# G. PARSHWANATH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA

- **Citation:** [2010] 10 S.C.R. 377
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2010-08-18
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 628 of 2005
- **Bench:** Harjit Singh Bedi, J.M. Panchal
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/g-parshwanath-v-state-of-karnataka-26094
- **Pages:** 33

## Headnote

A
B
Penal Code, 1860 - ss.302 and 201 - Punishment for
murder and for causing disappearance of evidence -
Prosecution case rested on circumstantial evidence -
C
Charred bodies of accused's wife and minor son recovered
from the house of accused - Accused suspected the
character of his wife and that he had not fathered the child -
Accused's mother-in-law testified that the accused subjected
his wife to cruelty - Door of the accused's house was found o
locked from outside - Kerosene was found present on the
dead bodies- Trial courl convicted the accused u/ss.302 and
201 and sentenced him to life imprisonment - Conviction
affirmed by High Coult - On appeal, held: The prosecution
sufficiently proved that the deaths were homicidal -More than
E
one and totally inconsistent defences were taken by the
accused - The suicide theory put forlh by the defence is not
only improbable but also impossible - The accused had
sufficient motive to kill his wife and the child - The chain of
circumstances against the accused when viewed with the false
explanation given by him, with reference to the incident in
F
question, makes it clear that the accused was the only person
responsible for murders of the two deceased - Conviction
upheld.
·
Evidence - Circumstantial evidence - Appreciation of -
G
Law discussed.
The wife and the minor son of the appellant died of
extensive burn injuries. Placing reliance upon the
377
H
378
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 10 S.C.R.
A circumstantial evidence in the facts and circumstances
of the case, the Sessions Judge convicted the appellant
under Sections 302 and 201 IPC and sentenced him to
life imprisonment. The conviction was affirmed by the
High Court.
B
In the instant appeal, the appellant challenged his
conviction stating that the circumstances on which the
prosecution proposed to rely were not firmly established
nor did they form a chain to indicate that it was the
appellant and appellant alone who had committed
C murders of the two deceased.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD:1. The evidence tendered in a court of law is
D either direct or circumstantial. Evidence is said to be
direct if it consists of an eye-witness account of the facts
in issue in a criminal case. On the other hand,
circumstantial evidence is evidence of relevant facts from
which, one can, by process of intuitive reasoning, infer
about the existence of facts in issue or factum
E probandum. In cases where evidence is of a
circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the
conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should, in the first
instance, be fully established. Each fact sought to be
relied upon must be proved individually. However, in
F applying this principle a distinction must be made
between facts called primary or basic on the one hand
and inference of facts to be drawn from them on the other. ·
In regard to proof of primary facts, the court has to judge
the evidence and decide whether that evidence proves
G a particular fact and if that fact is 1>roved, the question
whether that fact leads to an inference of guilt of the
accused person should be considered. In deciding the
sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence for the purpose
H
G. PARSHWANATH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
379
of conviction, the court has to consider the total A
cumulative effect of all the proved facts, each one of
which reinforces the conclusion of guilt and if the
combined effect of all these facts taken together is
conclusive in establishing the guilt of the accused, the
conviction would be justified even though it may be that B
one or more of these facts by itself or themselves is/are
not decisive. The facts established should be consistent
only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and
should exclude every hypothesis except the one sought
to be proved. But this does not mean that before the c
prosecution can succeed in a case resting upon
circumstantial evidence alone, it must exclude each and
every hypothesis suggested by the accused, howsoever,
extravaga

## Text

_Characters 0–39,873 of 67,437. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39873 for what follows._

[2010] 10 S.C.R. 377
G. PARSHWANATH
V.
STATE OF KARNATAKA
(Criminal Appeal No. 628 of 2005)
AUGUST 18, 2010
[HARJIT SINGH BEDI AND J.M. PANCHAL, JJ.]
A
B
Penal Code, 1860 - ss.302 and 201 - Punishment for
murder and for causing disappearance of evidence -
Prosecution case rested on circumstantial evidence -
C
Charred bodies of accused's wife and minor son recovered
from the house of accused - Accused suspected the
character of his wife and that he had not fathered the child -
Accused's mother-in-law testified that the accused subjected
his wife to cruelty - Door of the accused's house was found o
locked from outside - Kerosene was found present on the
dead bodies- Trial courl convicted the accused u/ss.302 and
201 and sentenced him to life imprisonment - Conviction
affirmed by High Coult - On appeal, held: The prosecution
sufficiently proved that the deaths were homicidal -More than
E
one and totally inconsistent defences were taken by the
accused - The suicide theory put forlh by the defence is not
only improbable but also impossible - The accused had
sufficient motive to kill his wife and the child - The chain of
circumstances against the accused when viewed with the false
explanation given by him, with reference to the incident in
F
question, makes it clear that the accused was the only person
responsible for murders of the two deceased - Conviction
upheld.
