# General Family Pension Fund v. The Commissionr of Income-tax, West Bengal Vmkatarama

- **Citation:** [1955] 1 S.C.R. 829
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1955
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 194 of 1952
- **Bench:** Mehr Chand Mahajan C.J, s. R. DAS, Ghulam Hasan, Bhagwati, Venkatarama Ayyar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/general-family-pension-fund-v-the-commissionr-of-income-tax-west-bengal-1205
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

Indian Income-tax Act (XI of 1922) s.
12-B-Government of
India Act, 1935 (26 Geo. 5 CH. 2) Seventh Schedule, List I, Item
54-Tax on capital gains, if ultra vires-Capital gains, if income
-Legislative
practice-Interpretation
of
words-Words used in
Constitution Act.
Section 12-B of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (inserted by
Act XXII of 1947) which imposed tax on 'Capital gains' is not
ultra vires the Government of India Act, 1935. The term 'Capital
1954
General Family
Pension Fund
v.
The Commissionr
of Income-tax,
West Bengal
Vmkatarama
4vyar J.
1954
November 1.
z954
Navinchandra
Mafatlal
v.
The Commissioner
of Income-tax,
Bombay City.
830
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
gains co1nes well \Vithin the 1neaning of the word 'income' used in
item No. 54 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Govern1nent
of India .. A.ct, 1935.
It is
incorrect
to say
that
income
cannot
signify 'Capital
gains' and it is equally an incorrect approach to hold that there is
a legislative practice which recognises a clear line of
demarcation
bet\veen income and capital.
\Vhat is relied on here as a legislative practice is nothing but the judicial interpretation given to the
\Vord 'incon1e' as used in the income-tax and fiscal statutes.
Such
interpretation does not necessarily cut do\vn the ordinary
natural
meaning of the word 'inco1ne' as used in item No. 54 of List I of
the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935.
Cardinal rule of interpretation is that the words should be read
in their ordinary natural and grammatical 1neaning.. But the words
in a constitutional enact1ne11t conferring legislative powers should
however
be
construed most liberally
an<l
in
their
widest
an1plitude.
Commissioner of Income-tax v. Shatv Wallace & Co. (L.R. 59
I.A. 206); Ryal/ v. Hoare and Ryal/ v. Honeywill (1923) 8 T.C. 521;
Californian
Copper Syndicate (Li1nited and Reduced)
v.
Ha"is
(1904) 5 T.C. 159; Wallace Brothers & Co. Ltd." v. Commissioner of
Income-tax [L.R. 75 I.A. 86:
(1948) F.C.R. 1:
16 I.T.R. 240];
Croft v. Dunphy L.R. 1933 A.C. 156; Kamakshya Narain Singh
v.
Commissioner of Income-tax [L.R. 70 I.A.
180: (1943)
11 I.T.R.
513] ; In re The Central Provinces and Bei·ar Act No. XIV of 1938
( 1939) F.C.R. 18; United Provinces v. Atiqa Begum (1940) F.C.R.
110; State of Bombay and Another v. F. N. Balsara (1951) S.C.R.
682; Eisner
v. Macomber
(252). U.S.
189: 64
L. Ed. 521);
Merchant's Loan
&
Trust Co. v.
Smietanka (2'.\5 U.S. 509: 65 L.
Ed. 751) ; United States v. Stewart (311 U.S. 60: 85 L. Ed. 40)
and Resch v. Federal Commissioner of Ta_xation
(66 C.L:.R.
198),
referred to.
CIVIL
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION :
Civil
Appeal
No. 194 of 1952.
Appeal from the Judgment and Order, dated· the
7th day- of Septe_mber, 1951, of .the
High
Court of
Judicature at
Bombay in Income-tax Referenq.:
No. 46
or 1950.
S. Mitra (R. f. Kolah and I. N. Shroff,
with him)
for the appellant.
