# GILLANDERS ARBUTHNOT AND CO., LTD v. THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, CALCUTTA

- **Citation:** [1964] 8 S.C.R. 121
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1962-01-10
- **Case number:** Civil Appeals Nos. 825-828 of 1963
- **Bench:** K. Subba Rao, J. c. SHAH, S. M. S!Kri
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/gillanders-arbuthnot-and-co-ltd-v-the-commissioner-of-income-tax-calcutta-3241
- **Pages:** 13

## Headnote

Income Tax-Capital or revenue-Termination of
agencY-Compensa~
tion-Business of several agencies-Cancellation of single agencyNature of compensation.
The appellant company was carrying on business in diverse Jines
as managing agents of some concerns, distributing agents of others and
u secretaries of still other class of concerns. It also dealt as an ex1964
May I.
1964
Gillanders
Arbuthnot and Co.
"·
C.l.T.
Shah J.
122
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
porter and importer. shipping agent, and as buyer and dealer in dive""
commodities. A large amount of business wu done by the appellant
as an agent of foreign companies in respect of different kinda of goods.
In respect of explosives manufactured by the Imperial Chemical Industries (Export) Ll'd .• Glasgow, Scotland, the appellant wu acting u the
sole agent and distributor of that company. The agency agreement was
terminable at the option of the principal company, and by a Jetter dated
March 11, 1947. the latter informed the appellant that the agency would
stand terminated from April I, 1948 and that compensation would be
paid for termination of the agency.
The appellant was be paid
an
amount which was computed on the basis of the profits of the business.
In the course of the proceedings 'for asaessment to income-tax appellant
claimed that the amount was received on determination of the agency
being receipt of a capital nature and was not liable to be included in
total income of the appellant, but the
Income~tax Officer rcjcctett
the claim holding that cancellation of a single contract of agency out
of a number of selling agencies held by the appellant was in the ordinary
course of business
and that the sum received as compensation
was
revenue taxable under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 .
. Held: Having regard to the vast array of business done
by
the
appellant as agents, the acquisition of agencies was in the normal course
of business and the determination of individual agencies, a normal incident, could not affect or impair the trading structure of the appallant, nor
involve a loss of an enduring trading asset. and the compensation received by the appellant, therefore, did not represent the price paid for loss
of a capital asset but only a payment made for the loss of profit it
suffered by the cancellation of its agency and was income chargeable
to the income-tax.
CIVIL
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION:
Civil
Appeals
Nos. 825-828 of 1963.
Appeals from the judgment and order dated January 10,
1962, of the Calcutta High Court in Income-tax Reference
No. 33 of 1957.
B. Sen, P. K. Chatterjee and D. N. Gupta, for the
appellant.
K. N. Rajagopal Sastri and R. N.
Sachthey, for the
respondent.
May 1, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered
by
SHAH, J.-The appellant which is a public limited com·
pany incorporated under the Indian Companies _Act, 1913,
has its registered office at Calcutta, and branches m Bo.mbay,
Madras, New Delhi and Kanpur. The appellant earned on
8 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
123
business in diverse lines, which may broadly be classified as
1964
(1) buying and selling on its own account, ( 2) introducing Gilland;;;- Arbucustomers to principals ( 3) acting as managing agents, ( 4)
thnot and Co.
acting as shipping agents, ( 5) acting as purchasing agents,
c.1:T.
( 6) acting as sole importers and distributors on behalf of
Ullited Kingdom principals liaving no organisation in India
and ( 7) acting as secretaries.
