# G. PONNIAH TREVAR v. NELLAYAM PERUMAL PILLAI AND OTHERS

- **Citation:** [1977] 2 S.C.R. 446
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1976-12-15
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 523 of 1976
- **Bench:** A. N. Ray, C.J. M. H. Beg, Jaswant Singh
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/g-ponniah-trevar-v-nellayam-perumal-pillai-and-others-7056
- **Pages:** 5

## Headnote

Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955, s. 2(e) "Landlord", whet~er relates only Ir;> creator of lease-Section 3 ( 1) whether protects tenancy
rzghts created by /lie-estate holder ;extending beyond his life-time-Provisions ot
Act, whether prospective.
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T~e plaintiffs-respondents· who became owners of the land in dispute, as.
remainder-men, sned to evict the appellant, a cultivating tenant, on the ground
that his tenancy rights created by Annamalai Ammal, a life-estate holder hact
ceased with her death. The appellant claimed protection under s. 3 ( 1) of the
Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955. The respondents contended
that such protection was only available against the creator of a lease, to persons
who were cultivating tenants in 1955 when the Act came into force, and not ti>
the appellant who became a cultivating tenant in 1961. The eviction-suit was.
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decreed by the District Court and the High Court.
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Allowin~ the appeal, the Court,
HELD : ( 1) The statutory definition of the term "tandlord" relates not only
to· the person who created the lease but contemplates and takes in every successive holder who could be entitled to evict a tenant.
That person can only be
one who has the right, at the time of filing the suit, to realise rents or evict
persons in wrongful occupation.
[4490-H]
(2) The terms of the statutory protection apply to all tenancie11 governed by the Act irrespective of the nature of rights of the person who leased the
· land ~o long as the lessor was entitled to create a tenancy. [447E]
The Court observedThe Madras High Court's view that a life estate holder cannot create
a
tenancy which could last beyond his life-time, applied to statutory tenancies
runs counter not only to the principles underlying creation of statutory tenancy
rights in agricultural land, through out the country, but is in conflict with tht:
particular statutory protection conferred upon cultivating tenants in the State of
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Madras. [447E-F]
(3) The provisions of the Act are prospective· except for section 4(1) and
even s. 4 (1) shows that the protection was not meant merely for those who
were cultivating tenants in 1.955. The provisions became enforceable as soon
as the Act became operative and there is nothing in the Act to show that it
ceased to be operative at any time or was limited in its operation only as
a
protection given to persons who were cultivating tenants in 1955. [450B-C]

