# GHAZIABAD ENGINEERING CO. (P) LTD v. CERTIFYING OFFICER, KANPUR AND ANR

- **Citation:** [1978] 2 S.C.R. 534
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1978-01-13
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 2171 of 1970
- **Bench:** V. R. Krishna Iyer, Jaswant Singh
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/ghaziabad-engineering-co-p-ltd-v-certifying-officer-kanpur-and-anr-7387
- **Pages:** 3

## Headnote

Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 136-Questions of fact cannot be canvassed
for invoking the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
Casual leave, concept of and whether has nexus with total number of days
leave that a worker is entitled~Value of current trend in a particular area or
industry-Industrial En1ployment (Standing Orders) Act 1946 rlw S. 79(1) of
Factories Act, 1948.
As against the claim of twelve days casual leave (on a paid basis) made by
the workmen of the appellant company and for modification of the Standing
Orders under the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act 1946, and the
rules framed thereunder, the certifying officer, taking into
consideration
(a)
the financial position of the appellanfs undertaking including it
having
paid
20% bonus to its v,iorkers _{b) the prevalent practice in neighbouring industries
in that industrial belt of giving paid casual leave, and (c) the current trend in
that particular industrial area, granted the modification reducing the number of
days to six, as being fair and reasonable. The appellate authority confirmed
the said modification.
Dis111issing the appeal by special leave, the Court
HELD : 1. Supreme Court's jurisdiction under Art. 136 cannot be exploited
for canvassing pure questions of fact.
[535 E]
2. Casual leave is not an automatic advantage to the total number of days'
leave that a worker is entitled. Casual leave is not a matter of right and it is
only in the event of sudden emergencies that casual leave is allowed.
Unforeseen circumstances may unexpectedly prop up necessitating sudden absence of
an employee, be he in Government service or any other office or in an industrial
undertaking. The whole concept of casual leave is calculated to provide for
such contingencies. [535 G-H; 536 A]
3. A certain number of days' leave prescribed in S. 79(1) is the minimum
and not the maximum.
Current trend in a particular area or industry has not
the force of law.
It may have persuasive value but not more, in considering
the ciaim for casual leave.
In the instant case; (i) There is nothing grossly unfair or shockingly violative of fairness or justice warranting interference by this Court by exercise of its
special jurisdiction.
After all the excess is around three days in a year over
the current trend of granting an overall maximum of thirty days,
which circumstance the Tribunal has taken note of.
[535 F, 536 C-D]
Ale1nbic Che1nical Works Co.
Ltd.
v.
Workmen
[1963]
1 SCR 297
reiterated.