Since January 21, 1886, M/s. Gillanders Arbuthnot &
Co. predecessors-in-interest of the appellant were the sole
agents and distributors in India of explosives manufactured
by the Imperial. Chemical Industries (Export) Ltd. Glasgow,
Scotland, hereiaaftet called 'the principal company'. There
was no written agreement between the principal company
and M/s Gillanders Arbuthnot & Co.
incorporating the
terms of the agency agreement. It is however coriimon
ground that the agency agreement was terminable at the
option of the principal company. The appellant was incorporated for tak

## Text

.S S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
121
in principle is disclosed. Where on a consideration of the
196'#
circumstances, payment is made to compensate a person Kettlew-;u-Bullen
for cancellation of a contract which does not affect the
and Co.
v.
trading structure of his business, nor deprive him of what
CJ.T.
in substance is his source of income, termillation of the
Shah 1•
-contract being a normal incident of the business, and such
cancellation leaves him free to carry on his trade
(freed
from tbe contract terminated) the receipt is revenue: Where
by the cancellation of an agency the trac! ing structure of
the assessee is impaired, or such cancellation results in loss
-Of what may be regarded as the source of the assessee's
income, tbe payment made to compensate for cancellation
of the agency agreement is normally a oapital receipt.
In the present case, on a review of all the circumsc:mces,
we have no doubt that what the assessee was paid was to
compensate him for loss of a capital asset. It matters little
whether the assessee did continue after the determination of
its agency with tbe Fort William Jute Co. Lid to conduct
the remaining agencies.
The transaction was not in the
nature of a trading transaction, but was one in which the.
assessee parted with an asset of an enduring value.
We
are, therefore, unable to agree with the High Court that
the amount received by the appellant was in the nature of
· a revenue receipt.
We accordingly record the answer on the question submitted by the Tribunal in the negative.
The appellant
would be entitled to its costs in this Court.
GILLANDERS ARBUTHNOT AND CO., LTD.
v.
THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, CALCUTTA
(K. SUBBA RAO, J. c. SHAH AND S. M. S!KRI, JJ.)
Income Tax-Capital or revenue-Termination of
agencY-Compensa~
tion-Business of several agencies-Cancellation of single agencyNature of compensation.
The appellant company was carrying on business in diverse Jines
as managing agents of some concerns, distributing agents of others and
u secretaries of still other class of concerns. It also dealt as an ex1964
May I.
1964
Gillanders
Arbuthnot and Co.
"·
C.l.T.
Shah J.
122
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
porter and importer. shipping agent, and as buyer and dealer in dive""
commodities. A large amount of business wu done by the appellant
as an agent of foreign companies in respect of different kinda of goods.
In respect of explosives manufactured by the Imperial Chemical Industries (Export) Ll'd .• Glasgow, Scotland, the appellant wu acting u the
sole agent and distributor of that company. The agency agreement was
terminable at the option of the principal company, and by a Jetter dated
March 11, 1947. the latter informed the appellant that the agency would
stand terminated from April I, 1948 and that compensation would be
paid for termination of the agency.
The appellant was be paid
an
amount which was computed on the basis of the profits of the business.
In the course of the proceedings 'for asaessment to income-tax appellant
claimed that the amount was received on determination of the agency
being receipt of a capital nature and was not liable to be included in
total income of the appellant, but the
Income~tax Officer rcjcctett
the claim holding that cancellation of a single contract of agency out
of a number of selling agencies held by the appellant was in the ordinary
course of business
and that the sum received as compensation
was
revenue taxable under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 .
. Held: Having regard to the vast array of business done
by
the
appellant as agents, the acquisition of agencies was in the normal course
of business and the determination of individual agencies, a normal incident, could not affect or impair the trading structure of the appallant, nor
involve a loss of an enduring trading asset. and the compensation received by the appellant, therefore, did not represent the price paid for loss
of a capital asset but only a payment made for the loss of profit it
suffered by the cancellation of its agency and was income chargeable
to the income-tax.
CIVIL
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION:
Civil
Appeals
Nos. 825-828 of 1963.
Appeals from the judgment and order dated January 10,
1962, of the Calcutta High Court in Income-tax Reference
No. 33 of 1957.
B. Sen, P. K. Chatterjee and D. N. Gupta, for the
appellant.
