# GIRJA SHANKAR KASHI HAM v. THE GUJABAT SPlNNING &

- **Citation:** [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 890
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1962
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/girja-shankar-kashi-ham-v-the-gujabat-splnning-2352
- **Pages:** 13

## Headnote

1962
E,,,~sin
Relation 14 tAt
Bh0W1a Collin.1
\'.
TJ.,ir Wor4:mtn
Se1Ur J.
I96Z
J-ry 30.
800 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
these malis were on persona.I work.
The word
"persona.I" is obviously used in the Bt'nce of work
for an individual as distinguished from work for
the Coal mine as a.n institution. These malis were
undoubtedly working for the officers as individuals.
ThereCore they were on persona.I
work.
For these reasons in our view the malis in
the present case were not entitled to any bonus
under the Bonus Scheme. As in our opinion the
order of ruference does not raise any question as
to whether the malis were entitled to bonus apart
from the Ronus ::icbeme, it is unnecessary for us to
ex presa any opinion on that question and we do
not do so.
The result is that this appeal is allowed and
we set aside the award of the Tribunal in so far as
it is concerned with the two points of dispute earlier set out which had been referred to it. \\·e do
not think it a fit ca.so to make any order for
cos ta.
Appe,al allowe.d.
GIRJA SHANKAR KASH! HAM
v.
THE GUJABAT SPlNNING &
WEAVING CO. LTD.
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A. K. SARKA!! and K. :N'.
WANC!tOO, ,TJ.)
lndu.tria/ Dilpuk-Erclu8ive right
of Reprt3entalive
Union to repreaent emplnyee•-Bomhay IndU81rtal Relatinns Act
(Xlo/ 1947) ••, 27A, J2, JJ, 42 (4).
The Gujarat Spinning & Weaving Co. Ltd., closed its
business on May 14, 1953, and •old its asscrs to Tarun Commercial Mills Co. Ltd. The old company had discharged all
its workmen when it closed its business.
The new company
re·started the business after a week an<l took in its service the
workmen of the old rompany.
When the closure took place
a dispute was pending hetween the old company and its
v.·orkmen lvith respect to bonus.
l'hc ·rextile Labour Associa·
tion, which is a Representative Union of the textile wockers in
the city of Ahmedabad, filed an application before the Labour
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
891
Appellate Tribunal where the dispute was pending. The
matter was compromised and the old company agreed to pay
some agreed bonus. The textile J.abour Association gave an
undertaking not to claim compensation in any other way in
any future proceeding.
Later !'>n, 376 employees of the old company gave a
notice under s. 42(1) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act,
1947, and claimed compensation. The Textile Labour Association made an appearance before the Labour Court and
contended that the application should be dismissed iii view of
the compromise arrived at before the Labour Appellate Tribunal. The Labour Court accepted the contention and dismissed the application. The workmen went in appeal to the
Industrial Court but their appeal was also dismissed.
They
made a petition in the Higl) Court under Art. 227 of the
Constitution but that was summarily rejected. They have
come in appeal to this Court by special leave.
Held, that where a Representative Union appears in
any proceeding under the Act, no one else can be allowed to
appear, not even the employee at whose instance the proceedings might have been siarted under s. 42(4). Where che
appearance is by an·y representative of the employees other than
a Representative Union, the authorities under s. 32 can permit the employee to appear himself in all proceedings before
them. The employee is entitled to appear through any person in certain proceedings sprcified in s. 33.
However, whenever the Representative Union makt"s an appearance, even
the employee rannut appear in any proceeding under the Act,
and the representation must be confined only to the Representative Union. The complete ban laid bys. 27A on representation otherwise than through a representative of employees
remains complete where the representative of employees is a
Representative Union that has appeared. If the representa·
tive of employees that has appeared is other than the Representative Union, ss. 32 and 33 provide for exceptions.