M. C. Setalvad, ·Attorney-General for India (G. ,\[,
foshi, with him) for the respondent.
1954. November 1. The Judgment of the
Court
was delivered by DAs J.
•
•
•
. ..
...
L.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
831
DAs J.-This appeal is directed
against the judgment pronounced on the 7th
September, 1951, by the
High Court of
Judicature at
Bombay on a reference
made
at die
instance of the appellant under section
66(1) of the
Indian
Income-tax
Act, 1922.
By an
assessment· order
dated the 31st
March,
1948,
the
appellant
was assessed
by
the
Income-tax
Officer,
Bombay, for the assessment year 1947-1948 on a total
income of Rs. 19,66,782 including a sum of Rs. 9,38,011
representing capital gains assessed in the hands of the
appellant
under
section
12-B of the
Act. The said
amount of capital gains was earned
by the appellant
in the following circumstances.
The assessee had a half
share
m
certain
immovable
properties
situate
in
Bombay which were sold by the assessee
and his coowners during the relevant
accounting year which was
the calendar year ending on the 31st
December, 1946,
to a private limited
company
k

## Text

..
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
829
could have been reached. But in the absence of such
a finding, we are unable to see any ground on which
the order of the
Tribunal could be upset in a reference
under section 66 ( 1). Vvhen once it is found that there
was no proper determination of the profits as required
under Rule 2(a)-and that was indeed
conceded-and
there was no justification for it such as the High Court
thought there was, the only order that could properly
be made was to remand the case for
further enquiry
and fresh disposal in accordance with law. That
was
the order which was passed by the
Tribunal, and that,
in our opinion, was right.
This appeal will accordingly be allowed,
and
the
second question referred by the
Tribunal answered in
the negative. The
result of this
will
be that the
Income-tax
Officer will proceed to enquire into
the
profits of the appellant
Company for
the
years in
question in accordance with the requirements of Rule 2.
Under the circumstances, we direct that the parties do
bear their respective costs both here and in the High
Court.
Appeal allowed.
NAVINCHANDRA MAFATLAL
THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,
BOMBAY CITY.
[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C.J., s. R. DAS,
GHULAM HASAN, BHAGWATI
and VENKATARAMA AYYAR JJ.]
Indian Income-tax Act (XI of 1922) s.
12-B-Government of
India Act, 1935 (26 Geo. 5 CH. 2) Seventh Schedule, List I, Item
54-Tax on capital gains, if ultra vires-Capital gains, if income
-Legislative
practice-Interpretation
of
words-Words used in
Constitution Act.
Section 12-B of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (inserted by
Act XXII of 1947) which imposed tax on 'Capital gains' is not
ultra vires the Government of India Act, 1935. The term 'Capital
1954
General Family
Pension Fund
v.
The Commissionr
of Income-tax,
West Bengal
Vmkatarama
4vyar J.
1954
November 1.
z954
Navinchandra
Mafatlal
v.
The Commissioner
of Income-tax,
Bombay City.
830
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
gains co1nes well \Vithin the 1neaning of the word 'income' used in
item No. 54 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Govern1nent
of India .. A.ct, 1935.
It is
incorrect
to say
that
income
cannot
signify 'Capital
gains' and it is equally an incorrect approach to hold that there is
a legislative practice which recognises a clear line of
demarcation
bet\veen income and capital.
\Vhat is relied on here as a legislative practice is nothing but the judicial interpretation given to the
\Vord 'incon1e' as used in the income-tax and fiscal statutes.
Such
interpretation does not necessarily cut do\vn the ordinary
natural
meaning of the word 'inco1ne' as used in item No. 54 of List I of
the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935.
Cardinal rule of interpretation is that the words should be read
in their ordinary natural and grammatical 1neaning.. But the words
in a constitutional enact1ne11t conferring legislative powers should
however
be
construed most liberally
an<l
in
their
widest
an1plitude.
