# G.M.ARUMUGAM v. S. RAJGOPAL & OTHERS

- **Citation:** [1976] 3 S.C.R. 82
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1975-12-19
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 1171 of 1973
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/g-m-arumugam-v-s-rajgopal-others-6839
- **Pages:** 17

## Headnote

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82
G.M.ARUMUGAM
v.
S. RAJGOPAL & OTHERS
December 19, 1975
!Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, P. N. BHAGWATI AND R. S. SARKAR!A, JJ.]
Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950, Paras 2 and 3-Adi Dravida,
l·o111'ertcd to Clnislia11ity and reconverted to Hinduisn1-lf and wlu'n could be
treated as Adi Dravida.
When conversion affects caste.
Code of Civil Procedure (Act 5 of 1908) s.
.iboiil caste of a candidat€ in one ell·ction petition
ari5es in another later election.
11-Res judicata-Dec1sio11
if res~judicata lVhen question
In the 1967 election to the State Legislative Assembly, the appellant and the
1st respondent clai1ning to be Adi Dravidas, stood as candidates for a
seat
reserved for Scheduled Castes.
The respondent was declared elected.
The appellant's election petition challenging the election was
allov-'ed
by the High
Court. This Court dismissed the respondent's appeal holding, (I) that the res·
pon<lent \Vas converted to Christianity in 1949, (2) that on such conversion he
ceased to be an Adi Dravidn, ( 3) that he \Vas reconverted to Hinduism but ( 4)
assuming that membership of a caste can be acquired on conversion or reconversiL1n to Hinduism, the respondent had frtiled to establish lhat he became a
member of the Adi Dravida caste after reconversion.
In the 1972 elections, the appellant and respondent again filed their nominations as Adi Dravidas for the seat reserved for Scheduled Castes.
On objection by the appellant, the lleturning Officer rejected the nomination of the
respondent on the view that on conversion to Christianity. he ceased t•J be an
Adi Dravida and that on reconversion, he could not claim the benefit of the
Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order,
1950.
The appellant was
declared
elected.
The respondent challenged the election and the 1-ligh Court held thrit
the question (a) whether the respondent embraced Christi<Jnity in 1949, (bl
whether on such conver<;ion he ceased to be nn Adi Dravida, and ( c) whether
he was reconverted to Hindtlism, were concluded by the decision of this Court
in the earlier case. In fact, the respondent so conceded on the first tv-'o ~tspects.
The High Court, however, held that the respondent had established twelve circircustanccs,
which
happened
subsequent
to
the
earlier
election
showing thrtt he
\Vas
accepted
intq their
fold by
the
members· of
the
.1\di Dravida caste, that he was, therefore, at the material time, an Adi Dravida
professing Hindu religion ns required by paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Constitution
/Scheduled Cnstes) Order, and that therefore, his nomination wa~ impr·operly
rejected.
Dismissing the appeal to this Court,
HELD: (1) The question whether :he respondent abandoned Hinduism and
embraced Christianity in 1949 is essentially a question of fact.
Tflc respondent,
having conceded before the High Court, that in view of the decision of this Court
in the earlier case, the question did not survive for consideration ;.1nd the High
Court, having acted on that concession, the respondent could not be pern1itted
to raise an argument thnt the evidence did not establish that he en1braced Christianity in 1949. l89 D-F]
r2) Similarly. the question \Vhcther the respondent was reconverted to H-induism stands concluded by the decision of this Court in the eariier case and it
mu~t be held that since prior to January 1967. the respondent \\'<lS re-converted
to Hinduism, he was, at the material time. professing the Hindll religion so as to
satisfy the requirement of para 3 of the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order.
[94 C-DJ
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G. M. ARUMUGAM V. S. RAJGOPAL
83
(3) The High Court was right in the view that on r:_ecoversion to Hinduis~,
the respondent could once again reconvert to his original Adi Dravida ~aste tf
he was accepted, as such, by the other members of that caste; _and that, in fact,
the respondent after his reconversion to Hinduism, was recognised and accep~ed
·1s a member of the Adi Dravida caste by the other members of that community.
'
[97 A-B, 98 G]
(a) Since

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82
G.M.ARUMUGAM
v.
S. RAJGOPAL & OTHERS
December 19, 1975
!Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, P. N. BHAGWATI AND R. S. SARKAR!A, JJ.]
Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950, Paras 2 and 3-Adi Dravida,
l·o111'ertcd to Clnislia11ity and reconverted to Hinduisn1-lf and wlu'n could be
treated as Adi Dravida.
When conversion affects caste.
Code of Civil Procedure (Act 5 of 1908) s.
.iboiil caste of a candidat€ in one ell·ction petition
ari5es in another later election.
