vague and it was only
in the reply affidavit that he stated that the Chief Engineer had
not asked all the tenderers whether they would be prepared t()
reduce rates further or withdraw conditions. Nothing has been
brought to our notice which would induce us to disagree with the
view taken by the High Court, namely, that the Chief Engineer's
assertion that he asked all the tenderers whether they were prepared to make any further reductions or withdraw ariy conditions
is correct If that is so-and we have no difficulty in accepting
the Chief Engineer's assertion in that behalf-there is no question
of discrimination in connection with what happened on October
15, 1966.
The appeal therefore fails and is hereby dismissed with costs.
V.P.S.
Appeal dismissed.
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