# GIAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB & ANOTHER

- **Citation:** [2012] 8 S.C.R. 753
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2012-09-24
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 2107-2125 of 2011
- **Bench:** R.M. Lodha, Anil R. Dave, Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/gian-singh-v-state-of-punjab-another-28523
- **Pages:** 60

## Headnote

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973:
ss. 482 and 320 - Quashing of criminal proceedings in
a case where offender has settled his dispute with the victim
A
B
c
of crime, but the said crime is not compoundable - Ambit and
scope of ss. 482 and 302 - Explained - Held: Power of
compounding of offences given to a court u/s 320 is materially 0
different from the quashing of criminal proceedings by the
High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction - In
compounding of offences, power of a criminal court is
circumscribed by the provisions contained in s. 320 and the
court is guided solely and squarely thereby; whreas the
E
formation of opinion by the High Court for quashing a criminal
offence or criminal proceeding or criminal complaint is
guided by the material on record as to whether the ends of
justice would justify such exercise of power although the
ultimate consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of
indictment - The words "nothing in this Code" occurring in
F
s.482 means that it is an overriding provision and none of the
provisions orthe Code limits or restricts the inherent power -
Decisions in the cases of B.S. Joshi, Nikhil Merchant, Manoj
Sharma and Shiji alias Pappu do illustrate the principle that
the High Court may quash criminal proceedings or FIR or G
complaint in exercise of its inherent power uls 482 of the
Code, and s. 320 does not limit or affect the powers of the
High Court u/s 482 - It cannot be said that by quashing
criminal proceedings in the said cases, the Court has
753
H
754
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2012] 8 S.C.R.
A compounded the non-compoundable offences indirectly -
Principles emerging from various decisions culled out.
s. 482 - Inherent power of High Court - Quashing of
criminal proceedings - Held: Before exercise of the power,
8
High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity
of the crime - Heinous and serious offences of mental
depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot
be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family
and the offender have settled the dispute - Similarly, any
compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the
C offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption
Act or the offences committed by public servants while working
in that capacity etc. cannot provide any basis for quashing
criminal proceedings involving such offences - But, as has
been explained in the instant judgment, the criminal cases
D having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour
stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing.
Maxim:
E
Quando lex a liquid alicui concedit, conceditur et id sine
qua res ipsa esse non potest - Explained.
The petitioner was convicted ulss 420 and 120-B IPC.
During the pendency of the appeal before the Sessions
Judge, the petitioner filed a petition uls 482 CrPC before
· F the High Court seeking to quash the FIR on the ground
of compounding the offence. The petition was dismissed.
When the instant petition was listed before a twoJudge Bench, it felt that the decisions in B. S. Joshi', Nikhil
G Merchant2 and Manoj Sharma3 required reconsideration
and, therefore, referred the matter to a larger Bench4•
1.
2003 (2) SCR 1104.
2.
2008 (12) SCR 236.
3.
2008 (14) SCR 539
H 4.
201 O SCR 1034.
GIAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB
755
The issue for consideration before the Court was with
A
regard to inherent powers of the High Court in quashing
the criminal proceedings against an offender who had
settled his dispute with the victim of the crime but the
crime in which he was involved was not compoundable
u/s 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
B
Answering the reference, the Court
HELD: 1.1. Quashing of offence or criminal
proceedings on the ground of settlement between an
offender and victim is not the same thing as
C
compounding of offence. They are different and not
interchangeable. Strictly speaking, the power of
compounding of offences given to a court u/s 320 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, is materiall

## Text

_Characters 0–39,960 of 114,066. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39960 for what follows._

[2012] 8 S.C.R. 753
GIAN SINGH
v.
STATE OF PUNJAB & ANOTHER
(Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 8989 of 2010 etc.)
SEPTEMBER 24, 2012
[R.M. LODHA, ANIL R. DAVE AND
SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, JJ.]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973:
ss. 482 and 320 - Quashing of criminal proceedings in
a case where offender has settled his dispute with the victim
A
B
c
of crime, but the said crime is not compoundable - Ambit and
scope of ss. 482 and 302 - Explained - Held: Power of
compounding of offences given to a court u/s 320 is materially 0
different from the quashing of criminal proceedings by the
High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction - In
compounding of offences, power of a criminal court is
circumscribed by the provisions contained in s. 320 and the
court is guided solely and squarely thereby; whreas the
E
formation of opinion by the High Court for quashing a criminal
offence or criminal proceeding or criminal complaint is
guided by the material on record as to whether the ends of
justice would justify such exercise of power although the
ultimate consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of
indictment - The words "nothing in this Code" occurring in
F
s.482 means that it is an overriding provision and none of the
provisions orthe Code limits or restricts the inherent power -
Decisions in the cases of B.S. Joshi, Nikhil Merchant, Manoj
Sharma and Shiji alias Pappu do illustrate the principle that
the High Court may quash criminal proceedings or FIR or G
complaint in exercise of its inherent power uls 482 of the
Code, and s. 320 does not limit or affect the powers of the
High Court u/s 482 - It cannot be said that by quashing
criminal proceedings in the said cases, the Court has
753
H
754
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2012] 8 S.C.R.