11-Res judicata-Dec1sio11
if res~judicata lVhen question
In the 1967 election to the State Legislative Assembly, the appellant and the
1st respondent clai1ning to be Adi Dravidas, stood as candidates for a
seat
reserved for Scheduled Castes.
The respondent was declared elected.
The appellant's election petition challenging the election was
allov-'ed
by the High
Court. This Court dismissed the respondent's appeal holding, (I) that the res·
pon<lent \Vas converted to Christianity in 1949, (2) that on such conversion he
ceased to be an Adi Dravidn, ( 3) that he \Vas reconverted to Hinduism but ( 4)
assuming that membership of a caste can be acquired on conversion or reconversiL1n to Hinduism, the respondent had frtiled to establish lhat he became a
member of the Adi Dravida caste after reconversion.
In the 1972 elections, the appellant and respondent again filed their nominations as Adi Dravidas for the seat reserved for Scheduled Castes.
On objection by the appellant, the lleturning Officer rejected the nomination of the
respondent on the view that on conversion to Christianity. he ceased t•J be an
Adi Dravida and that on reconversion, he could not claim the benefit of the
Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order,
1950.
The appellant was
declared
elected.
The respondent challenged the election and the 1-ligh Court held thrit
the question (a) whether the respondent embraced Christi<Jnity in 1949, (bl
whether on such conver<;ion he ceased to be nn Adi Dravida, and ( c) whether
he was reconverted to Hindtlism, were concluded by the decision of this Court
in the earlier case. In fact, the respondent so conceded on the first tv-'o ~tspects.
The High Court, however, held that the respondent had established twelve circircustanccs,
which
happened
subsequent
to
the
earlier
election
showing thrtt he
\Vas
accepted
intq their
fold by
the
members· of
the
.1\di Dravida caste, that he was, therefore, at the material time, an Adi Dravida
professing Hindu religion ns required by paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Constitution
/Scheduled Cnstes) Order, and that therefore, his nomination wa~ impr·operly
rejected.
Dismissing the appeal to this Court,
HELD: (1) The question whether :he respondent abandoned Hinduism and
embraced Christianity in 1949 is essentially a question of fact.
Tflc respondent,
having conceded before the High Court, that in view of the decision of this Court
in the earlier case, the question did not survive for consideration ;.1nd the High
Court, having acted on that concession, the respondent could not be pern1itted
to raise an argument thnt the evidence did not establish that he en1braced Christianity in 1949. l89 D-F]
r2) Similarly. the question \Vhcther the respondent was reconverted to H-induism stands concluded by the decision of this Court in the eariier case and it
mu~t be held that since prior to January 1967. the respondent \\'<lS re-converted
to Hinduism, he was, at the material time. professing the Hindll religion so as to
satisfy the requirement of para 3 of the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order.
[94 C-DJ
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G. M. ARUMUGAM V. S. RAJGOPAL
83
(3) The High Court was right in the view that on r:_ecoversion to Hinduis~,
the respondent could once again reconvert to his original Adi Dravida ~aste tf
he was accepted, as such, by the other members of that caste; _and that, in fact,
the respondent after his reconversion to Hinduism, was recognised and accep~ed
·1s a member of the Adi Dravida caste by the other members of that community.
'
[97 A-B, 98 G]
(a) Since a caste is a social combination of person governed by its rules
and regulations, it may, if
its rules and regulations so provide, admit a ~ew
member just as it may expel an existing member. The rules and regulations
of the caste may not have· been formalised-they may not exist i~ black and
\vhite : they n1ay consist only of practices and usages.
If, according to
the
practice and u-;age o~ the caste any particular ceremonies. are. required to be performed for readmission to the caste, a reconvert to H1ndu1sm would have to
perform those ceremoni~s if he seeks readmission to the. c~ste. But, if no rites
or ceremonies nre required to be performed for readm1ss1on of a person as a
1nember of the caste, the only thing necessary would be the acceptance of the
person concerned by the other n1embers of the caste. [95 C-F]
(b) The consistent view taken by the Courts from tha time of the decision in
Adniinistrator General of Madras v. Anandachari (ILR 9 Mad. 466), that is,
since 1886, ha~ been that on reconversion to Hinduism, a person can once again
become a member of the caste in which h6 was born and to which he belonged
before conversion to another religion if the members of the caste accept him
as a member.
If a person who has embraced another religion can be reconverted to Hinduism, there is no rational principle why he should not be able to
come back to his caste, if the other members of the caste are prepared to readmit him as a member. It stands to reason that he should be able to come
back to the fold to '\Vhich he once belonged, provided the community is willing
to take him within the fold.
[96 C-Rl
Nathu v. Keshwaji I.L.R. 26 Born. 174; Guruswami Nadar v. lrulappa Konar,
A.LR. 1934 ]\.fad. 630 and Durgaprasada Rao v. Sudarsanaswami, AIR 1940
:\·tad. 513, referred to.