The bona fides or mala fides of the representative of employees
can have n

## Text

1962
E,,,~sin
Relation 14 tAt
Bh0W1a Collin.1
\'.
TJ.,ir Wor4:mtn
Se1Ur J.
I96Z
J-ry 30.
800 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
these malis were on persona.I work.
The word
"persona.I" is obviously used in the Bt'nce of work
for an individual as distinguished from work for
the Coal mine as a.n institution. These malis were
undoubtedly working for the officers as individuals.
ThereCore they were on persona.I
work.
For these reasons in our view the malis in
the present case were not entitled to any bonus
under the Bonus Scheme. As in our opinion the
order of ruference does not raise any question as
to whether the malis were entitled to bonus apart
from the Ronus ::icbeme, it is unnecessary for us to
ex presa any opinion on that question and we do
not do so.
The result is that this appeal is allowed and
we set aside the award of the Tribunal in so far as
it is concerned with the two points of dispute earlier set out which had been referred to it. \\·e do
not think it a fit ca.so to make any order for
cos ta.
Appe,al allowe.d.
GIRJA SHANKAR KASH! HAM
v.
THE GUJABAT SPlNNING &
WEAVING CO. LTD.
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A. K. SARKA!! and K. :N'.
WANC!tOO, ,TJ.)
lndu.tria/ Dilpuk-Erclu8ive right
of Reprt3entalive
Union to repreaent emplnyee•-Bomhay IndU81rtal Relatinns Act
(Xlo/ 1947) ••, 27A, J2, JJ, 42 (4).
The Gujarat Spinning & Weaving Co. Ltd., closed its
business on May 14, 1953, and •old its asscrs to Tarun Commercial Mills Co. Ltd. The old company had discharged all
its workmen when it closed its business.
The new company
re·started the business after a week an<l took in its service the
workmen of the old rompany.
When the closure took place
a dispute was pending hetween the old company and its
v.·orkmen lvith respect to bonus.
l'hc ·rextile Labour Associa·
tion, which is a Representative Union of the textile wockers in
the city of Ahmedabad, filed an application before the Labour
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
891
Appellate Tribunal where the dispute was pending. The
matter was compromised and the old company agreed to pay
some agreed bonus. The textile J.abour Association gave an
undertaking not to claim compensation in any other way in
any future proceeding.
Later !'>n, 376 employees of the old company gave a
notice under s. 42(1) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act,
1947, and claimed compensation. The Textile Labour Association made an appearance before the Labour Court and
contended that the application should be dismissed iii view of
the compromise arrived at before the Labour Appellate Tribunal. The Labour Court accepted the contention and dismissed the application. The workmen went in appeal to the
Industrial Court but their appeal was also dismissed.
They
made a petition in the Higl) Court under Art. 227 of the
Constitution but that was summarily rejected. They have
come in appeal to this Court by special leave.
Held, that where a Representative Union appears in
any proceeding under the Act, no one else can be allowed to
appear, not even the employee at whose instance the proceedings might have been siarted under s. 42(4). Where che
appearance is by an·y representative of the employees other than
a Representative Union, the authorities under s. 32 can permit the employee to appear himself in all proceedings before
them. The employee is entitled to appear through any person in certain proceedings sprcified in s. 33.
However, whenever the Representative Union makt"s an appearance, even
the employee rannut appear in any proceeding under the Act,
and the representation must be confined only to the Representative Union. The complete ban laid bys. 27A on representation otherwise than through a representative of employees
remains complete where the representative of employees is a
Representative Union that has appeared. If the representa·
tive of employees that has appeared is other than the Representative Union, ss. 32 and 33 provide for exceptions.
The bona fides or mala fides of the representative of employees
can have nothing to do with the ban imposed Ly s. 27 A on
the appearance of any one else except the representative of
employees ao defined in •· 30.
The argument based on the so called tyranny of a
Representative Union or its motives in taking the action it
may choose to take in any proceedings after it appears can
have no relevance if the intention of the legislature is perfectly
clear from the provisions of the Act.