## Text

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446
G. PONNIAH TREVAR
v.
NELLAYAM PERUMAL PILLAI AND OTHERS
December 15, 1976
(A. N. RAY, C.J. M. H. BEG AND JASWANT SINGH, JJ.]
Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955, s. 2(e) "Landlord", whet~er relates only Ir;> creator of lease-Section 3 ( 1) whether protects tenancy
rzghts created by /lie-estate holder ;extending beyond his life-time-Provisions ot
Act, whether prospective.
C
T~e plaintiffs-respondents· who became owners of the land in dispute, as.
remainder-men, sned to evict the appellant, a cultivating tenant, on the ground
that his tenancy rights created by Annamalai Ammal, a life-estate holder hact
ceased with her death. The appellant claimed protection under s. 3 ( 1) of the
Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955. The respondents contended
that such protection was only available against the creator of a lease, to persons
who were cultivating tenants in 1955 when the Act came into force, and not ti>
the appellant who became a cultivating tenant in 1961. The eviction-suit was.
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decreed by the District Court and the High Court.
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Allowin~ the appeal, the Court,
HELD : ( 1) The statutory definition of the term "tandlord" relates not only
to· the person who created the lease but contemplates and takes in every successive holder who could be entitled to evict a tenant.
That person can only be
one who has the right, at the time of filing the suit, to realise rents or evict
persons in wrongful occupation.
[4490-H]
(2) The terms of the statutory protection apply to all tenancie11 governed by the Act irrespective of the nature of rights of the person who leased the
· land ~o long as the lessor was entitled to create a tenancy. [447E]
The Court observedThe Madras High Court's view that a life estate holder cannot create
a
tenancy which could last beyond his life-time, applied to statutory tenancies
runs counter not only to the principles underlying creation of statutory tenancy
rights in agricultural land, through out the country, but is in conflict with tht:
particular statutory protection conferred upon cultivating tenants in the State of
·~
Madras. [447E-F]
(3) The provisions of the Act are prospective· except for section 4(1) and
even s. 4 (1) shows that the protection was not meant merely for those who
were cultivating tenants in 1.955. The provisions became enforceable as soon
as the Act became operative and there is nothing in the Act to show that it
ceased to be operative at any time or was limited in its operation only as
a
protection given to persons who were cultivating tenants in 1955. [450B-C]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 523 of 1976,
(Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated
29-1-1976 of the Madras High Court in Second Appeal No. 468/75).
K. S. Ramamurthi and Mrs. S. Gopalakrishnan, for the appellant.
T. S. Krishnamoorthi Iyer, K. Rajendra Chowdhary and Miss Veena
Devi Khanna, for respondents Nos. 2-4.
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G. PONNIAH TREVAR v. N. P. PILLAI (Beg, J.)
447
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
BEG, J.-This appeal by special leave raises quite a .simple question
of interpretation of the provisions of the Madras Cultivating Tenants
Protection Act, 1955, (hereinafter referred to as 'th~ Act'), wh~ch, we
think, have been ignored entirely by the Madras High Court m the
judgment under appeal.
The undisputed facts :.re : one Annamalai Pillai died leaving behind
two widows, namely, Annamalai Ammal and Veerayee. The last. m~n
tioned lady instituted a suit No. 482 of 1927 in the Court of the D1stnct
Munsif, Periyakulam, for partitioning the properties of the deceased:
impleading the other widow and a nephew of the d~ceased Annam2h!
Pillai as defendants. That suit ended in a compromise dated 6th July,
1935. Under the terms of the compromise decree, some land was given
to Annamalai Ammal for enjoyment during her life time, and, thereafter,
absolutely to the sons of the second defendant of suit No. 482 of 19~7.
Annamalai Ammal died on 26th July, 1968. She had, however, dunng
her life time, inducted a tenant, G. Ponniah Thevar, the appellant before
us, by means of a lease dated 27th March, 1961. After the death of
Annamalai Ammal, the plaintiffs-respondents, as remainder-men, sued
to evict the appellant, the cultivating tenant, on the ground that his
tenancy rights did not eirnre beyond the life time of Annamalai Ammal.
The suit for eviction, decreed by the District Court and the High ·
Court, is now before us. It is n©t disputed that the provisions of the
Act conferring protection upon cultivating tenants govern the rights of
the appellant. We are, therefore, not concerned with any rights under
any general or personal law which may enable the remainder .. men to
evict a tenant of a life estate holder.
The terms of the statutory protection apply clearly to all tenancies governed by the Act irrespective of
the nature of rights of the person who leased the land so long as the
lessor was entitled to create a tenancy.
It is not disputed before us
that Annamalai Ammal was entitled to create a tenancy. The only
question, on which there is a dispute, is whether a tenancy created by
her could legally extend beyond her life. The Madras High Court had,
apparently, followed certain decisions of that Court which had ripplied
the principle that a life estate holder cannot create a tenancy which
could last bey9nd the life of a life-estate holder. The view taken by the
Madras High Court and applied to statutory tenancies runs counter not
only to the principles underlying creation of statutory tenancy rights
in agricultural land, throughout the length and breadth of the country,
but, it seems to us to be obviously in conflict with the particular· statutory protection conferred upon cultivatfog tenants in the State of
Madras. These enactments are really meant for the purposes proclaimed
by them. The obvious effect of such statutorv provisions cannot be
taken away or whittled down by forensic sophistry. Courts should not
allow themselves to become tools for defeating clearly expressed statutory intentions.
Section 2(aa) of the Act lays down :
"2(aa) 'cultivating tenant' in relation to any land-
(1) means a person who carried on personal cultivation on
such land, under a tenancy agreement, express or implied, and
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·448
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1977) 2 S.C.R.
(2) includes-
(i) any .such l?erson as !s referred to in sub-clause (1) who
contmues m possession of the land after the determination of the tenancy agreement,
(ii) in the district of Tiruchirappalli, a Kaiaeruvaramdar or a
muttuva!amdar who works on the land under an engagement with the landlord for remuneration by a share in
the crop in respect of which the work is done, and
(iii) the heirs of any such person as is referred to in subclause (1) or sub-clause. (2) (i) and '(ii) : but docs not
include a mere intermediary or his heirs.
Explanation.-A sub-tenant shall be deemed to be a cultivating tenant of the holding under the landlord if the lessor of
such sub-tenant has ceased to be the tenant of such landlord;"
Section 3 ( 1) of the Act lays down :
"3 ( 1) Subject to the next succeeding sub-sections, no cultivating tenant shall be evicted from his holding or any part
thereof, by or at the instance of his landlord, whether in execution ofa decree or order of a Court or otherwise".