·
Evidence - Circumstantial evidence - Appreciation of -
G
Law discussed.
The wife and the minor son of the appellant died of
extensive burn injuries. Placing reliance upon the
377
H
378
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 10 S.C.R.
A circumstantial evidence in the facts and circumstances
of the case, the Sessions Judge convicted the appellant
under Sections 302 and 201 IPC and sentenced him to
life imprisonment. The conviction was affirmed by the
High Court.
B
In the instant appeal, the appellant challenged his
conviction stating that the circumstances on which the
prosecution proposed to rely were not firmly established
nor did they form a chain to indicate that it was the
appellant and appellant alone who had committed
C murders of the two deceased.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD:1. The evidence tendered in a court of law is
D either direct or circumstantial. Evidence is said to be
direct if it consists of an eye-witness account of the facts
in issue in a criminal case. On the other hand,
circumstantial evidence is evidence of relevant facts from
which, one can, by process of intuitive reasoning, infer
about the existence of facts in issue or factum
E probandum. In cases where evidence is of a
circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the
conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should, in the first
instance, be fully established. Each fact sought to be
relied upon must be proved individually. However, in
F applying this principle a distinction must be made
between facts called primary or basic on the one hand
and inference of facts to be drawn from them on the other. ·
In regard to proof of primary facts, the court has to judge
the evidence and decide whether that evidence proves
G a particular fact and if that fact is 1>roved, the question
whether that fact leads to an inference of guilt of the
accused person should be considered. In deciding the
sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence for the purpose
H
G. PARSHWANATH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
379
of conviction, the court has to consider the total A
cumulative effect of all the proved facts, each one of
which reinforces the conclusion of guilt and if the
combined effect of all these facts taken together is
conclusive in establishing the guilt of the accused, the
conviction would be justified even though it may be that B
one or more of these facts by itself or themselves is/are
not decisive. The facts established should be consistent
only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and
should exclude every hypothesis except the one sought
to be proved. But this does not mean that before the c
prosecution can succeed in a case resting upon
circumstantial evidence alone, it must exclude each and
every hypothesis suggested by the accused, howsoever,
extravagant and fanciful it might be. There must be a chain
of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable 0
ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence
of the accused and m.ust show that in all human
probability the act must ti.ave been done by the accused;
where various links in chcliin are in themselves complete,
then the false plea or false defence may be called into aid
only to lend assurance to the court. [Para 11] [394-H; 395E
A-H; 396-A-C]
2.1. The first circumstance relied upon by the
prosecution is that both the deceased were residing with
the appellant and that the incident in question took place F
in the house of the appellant. The fact that the incident in
question has taken place in the house of the appellant is
not disputed by the appellant and this fact, also stands
firmly proved by the evidence of PW-12 (the mother of the
deceased) as well as by other evidence on the record. G
[Para 13] (396-E-G]
2.2.The second circumstance relied upon by the
prosecution is that the wife of the appellant had
telephoned her parents on the date of the incident and H
380
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[20.10] 10 S.C.R
A
complained about harassment meted out to her by the
appellant. The record of the case shows that PW-12, the
mother of the deceased, was searchingly cross-examined
at length by the defence on different dates; however, the
assertion made by her that on the day of incident at about
B
11.00 A.M. the deceased had reported cruelty meted out
to her over the telephone to her father, could not be
demolished at all. PW12 further stated that again at about
1.00 P.M., she herself had telephoned her daughter and
as soon as the receiver was picked up by her daughter
c the door bell of the house of the deceased rang and,
therefore, the deceased had put down the receiver saying
that her husband had come and that she would telephone
her, i.e., PW-12 at 2.00 P.M. The evidence of PW-12
establishes beyond shadow of doubt that at about 1.00
0
P.M. the appellant had visited his house and left the same
and subsequently at about 2.00 P.M. a person had
telephoned the parents of the deceased informing them
about the death of the appellant's wife and her child at
the residence of the appellant. Her evidence also makes
E
clear that the incident in question had taken place
between 1.00 P.M and 2.00 P.M. [Para 14) [396-H; 397-AE; 398-8-D]
2.3. The third circumstance relied upon by the
prosecution is that the appellant who had visited his
F
house at about 1.00 P .M. had left the same and come back
when the fire fighters were extinguishing the fire.