CIVIL APPELLATE JuiusnwTION: Civil Appeal
o. 189 of 1961.
I96Z
Girja Shoalcor
Kaahi Ra"'
v.
Thi Gr9aJat
Spinning d: Wtaiiing
Co. L•tl.
116%
Girja SMflkar
Jr1111ti R""'
v.
Tif Gttj~tll
Spiruo;., di W """"
c:.. Lid.
892 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment
and order dated ~ovcmber 2i, 1957, of the Indus·
trii.l Court, Bombay, at Ahmedabad in
Appeal
(I. C.) 187 of I 95i.
G. T. Daru, V. L. Narasimhamoorthy, E. Udaya·
rathnam and S. S. Shukla, for the appellants.
c. K. Daphtary, Solicitor General of India. I. M.
Nanavati', J. B. Dadaclianji and 0. C. Malhur, for the
respondent No. I.
N. M. Barot, Secretary of the Textjle. Labaur
Associati<m, for respondent No. 2.
1962. January 30. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
WANCHOO, J.-Thi.s appeal by special leave
against
the order
of the
Born bay
High
Court summarily dismissing the pc ti ti on of the
appellants under Art. 227 of the Constitution raises
an important question with regard to the right of
a Ropresentative Union under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, No. XI of 1947, (hereinafter
called tho Act) to appear in a proceeding under the
Act to the exclusion of an employee desiring a
change under s. 42(4) of the Act. Tbe question
arises in this way. The Gujarat Spinning and
Weaving Company Limited (hereinafter called thB
old Company) closed its busineBB on May 14, 1953
and sold its assets to the Tarun Commercial Mills
Company Limited (hereinaft:;r called the new Com·
pany). The old Company had discharged all its
workmen when it closed its business which happened
before s. :!5F relating to retrenchment was introduced in the Industrial Disputes Act, (No. XIV of
1947). The new Company re-started the business
after a week and took in it.s service the workmen of
the old Company. It appears th:\t at the time the
closure took place a <liHpute
wa~ pending between
the old Company and its workmen with respect to
bonus. As the clo~ur1J had taken place while that
'
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
893
dispute was pending, the Textile Labour Association (hereinafter called the Association), which· is a
Representative Union of the textile workers in the
city of Abmedabad, filed an application under s. 22
of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act
of 1950 before the Lab~ur Appellate Tribunal where
the dispute was pending. In that matter there was
a compromise, and though, according to the old
Company, there was no available surplus to give
bonus, the old Company agreed to pay bonus by
way of settlement to the extent of I /8th of the
earnings of the work!Ilen for the year in dispute;
and in consideration of this the Association on behalf of all the workmen discharged as a result of
closure agreed not to press for any compensation for
their discharge and the workmen who accepted the
b'.lnus by this agreement gave an undertaking not to
c !aim compensation in any other way in any future
proceeding. This happened in March 19.55. Thereafter in July 1956, 376 persons who had been in the
employ of the old Company and were a minority of
its workmen gave notice under s. 42(1) of the Act
and claimed compensation for the closure which
had taken place in 1953. As no settlement could be
arrived at between the parties this was followed by
an application under s. 42( 4) of the Act before the
labour court in October 1956 and these workmen
claimed that they should be paid adequate compensation for the closure of the mill in view of their
past services. To this application both the old
Company and the new Company were made parties.
The application was opposed by both the companies
on various grounds with which we are however not
concerned in the present appeal. In January 1957,
the Association made an appearance before the
labour court and contended that the application
should be dismissed in view of the compromise wl:tich
had been arrived at before the Labour Appellate
Tribun'tl in 1953.
The labour court accepted this
contention and dismissed the application.
196t
Girj• Shankar
Kas!ti Ren
v.
The Guiar 1t
Spinning ch W eavi11.,
Co. ltd.
Wanch~o J,
1962
Gir/• 81-lur
K.Jii Rm
v.