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(c.) It is the orthodox Hindu Society, still dominated to a large extent, partiE
cularly in rural areas, by medievalistic outlook and
status-oriented
approach
\Vhich attaches social and economic disabilities to a person belonging to a Scheduled Caste and that is why, certain favoured treatment -is- given to him by the
Constitution. Once such a person ceases to be a Hindu and becomes a Christian,
the social and economic disabilities arising because of Hindu religion cease and
hence, it is no longer necessary to give him protection; and for this reason, he
is deemed n0t to belong to a Scheduled Caste. But, when he is reconverted to
Hinduism, the social and economic disabilities once again revive and become
attached to him, because, these are disabilities inflicted by Hinduism. Therefore.
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the object and purpose of the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order Would be
advanced rather than retarded by taking the view that on reconversion to Ifinduism, a person can once again become a member of the Scheduled Caste to which
he belonged prior to his conversion. [96 F-97 A]
(d) Out of the 12 circumstances relied on by the High Court, 5 are not of
importance, namely, (i) that the respondent celebrated the marriages of his
younger brothers in the Adi Dravida manner;
(ii) that the respondent was
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looked upon as a peace-maker among the Adi Dravida Hindlls of the locality·
(iii) that the funeral ceremonies of the respondent's father were
performed
according to the Adi Dravida Hindu rites; (iv) that he participated in the first
annual death ceremonies of another Adi Dravida; and (v) that the
respondent participated in an All India Scheduled Castes Conference. The other seven
circumstances, however, establish that the respondent \\'as accepted and treated
as a member of the Adi Dravida community, namely, (i) that be was invited
to lay the foundation stone for the construction of the wall of an Adi Dravida
temple; (ii) that he was asked to take part in the celebrations connected with
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an Adi Dravida temple; (iii) that he was asked to preside at a festival connected with an Adi Dravida temple; (iv) that he was a member of the Exe~
cutivc Committee of the Scheduled Caste Cell in the organisation of the Ruling
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[J 976] 3 S.C.R.
Congress; (v) that his children were registered in school as Adi Dravidas and
that even the appellant had given a certificate that the respondent's son was an
Adi Dravida; (vi) that he V.'as treated as a member of the Adi Dravida caste
and was never diso\vned by the members of the caste; and (vii) that a Scheduled
Caste Conference \Vas held in the locality with the object of re-admitting the
respondent into the fold of Adi Dravida Caste and that not only was the purificatory ceremony performed on him at the Conference with a view to clearing
the doubt which had been cast on his membership of the Adi Dravida caste by
the earlier decision of this Court, but also an address \Vas presented to him felicitating him on the occasion. [97 C-98 F]
( 4) (a) The question whether on conversion to Christianity the respondent
ceased to be a member of the Adi Dravida caste is a mixed question of law
and fact and a concession made by him in the High Court on that question does
not prec_iude him from re-agitating it in the appeal before this Court.
r:~9 0-H]
(b) Further, the decision given in the
earlier case relating to
the
1967
elections on the basis of the evidence led in that case, cannot operate as res
judicata in the present case which relates to the 1972-election and \vhere fresh
evidence· has been adduced by the parties and moreover, when all the parties
in the present case are not the same as those in the earlier case. l89 H-90 B]
(c) When a 'caste' is referred to in modern times, the reference is not to the
4 primary castes. but to the innumerable castes and sub-castes that prevail
in
Hindu society.
The general rule is that conversion operates as an expulsion
from the caste, that is, a convert ceases to have any caste, because. caste
is
pre-dominantly a feature of Hindu Society and ordinarily a person, '"ho ceases
to be a Hindu, would not be regarded by the other members of the caste
as
belonging to their fold.
But it is not an invariable rule that \vhenever a person
renounces Hinduism and embraces another religious faith, he
automatically
ceases to be a me1nber of the caste in which he was born and to which he be·
longed prior to his conversion.
Ultimately, it must depend on the struchJre of
the caste and its rules and regulations whether a person would cease to belong
to the caste on his abjuring Hinduism.
If the structure of the caste is such
that its members, n1ust necessarily belol)g to Hindu religion, a member, who
ceases to be a Hindu, would go out of the_caste, because, no non-Hindu can he
in the caste according to its rules and regulations.
Where, on the other hand,
having regard to its structure, as. it has evolved over the years, a caste may
consist not only of persons professing Hinduism but also persons professing some
other religion as well, conversion from Hinduism to that other religion may not
involve loss of caste, because, even persons professing that other religion can
be members of the caste.
This might happen where caste is based on economic
or occupational characteristics and not o.n religious identity, or the cohesion of
the caste as a social group is so strong that conversion into another religion does
not operate to snap the bond between the convert and the social group. This
is ~ndeed not an infrequent phenomenon in South India, where, in some of the
castes, even after conversion to Christianity, a person is regarded as continuing
to belong to the caste.