According to the appellant himself, he had left his house
in order to give instructions to the shopkeeper, at whose
shop he had given a refrigerator for repair. It is neither
G the case of the appellant nor there is evidence to show
that any other person had visited his house between 1.00
P.M. to 2.00 P.M. Therefore, the only reasonable inference
that can be drawn would be that after the appellant had
left the house, no other person had entered the house of
H the appellant. PW-4, fireman in the fire brigade, was asked
G. PARSHWANATH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
381
a crucial question as to wherefrom the door of the house
was closed. In reply, it was stated by him that he was not.
able to say whether the door was bolted from inside or
locked from outside. However, in his statement recorded
under Section 161 CrPC, he had stated that the door was
locked from outside and, therefore, it was broken. As he
tried to plead ignorance about the fact whether door was
bolted from inside or locked from outside, he was treated
as hostile to the prosecution. However, it is settled law
that just because a witness turns hostile his entire
evidence need not be rejected by court. The trial court,
which had the advantage of observing the demeanour of
PW4, relied upon his testimony for the purpose of coming.
to the conclusion that the main door of the house of the
appellant was locked from outside. This finding has been
approved by the High Court on re-appreciation of the
entire evidence. The appellant could have been the only
person who could have locked his house from outside.
This circumstance was put to the appellant when his
statement under Section 313 CrPC was recorded. But no
explanation worth the name could be offered by him as
to how the door of the house was found locked from
outside. In addition, in the proceedings initiated under
Section 174 CrPC at the instance of the appellant, he had
mentioned that he had locked the door from outside
while going out to bring the repaired refrigerator. On the
facts and in the circumstance of the case, this finding
recorded by the trial court and affirmed by the High Court
deserves to be accepted by this Court. Once the
conclusion is reached that the door was locked from
outside, unpleasant inference would have to be drawn
that the door was locked only with the intention to see
that the deceased, who were set on fire, were not able to
come out from the house nor any outsider was in a
position to enter the house and make attempt to rescue
the deceased. [Para 15] [398-D-H; 399-A-H]
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
382
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 10 S.C.R.
A
2.4. The fourth circumstance relied upon by the
prosecution is that kerosene was found by the Doctor
who had conducted autopsy on the two dead bodies. The
evidence of the Doctor (PW-21) makes it clear that he had
found presence of kerosene on both the dead bodies.
B Though the Doctor could not give a clear opinion as to
whether the death was homicidal or suicidal, but the fact
that presence of Kerosene was found on the dead bodies
stands amply proved by the evidence of PW-21. [Para 16)
(399-H; 400-A-B]
c
2.5. Another circumstance sought to be relied upon
by the prosecution is that the deceased wife was alive and
conscious when she was set on fire and it was not
probablized by the appellant that when the house caught
fire the deceased inhaled carbon monoxide due to which
D the deceased had died and subsequently they were burnt
in the fire which had engulfed the house. The postmortem reports of the deceased revealed important
features regarding the position of the dead bodies and the
extent of burns and make it clear that both the deceased
E were alive when they had received the burn injuries and,
therefore, the trial court as well as the High Court were
justified in rejecting the contention of the appellant that
both the deceased had received burn injuries after they
were already dead. [Paras 17, 19) (400-C-D; 405-E-F]
F
Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology by H.W.V. Cox
and Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology by Modi - referred
to.
2.6. The sixth circumstance on which the prosecution
G has relied upon is that the deaths were homicidal and not
suicidal. The fact that the wife and son of the appellant
had died of extensive burn injuries stands amply proved
even otherwise by the contents of the post-mortem
reports produced coupled with the evidence of the
H Doctor who had conducted autopsy on the dead bodies.
G. PARSHWANATH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
383
The evidence of fire brigade personnel i.e. PW-4 and PWA
5 who were the first to enter the house and the
photographer PW-14 clearly establishes that both the
deceased had died unnatural death due to excessive
burn injuries. On perusal of the photographs produced
on the record of the case, it is clear that the dead bodies
B
were found lying inside a rpom next to eactl other. The
scene of offence sketched clearly indicates that the
house of the appellant is a big one, having a large
courtyard behind the living rooms etc. If the deceased
had tried to commit suicide after setting herself on fire c
she could not have slept peacefully on the floor as is
indicated in the photograph because of the intensive
heat. Further, the burning process would make her run
around and not only in the room but in the entire house.
However, the photograph Exhibit P-24 clearly indicates 0
otherwise. The trial court and the High Court have rightly
held that the suicide theory put forth by the defence is
not only improbable but also impossible. [Paras 20, 21]
[405-G-H; 406-A-G]
3. In a case when the motive alleged against E
accused is fully established, it provides foundational
material to connect the chain of circumstances. However,
in a case based on circumstantial evidence where proved
circumstances complete the chain of evidence, it cannot
be said that in absence of motive, the other proved
circumstances are of no consequence. The absence of
motive, however, puts tile court on its guard to scrutinize
the circumstances more carefully to ensure. that
suspicion and conjecture do not take place of legal proof.
