# GIRlSH KUMAR SUNEJA v. C.B.l - **Citation:** [2017] 9 S.C.R. 544 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 2017-07-13 - **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 1137 of2017 - **Bench:** Madan B. Lokur, Kurian Joseph, A. K. Sikri - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/girlsh-kumar-suneja-v-c-b-l-32501 - **Pages:** 50 ## Headnote Constitution of India: Art. 136 r/w Art. 142 - Exclusion ofjurisdiction of the High Court in Coal Block jlllocation matters - Supreme Court in the Coal Block Allocation cayes passed order dated 25.07.14 that any prayer which would impede the progress in the investigation/trial of the cases was to be made only to Supreme C01lrt - Special Judge hearing D . criminal cases pertaining to illegal allocation of coal blocks, issued direction to frame charges against the appellant - Challenge to. before High Court - Petition dismissed on the ground of nonmaintainabi!ity in view of the order dated 25. 07.14 - Appeal before Supreme Court to recall or revisit the order dated 25.07.14 on 1he ground that the appellants were denied access to justice - Held: E Such an order was held permissible 11/Art. 136 rlw Art.142, by the Supreme Court in· **Shahid Balwa case, considering the width and ambit of the investigation and also the larger public interest and to ensure that progress in the trial was not hampered - Jn view thereof and the issue having alreac(v been agitated before the Supreme Court F and negatived in another case, the order dated 25.07.14 need not be revisited or modified - .Arts. 226, 227 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.482. Arts. 226 and 227-,- Order by this Court that any prayer for stay or impeding the progress in the investigation/trial of the coal block a/location cases to be made only to this Court - Case of the G appellants that order passed by this Court prohibited them from approaching the High Court u/Arts. 226 and 227 - Held: Jurisdiction of High Court u/Arts.226 and 22 7 cannot be curtailed, yet extraordinary situations could arise where it would be advisable for High Court to decline. to interfere - This Court can pass an H 544 GIRISH KUMAR SUNEJA v. C.B.l. 545 order that in a certain identified category of cases, the High Court · A ought' not to interfere and this Court would take a decision in the matter in larger public interest. · Art. 14 - Equality before law'- Coal block allocation cases treated as a separate class having a separate procedure, thereby denying to them equal protection of the law - Violation of' Art. 14 - B Held: it is necessary to treat the coal block i::ases differentially since they form a unique identifiable categmy - Classification is certainly not arbitrary, on the contrary, it is in public interest and for the public good - Classification being identifiable and clear, there is · . no violation of Art. 14. c Art. 21 - Right to life and liberty - Order by this Court that any prayer for stay or impeding 'the progress in the investigation/ trial of the coal block allocation cases to be made only to this Court, thus, restricted right to life and liberty guaranteed by Art. 21 - Violation of Art. 21 - Held: No procedural safeguard denied to the appellants and it is a complete misnomer to say that any statuto1y D right has been restricted or constricted by a judicial order - Remedies available to the appellants continue to be available to them except that the forum shifted from the High Court to this Court in larger public interest, Arts. 32 and 142 - Order of this Court that any prayer for stay or impeding the progress in the investigation/trial of the coal block allocation cases to be made only t~ this Court - Plea that this order deprived appellants of their Nght to' access)1stice - Held: Appellants not denuded of their rights - it. is only' that their rights have been placed in the proper perspective and have been enabled to exercise their. rights be.fore ~nother ./orum . . · . '· . ' .Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: .. ss. 397 and 482 - Right to file a revision petition - Order by this Court that anyprayer.fo'r stay or impeding the progress in the E F -... investigation/triiil of ii1e coal block allocation;· ca~es to be inade G only to this Court and no othei· Court shall ~ntertain any sucli request - Appellant:~ case that they have a right to .file a revisi<>n pefi!.!.,oti against ## Text _Characters 0–39,763 of 115,944. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39763 for what follows._ A B c [2017] 9 S.C.R. 544 GIRlSH KUMAR SUNEJA v. C.B.l .. (Criminal Appeal No. 1137 of2017) JULY 13, 2017 [MADAN B. LOKUR, KURIAN JOSEPH AND A. K. SIKRI, JJ.J Constitution of India: Art. 136 r/w Art. 142 - Exclusion ofjurisdiction of the High Court in Coal Block jlllocation matters - Supreme Court in the Coal Block Allocation cayes passed order dated 25.07.14 that any prayer which would impede the progress in the investigation/trial of the cases was to be made only to Supreme C01lrt - Special Judge hearing D . criminal cases pertaining to illegal allocation of coal blocks, issued direction to frame charges against the appellant - Challenge to. before High Court - Petition dismissed on the ground of nonmaintainabi!ity in view of the order dated 25. 