A compounded the non-compoundable offences indirectly -
Principles emerging from various decisions culled out.
s. 482 - Inherent power of High Court - Quashing of
criminal proceedings - Held: Before exercise of the power,
8
High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity
of the crime - Heinous and serious offences of mental
depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot
be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family
and the offender have settled the dispute - Similarly, any
compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the
C offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption
Act or the offences committed by public servants while working
in that capacity etc. cannot provide any basis for quashing
criminal proceedings involving such offences - But, as has
been explained in the instant judgment, the criminal cases
D having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour
stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing.
Maxim:
E
Quando lex a liquid alicui concedit, conceditur et id sine
qua res ipsa esse non potest - Explained.
The petitioner was convicted ulss 420 and 120-B IPC.
During the pendency of the appeal before the Sessions
Judge, the petitioner filed a petition uls 482 CrPC before
· F the High Court seeking to quash the FIR on the ground
of compounding the offence. The petition was dismissed.
When the instant petition was listed before a twoJudge Bench, it felt that the decisions in B. S. Joshi', Nikhil
G Merchant2 and Manoj Sharma3 required reconsideration
and, therefore, referred the matter to a larger Bench4•
1.
2003 (2) SCR 1104.
2.
2008 (12) SCR 236.
3.
2008 (14) SCR 539
H 4.
201 O SCR 1034.
GIAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB
755
The issue for consideration before the Court was with
A
regard to inherent powers of the High Court in quashing
the criminal proceedings against an offender who had
settled his dispute with the victim of the crime but the
crime in which he was involved was not compoundable
u/s 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
B
Answering the reference, the Court
HELD: 1.1. Quashing of offence or criminal
proceedings on the ground of settlement between an
offender and victim is not the same thing as
C
compounding of offence. They are different and not
interchangeable. Strictly speaking, the power of
compounding of offences given to a court u/s 320 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, is materially different
from the quashing of criminal proceedings by the High o
Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. In
compounding of offences, power of a criminal court is
circumscribed by the provisions contained in s. 320 and
the court is guided solely and squarely thereby. The
consequence of the composition of an offence is acquittal
of the accused. Sub-s. (9) of s. 320 mandates that no
offence shall be compounded except as provided by this
Section. Obviously, in view thereof the composition of an
offence has to be in accord with s. 320 and in no other
manner. On the other hand, the formation of opinion by
E
F
the High Court for quashing a criminal offence or criminal
proceeding or criminal complaint is guided by the
material on record as to whether the ends of justice
would justify such exercise of power although the
ultimate consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of G
indictment. Where High Court quashes a criminal
proceeding having regard to the fact that dispute
between the offender and victim has been settled
although offences are not compoundable, it does so as
in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will
be an exercise in futility and justice in the case demands
H
756
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2012] 8 S.C.R.
A that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and
peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being the
ultimate guiding factor. [para 47 and 53-54] [806-E-F; 808C-H]
8
1.2. Section 482 of the Code, as its very language
suggests, saves the inherent power of the High Court
which it has by virtue of it being a superior court to
prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise
to secure the ends of justice. It begins with the words,
'nothing in this Code' which means that it is an overriding
C provision. These words leave no manner of doubt that
none of the provisions of the Code limits or restricts the
inherent power. The guideline for exercise of such power
is provided in s. 482 itself i.e., to prevent abuse of the
process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of
D justice. As has been repeatedly stated, s. 482 confers no
new powers on High Court; it merely safeguards existing
inherent powers possessed by High Court necessary to
prevent abuse of the process of any court or to secure
the ends of justice. It is equally well settled that the power
E is not to be resorted to if there is specific provision in the
Code for the redress of the grievance of an aggrieved
party. It should be exercised very sparingly and it should
not be exercised as against the express bar of law
engrafted in any other provision of the Code. In different
F situations, the inherent power may be exercised in
different ways to achieve its ultimate objective. Formation
of opinion by the High Court before it exercises inherent
power u/s 482 on either of the twin objectives, (i) to
prevent abuse of the process of any court or (ii) to secure
G the ends of justice, is a sine qua non. [para 49-50] [806G-H; 807-A-E]
1.3. In the very nature of its constitution, it is the
judicial obligation of the High Court to undo a wrong in
course of administration of justice or to prevent
H continuation of unnecessary judicial process. This is
GIAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB
757
founded on the legal maxim quando lex aliquid alicui A
concedit, conceditur et id sine qua res ipsa esse non potest,
the full import of which is whenever anything is
authorised, and especially if, as a matter of duty, required
to be done by law, it is found impossible to do that thing
unless something else not authorised in express terms
B
be also done, may also be done, then that something
else will be supplied by necessary intendment. Ex debito
justitiae is inbuilt in such exercise; the whole idea is to
do real, complete and substantial justice for which it
exists. The power possessed by the High Court u/s 482 c
of the Code is of wide amplitude but requires exercise
with great caution and circumspection. [para 51] [807-EH; 808-A]
1.4. B. S. Joshi, Nikhil Merchant, Manoj Sharma and Shiji
alias Pappu do illustrate the principle that High Court may
D
quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint in
exercise of its inherent power u/s 482 of the Code and s.