What is,_ therefore,
material to consider is how the
caste looks at the question of conversion.
Does it outcaste or ex-communicate
the convert or does it still treat him as continuing within its fold despite his
conversion.
If the convert desires and intends to continue as ;:i me1nhec of the
caste and the caste also continues to treat him as a member not\vithstanding
his conversion, he v..·ould continue to be a n1ember of the caste, and the views
of the new faith hardly matter.
Paragraphs 2
and
3 of the
Constitutio_n
(Scheduled Castes) Order, read together. also recognise
th::it
there may be
castes specified as Scheduled Castes which comprise persons belonging to a religion different from Hindu or Sikh religion.
In such cast~s, conversion of a
person from Hinduism cannot have the effect of putting hin1 out of the caste,
though, by reason of para 3, he would be deemed not to be a member of the·
Scheduled Caste. [90 F; 91 B-G; 93 C-E. F-H]
fl
Cooppoosan1i Clietty v. Duraisami Chetty, I.L.R. 33 Mad. 67: Mutl1usa1ni v.
Masilarnani, I.L.R. 33 Mad. 342; G. Michael v. S. Venkateswara11,
AIR 1952
Mad. 474: Kothapalli J'v'arasayya v. Ja1nn1ana Jogi, 30 E.L.R. 199; K.
Narasin1ha Reddy v. G. Bhupathi, 31 E.L.R. 211; Gangat v. Returning Officer, [1975]
'
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G. M. ARUMUGAM v. s. RAJGOPAL (Bhagwati, J.)
85
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1. S.C.C. 589 and Chatturbhuj Vithafdas Jasani v. Moreshwar Prasahran1, [1954]
A
S.C.R. 817, referred to.
[It would, therefore, prilna facie, seem that on conversio~ to C~ristianity, the
respondent did not automatically cease to. belong to the Adi prav1da caste; bu~
in view of the decision that on reconversion he
":'as
~eadm1tted to
the
AdL
Dravida faith, no final opinion was expresesd on this point.] [94 B-C]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1171 of 1973.
B
From the judgment and order dated the I 9th July, I 973
of the
Mysore High Court at Bangalore in Election Petition No. 3 of 1972 .
. M. N. Phadke, M/s. N. M. Ghatate and S. Balakrishnan for the
appellant.
A. K. Sen, G. L. Sanghi, M/s. M. Veerappa and Altai Ahmed for
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the respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
BHAGWATI, J.-This appeal under s. 116-A of the Representation
of People Act, 1951 is directed against an orde.r made by the Hi~h
Court of Mysore setting aside the election of the appellant on the
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ground that the nomination paper of the 1st respondent was improperly
rejected by the Returning Officer.
This litigation does not stand in
isolation. It has a history and that is necessary to be noticed in order
to appreciate the arguments which have been advanced on behalf of
both parties in the appeal.
The appellant and the !st respondent have been opponents in the
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electoral battle since a long time.
The constituency from which they
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have been standing as candidates is 68 KGF Constituency for election
to the Mysore Legislative Assembly.
They opposed each other
as
candidates from this constituency in 196 7 General Election to the
Mysore Legislative Assembly.
Now, the seat from this constituency
was a seat reserved for Scheduled Castes and, therefore, only members
of Scheduled Castes could stand as candidates from this constituency.
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The expression "Scheduled Castes" has a technical meaning given to
I it by cl. (24) of Art. 366 of the Constitution and it means "such
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castes, races or tribes or parts of or groups within such castes or
tribes as are deemed under Art. 341 to be Scheduled Castes for the
purpose of the Constitution". The President, in exercise of the power
conferred upon him under Art. 341 issued the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950.
Paragraphs 2 and 3 of this
Order are
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material and, since the amendment made by Central Act 63 of 1956,
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they are in the following terms :
"2. Subject to the provisions of this Order, the castes,
races or tribes or parts of, or groups within castes or tribes
specified in Part I to XIII of the Schedule to · this Order
shall, in relation to the States to which those parts respecH
tively relate, be deemed to be scheduled castes so far as
regards members thereof resident in the localities specified
in relation to them in those Parts of that Schedule.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 3 S.C.R.
3. Notwithstanding anything contained in paragraph 2,
no persou who professes a religion different from the Hindu
or the Sikh religion shall be deemed to be a member of a
Scheduled Castes."
The Schedule to this Order in Part VIII sets out "the castes, races or
tribes or parts of or groups within castes or tribes" which shall in the
different areas of the State of Mysore be deemed to be Scheduled
Castes.