Commissioner of Income-tax v. Shatv Wallace & Co. (L.R. 59
I.A. 206); Ryal/ v. Hoare and Ryal/ v. Honeywill (1923) 8 T.C. 521;
Californian
Copper Syndicate (Li1nited and Reduced)
v.
Ha"is
(1904) 5 T.C. 159; Wallace Brothers & Co. Ltd." v. Commissioner of
Income-tax [L.R. 75 I.A. 86:
(1948) F.C.R. 1:
16 I.T.R. 240];
Croft v. Dunphy L.R. 1933 A.C. 156; Kamakshya Narain Singh
v.
Commissioner of Income-tax [L.R. 70 I.A.
180: (1943)
11 I.T.R.
513] ; In re The Central Provinces and Bei·ar Act No. XIV of 1938
( 1939) F.C.R. 18; United Provinces v. Atiqa Begum (1940) F.C.R.
110; State of Bombay and Another v. F. N. Balsara (1951) S.C.R.
682; Eisner
v. Macomber
(252). U.S.
189: 64
L. Ed. 521);
Merchant's Loan
&
Trust Co. v.
Smietanka (2'.\5 U.S. 509: 65 L.
Ed. 751) ; United States v. Stewart (311 U.S. 60: 85 L. Ed. 40)
and Resch v. Federal Commissioner of Ta_xation
(66 C.L:.R.
198),
referred to.
CIVIL
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION :
Civil
Appeal
No. 194 of 1952.
Appeal from the Judgment and Order, dated· the
7th day- of Septe_mber, 1951, of .the
High
Court of
Judicature at
Bombay in Income-tax Referenq.:
No. 46
or 1950.
S. Mitra (R. f. Kolah and I. N. Shroff,
with him)
for the appellant.
M. C. Setalvad, ·Attorney-General for India (G. ,\[,
foshi, with him) for the respondent.
1954. November 1. The Judgment of the
Court
was delivered by DAs J.
•
•
•
. ..
...
L.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
831
DAs J.-This appeal is directed
against the judgment pronounced on the 7th
September, 1951, by the
High Court of
Judicature at
Bombay on a reference
made
at die
instance of the appellant under section
66(1) of the
Indian
Income-tax
Act, 1922.
By an
assessment· order
dated the 31st
March,
1948,
the
appellant
was assessed
by
the
Income-tax
Officer,
Bombay, for the assessment year 1947-1948 on a total
income of Rs. 19,66,782 including a sum of Rs. 9,38,011
representing capital gains assessed in the hands of the
appellant
under
section
12-B of the
Act. The said
amount of capital gains was earned
by the appellant
in the following circumstances.
The assessee had a half
share
m
certain
immovable
properties
situate
in
Bombay which were sold by the assessee
and his coowners during the relevant
accounting year which was
the calendar year ending on the 31st
December, 1946,
to a private limited
company
known as
Mafatlal
Gagalbhai & Company Ltd. The profits on the sale of
the said properties amounted to Rs. 18,76,023
and the
appellant's half share
therein came to the sum of
Rs. 9,38,0ll
which
was
included m the assessment
under section 12-B.
In April, 1948, the appellant appealed from the said
order to the
Appellate Assistant Commissioner contending that section 12-B of the
Act authorising the levy
of tax on
capital
gams was ultra vires the
Central
Legislature.
The
Appellate
Assistant
Commissioner
by his order dated the 5th
April, 1949, dismissed
the
appeal. A L.irther appeal to the Income-tax Appellate
Tribunal was dismissed by its order dated the
30th
June 1950.
Being aggrieved by the · order of the Appellate Tribunal the app~llant applied to it
under section 66(1)
of the Act for raising certain questions of law. The
AJ?pellate
Tribunal agreeing that certain questions of
law did arise om of its order drew up a statement of
the case which
was agreed to by
the
parties
and
rtferred to the High Court the following questions :-
( 1) Whether the imposition of a tax under the
l1ead "capital gains" by the
Central Legislature
was
ultra vires ?