320 does not limit or affect the powers of the High Court
u/s 482. It cannot be said that by quashing criminal
proceedings in the said cases, this Court has
E
compounded the non-compoundable offences indirectly.
There is no incongruity in this principle of law and the
decisions of this Court in Simrikhia, Dharampal, Arun
Shankar Shukla, lshwar Singh, Rumi Dhar (Smt.) and Ashok
Sadarangani.Therefore, it cannot be said that 8.S. Joshi,
F
Nikhil Merchant and Manoj Sharma were not correctly
decided. [para 55,56 and 58] [809-F-H; 810-A-B-C; 812-FG]
B.S. Joshi and others v. State of Haryana and another G
2003 (2) SCR 1104 = (2003) 4 SCC 675, Nikhil Merchant v.
Central Bureau of Investigation and another 2008 (12)
SCR 236 = (2008) 9 SCC 677; Manoj Sharma v. State and
others 2008 (14) SCR 539 = (2008) 16 sec 1; and Shiji
alias Pappu and others vs. Radhika and another 2011 (13)
H
scR 135 =(2011) 10 sec 705 - upheld.
758
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2012] 8 S.C.R.
A
Simrikhia v. Dolley Mukherjee and Chhabi Mukherjee
and another 1990 (1) SCR 788 = (1990) 2 sec 437;
Dharampal & Ors. v. Ramshri (Smt.) and others 1993 Crl. L.J.
1049; Arun Shankar Shukla v. State of Uttar Pradesh and ors.
1999 (3) SCR 1060 = AIR 1999 SC 2554; /shwar Singh v.
B State of Madhya Pradesh 2008 (14) SCR 574 = (2008) 15
SCC 667; Rumi Dhar (Smt.) v. State of West Bengal and
another -2009 (5) SCR 553 = (2009) 6 SCC 364; Ashok
Sadarangani and Anr. vs. Union of India and others JT 2012
(3) SC 469; CBI v. Duncans Agro Industries Limited 1996 (3)
c Suppl. SCR 360 = (1996) 5 SCC 591, State of Haryana v.
Bhajan Lal 1990 (3) Suppl. SCR 259 = (1992) 4 SCC 305,
State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma 1991 (2) SCR 1 = 1992 Supp
(1) SCC 335, Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary 1992 (1) Suppl.
SCR 226 = (1992) 4 SCC 305; Rajiv Saxena and others v.
0
State (NCT of Delhi) and another (2012) 5 sec 627;
Jayrajsinh Digvijaysinh Rana v. State of Gujarat and another
JT 2012 (6) SC 504; Y. Suresh Babu v. State of A. P. (2005)
1 SCC 347; Ram Lal and Anr. v. State of J & K 1999 (1)
. SCR 230 = (1999) 2 SCC 213 ; Ku/winder Singh and others
v. State of Punjab and another (2007) 4 CTC 769; Abasaheb
.E
Yadav Honmane v. State of Maharashtra 2008 (2)
Mh.L.J.856- referred to.
1.5. The position that emerges from the decisions of
this Court can be summarised thus: the power of the
F High Court in quashing a.criminal proceeding or FIR or·
complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct
and different from the power given to a criminal court for . ·
compounding the offences u/s 320 of the Code. Inherent ..
power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but .·
G it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline·_
engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of.
justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any:.
Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal
proceeding or complaint or F.l.R may be exercised where
H the offender and victim have settled their dispute would ,
GIAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB
759
depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and
A
no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise
of such power, the High Court must have due regard to
the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious
offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape,
dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the
B
victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the
dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have
serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise
between the victim and offender in relation to the
offences under special statutes like Prevention of c
Corruption Act or the offences committed by public
servants while working in that capacity etc. cannot
provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings
involving such offences. But the criminal cases having
overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand
0
on different footing for the purposes of quashing,
particularly, the offences arising from commercial,
financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like
transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony
relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the
E
wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the
parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category
of cases, High Court may, within the frame work of its
inherent power, quash criminal proceedings if in its view,
because of the compromise between the offender and
victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak
and continuation of criminal case would put accused to
great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice
would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal
case despite full and complete settlement and
compromise with the victim. The High Court must G
consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the
interest of justice to continue with the criminal
proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding
would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite
settlement and compromise between the victim and
F
H
760
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2012] 8 S.C.R.
A wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it
is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if
the answer to the questions is in affirmative, the High
Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the
criminal proceeding. [para 57] [811-D-H; 812-A-F]
B
Central Bureau of Investigation and others v. Keshub
Mahindra and others 2011 (6) SCR 384 = (2011) 6 SCC 216
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Rameshwar and others 2009 (5)
SCR 510 = (2009) 11 SCC 424; Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir
C Ahmed (1945) 47 Born. L.R. 245; Khushi Ram v. Hashim
and others AIR 1959 SC 542; State of Uttar Pradesh. v.
Mohammad Nairn 1964 SCR 363 = AIR 1964 SC 703;
Pampathy v. State of Mysore 1966 (Suppl) SCR 477; State
of Kamataka v. L. Muniswamy and others 1977 (3) SCR
113 = (1977) 2 SCC 699; Madhu Limaye v. The State of
D Maharashtra 1978 (1) SCR 749 = (1977) 4 SCC 551; Raj
Kapoor and others v. State and others 1980 (1) SCR 1081 =
(1980) 1 SCC 43; G. Sagar Suri and another v. State of U.P.
and others 2000 (1) SCR 417 = (2000) 2 SCC 636; State of
Kamataka v. M. Devendrappa and another 2002 (1)
E SCR 275 = (2002) 3 SCC 89; Central Bureau of Investigation
v. A. Ravishankar Prasad and others (2009) 6 SCC 351;
Devendra and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another
2009 (7) SCR 872 = (2009) 7 sec 495 Sushi/ Suri v. Central
Bureau of Investigation and another 2011 (8) SCR 1 = (2011)
F 5 SCC 708; Madan Mohan Abbot v. State of Punjab 2008
(5) SCR 526 = (2008) 4 SCC 582; Jetha Ram v. State of
Rajasthan (2006) 9 sec 255; Murugesan v. Ganapathy
Velar (2001) 10 SCC 504; lshwarlal v. State of M.P. (2008)
15 SCC 671 and Mahesh Chand & another v. State of
G Rajasthan 1990 (supp) SCC 681 - referred to
H
Lala Jairam Das & Ors. v. Emperor AIR 1945 PC 94referred to
GIAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB
761
Case Law Reference:
A
2003 (2) SCR 1104
upheld
para 1
2008 (12) SCR 236
upheld
para 1
2008 (14) SCR 539
upheld
para 1
B
2011 (6) SCR 384
referred to
para 16
2009 (5) SCR 510
referred to
para 16
(1945) 47 Born. LR. 245 referred to
para 18
c
AIR 1959 SC 542
referred to
para 19
AIR 1945 PC 94
referred to
para 20
1964 SCR 363
referred to
para 20
1966 (Suppl) SCR 477
referred to
para 21
D
1977 (3) SCR 113
referred to
para 22
1978 (1) SCR 749
referred to
para 24
1980 (1) SCR 1081
referred to
para 25
E
1990 (1) SCR 788
referred to
para 26
1993 Crl. L.J. 1049
referred to
para 27
1999 (3) SCR 1060
referred to
para 28
F
2000 (1) SCR 417
referred to
para 29
2002 (1) SCR 275
referred to
para 30
2009 (6) sec 351
referred to
para 31
para 32
G
2009 (7) SCR 872
referred to
2011 (8) SCR 1
referred to
para 33
2008 (5) SCR 526
referred to
para 35
2008 (14) SCR 574
referred to
para 36
H
•
762
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2012] 8 S.C.R.
A
2006 (9) sec 255
referred to
para 37
2001 (10) sec 504
referred to
para 37
(2006) 9 sec 255
referred to
para 37
B
2001 (10) sec 504
referred to
para 37
(2008) 15 sec 671
referred to
para 37
1990 (supp) sec 681
referred to
para 38
2009 (5) SCR 553
referred to
para 38
c
1996 (3) Suppl. SCR 360 referred to
para 38
1990 (3) Suppl. SCR 259 referred to
para 38
1991 (2) SCR 1
referred to
para 38
D
1992 (1) Suppl. SCR 226 referred to
para 38
2011 (13) SCR 135
upheld
para 39
2012 (3) JT 469
referred to
para 40
E
2012 (5) sec 627
referred to
para 41
JT 2012 (6) SC 504
referred to
para 42
(2005) 1 sec 347
referred to
para 43
F
1999 (1) SCR 230
referred to
para 43
(2007) 4 CTC 769
referred to
para 45
2008 (2) Mh.L.J.856
referred to
para 46
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave
G Petition (Crl) No. 8989 of 2010.
From the Judgment & Order dated 17.9.2010 of the High
Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in CRM No. M27367 of 2010.
H
GIAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB
763
WITH
SLP (Crl) Nos. 6138 of 2006, 5203 and 259 of 2011, 5921,
7148 and 6324 of 2009 and Criminal Appeal No. 2107-2125
of 2011.