K. N. Rajagopal Sastri and R. N.
Sachthey, for the
respondent.
May 1, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered
by
SHAH, J.-The appellant which is a public limited com·
pany incorporated under the Indian Companies _Act, 1913,
has its registered office at Calcutta, and branches m Bo.mbay,
Madras, New Delhi and Kanpur. The appellant earned on
8 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
123
business in diverse lines, which may broadly be classified as
1964
(1) buying and selling on its own account, ( 2) introducing Gilland;;;- Arbucustomers to principals ( 3) acting as managing agents, ( 4)
thnot and Co.
acting as shipping agents, ( 5) acting as purchasing agents,
c.1:T.
( 6) acting as sole importers and distributors on behalf of
Ullited Kingdom principals liaving no organisation in India
and ( 7) acting as secretaries.
Since January 21, 1886, M/s. Gillanders Arbuthnot &
Co. predecessors-in-interest of the appellant were the sole
agents and distributors in India of explosives manufactured
by the Imperial. Chemical Industries (Export) Ltd. Glasgow,
Scotland, hereiaaftet called 'the principal company'. There
was no written agreement between the principal company
and M/s Gillanders Arbuthnot & Co.
incorporating the
terms of the agency agreement. It is however coriimon
ground that the agency agreement was terminable at the
option of the principal company. The appellant was incorporated for taking over the business of M/ s Gillanders
Arbuthnot & Co. and since it took over the "distributing
agency the appellant acted as the sole agent and distributor
of explosives manufactured by the principal company, but
without a written agreement.
In May 1945 the principal company desired to set up
its own organisation for distributing its products, and intimated the appellant that the agency of the appellant may
be cancelled after two or three years. By letter dated March,
11, 1947, the principal company informed the appellant
that the agency will stand terminated from April 1, 1948,
and that it desired to compensate the appellant for termination of the agency on the following basis:
( 1) "For the first three post-transfer years" the
principal company shall pay to the appellant
two-fifths of the commission accrued on actual
sales in the territory of the latter's agency taken
over the principal company, such commission
to be computed at the commission rates formerly paid to the appellant;
(2) That "in the third
post-transfer year",
the
principal company shall pay the appellant in
Shalt J.
1964
Gillander1 Arbu·
thnot and Ct>.
v.
C.l.T
Shah I.
124
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1g64]
addition a sum equivalent to full commission on
the sales for that year effected by the principal
company in the appellant's territory calculated
at the same rates.
( 3) That payments would be made to the appellant
after the end of each year as soon as the amount
due was ascertained.
Certain other matters in the letter which have a bearing on
the dispute, may be reproduced:
"For the purpose of calculating the commission due
to you, the post-transfer will be deemed to run
as from the date of the transfer of your agency
to Imperial Chemical Industries (India) Ltd.,
We trust that you will find
these proposals
acceptable.
As a condition of our paying you compensation on
the basis outlined above, we would request you
to be good enough to give us a formal undertaking to refrain from selling or accepting any
agency for explosives or other commodities
competitive with those covered by the agency
agreement now being terminated.
In this connection, we are asking our Legal Depart·
ment to prepare a formal agreement which we
will submit to you for signature as soon
as
possible."
It is common ground that no ~ormal agreement in writing,
which was contemplated to be taken from the appellant,
was executed: not even a draft of the agreement was submitted by the principal company to the appellant.
Pursuant to conditions (1) and (2) incorporated in
the letter dated March 11, 194 7, which have been set out
earlier, the appellant received the following amounts from
the principal company·
I
!
8 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
125
1964
For the previous year corresponding to the
asscsment year ending 31st March, 1949.
.. .... Rs.
1' 53'47l/II/- Gilland;;:;- Arbuthnot and Co.
v.
For the previous year corresponding to the
assessment yrar ending 31st March, 1950.
.. .... Ro.
l,59,>71/4/-
C.1.T.