15-88 S. C. India/59
'
1954
N avitU;handra
Mafatlal
v.
The CommissiMwr
of !n&Dme-tox,
BMnbay Ci!Y.
DatJ.
1954
N avinchandra
Mqfailal
v.
The Commissiontr
of ln&orne-tax,
&mbayCi!J'.
Das].
832
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
(2) Whether the imposition was in any way invalid
on the ground that it was done by amending the Indian
Income-tax Act ?
After hearing the reference the High Court following
its judgment in Income-tax Reference No. 18 of 1950,
Sir /. N. Duggan and Lady Jeena /. Duggan v. The
Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City, answered
the first
question in the negative and expressed the
opinion that it was not necessary to answer the second
question. In that
reference the two learned
Judges
gave the same answer to the
first question
but on
different grounds
as elaborated in their
respective
judgments.
The principal question that was discussed before the
High Court, as before us, was whether section 12-B
which authorised the imposition of a tax
on capital
gains was invalid being ultra vires the Central
Legislature.
Section 12-B was inserted in the
Act
by the
Indian
Income-tax and
Excess Profits
Tax (Amendment) Act, 1947 (XXII of 1947)
which was a Central
Act.
Under section 100 of the
Government
of
India
Act, 1935, the
Central Legislature was empowered to
make laws with
respect to
matters enumerated
in
List I in the
Seventh Schedule to that Act.
The only
entries in List I on which reliance
could be placed to
uphold the impugned Act were entries 54 and 55 which
were as follows :
"54.
Taxes on
income
other
than agricultural
income.
55. Taxes on the capital value of the assets, exclusive of agricultural land, of individuals and companies,
and taxes on the capital of companies."
Chagla C. J. held that the enactment of
Act XXII
of 1947 which inserted section
12-B was well within
the scope of the legislative
powers of
the
Central
Legislature as it fell within entry 55 and
was valid
either as a whole or, in any case, to the extent that it
applied to individuals and companies. Although it was
unnecessary
for the
learned
Chief Justice to decide
whether the
Act could be supported as a valid piece of
legislation falling within the scope of entry 54 yet in
deference to the arguments advanced before the
Court
I
.• '
•
S.C.R..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
833
the learned
Chief Justice
expressed the view that it
could not be so supported.
Tendolkar J., on the other
hand, held that Act XXII of 1947 was
wholly
intra
vires the
Central
Legislature as it fell within entry 54
and in this view of the matter he did not
consider it
necessary to discuss whether the legislation was covered
by entry 55 in List I of the Seventh Schedule.
In our
opinion the view taken
by
Tendolkar J. with respect
to entry 54 is corn~ct and well-founded.
In the course of a lucid argument advanced with his
usual ability and skill Mr.
Kolah
submitted
that
entry 54 which deals with "taxes on income" does not
embrace
within its
scope
tax
on
capital
gains.
"Income'', according to him, does
not signify capital
gains either according to its natural import or common
usage or according to judicial interpretation of relevant
'legislation both in England and in India. He submitted
that the learned Chief Justice was entirely right in the
view that there was a clear line of demarcation that
had always
been observed by
English lawyers and
English jurists
between income an<l capital, that the
English legislative practice had always recognised this
difference and
that as the word ha<l come to acquire a
certain meaning and a certain connotation by
reason
of such
legislative
practice in
England, the
British
Parliament which enacted the Government of
India
Act, 1935, must be regarded as having understood and
used that word "income" in entry 54 in that sense.
Our attention has
not, however, been drawn to any
enactment other than fiscal statutes like the Finance
Act and the Income-tax Act where the word "income"
has been used and, therefore, it is not possible to say
that the critical word
had
acquired any particular
meaning by reason of any legislative practice. Reference
has been made to several cases where the word "income"
has been construed by the Court. What is, therefore,
described as legislative practice is
nothing but judicial
interpretations
of
the
word "income"
as
appearing in the fiscal statutes mentioned above.