A
P.P. Malhotra, ASG, P.P. Rao, Dr. Abhishek Manu
B
Singhvi, V. Giri, Rajiv Kataria, (for Delhi Law Chambers), P:
Parmeswaran, Rajiv Nanda, T.A. Khan, Ranjana Narayan,
Priyanka Mathur, Arvind Kumar Sharma, B.K. Satija, Sameer
Sodhi, Amit Bhandari, Ashok Jain, Pankaj Jain, Bijoy Kumar
Jain, Pragati Neekhra, Suryanarayana Singh, Yashoda Sharma, c
Sushil Karanjkar, Nikhilesh Kumar, Mohammed Sadique T.A.,
K.N. Rai, A.V. Rangam, Buddy Ranganadhan, Richa
Bharadwaj, V. Prabhakar, R. Chandrachud, Jyoti Prashar, Yasir
Rauf, Vishwaaman Kandwal, Dr. Kailash Chand, Sunil Kumar
Verma, Asha Gopalan Nair, Praveen Swarup, Nikhil Jain, Atishi
D
Dipankar, Manu Beri, Ashish Agarwal, Yash Pal Dhingra,
Deepak Dhingra, Partha Sil, Rajesh Tyagi, Anil Kumar Bakshi,
Pawan Kumar, Sheel Kumar, Ravi Bassi for the Appearing
Parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
R.M. LODHA, J. 1. When the special leave petition in
Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and a_nother came up for hearing,
a two-Judge Bench (Markandey Katju and Gyan Sudha Misra,
E
JJ.) doubted the correctness of the decisions of this Court in
F
B. S. Joshi and others v. State of Haryana and another', Nikhil
Merchant v. Central Bureau of Investigation and anotheF and
Manoj Sharma v. State and others3 and referred the matter to
a larger Bench. The reference order reads as follows :
"Heard learned counsel for the petitioner.
G
The petitioner ha'S been convicted under Section 420
------
1.
(2003) 4 sec 675.
2.
(2008) g sec 677.
3.
(2008) 16 sec 1.
H
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
764
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2012] 8 S.C.R.
and Section 1208, IPC by the learned Magistrate. He filed
an appeal challenging his conviction before the learned
Sessions Judge. While his appeal was pending, he filed
an application before the learned Sessions Judge for
compounding the offence, which, according to the learned
counsel, was directed to be taken up along with the main
appeal. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition under
Section 482, Cr.P.C. for quashing of the FIR on the ground
of compounding the offence. That petition under Section
482 Cr.P.C. has been dismissed by the High Court by its
impugned order. Hence, this petition has been filed in this
Court.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on three
decisions of this Court, all by two Judge Benches. They
are 8. S. Joshi VS. State of Haryana (2003) 4 sec 675;
Nikhil Merchant vs. Central Bureau of Investigation and
Another (2008) 9 SCC 677; and Mano~ Sharma vs. State
and Others (2008) 16 SCC 1. In these decisions, this
Court has indirectly permitted compounding of noncompoundable offences. One of us, Hon'ble Mr. Justice
Markandey Katju, was a member to the last two decisions.
Section 320, Cr.P.C. mentions certain offences as
compoundable, certain other offences as compoundable
with the permission of the Court, and the other offences
as non-compoundable vide Section 320(7).
Section 420, IPC, one of the counts on which the
petitioner has been convicted, no doubt, is a
compoundable offence with permission of the Court in
view of Section 320, Cr.P.C. but Section 1208 IPC, the
other count on which the petitioner has been convicted. is
a non-compoundable offence. Section 1208 (Criminal
conspiracy) is a separate offence and since it is a noncom poundable offence, we cannot permit it to be
compounded.
GIAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB [R.M. LODHA, J.] 765
The Court cannot amend the statute and must
A
maintain judicial restraint in this connection. The Courts
should not try to take over the function of the Parliament
or executive. It is the legislature alone which can amend
Section 320 Cr.P.C.
We are of the opinion that the above three decisions
require to be re-considered as, in our opinion, something
which cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly.
B
In our, prima facie, opinion, non-compoundable offences
cannot be permitted to be compounded by the Court,
C
whether directly or indirectly. Hence, the above three
decisions do not appear to us to be correctly decided.
It is true that in the last two decisions, one of us,
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Markandey Katju, was a member but
a Judge should always be open to correct his mistakes.
D
We feel that these decisions require re-consideration and
hence we direct that this matter be placed before a larger
Bench to reconsider the correctness of the aforesaid three
decisions.
Let the papers of this case be placed before
Hon'ble Chief Justice of India for constituting a larger
Bench."
2. This is how these matters have come up for
consideration before us.
E
F
3. Two provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (for short, 'Code') which are vital for consideration of the
issue referred to the larger Bench are Sections 320 and 482.