F
In the instant case, on the question of motive which G
prompted the appellant to commit the crime in question,
the prosecution has alleged that the appellant had a
dislike for his deceased wife as he was su~pecting that
he had not fathered the child and he was contemplating
to marry another girl. The finding recorded by the High
H
384
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2010] 10 S.C.R.
A
Court that from a letter relied upon by the defence i.e.
Exhibit D-2 it transpires that the appellant was harassing
the deceased and treating her with cruelty because he
was desirous of marrying some other girl cannot be
ignored. The contents of other letters produced by the
B defence indicate that there was definitely something
wrong between the appellant and his wife. They also
indicate that the appellant was suspecting the character
of the deceased and definitely causing mental cruelty to
her. This constitutes sufficient motive on the part of the
c appellant to kill his wife and child. The appellant had··
initiated divorce proceedings against deceased. Those
proceedings were dismissed for default. PW-17 claimed
that the appellant's wife used to write letters to her stating
that the appellant was subjecting her to ill-treatment
0
saying that the child was not born through him. Her
testimony would indicate that she had given reply to the
letter of appellant's wife and one such reply was
produced as Exh. P-25. Though this witness was also
cross-examined searchingly, nothing could be brought
on record to impeach her credibility. The evidence of PWE
17 also establishes the motive on the part of the appellant
for commission of crime in question. [Para 22] [407-B-H;
408-A-G]
4.1. If all the circumstances of the instant case are
F
taken together coupled with the absence of any material
to indicate that the appellant's wife had committed
suicide with the child, they lead to only one inference that
in all human probability the murders of the deceased
were committed by the appellant alone and none else.
G From the evidence of PW-3 ASI, it is clear that the
appellant, knowing fully well that he had committed
murders of his wife and child. gave false opinion to the
police on the basis of which UDR proceedings were
initiated. By examining the refrigerator repairer, it was
H sought to be suggested by the appellant that he was not
G. PARSHWANATH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
385
present in his house when the incident had taken place.
A
Thus, the defence of the appellant was that a fire had
taken place in his house and both the deceased had died
because of inhaling of carbon monoxide after which their
bodies were burnt lJecause the house was engulfed in
fire. However, at another stage the defence of the
B
appellant was that his deceased wife with his child had
committed suicide because· her parents . were
pressurizing her to leave matrimonial home for their
selfish purpose of having income of the deceased.
Whereas, the deceased was not inclined to leave her c
matrimonial home. Thus, more than one and totally
inconsistent defences have been taken by the appellant.
All the defences were false to the knowledge of the
appellant. Not a single defence was found to be probable
or plausible either by the trial court or by the High Court.· 0
The appellant could not explain satisfactorily the
circumstances in which his wife and child met violent
deaths. Therefore, offering of false explanation by the
appellant regarding death of his wife and child will have
to be regarded as an additional circumstance against him
strengthening the chain of circumstances already firmly
found. [Para 23] [408-G-H; 409-A-F]
E
4.2. The evidence on record has been rightly
appreciated by the trial court and the High Court. On
appreciation of the evidence, the appellant is found guilty.
F
Neither the reasons given by the trial court nor given by
the High Court can be termed as perverse so as to call
for interference of this Court. [Para 24] [409-G-H]
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
G
No. 628 of 2005.
From the Judgment & Order dated 17.12.2004 of the High
Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Criminal Appeal No. 14247
of 2003.
H
386
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 10 S.C.R.
A
J.S. Attri, Dr. N.N. Ghatate, Rajesh Mahale, A. Rohan
Singh, Aditya, Sanjay R. Hegde, Avijit Roy, Keshav Roy
Choudhary (for Corporate Law Group), Gopal Singh, Chandan
Kumar, Niraj Jha, D.K. Thakur, Subhash Kaushik, Anil Katiyar,
Anis Suhrawardy, S. Mehdi Imam, Mohd. P. Dabas, T. Ahmed,
B G. Prakash, B. Anand, P.V. Dinesh, M.P. Singh, C.D. Singh,
K.H. Nobin Singh, Kuldip Singh, K.K. Pandey, Aruna Mathur,
Amarjeet Singh, S. Thanajayan, Promila, Harish Kr., R.
Nedumaran,
V.G.
Pragasam,
S.J.
Aristotle,
P.