A perusal
.of the those
cases, however,
will reveal at once that
those decisions were concerned
with
ascertaining the
meaning of that word in the context of the Income-tax
1954
Navinchandra
Mefatlal
v.
The Commissioner
of lncome-tQJ<,
Bombay City.
Das].
1954
NavinchanJra
Mqfat/al
v.
The Commissiontr
ofl~tax,
Bombt!J Ci!J.
Das].
834
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
legislation. Thus the observation of their Lordships of
the Privy Council in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Shat11
Wallace & Co. ('), laid down the connotation of the
word "income" as used "in this Act." The passage in the
judgment of Rowlatt J. in Ryal! v. Hoare and
Ryal!
v. Honeyt11ill (2), quoted by the learned Chief Justice in
his
judgment and strongly
relied on by
Mr. Kolah,
refers to profits or gains "as used in these Acts." In
Californian Copper Syndicate (Limited and Reduced) v.
Harris ('), Lord Justice Clerk refers to the enhanced
price realised on sale of certain things
over
the cost
price thereof as
not being profits "in the sense
of
Schedule D of the Income Tax Act of 1842."
These
guarded observations quite clearly indicate
that
they
relate to the term "income" or "profit" as used in the
Income-tax Act.
There is no warrant for saying that
these observations cut down the natural meaning of the
ordinary English word "income" in any way. The truth
of the
tn;itter
is
that while
Income-tax
legislation
adopts an inclusive
definition
of the word "income"
the scheme of such legislation is to bring to charge only
such
income as falls under
certain
specified
heads
(e.g., the 5 Schedules of the English Act of 1918 and our
section 6 read with the following sections) and as arises
or accrues or is received or is deemed to arise or accrue
or to be received as
mentioned in the statute. The
Courts have striven to
ascertain the
meaning
of the
word "income" in the context of this scheme.
There
is no reason to suppose that the interpretation
placed
by the
Courts on the word in question was intended to
be exhaustive of the connotation of rhe word "income"
outside the particular statute.
If we hold, as
we are
asked to do, that the meaning of the
word "income"
has become rigidly crystallised by reason of the judicial
interpretation
of that word appearing in the Incometax Act then logically no enlargement
of the scope of
the
Income-tax Act, by amendment or otherwise, will
be permissible in future.
A conclusion so extravagant
and astounding
can
scarcely
be
contemplated or
(1) (1932) L. R. 59 I. A. 206 at page 2r2.
(2) (1923) 8 T. C. 521 at page 525.
(3) (1904) 5 T. C. 159 at page 165.
t
)
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
835
countenanced. We are satisfied that the cases relied
on by Mr. Kolah and referred to in the judgment of the
learned Chief Justice do not, as we read them, establish
the broad proposition that the ordinary English
word
"income" has
acquired a
particular! y
restricted
meaning.
The case of Wallace
Brothers & Co. Ltd. v.
Commissioner of lncome-tax(1), was not concerned with
ascertaining the meaning of the word "incomt" at all.
The problem there was whether the foreign income of
an
English company which was a partner in a firm
carrying on business in
Bombay
and whose Indian
income was greater than its foreign income could
be
treated as a resident within the meaning of section 4-A.
It was in that
context
said in
that
case
that in
determining the scope
and meaning of the legislative
power regard was to be had to what was ordinarily
treated as embraced within that topic in the legislative
practice of the United Kingdom.
The problem there
was not to ascertain the meaning of the word "income"
so much as to ascertain the extent of the application
of the
Act to the foreign income. That case, clearly,
does not establish that the word "income" had acquired
any special or narrow
meaning. The same remarks
apply to the case of Croft v. Dunphy{"), referred to by
Lord Uthwatt in delivering the judgment of the Privy
Council in Wallace Brothers case (supra). In Kamakshya
Narain Singh v. Commissioner of lncome-tax(3), Lord
Wright observed :-
"Income, it is true, is a word difficult and perhaps
impossible to define in any precise general formula.