'114 Gujatol
Spimtirrz if. W tac1ng
Co. Ltd.
w ,,... J.
894 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.
Thereupon some of the workmen went in appeal
to the industrial court and their contention seema
to have been that, though no individual oan be
permitted to appear in any proceeding where the
Rep.esentative Union 'lppears as representative of
employees, in this case the action of the Association
after itR appearance in not supporting the case of
the workmen before the labour court was malafide;
therefore the Association should not have been
allowed to appear on behalf of tho employees who
had applied to the labour court and they ehould be
permitted to carry on their application. This contention was rejected by the industrial court, which
was of opinion that it was not for an industrial
court to go into the question of bona/ides or malafitles for appearance of a Representative Union and
that the law under the Act was clear that where a
Representative Union appeared it alone could represent thti applicants even in a case under s. 42( 4)
of the Act. The appeal was therefore dismiBsed.
Thereupon the employee.s appear to have filed a
petition \,efore the High Court unde.r Art. 227 of
the Constitution, which was summarily rejected.
The High Cuurt also n· fuRed to give leave to appeal.
Then thore was a petition to th is Court for special
leave which was granted, and that is how the
matter has come up before us.
'l'he main contention on behalf of the appellant.a
h~fore U8 is tha.t reading the various provisions or
theAct, an employee making an application under
s. 42( 4) of th<' Act is not debarred from appearing in
the labour or industrial court and carrying on with
his application even though the Repreeent11tive
Union makes an appearanoo. It is submitted that if
the inti>rprntation pr1.·ssrd on behalf of the respondents were a.ceepten it would amount to tyranny of
the Representative Union and this could not be the
intention of the legislature in framing the Act.
It is also contenrled that if the interpretation
pressed on behalf of the respondents is correct, the
..,
,
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
895
provisions in the Act may he liable to be struck
down as ultra vires the Constitution.
The case of the respondents on the other hand
is that the provisions of the Act are perfectly plain
and provide that where a Representative Union
appears in any proceeding it alone, to the exclusion
even of the employee who might have made an
application under s. 42 (4), is entitled to carry on
with the proceedings and the employee concerned
has no locus standi in the matter after· the application has been filed by him, if the Representative
Union chooses to appear.
It is urged that the
so-called tyranny by the Representative Union can
have no bearing on the interpretation of the provisions of the Act if they are plain in their intent.
Further it is contended that there is no question of
the constitutionality of the various provisions of the
Act in this case as at no stage has the constitutionality of the . provisions been challenged by the
appellants, not even in their special leave petition.
Before we deal with the interpretation of the
various provisions of the Act· in this behalf we may
point out that the constitutionality of the provisions has never been challenged so far and we
therefore express no opinion as to the colliltitutionality of these provisions. We are further of opinion
that the argument based on the so-called tyranny
of a Representative Union or its motives in taking
t.he action it may choose to take in any proceeding
after it appears can have no relevance if the
intention of the legislature as it can be gathered
from the various provisions is perfectly plain.
Let us therefore see what the Act provides in
this behalf. The main provisions with which are concerned are contained in Chap.Vof the Act which deals
with "representatives of employees and employers,
and appearance on their behalf". It may be stated at
the outset that the Act contains elaborate provisions
for registrat.ion of unions and approved unions in
1962
Girj11 Shankar
liaski Ram
v.
The Gujara~
Spinning &: ·W eavin,e
Co. Ltd.
Wancho1 J.
IllOt
Giri• Sh..J:.,
K•sln Rim
v.
,.,., o.; ... 1
S#flti., .b W ,....,
Co. Ltd.
W.....U.J.
896 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
Chapters III and IV respectively and ia in this
respect riifferent from the Industrial Disputes Act.
Under Chap. III the Registrar is given the power
to register a. Representative Union for any indUBtry
in any local area and also the power to cancel such
r~istration under certain circumstances and there
is also a provision for appeal where a registration
is oancolled.