For the previous year corresponding to the
assessment year ending 31st March, 1951
...... Rs.
6,20,131/2/-
These amounts were included in its profit & loss account by
the appellant as commission received by it.
But in the
course of the proceedings for assessment to income-tax and
Business Profits Tax, the appellant claimed that the amounts
we:e compensation received on determination of the agency
being receipts of a capital nature and were not liable to be
included in the total income of the appellant. The Incometax Officer, Companies District IV, Calcutta, rejected the
contention of the appellant, holding that cancellation of a
single contract of agency out of a riumber of selling agencies
held by the appellant was in the ordinary course of business
and the sums received by the appellant as compensation for
f ancellation were revenue, taxable under the Indian Incomet ax Act, 1922. The Income-tax Officer also assessed the
l elevant amount of compensation to Business Profits tax
for the chargeable accounting period ending March 31,
1949.
In appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, the
contention of the appellant was accepted principally on the
ground that the amounts received by the appellant were
compensation for termination of the agency with the principal company and as consideration for agreeing to refrain
from carrying on in future competitive business in explosives.
The Appellate Tribunal held that the_ compensation received
by the appellant was merely incidental to the carrying on
of the business. The Tribunal negatived the contention of
the appellant that the explosives agency was
a separate
business or that termination of that business amounted to
loss of an enduring asset. The Tribunal also held that the
covenant referred to in the letter dated March, 11, 194 7,
about the appellant agreeing to refrain from carrying on a
competitive business in explosives did not form cons~dera
tion for the amount paid, because although proposed m the
Shah J.
126
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[rg64]
~
ldter dated March 11, 1947, there was no formal acceptance
Gilland.,• Arbu- <>f the offer or an undertaking in writing given by the
thnot and Co.
appellant agreeing not to carry on a competitive business.
v.
C.1.T.
'Jn the view of the Tribunal the offer relating to the underShah 1.
talcing not to carry ori a competitive business contained in
the letter was not accepted, and. the amounts paid by the
principal company could not therefore be regarded as forming consideration partially or wholly for acceptance
of
that offer.
The Tribunal thereafter referred three questions under
s. 66 ( 1 ) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 to the High
Court of Judicature at Calcutta. These questions were:
( 1) Whether the assessee's agency of the Imperial
Chemical Industries (Export) Ltd. was a separate business by itself, the closure of which
resulted in the destruction of a capital asset
of the assessee;
(2) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances
of this case, the compensation sums received
by the assessee from the Imperial
Chemical
Industries (Export) Ltd. are income
chargeable in the hands of the assessee; and
(3') Whether on the facts and in the circumstances
of this case no part of the compensation money
was received by the assessee on the condition
not to carry on a competitive business in the
same line of activity in explosives and as such
no part of the money was in the nature of capital being exempt
from
Indian
Income-tax
levy?
The High Court recorded answers to the question as follows:
"Qu;:.;tion 1.-The assessee's agency of the Imperial
Chemical Industries (Export) Ltd. was not a
separate business by itself and th~ closure of
this business did not result in the destruction
of a capital asset of the assesee.
8 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
127
Question 2.-The amounts of compensation received
!964
by the assessee from the Imperial Chemical Gilllin;;;;"Arbu·
Industries (Export) Ltd. were income chargethnot and Co.
v.
able in the hands of the assessee.
c.1. r.
Question 3.-No part of the compensation money
was received by the assessee on condition not
to carry on a competitive business in explosives
and consequently no part thereof was exempt
from Indian Income-tax levy."
With certificate of fitness granted by the High Court,
these appeals have been preferred by the appellant.
The principal question in dispute is whether the amount
received by the appellant as compensation for loss of agency
are of the nature of capital or revenue. It is necessary in the
first instance to eliminate two subsidiary contentions raised
by the appellant. It was urged that the amounts received by
the appellant were in lieu of compensation for cancellation
of the agency by the principal company, for Joss of goodwill
of the appellant's business, and also in consideration of the
appellant's agreeing not to carry on any competitive business
in explosives or other commodities in which business was
carried on by the appellant under the agency agreement.