We are concerned with cl. (I) of Part VIII as the area of
68 KGF Constituency is covered by that clause.
One of the castes
specified there is Adi Dravida and that caste must, therefore, for the
purpose of election from 68 KGF Constituency, be deemed to be a
Scheduled Caste.
The appellant was admittedly, at the date when
he filccl his nomination paper for the 1967 election from 68 KGF
Constituency, an Adi Dravida professing Hindu relig10n
and
was
consequently qualified to stand as a candidate !or the reserved scat
from this constituency.
The 1st respondent also claimed to be an
Adi Dravida professing Hindu religion and on this basis, filed his
nomination from the same constituency.
The appellant and the 1st
respondent were thus rival candidates-in fact they were
the
only
two contesting candidates- and in a straight contest, the 1st respondrnt defeated the appellant and was declared elected.
The appellant thereupon filed election petition No. 4 of 1967 in
the Mysore High Court challenging the election of the 1st respondent
on t11c ground that the !st respondent was not an Adi Dravida professin~ Hindu religion at the date when he filed his nomination and
was, therefore, not qualified to stand as a candidate for the reserved
scat from 68 KGF Constituency.
The Mysore High Court, by an
orJcr da:ed 30th August, 1967, held that the 1st respondent
was
converted to Christianity in 1949 and on such conversion, he ceased
to be an Adi Dravida and, therefore, at the material date, he could
not be said to be a member of a s,heduled Caste, nor did he profess
Hindu religion, and he was consequently not eligible for being chosen
as a candidate for election from a reserved constituency.
The l st
responJcnt being aggrieved by the order setting aside his
election,
preferred C.A. No. 1553 of 1967 to this Court under s. 116A of the
Representation of People Act, 1951.
This Court addressed itself to
four question, namely, first, whether the 1st respondent had become
a convert to Christianity in 1949; secondly, whether, on such conversion, he ceased to be a member of Adi Dravida caste; thirdly, whether
he had reverted to Hinduism and started professing Hindu religion at
the date of filing his nomination, and lastly, whether on again professing the Hindu religion, he once again became a member of Adi
Dravida caste. So far as the first question was concerned, this Court,
on a consideration of the evidence, held that the 1st respondent was
converted to Christianity in 1949 and in regard to the second question, this Court observed that it must be held that when the 1st respondent embraced Christianity in 1949, he ceased to belong to Adi
Dravida caste.
This Court then proceeded to
consider the
third
question and held that having regard to the seven circumstances enumerated in the judgment, it was clear that at the relevant time in 1967.
that is in January-February 1967, the !st respondent was professing
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G. M. ARUMUGAM v. s. RAJGOPAL (Bhagwati, !.)
8 7
Hindu religion.
That led to a consideration of the last question as
to the effect of reconversion of the !st respondent to Hinduism. This
Court referr<d to a 1mmber of decisions of various High Courts which
laid down the principle that "on reconversion to Hinduism, a person
can become a member of the same caste in which he was born and
to which he belonged before havin_g been converted to another religion", and pointed out that the main basis on which these decisions
proceeded was that "if the members of the caste accept the reconversion of a person as a member, it should be held that he docs become
a member of that caste, even though he may have lost membership of
that caste on conversion to another religion".
This Court, however,
did not consider it necessary to express any opinion on the correctness
of these decisions, as it found that even if the principle enunciated in
these decisions was valid, the !st respondent did not give evidence to
satisfy the requirements laid down by this principle and "failed
to
establish that he became a member of the Adi Dravida Hindu caste
after he started professing the Hindu religion". This Court observed
that "whether the membership of a caste can be acquired by conversion to Hinduism or after reconversion to Hinduism is a question
on which we have refrained from expressing our opinion, because on
the assumption that it can be acquired, we have arrived at the conclusion that the appellant", that is, the !st respondent in the present
case, "must fail in this appeal". This Court accordingly upheld the
decision of the High Court and dis1nissed the appeal. (1)
This decision was given by a Bench consisting of two judges on
3rd May, 1968. In the three or four years that followed
certain
events happened to which we shall refer a little later.
Suffice it to
state for the present that, according to the 1st respondent, these events
showed that the members of the Adi Dravida caste accepted him as
a member and regarded him as belonging to their fold.
The next
General Election to the Mysore Legislative Assembly took place in
1972. There was again a contest from 68 KGF Constituency which
was reserved for candidates from Scheduled Castes.
T)le appellant
filed his nomination as a candidate from this constituency and so did
the !st respondent.
The nomination of the
1st respondent was,
however, objected by the appellant on the ground that the 1st respondent was not an Adi Dravida professing Hindu religion at
the
date of filing his nomination and he was, therefore, not qualified to
stand as a candidate for the reserved seat from this constituency. The
!st respondent rejoined by saying that he was never converted to
Christianity and that in any event, even if it was held that he had become a Christian, he was reconverted to Hinduism since long and was
accepted by the members of the Adi Dravida caste as belonging to
their fold and was, therefore, an Adi Dravida professing Hindu religion at the material date and hence qualified to stand as a candidate.