Section 320 of the Code provides for compounding of certain
G
offences punishable under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for
short, 'IPC'). It reads as follows :
H
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
766
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2012] 8 S.C.R.
"S. 320. Compounding of offences.-(1) The offences
punishable under the sections of the Indian Penal Code,
(45 of 1860) specified in the first two columns of the Table
next following may be compounded by the persons
mentioned in the third column of that Table :
TABLE
Offence
Section of
Person by whom offence
the Indian
may be compounded
Penal Code
applicable
1
2
3
(2) The offences punishable under the sections of the
Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) specified in the first two
columns of the table next following may, with the
permission of the Court before which any prosecution for
such offence is pending, be compounded by the persons
mentioned in the third column of that Table:-
TABLE
Offence
Section of
Person by whom
the Indian
offence may be
Penal Code
compounded
applicable
1
2
3
(3) When an offence is compoundable under this section,
the abatement of such offence or an attempt to commit
such offence (when such attempt is itself an offence) or
where the accused is liable under section 34 or 149 of the
Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) may be compounded in
like manner.
GIAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB [R.M. LODHA, J.] 767
(4) (a)
When the person who would otherwise be
A
competent to compound an offence under this
section is under the age of eighteen years or is an
idiot or a lunatic, any person competent to contract
on his behalf, may, with the permission of the Court,
compound such offence.
B
(b)
When the person who would otherwise be
competent to compound an offence under this
section is dead, the legal representative, as
defined in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 of
C
such person may, with the· consent of the Court,
compound such offence.
(5) When the accused has been committed for trial or when
he has been convicted and an appeal is pending, no
composition for the offence shall be allowed without the
D
leave of the Court to which he is committed, or, as the case
may be, before which the appeal is to be heard.
(6) A High Court or Court of Session acting in the exercise
of its powers of revision under section 401 may allow any
E
person to compound any offence which such person is
competent to compound under this section.
(7) No offence shall be compounded if the accused is, by
reason of a previous conviction, liable either to enhanced
punishment or to a punishment of a different kind for such
F
offence.
(8) The composition of an offence under this section shall
have the effect of an acquittal of the accused with whom
the offence has been compounded.
G
(9) No offence shall be compounded except as provided
by this section." •
4. Section 482 saves the inherent power of the High Court
and it reads as follows :
H
768
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2012] 8 S.C.R.
A
"S. 482. Saving of inherent power of High Court. -Nothing
in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent
powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be
necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or
to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise
B
to secure the ends of justice."
5. In B. S. Joshi\ the undisputed facts were these : the
husband was one of the appellants while the wife was
respondent no. 2 in the appeal before this Court. They were
married on 21.7.1999 and were living separately since
C 15.7.2000. An FIR was registered under Sections 498-A/323
and 406, IPC at the instance of the wife on 2.1.2002. When the
criminal case registered at the instance of the wife was
pending, the dispute between the husband and wife and their
family members was settled. It appears that the wife filed an
D affidavit that her disputes with the husband and the other
members of his family had been finally settled and she and her
husband had agreed for mutual divorce. Based on the said
affidavit, the matter was taken to the High Court by both the
parties and they jointly prayed for quashing the criminal
E proceedings launched against the husband and his family
members on the basis of the FIR registered at the wife's
instance under Sections 498-A and 406 IPC. The High Court
dismissed the petition for quashing the FIR as in its view the
offences under Sections 498-A and 406, IPC were nonF compoundable and the inherent powers under Section 482 of
the Code could not be invoked to by-pass Section 320 of the
Code. It is from this order that the matter reached this Court.
This Court held that the High Court in exercise of its inherent
powers could quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint
G and Section 320 of the Code did not limit or affect the powers
under Section 482 of the Code. The Court in paragraphs 14
and 15 (Pg. 682) of the Report held as under:
H
"14. There is no doubt that the object of introducing
Chapter XX-A containing Section 498-A in the Indian
GIAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB [R.M. LODHA, J] 769
Penal Code was to prevent torture to a woman by her
A
husband or by relatives of her husband. Section 498-A was
added with a view to punishing a husband and his relatives
who harass or torture the wife to coerce her or her relatives
to satisfy unlawful demands of dowry. The hypertechnical
view would be counterproductive and would act against
B
interests of women and against the object for which this
provision was added. There is every likelihood that nonexercise of inherent power to quash the proceedings to
meet the ends of justice would prevent women from settling
earlier. That is not the object of Chapter XX-A of the Indian c
Penal Code.
15. In view of the above discussion, we hold that the High
Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash criminal
proceedings or FIR or complaint and Section 320 of the
Code does not limit or affect the powers under Section 482
D
of the Code."