It
is a word of the broadest connotation."
After making the above observation
his Lordship
referred to the observations of Sir George Lowndes in
Commissioner of Income-tax, Bengal v. Shaw Wallace &
Co. (supra), where an attempt was made to indicate the
connotation of the word "income"
as
used "in this
Act." It is, therefore, clear that none of the authorities
relied on by Mr. Kol.ah establish what may be called a
legislative practice indicating
the
connotation of the
(1) (1948) L. R. 75 I. A. 86;
[1948] F. C.R. 1; 16 I. T. R. 240.
(2) L. R. [1933] A. C. 156.
{3) (1943) L. R. 70 I. A. 180; [1943] u I. T. R. 513.
1954
N avin&handra
Mtifatlal
v.
The CommissioMr
of Income-taJt,
Bom6a,y City.
DasJ.
1954
.N cwinchandra
Mqfatla(
v.
Tht Commissionct
of lncome--tax,
Bombay Cit)'.
Das J.
836
S1)PREME COURT REPORTS
[19551
term "income'', apart from the Income-tax statute.
In
our view, it will be wrong to interpret the word "income"
in entry 54 in the
light of
any supposed
English
legislative practice as contended for by Mr. Kolah. It
is interesting to note that in the English Income Tax
Act of 1945 (8 and 9 Geo. VI, C. 32, sections 37 and 38)
capital gains have been included as taxable income.
It should be remembered that
the question
before
us relates to
the
correct
interpretation
of a wore\
appearing in a Constitution Act which, as has been said,
must not be construed in
any
narrow and
pedantic
sense.
Gwyer C.J. in In re
The
Central
Provinces
and Berar Act No. XIV of 1938('), observed
at pages
36-37 that the rules which apply to the interpretation
of other statutes apply equally to the interpretation of
a constitutional enactment
subject to this reservation
that their application is of necessity conditioned by the
subject-matter of the enactment itsclft It should be
remembered that the problem before us is to construe
a word
appearing in entry 54 which is a head of
legislative power. As
pointed out by Gwyer
C.J. in
The United Provinces v. Atiqa Begum(2) at page 134
none of the items in the Lists is to be read in a narrow
or restricted sense and
that each general word should
be held to extend to all ancillary or subsidiary matters
which can fairly and
reasonably
be said to be comprehended in it. It is, therefore, clear-and it is acknowledged
by Chief Justice Chagla-that in construing an entry
in a List
conferring
legislative
powers
the
widest
possible
construction
according
to
their
ordinary
meaning mnst be put upon the
words
used
therein.
Reference to legislative practice may be admissible for
cutting down
the meaning of a word
in
order to
reconcile two conflicting provisions in
two
legislative
Lists
as
was
done in The C. P. and Berar Act case
(supra), or to enlarge their ordinary meaning as in The
State of Bombay and Another v. F. N.
Balsara (3).
The cardinal rule of interpretation, however,
is that
words should be read in their
ordinary, natural and
grammatical
meaning
subject
to this rider
that in
(') ['939] F. C.R. ,s.
(3) ['95'] S. C.R. 682.
\2) ['940] F. C.R. no.
_._
-
i
...,
....
,.
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
837
construing words in a constitutional
enactment
conferring legislative power
the most liberal construction
should
be put upon the words so that the same may
have effect in their widest amplitude.
What, then, is the ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning
of the word "income"?
According
to
the dictionary it means "a thing that
comes in". (See
Oxford Dictionary, Vol. V, page 162; Stroud, Vol. II,
pages 14-16).
In the United States of America and in
Australia both of which
also are
English
speaking
countries the word "income" is understood in a
wide
sense so as to include a capital gain.