Ramasubramanin, Rituraj Biswas, T.C. Sharma, Neelam
c Sharma, A.P. Mayee, Asha G. Nair, Kamini Jaiswal, Atul Jha,
D.K. Sinha, Milind Kr., R. Gopalakrishnan, Aruneshwar Gupta,
Ranjan Mukherjee, Gopal Prasad, Ratan K. Chaudhary, Abhay
Prakash Sahay, J. K. Bhatia, D. Bharathi Reddy, A.
Subhashini, H. Wahi, K. N. Gupta, Naresh K. Sharma, Himinder
D Lal, Prashant, J.R. Das, G.V. Rao, Kamlendra Mishra, Praveen
Swarup, D.S. Mehra, P.V. Dinesh, Ramesh Babu M.R.,
Subramonium Prasad, C.D. Singh, Vibha Datta Makhija, Atul
Jha, Dharmendra Kumar Sinha, Manish Kumar Saran for the
appearing parties.
E
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
J.M. PANCHAL, J. 1. The instant appeal questions legality
. of judgment dated December 17, 2004, rendered by High Court
of Karnataka at Bangalore in Criminal Appeal No. 1427 of
F 2003 by which judgment dated September 1, 2003 delivered
by the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Bellary in S.C. No.
91/93 convicting the appellant under Sections 302 and 201 IPC
and sentencing him to undergo RI for life and fine of Rs.5,000/
- in default RI for six months for commission of offence
G punishable under Section 302 IPC as well as RI for one year
and fine of Rs.2,000/- in default RI for two months for
commission of offence punishable under Section 201 IPC, is
confirmed.
2. The facts emerging from the record of the case are as
H under:-
G. PARSHWANATH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
387
[J.M. PANCHAL, J.]
Deceased Chethana was daughter of Jwalnaiah and Smt.
A
Radhamma. The parents of the deceased were residents of
Bangalore. Marriage of deceased Chethana took place with t; 1tl
appellant in the year 1987. After marriage the deceased started
residing at Bellary because the appellant and his family were
residents of Bellary. In the year 1988 the deceased gave birth
B
to a male child, who was named Mahaveer. Initially the relations
between the appellant and the deceased were cordial, but, after
sometime bickering started taking place between the two of
them. As the days passed by, this bickering grew into
discordiality resulting in the harassment and cruelty to the c
deceased by the appellant. The deceased used to complain
about harassment and cruelty meted out to her, to her father,
mother and sister when she had occasion to meet them. The
deceased Chethana had mentioned before her sister Ranjana
Jain that the appellant was treating her cruelly and was
D
harassing her because he was having a doubt that the male
child was not born through him and that the appellant was having
illicit relationship with one girl named Asha of Bangalore. The
harassment meted out to the deceased reached such a peak
that one day the deceased had to call her parents to Bellaiy
E
and the parents had to take help ofpolice to take back the
deceased to their house at Bangalore. Obviously, the appellant
. was annoyed and, therefore, lite appellant filed a petition for
divorce. During the time when thedeceased was staying with
her parents at Bangalore and when the divorce petition was
pending, efforts were made to settle the disputes between
husband and wife amicably. The result of those efforts was that
the appellant had withdrawn the divorce petition whereas the
deceased had started living with the appellant at Bellary. On
F
the surface, the differences appeared to have cooled down for
some time but nevertheless ill treatment of the deceased. by the
G
appellant and ill feelings between the appellant and his family
on one hand and the deceased on the other continued.
On May 13, 1993 around 1.45 P.M. the neighbours of the
H
388
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010) 10 S.C.R.
A appellant noticed smoke and fumes emitting from the house of
the appellant, which was situated at Ganesh Temple Street,
Bellary. One of the neighbours summoned fire brigade service
and also informed police. Papaiah and Neelakanat, who were
then fire brigade officials, rushed to the house along with their
B team. They had to break open the front door of the house. When
they entered the house, they noticed two completely burnt and
charred bodies of a woman and child in one of the rooms. They
found that the appellant was not present in the house. They also
noticed that the appellant had come back to his house only after
c the information about the fire having taken place in his house
was conveyed to him.
On receiving a phone call in the police station, ASI on duty
went to the spot and made enquiry with the appellant, who by
that time had come back to his house. On the basis of the
D statement made by the appellant the ASI registered a case as
UDR No. 9/93 and sent requisition to the Executive Magistrate
to draw inquest proceedings. Accordingly Mr. Mahmood, who
was Taluka Executive Magistrate, went to the spot and held
inquest on the dead bodies of the two deceased. When the
E inquest proceedings were being held, the father of the
deceased, i.e., Jwalnaiah arrived at the scene along with Smt.