6. In Nikhil Merchant2 , a company, Mis. Neemuch
Emballage Ltd., Mumbai was granted financial assistance by
Andhra Bank under various facilities. On account of default in
E
repayment of loans, the bank filed a suit for recovery of the
amount payable by the borrower company. The bank also filed
a complaint against the company, its Managing Director and
the officials of Andhra Bank for diverse offences, namely,
Section 120-B read with Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 of the
F
IPC read with Sections 5(2) and 5(1 )(d) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 194 7 and Section 13(2) read with Section
13(1 )(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The suit for
recovery filed by the bank against the company and the
Managing Director of the Company was compromised. The suit
G
was compromised upon the defendants agreeing to pay the
amounts due as per the schedule mentioned in the consent
terms. Clause 11 of the consent terms read, "agreed that save
as aforesaid neither party has any claim against the other and
parties do hereby withdraw all the allegations and counterH
allegations made against each other". Based on clause 11 of
770
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2012] 8 S.C.R.
A the consent terms, the Managing Director of the Company, the
appellant who was accused no. 3 in charge sheet filed by CBI,
made application for discharge from the criminal complaint. The
said application was rejected by the Special Judge (CBI),
Greater Bombay, which came to be challenged before the
B Bombay High Court. The contention before the High Court was
that since the subject matter of the dispute had been settled
between the appellant and the bank, it would be unreasonable
to continue with the criminal proceedings. The High Court
rejected the application for discharge from the criminal cases.
c It is from this order that the matter reached this Court by way
of special leave. The Court having regard to the facts of the
case and the earlier decision of this Court in 8. S. Joshi', set
aside the order of the High Court and quashed the criminal
proceedings by consideration of the matter thus:
D
E
F
G
"28. The basic intention of the accused in this case
appears to have been to misrepresent the financial status
of the Company, M/s Neemuch Emballage Ltd., Mumbai,
in order to avail of the credit facilities to an extent to which
the Company was not entitled. In other words, the main
intention of the Company and its officers was to cheat the
Bank and induce it to part with additional amounts of credit
to which the Company was not otherwise entitled.
29. Despite the ingredients and the factual content of an
offence of cheating punishable under Section 420 IPC, the
same has been made compoundable under sub-section
(2) of Section 320 CrPC with the leave of the court. Of
course, forgery has not been included as one of the
compoundable offences, but it is in such cases that the
prineiple enunciated in B.S. Joshi case becomes relevant.
30. In the instant case, the disputes between the Company
and the Bank have been set at rest on the basis of the
compromise arrived at by them whereunder the dues of
the Bank have been cleared and the Bank does not appear
H
to have any further claim against the Company. What,
GIAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB [RM. LODHA, J.] 771
however, remains is the fact that certain documents were
A
alleged to have been created by the appellant herein in
order to avail of credit facilities beyond the limit to which
the Company was entitled. The dispute involved herein has
overtones of a civil dispute with certain criminal facets. The
question which is required to be answered in this case is
B
whether the power which independently lies with this Court
to quash the criminal proceedings pursuant to the
compromise arrived at, should at all be exercised?
31. On an overall view of the facts as indicated c
hereinabove and keeping in mind the decision of this Court
in B. S. Joshi case and the compromise arrived at between
the Company and the Bank as also Clause 11 of the
consent terms filed in the suit filed by the Bank, we are
satisfied that this is a fit case where technicality should not
D
be allowed to stand in the way in the quashing of the
criminal proceedings, since, in our view, the continuance
of the same after the compromise arrived at between the
parties would be a futile exercise."
7. In Mano} Sharma3, the Court was concerned with the
E
question whether an F.l.R. under Sections 420/468/471/34/120B IPC can be quashed either under Section 482 of the Code
or under Article 226 of the Constitution when the accused and
the complainant have compromised and settled the matter
between themselves. Altamas Kabir, J., who delivered the lead
F
judgment referred to B.S. Joshi1 and the submission made on
behalf of the State that B. S. Joshi' required a second look and
held that the Court was not inclined to accept the contention
made on behalf of the State that the decision in B.S. Joshi'
required reconsideration, at least not in the facts of the case. It
G
was held that what was decided in B.S. Joshi' was the power
and authority of the High Court to exercise jurisdiction under
Section 482 of the Code or under Article 226 of the Constitution
to quash offences which were not compoundable. The law
n
stated in B.S. Joshi' simply indicated the powers of the High
H
772
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2012] 8 S.C.R.
A Court to quash any criminal proceeding or first information
report or complaint whether the offences were compoundable
or not. Altamas Kabir, J. further observed, "The ultimate
exercise of discretion under Section 482 CrPC or under Article
226 of the Constitution is with the court which has to exercise
B such jurisdiction in the facts of each case. It has been explained
that the said power is in no way limited by the provisions of
Section 320 CrPC. We are unable to disagree with such
statement of law. In any event, in this case, we are only required
to consider whether the High Court had exercised its jurisdiction
c under Section 482 CrPC legally and correctly." Then in
paragraphs 8 and 9 (pg. 5) of the Report, Altamas Kabir, J.,
inter alia, held as under :
D
E
F
"8 ...... Once the complainant decided not to pursue the
matter further, the High Court could have taken a more
pragmatic view of the matter. We do not suggest that while
exercising its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution
the High Court could not have refused to quash the first
information report, but what we do say is that the matter
could have been considered by the High Court with greater
pragmatism in the facts of the case.