## Text

A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
534
GHAZIABAD ENGINEERING CO. (P) LTD.
v.
CERTIFYING OFFICER, KANPUR AND ANR.
January 13, 1978
(V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND JASWANT SINGH, JJ.]
Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 136-Questions of fact cannot be canvassed
for invoking the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
Casual leave, concept of and whether has nexus with total number of days
leave that a worker is entitled~Value of current trend in a particular area or
industry-Industrial En1ployment (Standing Orders) Act 1946 rlw S. 79(1) of
Factories Act, 1948.
As against the claim of twelve days casual leave (on a paid basis) made by
the workmen of the appellant company and for modification of the Standing
Orders under the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act 1946, and the
rules framed thereunder, the certifying officer, taking into
consideration
(a)
the financial position of the appellanfs undertaking including it
having
paid
20% bonus to its v,iorkers _{b) the prevalent practice in neighbouring industries
in that industrial belt of giving paid casual leave, and (c) the current trend in
that particular industrial area, granted the modification reducing the number of
days to six, as being fair and reasonable. The appellate authority confirmed
the said modification.
Dis111issing the appeal by special leave, the Court
HELD : 1. Supreme Court's jurisdiction under Art. 136 cannot be exploited
for canvassing pure questions of fact.
[535 E]
2. Casual leave is not an automatic advantage to the total number of days'
leave that a worker is entitled. Casual leave is not a matter of right and it is
only in the event of sudden emergencies that casual leave is allowed.
Unforeseen circumstances may unexpectedly prop up necessitating sudden absence of
an employee, be he in Government service or any other office or in an industrial
undertaking. The whole concept of casual leave is calculated to provide for
such contingencies. [535 G-H; 536 A]
3. A certain number of days' leave prescribed in S. 79(1) is the minimum
and not the maximum.
Current trend in a particular area or industry has not
the force of law.
It may have persuasive value but not more, in considering
the ciaim for casual leave.
In the instant case; (i) There is nothing grossly unfair or shockingly violative of fairness or justice warranting interference by this Court by exercise of its
special jurisdiction.
After all the excess is around three days in a year over
the current trend of granting an overall maximum of thirty days,
which circumstance the Tribunal has taken note of.
[535 F, 536 C-D]
Ale1nbic Che1nical Works Co.
Ltd.
v.
Workmen
[1963]
1 SCR 297
reiterated.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2171
of
1970.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Order dated 30-3-1970 of
the Appellate Authority Allahabad (Industrial Tribunal) in Standing
Order Appeal No. 8/69.
K. P. Gupta for the Appellant.
/
I
\
l
I
GHAZIABAD ENGINEERING CO. V. CERTIFYING OFFICER
53 5
(Krishna Iyer, !.)
G. N. Dikshit and 0. P. Rana for Respondent No. I.
A
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
KRISHNA IYER, J.-This appeal by special leave raises a
short
question which has been decided adverse to the appellant by the certifying officer, Kanpur and the Industrial Tribunal which is the appellate
authority.
The narrow point that falls for decision is as to whether .
the modification of the Standing Orders under the 1ndustrial EmployB
ment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 and the rules framed thereunder
was illegally made by the certifying officer.
The modification itself
related to grant of six days' casual leave (on a paid basis) to the
workers in the appellant's factory in Ghaziabad.
The certifying officer
has considered this grant of casual leave as fair and reasonable having
regard to the prevalent practice in the neighbouring industries of this
industrial belt and also paying attention to the financial position
of
the appellant's undertaking.
For this purpose he has relied upon the
fact that 20% bonus was paid under the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965
and has 'further stated that certain other factories have been giving
paid casual leave for their workers.
These facts persuaded him to
grant the modification although reducing the number of days to six
as against twelve which the workers originally claimed.
c
D
. The appellate authority concurred by a separate discussion in the
same conclusion.
We are requested by Shri Gupta to reverse this
concurrent refinding of fact on two grounds.
He states that the undertaking of the appellant is a losing proposition and relies upon certain
balance sheets stated to have been produced before the certifying
officer.
He also argues that there is no positive material to make out . E
that other industries in the locality are graning casual leave for their
workers.
These are pure questions of fact and this Court's jurisdiction under
Art. 136 cannot be exploited for canvassing points such as these. It
is clear that the modification was within the jurisdiction of the certifying officer and he has not contravened any provision of the Act or any
statute. The Factories Act, 1948 prescribes ins. 79(1) a certain number of days' leave but this is the minimum and not the maximum as has
been indicated in this Court's ruling in Alembic Chemical Works Co.
Ltd. v. Workmen('). Moreover, the model Standing Orders as
well
as the Schedule to the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act,
1946 deal with casual leave.
In this view there is nothing ille.gal in
the order impugned nor are we satisfied that there is anything •hockingly violative of fairness or justice.
It is a notorious fact that casut•I
leave is not an automatic advantage to the total number of days' leave
that a worker is entitled.
It is only in the event of sudden emergencies that casual •leave is allowed and so the grievance of the appellant
is exaggerated, if not imaginary.,
Apart from this, it is elementary that
unforeseen circumstances may unexpectedly prop up necessitating sudden absence of an employee, be he in Government service or any other
offices or in an industrial undertaking.
The whole concept of casual
(!) [1963J l S.C.R. 297.
F
G
H
536
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1978] 2 S.C.R.
A
leave is calculated to provide for such contingencies.
We see nothing
unfair in the certifying officer according six days by way of casual
leave to the workers.
After all the contentment of the workers is an
esseutial component of their efficiency and if the certifying officer and
the Appellate Authority who deal regularly with such matters have
felt that this step was fair and nothing is shown to our satisfaction that
there is anything grossly unfair about this modification, we should not
B
interfere by exercise of the special jurisdiction of this Court.
The third point put forward by Shri Gupta was that according to
the appellate Tribunal, the current trend is to grant an overall maximum of thirty days leave while in this case if the casual leave is also
taken into account it may extend to 33t days leave.
As pointed
out earlier, casual leave is not a matter of right and a man may
not
C
get casual leave unless circumstances are sudden or which in the ordinary course cannot be met by taking regular leave.
Secondly, we
are not satisfied that the current trend in a particular area or industry
has the force of law.
It may have persuasive value but not more. That
is why after taking note of that circumstance, the Tribunal has
still
chosen to affirm the claim for six days casual leave.
After all the
D
excess is around three days in a year.
We, therefore, dismiss the appeal, but, in the circumstances, without
costs.
S. R.
Appeal dismissed.
'
•