Jayashanti, who was one of the neighbours of the appellant. The
statements of the father of the deceased and Smt. Jayashanti
were recorded and photographs of the dead bodies were
F taken. The dead bodies were, thereafter, sent for post mortem
examination.
When the Executive Magistrate was holding inquest
proceedings, he suspected that the deaths of the two deceased
were unnatural ahd seemed more to be a case of their murder.
G Therefore, he sent intimation to the ASI. On receipt of the
intimation the ASI registered a case as Crime No. 121/93 for
the offences punishable under Sections 302 and 201 IPC
against the appellant alone. After registration of the FIR, the
same was sent to the jurisdictional Magistrate as well as to the
H
G. PARSHWANATH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
389
[J.M. PANCHAL, J.]
higher officials. Because of the gravity of the incident and
A
offences involved, the investigation was taken over by
Somashekar, who was then Inspector of Police. The Police
Inspector recorded statements of the neighbours, close relatives
and others, who were found to be conversant with the facts of
the case. The Police Inspector suspected that the appellant was
B
responsible for the murders of the deceased and, therefore, he
arrested the appellant at about 8.00 P.M. Necessary mahazars
were drawn and certain incriminating articles as well as
documents were seized. During the investigation, it transpired
that over and above the complicity of the appellant in two
C
murders, Radhabai, who was mother of the appellant and
Jaishree, who was sister of the appellant, were also involved
in the murders of the deceased. Therefore, they were also
arrested. On conclusion of investigation the appellant, his
mother and his sister were charge-sheeted in the court of o
learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bellary for commission of
offences punishable under Sections 498A, 302 and 201 IPC.
3. After the case was committed to the Court of learned
Sessions Judge, Bellary for trial, necessary charges were
framed against the appellant, his mother and his sister. The
E
charges were read over and explained to them. They pleaded
not guilty to the same and clailnad to be tried. Therefore, the
prosecution examined 32 witnesses and produced certain
documents in support of their case against the three accused.
After recording of evidence of prosecution witnesses was over,
the learned Judge explained to the three accused the
circumstances appearing against them in the evidence of the
prosecution witnesses and recorded their further statements as
required by Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The
appellant filed a detailed written statement inter alia mentioning
that his father-in-law, who was a former MLA and influential
person, had falsely implicated him and his family. It was stated
by the appellant that his father-in-law had neither regular income
nor properties except one house, which was given by him on
rent to tenants, who were paying meager rent of Rs.1,500/- per
F
G
H
390
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 10 S.C.R.
\
month and thus he was totally dependant upon the income of
his daughter ....; deceased Chethana - who was working as
computer engineer at Bangalore before her marriage and
supporting the family. What was claimed by the appellant was
that because of financial crunch from which his father-in-law
B was suffering, his father-in-law was insisting the appellant to
come and stay at Bangalore with him as a "Ghar-Jamai", which
was opposed by the appellant and since then his father-in-law
was nurturing a grudge against him. According to the appellant,
he was a man of an independent nature and had more
c responsibilities towards his family. According to him, he had
the responsibility of running the school established by his family
and, in such circumstances, he had refused to accept the offer
of his father-in-law and decided to stay at Bellary only. It was
mentioned by the appellant that feeling let down, his father-inD law had started pressurizing the deceased to desert the
. appellant and come back and stay with him at Bangalore and
to continue her computer career. The appellant had claimed in
his written statement that after the first Deepawali the deceased
was forcibly taken from Bellary to Bangalore by his father-inE law with the help of police. It was further stated that when the
deceased was pregnant and had delivered the first child, the
appellant had requested his father-in-law and mother-in-law to
send the deceased to Bellary to enable him and his family to
perform some religious ceremonies, but his father-in-law had
refused to send the deceased and when he had gone to bring
F his wife to Bellary, an attempt was made by his father-in-law to
assault him through his son. It was also mentioned in the written
statement that after the delivery of child Mahaveer, the
deceased with the child had come back to Bellary and was
living happily with him, but, again her parents had taken away
G her with the child forcibly and that is why he had to file a divorce
petition on the ground of desertion by his wife with a fond hope
that his wife and child would be sent back. According to him,
he was never serious about the divorce and that is why he had
not taken any further steps to pursue the petition and that is why
H the divorce petition was dismissed for non-prosecution. What
G. PARSHWANATH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
391
[J.M. PANCHAL, J.]
was stated by the appellant was that when the divorce
A
proceedings were pending, his wife, i.e., the deceased used
to write love letters to him .and no complaints were made in
those letters about the so-called harassment and cruelty by him
to her. It was asserted that due to decline in the income of his
father-in-law, the parents of the deceased were pestering the
deceased to stay with them whereas the deceased was inclined
to stay with the appellant and, therefore, out of frustration the
deceased with minor son Mahaveer committed suicide. The
explanation offered in his written statement further proceeded
to state that on May 13, 1993, he was at home till 1.00 P.M.