Then <Jomes Chap. V which deals
with the representatiVPil of employees and employers
and anpe11.ranoe on their behalf in proceedings
under the Act. Section 27 provide3 for recognition
of an aeeociation of employers and its right to
app!l&r in proceedings under the Act. Seotion 30
enumerates the representatives of employees and
gives an order of preferenoe in which the six cl&lllle8
of rP.preqentatives of employees mentioned in that
section oan appear or act in any industry in any
local area., the first being a Representative Union
for such industrv. It is not in dispute that the
A88ociation in the present ca.se is a Representative
Union in the textile industry in thl\t region and
has the most preferential right to appear or to act
&a the representative of employees in the textile
industry in that are11. Sections 28 and 29 provide
for election or representatives or employees where
there is no Representative Union in rt'llp60t of
any industry in any local area and such elected
representativeR under s. 30 are respreaentativea of
employees and are fifth in order of preference.
Then we oome to SB. 27 A, 32 and 33 with which we
are particularly concerned in this appeal. Th11y
may be read in exten.~.
"2"A-Save as provided in sections 32
and 33. no employee shall be allowed to
appear or act in any prooeeding under this
Act except through
the representative of
employees."
"3~A conciliator, a Board, an Arbitra·
ior. a'wsge Board, a Labour Court and the
Industrial Court may, if hu or it coneiders it
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
897
expedient for the ends of justice, permit an
indivHual, whether an employee or not, to
appear in any proceeding before him or it ;
Provided that no suoh individual shall be
permitted to appear in any proceedings in
which a Representative Union has appeared
as the representative of employees."
"33-N otwithstanding anything contained
in any .other provision of this Aot, an employee or a representative union shall be
entitled to appear through any person.
(a) in all proceedings before the industrial court ;
(aa) in all proceedings before a wage
board;
(b) in proceedings before a Labour Court
for deciding whether a strike, lock-out, closure
or stoppage or change or an order passed by
an employer under the standing orders is
illegal or for deoiding any industrial dispute
referred to it under section 72 ;
( c) in such other proceedings as the
Industrial Court may, on application made
"in that behalf, permit ;
Provided that a legal practitioner shall
not be permitted under clause (o) to appear
in any proceeding under this Act except
before a Labour Court as provided in section
83A or the Industrial Court ;
Provided further that no employee shall
be entitled to appear through any person in
any proceeding under this Act in which a
Representative Union has appeared u
the
repre1entative of employees."
,,,~
firj• Siank.,
Ksshi Ram
v.
IM Guj•r•t
S;innint ch W enin
o,. Lti.
lift
Qirj• Slwml:r
~cshi R~
'·
"nlc.Joru
~v• w,..;,,
Co. UC.
W.W. J,
898 SUPREME OOURT REPOR'.l'S [1962] SUPP.
It will be seen that e. 27 A provides that no
employee ~hall be allowed to appear or act ,in any
proceeding under the Act, except through the
representative of employet>s, the only exception to
this being t.he provisions of BB. 32 and 33.
There·
fore, this R<'ctio!I completely bans the appearance
of an employee or of any one on his behalf in any
proceeding after it has once commenced except
through the representative of employees. The only
exceptions to this complete ban are to be found in
ee. 32 and 33, to which we shall presently refer.
But it i~ clear that bona /irks or mala fi<IM of the
reprt>eentative of employees can have nothing to do
with th" ban placed by
~. 27 A 011 the appearance
of any one else except the representative of employees a.8 defined in e. 30 and that if anyone else
can appPar in any proceeding. we must find a provision in that behalf in either s. 32 or s. 33 which are
the only exceptions to 8. 27A. It may be noticed
that there is no exception in e. 27A in favour of
the empfoyee, who might have made an application
under s. 42 (4). to appear on his own behalf and the
ban which is placed bys. 27A will apply equally to
such an employee. In order however to aoften the
rigour' of the provisions of a. 27A, for it may well be
that the representative of employees may not choose
to appear in many proceedings started by an
employee under 8. 42 ( 4 ), exceptions are provided
in es. 3:? and 33. The scheme of these three provisions clearly is that if the Representative Union
appears, no one else can appear and carry on a
proceeding, even if it be i,egun on an application
under s. 42 (4\ but where the Representative Union
does not cho06e to appear there are provisions in
BB. 32 and 33 whi.ch permit others to appear in
proceedings under the Act.