The Returning Officer, by an order dated 9th February, 1972, upheld the objection of the appellant and taking the view that, on conversion to Christianity, the 1st respondent ceased to be an Adi Dravida
and thereafter on reconversion, he could not claim the benefit of the
Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950, the Returning Officer
(I) S. Rajagopal v. C.M. Arumugam, [1969] 1 S.C.R. 254.
7-1390 SCI/76
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 3 S.C.R.
rejected the nomination of the 1st respondent.
The election thereafter took place without the !st respondent as a candidate and the
appeliaut, having obtained the highest number of votes, was declared
elected.
The !st respondent filed Election Petition No. 3 of 1972 in the
High Court of Mysore challenging the election of the appellant on
the £round that the nomination of the 1st respondent was improperly
rejected.
This was a ground under s. 100 ( 1) ( c) of the Act and if
well founded, it would be sufficient, without more, to invalidate the
election.
The poirit which was, therefore, seriously debated before
the High Court was whether the nomination of the 1st respondent was
improperly rejected and that in its turn depended on the answer to the
question whether the 1st respondent was an Adi Dravida professing
Hindu religion at the date of filing his nomination. There were four aspects bearing on this question which arose for consideration and they
were broadly the same as in the earlier case (supra), namely, whether
the !st respondent embraced Christianity in 1949, whether on his conversion to Christianity he ceased to belong to
Adi Dravida caste,
whether he was reconverted to Hinduism and whether on such reconversion, he was accepted by the members of the Adi Dravida caste
as belonging to their fold.
So far as the first three aspects were concerned, the High Court took the view that they must be taken to be
concluded by the decision of this Court in the earlier case
(supra)
and the discussion of the question must, therefore, proceed on the
established premise that the 1st respondent was born an Adi Dravcda
Hindu, he was converted to Christianity in 1949 and on such conversion he lost his capacity as an Adi Dravida Hindu and at least by the
year 1967, he had once again started professing Hindu religion. Visa-vis the fourth aspect, the High Court observed : "It is settled law.
that reconversion to Hinduism does not require any formal ceremony
or rituals or expiratory ceremonies, that a reconvert to Hinduism can
revert to i).is original Hindu caste on acceptance by the members of
that caste and that the quantum and degree of proof of acceptance
depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, according to
the established customs prevalent in a particular locality amongst the
caste there", and on this view of the law, the High Court proceeded
to examine the evidence led on behalf of the parties and pointed out
that this evidence established twelve important circumstances subsequent lo January-Febrnary 1967 which clearly showed that the 1st
respondent was accepted into their fold by the members of the Adi
Dravida caste and he was, therefore, at the material time, an
Adi
Dravida professing Hindu religion as required by Paragraphs 2 and 3
of the Constitution (Scheduled Caste) Order, 1950. The High Court,
in this view, held that the nomination of the !st respondent was improperly rejected by the Returning Officer and. that invalidated. the
election under s. 100(1) (c) of the Act. The High Court accordmgly
set aside the election of the appellant and declared it to be void. This
judgment of the High Court is impugned in the present appeal under
s. ll 6A of the Act.
Now before we deal with the contentions urged on behalf of the
aprcllant in support of the appeal, it would be convenient first
to
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G. M. ARUMUGAM v. s. RAJGOPAL (Bhagwati, l.)
89
refer to two grounds which were held by the High Court against the
1st respondent.
The 1st respondent
contended
that
these
two
grounds were wrongly decided against him and even on these
two
grounds, he was entitled to claim that, at the material time, he was
an Adi Dravida professing Hindu religion. The first ground was that
he was never converted to Christianity and the second was, that, on
such conversion, he did not cease to be an Adi Dravida. The appellant disputed the clainr of the 1st respondent to agitate these
two
grounds in the appeal before us. The reason given was that the !st
respondent had not pressed them in the course of the arguments
before the High Court and had conceded that, in view of the judgment of this Court in the earlier case, Issue No. 3, which raised the
question: "Whether the petitioner having abandoned Hinduism und
embraced Christianity in the year 1949 had lost the membership of
the Adi Dravida Hindu caste and incurred the disqualification under
Paragraph 3 of the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Ori!er,
1950"
and "Is this issue concluded against the petitioner by virtue of the
judgment of the High Court in Civil Appeal 1553 of 1967", did not
survive for consideration. There can be no doubt that so far as the
first of these two grounds is concerned, there is force in the objection
raised 0n behalf of the appellant.