9 ....... In the facts of this case we are of the view that
continuing with the criminal proceedings would be an
exercise in futility ......... "
8. Markandey Katju, J. although concurred with the view
of Altamas Kabir, J. that criminal proceedings in that case
deserved to be quashed but observed that question may have
to be decided in some subsequent decision or decisions
(preferably by a larger Bench) as to which non-compoundable
G cases can be quashed under Section 482 of the Code or Article
226 of the Constitution on the basis that the parties have entered
into compromise. In paragraphs 27 and 28 (pg. 10) of the
report he held as under:
H
"27. There can be no doubt that a case under Section 302
GIAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB [R.M. LODHA, J.] 773
IPC or other serious offences like those under Sections
A
395, 307 or 304-B cannot be compounded and hen_ce
proceedings in those provisions cannot be quashed by the
High Court in exercise of its power under Section 482
CrPC or in writ jurisdiction on the basis of compromise.
However, in some other cases (like those akin to a civil
B
nature), the proceedings can be quashed by the High
Court if the parties have come to an amicable settlement
even though the provisions are not compoundable. Where
a line is to be drawn will have to be decided in some later
decisions of this Court, preferably by a larger Bench (so c
as to make it more authoritative). Some guidelines will
have to be evolved in this. connection and the matter
cannot be left at the sole unguided discretion of Judges,
otherwise there may be conflicting decisions and judicial
anarchy. A judicial discretion has to be exercised on some
0
objective guiding principles and criteria, and not on the
whims and fancies of individual Judges. Discretion, after
all, cannot be the Chancellor's foot.
28. I am expressing this opinion because Shri B.B. Singh,
learned counsel for the respondent has rightly expressed
E
his concern that the decision in B.S. Joshi case should not
be understood to have meant that Judges can quash any
kind of criminal case merely because there has been a
compromise between the parties. After all, a crime is an
offence against society, and not merely against a private
F
individual.·
9. Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, learned senior counsel for
the petitioner in SLP(Crl.) No. 6324 of 2009 submitted that the
inherent power of the High Court to quash a non-compoundable
G
offence was not circumscribed by any of the provisions of the
Code, including Section 320. Section 482 is a declaration of
the inherent power pre-existing in the High Court and so long
as the exercise of the inherent power falls within the parameters
of Section 482, it sh all have an overriding effect over any of the
H
774
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2012] 8 S.C.R.
A provisions of the Code. He, thus, submitted that in exercise of
its inherent powers under Section 482, the High Court may
permit compounding of a non-compoundable offence provided
that in doing so it satisfies the conditions mentioned therein.
Learned senior counsel would submit that the power to quash
s the criminal proceedings under Section 482 of the Code exists
even in non-compoundable offence but its actual exercise will
depend on facts of a particular case. He submitted that some
or all of the following tests may be relevant to decide whether
to quash or not to quash the criminal proceedings in a given
c case; (a) the nature and gravity of case; (b) does the dispute
reflect overwhelming and pre-dominantly civil flavour; (c) would
the quashing involve settlement of entire or almost the entire
dispute; (d) the compromise/settlement between parties and/
or other facts and the circumstances render possibility of
0 conviction remote and bleak; (e) not to quash would cause
extreme injustice and would not serve ends of justice and (f)
not to quash would result in abuse of process of court.
10. Shri P.P. Rao, learned senior counsel for the petitioner
in Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 5921 of 2009 submitted that
E Section 482 of the Code is complete answer to the reference
made to the larger Bench. He analysed Section 482 and
Section 320 of the Code and submitted that Section 320 did
not limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court.
Notwithstanding Section 320, High Court can exercise its
F inherent power, inter alia, to prevent abuse of the process of
any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. To secure
the ends of justice is a wholesome and definite guideline. It
requires formation of opinion by High Court on the basis of
material on record as to whether the ends of justice would justify
G quashing of a particular criminal complaint, FIR or a proceeding.
When the Court exercises its inherent power under Section 482
in respect of offences which are not compoundable taking into
account the fact that the accused and the complainant have
settled their differences amicably, it cannot be viewed as
H permitting compounding of offence which is not compoundable.
GIAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB [R.M. LODHA, J.] 775
11. Mr. P.P. Rao, learned senior counsel submitted that
A
in cases of civil wrongs which also constitute criminal offences,
the High Court may pass order under Section 482 once both
parties jointly pray for dropping the criminal proceeding initiated
by one of them to put an end to the dispute and restore peace
between the parties.
B
12. Mr. V. Giri, learned senior counsel for the respondent
(accused) in Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.