and as it was a summer holiday for the schools run by him and
the deceased was insisting to get the refrigerator back from
B
c
the repair shop, he had gone to the shop of Sattar Hussein at
whose shop the refrigerator was sent for repairs and informed
Sattar Hussein that the refrigerator should be sent to his home
D
immediately. It was mentioned by him that thereafter he had
proceeded to his school where someone had informed about
the fire having taken place in his house and, therefore, he had
rushed back on his motorcycle and found that his wife and son
were dead. According to him, the PSI had arrested him, taken
his signatures on blank paper and after deliberations with his
father-in-law, concocted the present case falsely not only against
him but also against his mother and sister, who were totally
innocent and this was done only with a view to harassing him
and seeking vengeance. In his written statement the appellant
had made attempt to point out certain discrepancies appearing
in the investigation and had ultimately prayed to acquit him of
all the charges.
E
F
4. It may be mentioned that though the appellant had
submitted a detailed written statement, he had not examined
G
any witness in support of his case pleaded in the written
statement. During the trial the original accused No. 2, i.e., Smt
Radhabai, who was mother of the appellant, expired and,
therefore, the appellant and his sister Jaishree were tried by
the learned Sessions Judge.
H
392
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 10 S.C.R.
A
5. On appreciation of the evidence adduced by the
prosecution and certain documents brought on record by the
appellant, the learned judge held that no case either against
the appellant or his sister was made out by the prosecution
under Section 498A IPC. The learned Judge thereafter
B proceeded to consider the question whether any case was
made out against the appellant and his sister for commission
of the offences punishable under Sections 302 and 201 IPC.
The learned judge noticed that the case against the appellant
and his sister was solely based or 1 circumstantial evidence and
c that no circumstances could be brought on record to suggest
that the sister of the appellant was responsible for the death of
the two deceased. However, the learned Judge came to the
conclusion that case against the appellant for commission of
offences punishable under Sections 302 and 201 IPC was
D proved beyond pale of doubt and sentenced him as noticed
earlier.
E
6. Feeling aggrieved the appellant preferred appeal, which
has been dismissed by the High Court, giving rise to the present
appeal.
7. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties
at length and considered the documents forming part of the
appeal.
8. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the
F appellant had left his house at about 1.00 P.M. to bring back a
refrigerator, which was given for repair in the shop belonging
to PW-15, who has spoken about the presence of the appellant
in his shop at the relevant time and, therefore, the High Court
erred in holding that the appellant had left his house at about
G 1.00 P.M. after committing murders of the deceased and had
come back only after he was informed about the fire having
taken place in his house. It was pointed out by the learned
counsel for the appellant that the ASI PW-23 had recorded the
statement of the appellant on the basis of which the said ASI
H had registered a case as UDR 9/93 under Section 174 of the
G. PARSHWANATH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
393
[J.M. PANCHAL, J.]
Criminal Procedure Code regarding unnatural death of the two
A
deceased and, therefore, the whole case built up against the
appellant on the basis of some suspicion shown by the
Tehsildar, should have been disbelieved by the High Court.
According to the learned counsel, the inquest report was a
suspicious document because as per the inquest report, which
B
was prepared between 4.00 P.M. and 6.00 P.M. on May 13,
1993, when the inquest proceedings were being held, the father
of the deceased had come to the spot and identified the two
dead bodies, which was highly doubtful because the father-inlaw of the appellant, who was staying at Bangalore, was c
informed by one PT Master at about 2.00 P.M. that the
deceased were dead and distance between Bellary and
Bangalore being about 300 Kms., it was not possible for the
father of the deceased Chethana to be present at Bellary at the
time when inquest proceedings were held and, therefore,
0
inquest report should have been ignored by the High Court.
What was argued by the learned counsel for the appellant was
that in the inquest report the Tehsildar had recorded that there
were 100% burn injuries on the deceased and that her clothes
were also burnt and that there were no clothes on the dead body
E
except a small piece of cloth, which was stuck between the
thighs and as Tehsildar had not noticed any other clothes on
the deceased, the suspicion entertained by the Tehsildar that
the case was of murder should not have been acted upon by
the police. The learned counsel pointed out the testimony of
doctor, examined as PW-31, who had conducted autopsy on
F
the dead bodies of the deceased Chethana and Mahaveer and
contended that the report indicated at the best that the child had
died a homicidal death but as far as deceased Chethana was
concerned in the opinion of the doctor, he was not able to state
whether the death of Chethana was suicidal or homicidal and, G
therefore, the High Court erred in holding that it was proved by
the prosecution that the deceased Chethana and her son
Mahaveer had died homicidal deaths. What was highlighted
was that the trial court did not find any material against the
appellant for convicting him under Section 498A IPC whereas
H
394
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 10 S.C.R.