The question wh~ther the 1st respondent abandoned
Hinduism
and embraced Christianity in 1949 is essentially a question of fact
and if, at the stage of the. arguments before the High Court, the 1st
respondent conceded that, in view of the decision of this Court in
the earlier case, this question did not survive for consideration and
the High Court, acting on the concession of the
1st respondent,
refrained from examining the question on merits and proceeded on
the basis that it stood concluded by the decision of this Court in the
earlkr case, how could the 1st respondent be now permitted to reagitate this question at the hearing. of the appeal before this Court ?
The 1st respondent. mnst be held bound by the concession made by
him on a question of fact before the High Court. We cannot, therefore, permit the 1st respondent to raise an argument that the evidence
<Jn record does not establish that he embraced Christianity in 1949.
We must proceed on the basis that he was converted to Christianity
in that year.
The position is, however, different when we turn to the question
whe:her, on conversion to Christianity, the 1st respondent ceased to
be a member of the Adi Dravida caste. That question is a mixed
question of law and fact and we do not think that a concession made
by tk 1st r~spondent on snch a question at the stage of argument
before the High Court, can preclude him from reagitating it in the
.appea1 before this. Court, when it formed the subject matter of an
issue before the High Court and full and complete evidence in reoard
to su-:h issue was led by both parties. It is true that this Court held
in the earlier case that, on embracing Christianity in 1949, the l st
respondent ceased to be a member of the Adi DraVida caste but this
decision given in a case relating to 1967 General Election on' the basis
of the eyidence led in that case, cannot ?e res judicata in the present
case wh,ch relates to 1972 General Elecl!on and where fresh evidence
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has been adduced on behalf of the parties, and more so, when all
the parties in the present case are not the same as those in the earlier
case. It is, tlierefore, competent to us to consider whether, ou the
evidence on record in the present case, it can be said to have been
established that, on conversion to Christianity in 194?, the 1st respondent ceased to belong to Adi Dravida caste.
It is a matter of common knowledge that the institution of
caste
is
a peculiarly Indian institution.
There is considerable
controversy
amongst
scholars
as
to
how
the
caste
system originated in this country. It is not necessary for the purpose
of this appeal to go into this highly debatable question. It is sufficient
to state that originally there were only four main caste~ but gradually castes and sub-castes multiplied as the social fabric e,ipanded with
the absorption of different groups of people belonging to various cults
and professing different religious faiths. The caste system in its early
stages was quite elastic but in course of time it gradually hardened
into a rigid framework based upon heredity. Inevitably it gave rise
to gradation which resulted in social inequality and put a premium on
snobbery. The caste system tended to develop, as it were, group
snobbery, one caste looking down upon another.
Thus there came
into being social hierarchy and stratification resulting in perpetration
of social and economic injustice by the so-called higher castes on the
lower castes. It was for this reason that it was thought necessary by
the Constitution makers to accord favoured treatment to the lower
castes who were at the bottom of the scale of social values and who
were afllicted by social and economic disabilities and the Constitution makers accordingly provided that the President may specify the
castes and these would obviously be the lower castes which had suffered centuries of oppression and exploitation-which shall be deemed
to be Scheduled Castes and laid down the principle that seats should
be reserved in the legislatnre for the Scheduled Castes as it was believed and rightly, that the higher castes would not properly represent
the mterest of these lower castes.
But that immediately raises the question : what is a caste? When
we speak of a caste, we do not mean to refer in this context to the
four primary castes, but to the multiplicity of castes and sub-castes
which disfigure the Indian social scene. "A caste'', as pointed out by
the High Court of Madras in Cooppoosami Chetty v. Duraisami Chetty( ') "is a voluntary association of persons for certain purposes." It
is a well defined yet fluctuating group of persons governea by their
own rules and regulations for certain internal purposes. Sir H. Risley
has shown in his book on People of India how castes are formed
based not only on community of religion, but also on community of
functions. It is also pointed out by Sankaran Nair, J., in Muthusami
v. Masilamani(2 ) : "-a change in the occupation sometimes creates
a new caste.
A common occupation sometimes combines members
of different castes into a distinct body which becomes a new caste.
Migration to another place makes sometimes a new caste". A caste
is more a social combination than a religious group. But since, as
(!) I. L. R. 33 Mad. 67.
(2) I. L. R. 33 Mad. 342.
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G. M. ARUMUGAM v. s. RAJGOPAL (Bhagwati, !.)