Section 32 gives power to a conciliator, a
boa.rd, a wage board, a. labour court and the industrial court to permit an individual, whether an
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
899
employee or not, to appear in any proceeding before
him or it.
This shows that the complete ban
imposed bys. 27A can be removed if the authorities
under the Act think it expedient to permit another
person to appear and that person may be an
employee or not.
Thus· the employee who has
made an application under s. 42(4) may be permitted to appear before tbe authorities under the Art ;
but this provision is subject to a proviso namely
that no such individual which would include an
employee who has himself made an application
under s. 42(4), shall be permitted to appear in any
proceeding in which the Representative Union has
appeared as
the representative of employees.
Reading therefore ss. 27A, 30 and 32 together, it
is clear that no one else can appear in any proceeding under the Act except a representative of employees ; but the authorities ari;i empowered to
permit anyone to appear whether he be an employee
or not, if they consider it expedient for the ends of
justice (and we have no doubt that where representative of employees does not choose to appear the
authorities will generally permit the employee who
has made the application under s. 42(4) to appear).
but this power is subject to the proviso, namely,
that no one will be allowed to appear if the Representative Union has made an. appearance. It will
be seen that the proviso puts the Representative
Union in a special position out of the six classes
mentioned as representatives of employees in s. 30.
Thuss. 32 makes it clear that where the Representative Union of the six classes in s. 30, appears no
one else can appear, including the person who
mi~ht have made an application under s. 42 (4).
If the other five classes which
~.re mentioned in
s. 30 as representatives of employees appear, the
authorities have the P.Ower to allow the employee or
any other person to appear along with them.
1911
Qirj• ShtinkM
Kash1 Ram
v.
The Gujar•t
~·;innint tb W ea•inl
Co. Ltd.
Wanchoo J,
]~·
o;,;. si-ur
Keslti Ram
••
Ti.. G.J.,.al
Spitllt#i14' W..W.1
Co. Lid.
W•.loo J.
900 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [19!12) SUPP.
Then we come t-0 s. 33, which starts with a
non obBllt.nte clause and deals with the appearance of
an employee or a repreRentative union through any
person. 8Pction 33 thus is an exception to s. 27 A an :I
authorisea an employee who could not appear in
any proceeding under the Act except through the
representative of employees under 8. 27 A, to appear
through any perRon in certain proceedings men·
tioned in 8. 33, but this again i.~ subject to provisos,
with the first of which we are not concerned here.
The second proviso lays down that no employee
Rhall he entitled to appear through any person in
any pro<'PMing unrler thr- Aet in which the Representativ" Union has appeared as the
rPpresente.·
tive of timployees.
This proviso age.in gives
a. special position to the Representative Union
out of the six classes of representatives of employees provided in s. 30 anrl makes it clear that
though an employee may appear in certain proceedings specified in s. 33 through any person in spite
of s. 27A, he cannot do so where a Representative
Union has appeared as tho representative of em·
ployees. Here again the position is the same as
in s. 32; if a representative of employees other
than a Representative Union has appeared in the
proceeding the employee can also appear through
any pers'?n in the proceedings mentioned in s. 33;
but he cannot do so where the representative of
employe011 which has appeared even in proceedings
under s. 33 is the RepresentBtive Union.
Tho result therefore <•f taking 88. 2i A, 32 and
33 together is that s. 27 A first places a complete
ban on the appearanre of an employee in proceed.
ings under the Act once it has commenced except
throu<rh the
representative of employees.