A
the sister of the appellant came to be acquitted of all the
charges levelled against her and as evidence of prosecution
witnesses is not reliable at all, the appellant should have been
granted benefit of doubt to which he is entitled to. The learned
counsel emphasized that the circumstances on which the
B
prosecution proposes to rely are not firmly established nor they
form a chain to indicate that it was the appellant and appellant
alone who had committed murders of the two deceased and,
therefore, the appeal should be accepted.
9. The learned counsel for the State argued that it was
C sufficiently proved by the prosecution that death of the
deceased Chethana and Mahaveer were homicidal deaths
whereas motive and conduct of the appellant towards the
deceased when they were alive is also proved and if the above
mentioned circumstances are viewed with false explanation
D given by the appellant with reference to the incident in question,
it becomes at once clear that the appellant was the only person
responsible for murders of the two deceased. The learned
counsel emphasized that on appreciation of evidence the trial
court has recorded conviction of the appellant under Sections
E
302 and 201 IPC, which finding on re-appreciation of the
evidence has been confirmed by the High Court and, therefore,
the concurrent findings of facts should not be interfered with by
this Court while exercising powers under Article 136 of the
Constitution.
F
10. It is not in dispute that the case against the appellant
rests on circumstantial evidence and, therefore, before
adverting to the prosecution evidence against the appellant it
would be advantageous to recall to the memory, law relating
G to appreciation of evidence in a case based on circumstantial
evidence.
11. The evidence tendered in a court of law is either direct
or circumstantial. Evidence is said to be direct if it consists of
an eye-witness account of the facts in issue in a criminal case.
H
On the other hand, circumstantial evidence is evidence of
G. PARSHWANATH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
395
[J.M. PANCHAL, J.]
relevant facts from which, one can, by process of intuitive
A
reasoning, infer about the existence of facts in issue or factum
probandum. In dealing with circumstantial evidence there is
always a danger that conjecture or suspicion lingering on mind
may take place of proof. Suspicion, however, strong cannot be
allowed to take place of proof and, therefore, the Court has to
B
be watchful and ensure that conjectures and suspicions do not
take place of legal proof. However, it is not derogation of
evidence to say that it is circumstantial. Human agency may be
faulty in expressing picturisation of actual incident, but the
circumstances cannot fail. Therefore, many a times it is aptly
C
said that "men may tell lies, but circumstances do not". In cases
where evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances
from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should, in the
first instance, be fully established. Each fact sought to be relied
upon must be proved individually. However, in applying this
D
principle a distinction must be made between facts called
primary or basic on the one hand and inference of facts to be
drawn from them on the other. In regard to proof of primary
facts, the court has to judge the evidence and decide whether
that evidence proves a particular fact and if that fact is proved,
E
the question whether that fact leads to an inference of guilt of
the accused person should be considered. In dealing with this
aspect of the problem, the doctrine of benefit of doubt applies.
Although there should not be any missing links in the case, yet
it is not essential that each of the links must appear on the
surface of the evidence adduced and some of these links may
have to be inferred from the proved facts. In drawing these
inferences, the court must have regard to the common course
of natural events and to human conduct and their relations to
F
the facts of the particular case. The Court thereafter has to
consider the effect of proved facts. In deciding the sufficiency
G
of the circumstantial evidence for the purpose of conviction, the
court has to consider the total cumulative effect of all the proved
facts, each one of which reinforces the conclusion of guilt and
if the combined effect of all these facts taken together is
conclusive in establishing the guilt of the accused, the conviction
H
396
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 10 S.C.R.
A would be justified even though it may be that one or more of
these facts by itself or themselves is/are not decisive. The facts
established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the
guilt of the accused and should exclude every hypothesis except
the one sought to be proved. But this does net mean that before
B the prosecution can succeed in a case resting upon
circumstantial evidence alone, it must exclude each and every
hypothesis suggested by the accused, howsoever, extravagant
and fanciful it might be. There must be a chain of evidence so
complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the
C conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and
must show that in all human probability the act must have been
done by the accused, where various links in chain are in
themselves complete, then the false plea or false defence may
be called into aid only to lend assurance to the court.
D
12. Having noticed the principles governing the case
based on the circumstantial evidence this Court proposes to
consider the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution.
13.