91
pointed out by Rajamannar, C.J., in C. Michael v. S. VenkateswaA
ran (1), ethics provides the standard for social life and it is founded
ultimately on religious beliefs and doctrines, religion
is
inevitably
mixed up with social conduct and that is why caste has become an
integral feature of Hindu society. But from that it does not necessarily follow as an invariab.le rule that whenever a person renounces
Hinduism and embraces another religious faith,
he
automatically
ceases to be a member .of the caste in which he was born and to which
B
he belonged prior to his conversion. It is no doubt true; and there we
agree with the Madras High Court in C. Michael's case (supra) that
the general rule is that conversion operates as an expulsion from the
caste, or, in other words, the convert ceases to have any caste, because caste is predominantly a feature of Hindu society and ordinarily
a person who ceases to be a Hindu would not be regarded by the
other member> of the caste as belonging to their fold. But ultimately
C
it must depend on the structure of the caste and its rules aud regulations whether a person would cease to belong to the caste on his
abjuring Hinduism. If the structure of the caste is such that its members must necessarily belong to Hindu religion,
a member,
who
ceases to be a Hindu, would go out of the caste, because no nonHindu can be in the caste according to its rules and regulations.
Where, on the other hand, having regard to its structure, as it has
D
evolved over the years, a caste may consist not only of persons professing Hindu religion but also persons professing some other
religion as well, conversion from Hinduism to that other religion may
not involve loss of caste, because even persons professing such other
religion can be members of the caste. This might happen where caste
is based on economic or occupational characteristics and
not on
religious identity or the cohesion of the caste as a social group is so
E
strong that conversion into another religion does not operate to snap
the bond between the convert and the social group. This is indeed not
an infrequent phenomenon in South India where,
in some of the
castes, even after conversion to Christianity, a person is regarded as
continuing to belong to the caste.
When an argument was advanced
before the Madras High Court in G. Michael's case (supra) "that
there were several cases in which a member of one of the lower castes
II
who has been converted to Christianity has continued not only to consider himself as still being a member of the caste, but has also been
considered so by other members of the caste who had not been converted," Rajamannar, C.J., who, it can safely be presumed,
was
familiar with the customs and practices prevalent in South India,
accepted the position "that instances can be found ill which in spite
of conversion the caste distinctions might continue", though he treated
G
them as exceptions to the general rule.
_ The High Court of Andhra Pradesh also affirmed in Kothapalli
Narasayya v. Jammana Jogi(') that "notwithstanding conversions, the
converts whether an individual or family or group of converts, may
like to be governed by the law by which they were g,averned before
they became converts-and the community to which they originally
H
(1)- A.l.R. 1952 Mad. 474.
(2) 30 EL. R. I.
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belonged may also continue to accept them within their fold notwithstanding conversion", and proceeded to add :
"While tendency to divide into sects and division to form
new sects with their own religious and social observances
is a characteristic feature of Hinduism-it should be remembered that sects were formed not only on community of religions but also community of functions. Casteism which has
taken deep roots in Hinduism for some reason or other may
not therefore cease its existence even after conversion.
May
be that the religion or faith to which conversion takes place,
on grounds of policy or otherwise, does not take exception
to this social order which does not interfere with its spiritual or theological aspect which is the main object of the
religion.
That is why we find several members of lower
castes converted to Christianity in Madras State-still c011··
tinue to the members of their castes-Thus a conversion
docs not necessarily result in extinguishment of caste and
notwithstanding conversion, a convert may enjoy the privileges social and political by virtue Of his being a member
of the community with its acceptance."
The elected candidate in this case was held to continue to belong to
the Mala Andhra Caste which was a Scheduled Caste, despit.e his
conversion to Christianity. It was again reiterated by the High Court
of Andhra Pradesh in a subsequent decision reported in K. Narasimha
Reddy v. G. Bhupathi(l) that survival of caste after conversion to
Christianity is not an unfamiliar phenomenon in this part of the
country and it was held that, even after his conversion ,to Christianity, the elected candidate, who belonged to Bindla caste, specified
as a Scheduled Caste, continued to retain his caste, since he never
abjured his caste nor did his caste people ostracize or excommunicate.
him.
The caste system is indeed so deeply ingrained in the Indian
mind that, as pointed out by this Court in Ganpat v, Returning Officer,(') "for a person who has grown up in Indian society, it is very
difficult to get out of the coils of the caste system·· and, therefore,
even conversion to another religion like Christianity, has in some
cases no impact on the membership of the caste and the other men,.
bers continue to regard the convert as still being a member of the
caste.
This Court pointed out in Ganpat's case (supra) that "to this
day one sees matrimonial advertisements which want a Vellala Christian bride or Nadar Christian bride" which shows that Vellala and
Nadar comprise both Hindus and Christians.
It seems that the correct test for determining this question is the
one pointed out by this Court in Chatturbhuj Vithaldas Jasani v.
Moreshwar Prasahram.(")
Bose, J., speaking on behalf of the Court
in this case pointed out that when a question arises whether conversion operates as a break away from the caste "what we have to
(1) 31 E.L.R.211.
(2) [197511 S.C.C. 589.
(3) [19541S.C.R.817.
t
. G. M. ARUMUGAM v. s.