But
there a.re two exceptions to this ban contained in
88. 32 and 33,
Sertion 32 is concerned with all
prooeedings beforr the authorities and gives power
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
901
to the authorities under the Act to permit an
employee himself to appear even though a representative of employees may have appeared hut
this permission cannot he granted where the representative Union has appeared as a representative
of employees. Section 33 which is the other
exception allows an employee to appear through
any person in certain proceedings only even though
a
representative
of
employees
might have
appeared; but here again it is subject to this that
no one else, not even the employee who might have
made the application, will have the right to appear
if a Representative Union has put in appearance
as the rl:presentative of employees. It is quite
clear therefore that the scheme of the Act is that
where a Representative Union appears in any
proceeding under the Act, no one else can be
allowed to appear not even the employee at whose
instance the proceedings might have begun under
s. 42 ( 4).
But where the appearance is by any
representative of employees other than a Representative Union authorities under s. 32 can permit
the employee to appear himself in all proceedings
before them and further the employee is entitled
to appear by any person in certain proceedings
specified in s. 33. But whenever the Representative Union has made an appearance, even the
employee cannot appear in any proceeding under
the Act and the representation must be confined
only to the Representative Union. The complete
ban therefore laid by s. 27 A on representation
otherwise than through a representative of employees remains complete
where the representative of employees is the Representative Union
that has appeared ; but if the representativa of employees that has appeared is other than the Representative Union then ss. 32 and 33 provide
for exceptions with which we have already dealt.
1962
Girja S4tutA:ar
Kashi 8am
v.
Tiu O,Yarat
Spinni11t th W1aving
C•. Ltd.
Wan&hoo J.
IHI
v.
n. o.g..i
l;iMiqdl w ......
C.. L".
w.-..w.J.
J-.,Jl.
902 SUPRll:ME COURT REPORTS [1002] SUPP.
'!'.here oa.n therefore be no escape from the concJu.
BJOn tha.t the Act plainly intends that where the
Representative Union appears in any proceeding
under the Act even though that proceeding might
have commenced by an employee under s. 42 (4)
of the Act, the Representative Union alone can
represent the employee and the employee oa.nnot
'.l.ppear or act in such proceeding.
. .
In this view o.f t~e mattn the appeal must
tail and Is hereby d1sm1ssed.
In the circumstances
we pa.as no order as to costs.
Appe.al dismiB&ed.
THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX
BOMBAY
v.
l\IANILAL DHANJI, BOMBAY
(S.K. DAs, M. liIDAYATULLAH and J.C. SHAH, JJ.)
Income Tax-Trmt crealed in favour of minor child-No
benefit =ruing to TMnor in acwunting yoar-Whelher incomt from
tnul la:etJbl< a.< i~
of a.<llUM~-Triut by aut.18tea fatMrAaae&U directed to iue it1COme for benefit of him8df, Ma wife and
cAi/dron-Whtther income tazabl< a.< i•come of aaauaee-lndian
lnconit·W Act 1922 (XI of 1922) as. 16(3) 41(1)-·Indian
T"'81JJ Act, 1882 (11of1882) •· 8.
In 1953 the assessee created a trust in 1espect of a sum of
money and provided that the interest on that amount was to
be accumulated and added to the corpus and that his minor
daughter C was to rettive the income from the corpu1
increased by the addition of interest when she attained the age
of 18 years.
In the relevant account year, when C was 1tlll a
minor the income derived from the trust fund was Rs. 410
Earll.,; in 1941, the as1e1ace's father had created a tru1t in
respect of =tain shares and money directing the trustees to
pay the net intercat "':'d income ther"."f to the assessee "for
the maintenance of hunself and h11 wife and for the malnten•
ance education and bcneflt of all his children till his death".
In the relevant account year a sum of Rs. 14, 170 accrued as
income in the hands of the asscssee from the said trust funds,