Reference
may
be made to Eisner v. Macomber( 1 ), Merchants' Loan &
Trust Co. v. Smietunka (2), and United States v. Stewart{3),
and Resch v. Federal Commissio11er of Taxation (4). Jn
each of these cases very wide meaning was ascribed to
the
word "income" as its
natural
meaning.
The
relevant observations of learned
Judges deciding those
cases which
have been
quoted
in the judgment
of
Tendolkar J. quite
clearly
indicate that
such wide
meaning was put upon the word "income" not because
of any particular
legislative
practice
either
in the
United States or in the
Commonwealth of
Australia
but because such was the normal concept and connotation of the
ordinary
English
word "income." Its
natural meaning ef9.braces any profit or gain which is
actually received.
This is in
consonance
with
the
observations of Lord Wright to which reference has
already been made. Mr. Kolah concedes that the word
"income" is understood in
the
United
States
and
Australia in the wide sense
contended
for· by the
learned
Attorney"General
but he maintains
that the
law in
England is different
and, therefore, entry 54
which occurs in a
Parliamentary
statute should
be
construed according to the law of England. We are
again brought back to the same argument as to the
word having acquired a restricted meaning
by reason
of what
has
been
called
the
legislative
practice
(1) \1920) 252 U. S. 189; 64 L. Ed. 521.
(2) (1925) 255 U.S. 509; 65 L. Ed. 751.
).. •
(3) (1940) 311 U.S. 60; 85 L. Fd. 40.
(4) (1942) 66 C. L. R. 1g8.
1954
Navincnandm
Mafatlal
v.
The Commissioner
of /nfX1tn4-tait,
Bomb'!)' Ci1'.
Das].
·----- ---
838
: . "SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955)
in England ~an argument which· we have already
·discarded. The argument founded on an assumed
]tl avinchandt'a legislative practice being thus out of the way, there can
Mafatla_l
v.
be no difficulty in applying its natural and grammatical
Th• Commission~ meaning to the ordinary English word "income." As
ofl•come-taz. · already observed, the word should be given it widest
Bombay c.1y. connotation in ·view of the fact that it occurs in a
n.,;.
Iegislativ"e head conferring legislative power.
'
For reasons stated above we are of opinion that Act
XXII of 1947 which amended the Indian Income-tax
, I
I954.
October I8.·
. Act by enlarging the definition of the term income in
section 2(6-0) and introducing a new head of income in
section 6 and inserting the new section 12-B is int·ra
vires the powers of the Central Legislature acting under
entry 54 in List I of the Seventh Schedule of the Govern~
merit of India Act, 1935. In this view of the matter it
is unnecessary for. us to consider or express any opinion
as to the meaning, scope and ambit of entry 55 in that
List. ·The appeal is accordingly dismis8ed with costs.
Appeal dismissed. ·
THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, HAPUR, AND
THREE OTHERS
v.
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND
T\VO OTHERS.
[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C.J., s. R. DAS,
GHULA~I HASAN, BHAGWATI and JAGANNADHADAS JJ.]
Uttar Pradesh Food-grains (Futures and Options Prohibition)
Order, 1951-Uttar Pradesh Food-grains (Futures and Options
Prohibition) Order, 1945-Restrictfons on dealings in pulses other
thangram,....:.1,. both orders-Order o/'1951 partlu declared ultra
vires by Supreme Court-Not so s. 9 thereof which repealrd Order of
-1945-Whether Order of 1945 still fo force-Proper procedure for
' clarification of the matter • .
Uttar Pradesh Food-grains (Futures and Options Prohibition)
Order, 1951, made it illegal and a punishable offence for any
· person to enter into any fntures in pulses other than gram, or to
pa.y or receive or to agree to pay or receive a.ny margin rel.a.ting to
such futures. Bys. 9 of that Order the Order of 1945·conlaining .
similar provisions was repealed. An application qnd~r Art. S2 of