It cannot seriously be disputed that compensation paid for
agreeing to refrain from carrying on competitive business
in the commodities in respect of which the agency was terminated, or for loss of goodwill would, prima facie, be off
the nature of a capital receipt. But there is no evidence that
compensation was paid to the appellant as
consideration
for giving the undertaking not to carry on a competitive
business, or as compensation for loss of goodwill.
In the letter dated March 11, 194 7, it was expressly
recited that as a condition of payment of compensation on
the basis outlined therein the principal company had called
upon the appellant to give a formal undertaking to refrain
from selling or accepting any agency for explosives or other
commodities competitive with those covered by the agency
agreement, but no such formal undertakin~ was ever given.
It was recited in the last paragraph of the letter that the prin·
Shah/.
128
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[rgp4J
1'6'1
cipal company will submit a fonnal agreement to the apGillandm Arbu- pellant for execution. But it appears that at the time of
thnot and Co.
payment of the compensation and thereafter also both sides
cJ:T.
ignored
this
condition. Payment of compensation was
Shah J.
spread over a period of three years, but that will not give·
rise to an inference that the object behind the payment was.
to enforce the undertaking, for the undertaking, if any,
would have operated pennanently whereas full compensation
was payable within three years. If importance was attached·
to the undertaking the principal company would have declined to make even the first payment without insisting upon
a fonnal agreement incorporating the undertaking.
Whether the appellant did not in fact carry on any competitive
business was never investigated, and the absence of evidence on that point may reasonably justify the inference that
the appellant never attempted to establish that part of its
case. Granting that an agreement to refrain from carrying
on a competitive business may be implied from subsequent
c.onduct, in the absence of any material at any stage of the
proceedings before the Revenue authorities, it would be reasonable to hold that the .appellant did not place any reliance upon the case that part of the compensation was attributable to an undertaking not to engage in competitive
business.
No part of the compensation may be attributed to loss
of goodwil! suffered by the appellant. It is true that the
agency had continued in the hands of the predecessors
of the_ appellant and thereafter with the appellant for upwards of sixty years.
It was urged that an extensive
market had been built up in India and the goodwill of
that business was on termination of the appellant's agency
taken over by the new agents of the principal company
and compensation paid in _that behalf must be regarded as
capital.
But this question also was never raised before the
Revenue authorities, nor even before the Tribunal.
The
Tribunal observed that it had not been supplied with "any
material regarding the basis of the value of the goodwill,
nor anything to indicate as to what the written down value
of the goodwill was, due to the tennination of the agency".
/-
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
129
It therefore held that the inference sought to be drawn by
1964
the appellant that compensation was referable to the Joss Gilland;;;-A.rbuof goodwill, was based on no evidence and the High Court
thnot •M Co.
agreed with that conclusion.
We are unable to hold that
cir.
the High Court was, in so holding in error. If it was the
case of the appellant that a part of the compensation was
in fact paid for loss of goodwill of the business, the appellant couid have led evidence to establish ~hat it was the intentioo of the parties that the loss ·of good will was to be
compensated by payment of an amounit which was included
in the compensation ultimately paid by the principal company to the appellant.
The business of agency had
undoubtedly continued for more than sixty years, but there is
no evidence about the terms of the agency agreement. There
was no written agreement, and it is common ground that
tl1e agency was terminable at will.
The principal company
had, as early as 1945, informed the appellant that the distribution arrangement "would be terminated after two or
three years". The appellant had sufficient notice of the proposed determination.
Thereafter the agency was cancelled
with effect from April 1, 1945, and in -the correspondence
which is tendered in evidence, there is not even an indirect
reference to any negotiation for payment of Compensation
for loss of goodwill, or any agreement in that behalf.