Section 3 (2) deals with the exceptional circumstances, such as default
in payment of rent, in which the statutory protection is lifted. Section
3 ( 3) relates to other matters with which also we are not concerned
here. Section 3 ( 4) lays down the procedure for the eviction of tenants
in those cases in which the statutory protection is removed. It runs as
follows:
"4(a) Every fandlord seeking to evict a cultivating tenant
falling under sub-section (2) shall, whether or not there is an
order or decree of a Court for the eviction of such cultivating
tenant, make an application to the Revenue Divisional Officer
and such application shall bear a Court-fee stamp of one
rupee.
(b) On receipt of such application, the Revenue Divisional Officer shall, after giving a reasonable opportunity to
the landlord and the cultivating tenant to make their representations, hold a summary enquiry into the matter and pass an
order either allowing the application or dismissing it and in a
c:ase falling under clause (a) or clause ( aa) of sub-section ( 2)
in which the tenant had not availed of the provisions contained in sub-section (3), the Revenue Divisional Officer may
allow the cultivating tenant such time as he considers just and.
reasonable having regard to the relative circumstances of the
landlord and the cultivating tenant for depositing the arrears
of rent payable under this Act inclusive of such costs as he
may direct. If the cultivating tenant deposits the sum as
directed, he shall be deemed to have paid the rent under subsection ( 3) (b). If the cultivating tenant fails to deposit the
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G. PONNIAH TREVAR Ji. N. p'. PILLAI (Beg, J.)
449
sum as directed the Revenue Divisional Officer shall pass au
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order for eviction" .
. Thus, we see that the statutory protection from ·eviction, in this
exhaustively comprehensive self contained pro~ed~re, may . la.st even
after the landlord has filed the prescnbed application for eviction, ,after
an accrual of his cause of action.
Section 2 ( e) defoies the landlord as follows :
"2 ( e) 'landlord' in relation to a holding or part thereof
means the person entitled to evict the cuitivating tenant from
such holding or part;"
The plaintiffs respondents, on their own ;howing, are landlords as
<lefined by the Act because they claimed, as the learned Counsel for the
contesting respondents admitted, to be able to evict the appellant.
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There is no doubt whatsoever that the appellant was the lessee whose
right to cultivate as a tenant had not been determined by anything in
the lease or nnder any statutory provision. The learned Counsel for the
appellant pointed oat that, even if there had 1.Jeen a aetermination of
the tenancy under a lease, the appellant would still be a cultivating
tenant as defined in the Act because of the provisions of Section 2(aa)
(2) (i) of the Act. Apparently, such a statutory definition of a cultivating tenant and an exhaustive procedure for his eviction in certain
cases only and in no other case, are there so as to carry out the purpose
:stated in the preamble as follows :
"Whereas it is necessary to protect cultivating tenants in
'Certain areas in the State of Madras from unjust eviction".
The plaintiffs ·landlords could be entitled to resume land only under
-section 4(A) of the Act added by the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protectiot1 (Amendment) Act of 1956, for purposes of personal cultivation
in the manner laid down in the Act itself.
The tenant could ah;o be
evicted for arrears of rent as provided in Section 3 (2) of the Act, because, in that case, the protection given by Section 3 (1)
would not
apply. But, none of the conditions for eviction is fulfilled in the case
before us. Moreover, the procedure for eviction is a speciul procedure
provided by Section 3 ( 4) of the Act by proceedings in the Court of the
:Revenue Divisional Officer.
Learned Counsel for the contesting respondent had tried to advance
two contentions in support of the view taken by the High Court. Firstly,
he submits that the protection given under Section 3 ( 1) was for the
landlord of the cultivating. tenant. In view of the statutory definition of
. the term "landlord", we think that the suit itself would fail if the plaintiffs were not landlords. The statutory definition of the term landlord
relates not only to the person who created the lease but contemplates
and takes in every successive holder who could be entitled to evict a
tenant. That person can only be one who has the right, at the time
of filin¥ the s~it, t? realise re~ts or evict persons in wrongful occupation.
There .1s nothmg m the Act itself to show that the protection given to
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SUP~EME COU~T ~EPOUS
(1977] 2 S.C.R~
the cultivatin~ tenant, as defined in the Act, wits given onJy against his;
original lessor and did not extend to subsequent holders of land occupying the capacity of the landlord. Secondly, it was urged that the protection was given only to those persons who were cultivating tenants in
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1955 when the Act came into force.
The argument has only to be--
stated to be rejected. There is not a scintilla of indication in the pro-
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visions of the Act to support such an impossible interpretation.
The
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provisions of the Act are clearly prospective except for the provisions of
Section 4 ( 1) of the Act, showing that even a person who was a cultivating tenant of any land on 1st December, 1933. but is "not in possession thereof at the commencement of the Act'' could be tre<:1ted as.
if he was in possession of the fand on 1st December,
1953. Even
,....__' '.
Section 4 ( 1) of the Act shows that the protection was not meant merely
1
for those who were cultivating tenants in 1955. Provisions of the Act
show that they became enforceable as soon as the Act became operative. There is nothing whatsoever in the Act to show that it ceased to·
be operative at any time or was limited in its operation only as a protection given to persons who were cultivating tenants in 1955. Hence,
we are unable to see any reason whatsoever for denying the appellant
the clearly intended protection conferred upon cultivating tenants, as
defined in the Act, by the provisions of the Act set out above.
Our attention has been invited to some cases which relate to the--
applicability of Section 76(a) of the Transfer of Property Act. It is.
true that this provision has been applied to tenancies created under
. various statutory provisions regulating the rights of tenants to agricultural fands in States all over India. Bu,t, we are not concerne<J here
with a case in which the position of the alleged lessee is struck by Section 76(a) of the Transfer of Property Act. Such alleged lessees are
not tenants at all at the time when they are inducted on the land as
tenants whatever else they may be. We, therefore, need not even refer
to the cases cited before us which relate either to this provision of law
or to enactments of other States.
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Consequently, we allow this appeal and set aside the judgment and
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decree of the High Court.
But, in the circumstances of the case the·
parties will bear their own costs.
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M.R.
Appeal allowed~