We may now address ourselves to the question, whether
eompensation paid by the principal company for cancellation
of the agency may be regarded as a capital or revenue receipt. We have in a recent case in Kettlewell Dullen & Co.
v. The Commissioner of Income-tax;·· Calcutta ( 1) made a
survey of the important cases which have arisen before the
Courts in the United Kingdom and in India about the principles which govern the determination of the nature of compensation received on the termination of an agency. We ,
observed in that case:
"On an analysis of these cases which fa!! on two sides
of the dividing line, a satisfactory measure of
consistency in principle is
disclosed.
Where
------
(1)( 1964] S.C.L· 93.
SI S.C.-9
Sluih J.
1964
Gillandera
Arb11thnot and Co.
Y.
C.1.T.
s•11 1.
130
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[rg64]
on a consideration of the circumstances, payment is made to compensate a person for cancellation of a contract which does not affect
the
trading structure of his
business,
nor
deprive him of what in substance is his source
of income, termination of the contract being
a normal incident of the business, and such
cancellation leaves him free to carry on his
trade (freed from the contract terminated) the
receipt is revenue: where by the cancellation ef
an agency the trading structure of the assessee
is impaired, or such cancellation results in loss
of what may be regarded as the source of the
assessee's income, the payment made to compensate for cancellation of the agency
agreement is normally a capital receipt."
Examining the circumstances of the present case in the
light of that principle, we agree with the High Court that
what was received by the appellant was income and not
capital.
Compensation received by the appellant for cancellation of the agency which was terminable at will, the
appellant was- to be paid an amount which was to be computed on the basis of the profits of the business. Under the
letter dated March 11, 194 7, the appellant was to be paid
"for the first three post-transfer years" two-fifths of the commission accrued on actual sales in the territory of the appellant's agency taken over by the Imperial Chemical Industries
<India) Ltd., such commission to be computed at the rates
of commission formerly paid to the appellant, and that in
"the third post-transfer year" the princip2l company was to
pay the appellant in addition a sum equivalent to full com-
~
mission on the sales for that year effected by the Imperial
C::hemical Industries (India) Ltd. in the appellant's territory calculated at the same rates.
The appellant was conducting business
as
selling or
distributing agent of numerous principals.
The agency
which was terminated was one of many such agencies in
which the appellant functioned as distributing agent of a
8 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
131
foreign principal. There is not even a suggestion, that by
~
the determination of the agency held by the appellant in Gillandm
..4rb11explosives from the principal company, the trading structure
thnot and Co.
Y.
of the assessee's business was impaired. It is manifest that
C.l.T.
the agencies of the companies conducted by the appellant
sw J
must h~v~ been obtained at different times.
There is no
evidence that these agencies were of any fixed duration. It
would be reasonable to infer that some of the agencies may
be cancelled and fresh agencies obtained. The list t.;rnishtd
by the appellant before the Tribunal, ana1ysing the different
classes of business carried on by it d1scbsed that the business was done in many lines.
The appellant acted as
managing agent of some concerns,
distributing agent of
'others. and as secretary of still other class of concerns.
Again it dealt as an exporter and importer, shipping agent,
and as a buyer and dealer in diverse commodities. A large
amount of business was done by the. appellant as an agent
of foreign companies. The appellant had obtained agencies
for paints, varnishes, petroleum, kerosene oil, medicines and
toilet preparations, cement, timber, stationery, metals, tea,
engineering goods, air-conditioning equipment and a large
number of other commodities. It may reasonably be held,
having regard to the vast array of business done by the appellant as agents, that the acquisition of agencies was .in the
normal course of business and determination of individual
agencies, a normal incident, not affecting or impairing the
trading structure of tl!e appellant. The appellant was compensated by payment to it the loss of profit it suffered by
the cancellation of its agency, leaving it free to conduct its
remaining business.
It was said that the appellant had employed expert officers who were accustomed to handle explosives which are a
specialised commodity and the cancellation of that agency
seriously affected the organization of its trading operations.
Bl.!: foe appellant was undoubtedly dealing in several kinds
of infl2mmable substances, such as, petroleum, kerosene oil,
timber and similar other commodities.
It is true that
explosives would require great care in handling.- It appears,
however, that eighty per cent of the staff attached to the
Magazine Section was maintained not at the expense of the
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
~
appellant, but at the expense of the principal company. Out
GUlandm .A.rbu- of the officers who were attached to the explosives business,
thnot and c,,. services of five officers were taken over by the principal
cJ.r.
company and six others were retained by the· appellant and
Slllzh I.
absorbed in other branches.
It cannot, therefore, be said
that termination of the agency resulted in impairment of the
trading organisation of the appellant. One of the agencies
was undoubtedly lost to the appellant, and even temporary
dislocation in the organisation of the business thereby may
oe assumed. There is no evidence, however, that the appellant
could not in the ordinary course of business
repair the
dislocation. There is no evidence that it could not obtain an
agency from another
manufacturer of explosives.
Even
assuming that such an agency in explosives may not be
replaced, that circumstance by itself may not justify the
inference that the agency was independent of the other lines
of business conducted by the appellant, or that by the cancellation "of the agency an enduring asset was lost to the
appellant. The circumstance that the agency was determinaJil~ at the will of the principal company which maintained
a large staff at their expense justifies the inference that upon
cancellation of that agency the appellant's business organization was not substantially impaired. The cancellation, it
may be held, was an incident of the trading operations of
the appeallant in the normal course of business.
The payment received by the appellant could not, therefore, be regarded truly as compensation for not carrying on the business: it was a sum which was worked out in terms of profits
which the appellant would have earned during the period
of notice and paid in the ordinary course of brisiness to
adjust the relations between the appellant and the principal
company.
There is, in our judgment, no immutable principle that
compensation received on cancellation of an agency must
always be regarded as capital. In each case the question
has to be determined in the light of the attendant circumstances.
In the judgment in Kettlewal/ Bullen and Co.'s
case (1) we have explained that the judgment of the Judicial
Committee in the Commissioner of
Income-tax v. Shaw
< ) [ 1964! sis.c.R. 93.
8 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
133
Val/ace and Co.(') was not intended to, and did not lay
~
Jown that in every case, cancellation of an agency resulted Gillandm A.rb1
in loss of a source of revenue or that amounts paid to cornthnot :nd Co.
pensate for loss of agency must be regarded as capital loss.
ciT.
On a careful consideration of all the circumstances we
agree with the High Court that cancellation of the comracr
of agency did not affect the profit-making structure of the
appellant, nor did it iinvolve a loss of an enduring trading
asset; it Iljerely deprived the appellant of a trading avenue,
leaving him free to devote his energies after the cancellation
to carry on the rest of the business, and to replace the contract
lost by a similar cpntract. The compensation paid, therefore,
d.id not represent 'the price paid for loss of a capital asset.
We therefore dismiss the appeals with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
MASALTI
v.
STATE OF U. P.
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO. K. c. DAS
GUPTA AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ)
Criminal Appeal-Appeal by special leave-Scope-Murders committed
by village faction constituting
unlawful assembly-Sentence of
death, if and when can be pas.Jed-Apprecilztion of evidence-T11t
-Validity Prosecution-It must examine all witnesses cited.
Forty persons
belonging to a village faction and · constituting an
unlawful assembly were put up on trial before the Ad'ditional Sessions
lodge under s. 302 read with s. 149 of the Indiao Penal Code and other
sections thereof for murdering 5 persons of the other faotion with gun1.
The trial lodge found 35 of them ~illy and sentenced 10 of them. who
carried fire arms, to death and the rest to imprisonment for life. Three
appeals were preferred by the convicted persons to the High Court anll
!he sentences of death came up for confirmation under s. 374 of the
(I) L.R. 59 I.A. 206,
Shllh /.
lPM
May,4