07.14 - Appeal before Supreme Court to recall or revisit the order dated 25.07.14 on 1he ground that the appellants were denied access to justice - Held: E Such an order was held permissible 11/Art. 136 rlw Art.142, by the Supreme Court in· **Shahid Balwa case, considering the width and ambit of the investigation and also the larger public interest and to ensure that progress in the trial was not hampered - Jn view thereof and the issue having alreac(v been agitated before the Supreme Court F and negatived in another case, the order dated 25.07.14 need not be revisited or modified - .Arts. 226, 227 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.482. Arts. 226 and 227-,- Order by this Court that any prayer for stay or impeding the progress in the investigation/trial of the coal block a/location cases to be made only to this Court - Case of the G appellants that order passed by this Court prohibited them from approaching the High Court u/Arts. 226 and 227 - Held: Jurisdiction of High Court u/Arts.226 and 22 7 cannot be curtailed, yet extraordinary situations could arise where it would be advisable for High Court to decline. to interfere - This Court can pass an H 544 GIRISH KUMAR SUNEJA v. C.B.l. 545 order that in a certain identified category of cases, the High Court · A ought' not to interfere and this Court would take a decision in the matter in larger public interest. · Art. 14 - Equality before law'- Coal block allocation cases treated as a separate class having a separate procedure, thereby denying to them equal protection of the law - Violation of' Art. 14 - B Held: it is necessary to treat the coal block i::ases differentially since they form a unique identifiable categmy - Classification is certainly not arbitrary, on the contrary, it is in public interest and for the public good - Classification being identifiable and clear, there is · . no violation of Art. 14. c Art. 21 - Right to life and liberty - Order by this Court that any prayer for stay or impeding 'the progress in the investigation/ trial of the coal block allocation cases to be made only to this Court, thus, restricted right to life and liberty guaranteed by Art. 21 - Violation of Art. 21 - Held: No procedural safeguard denied to the appellants and it is a complete misnomer to say that any statuto1y D right has been restricted or constricted by a judicial order - Remedies available to the appellants continue to be available to them except that the forum shifted from the High Court to this Court in larger public interest, Arts. 32 and 142 - Order of this Court that any prayer for stay or impeding the progress in the investigation/trial of the coal block allocation cases to be made only t~ this Court - Plea that this order deprived appellants of their Nght to' access)1stice - Held: Appellants not denuded of their rights - it. is only' that their rights have been placed in the proper perspective and have been enabled to exercise their. rights be.fore ~nother ./orum . . · . '· . ' .Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: .. ss. 397 and 482 - Right to file a revision petition - Order by this Court that anyprayer.fo'r stay or impeding the progress in the E F -... investigation/triiil of ii1e coal block allocation;· ca~es to be inade G only to this Court and no othei· Court shall ~ntertain any sucli request - Appellant:~ case that they have a right to .file a revisi<>n pefi!.!.,oti against orders passed by th~ Special Ju,d~e; but the order passe{J.by this Court effectively preve'!ts the High CourtJrom ... H 546 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 9 S.C.R. A entertaining any such petition - Held: This does not mean that appellant have no remedy available to them - Order does not prohibit them from approaching this Court u/Art.136 - Jn a way, the forum for ventilating the grievance of the appellants has sh(fied irom the High Court to this Court. B Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988: ss. 19 and 4 - Stay of proceedings - Inherent right of High Court - Plea that order of this Court deprive the High Court of exercising its inherent right to grant stay of proceedings - Held:· Cannot be accepted - To ensure that the trial is concluded at the c earliest not only in the interest of the accused persons but also in public interest, any application intended to stay or impede the trial will be subject to orders of this Court. s. J 9(3)(c) - Interpretation to s. l 9(3)(c) - Held: Section 1"(3}(c) must be given a very restricted interpretation and not the D over-broad interpretation - It cannot be said that the prohibition against granting a stay of proceedings is not absolute insofar as s. 19(3)(c) is concerned; and that if there is a failure of justice, a stay of proceedings could certainly be granted by the High Court. Disposing of the appeal, the Court E HELD: 1. In *Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India this Court passed the following order on 11th April, 2011, commonly known as the 2G Spectrum Scam cases that any objection about the appointment of Special Public Prosecutor or his assistant advocates or any prayer for staying or impeding the F progress of the trial can be made only before this Court and no other court shall entertain the same. The trial must proceed on a day-to-day basis. All these directions are given by this Court in exercise of its power under Article 136 read with Article 142 of the Constitution and in the interest of holding a fair prosecution of the case. The said order came up for consideration before this G Court in **Shahid Balwa. v. Union of 11ldia. While dealing with the submissions made in relation to the said order (submissions, that are similar to those made before this Court) this Court hHd that considering the width and ambit of the investigation .Which could even spread overseas and also considering the larger H public interest, the said order was passed reserving the right of GIRISH KUMAR SUNEJA v. C.B.l. . 547 the accused to move this Court if there is a grievance against the A order passed by the Special Judge during the trial and that this would ensure that progress in the trial is not hampered. Such an order was permissible under the provisions of Article 136 read ·with Article 142 of the Constitution. It was also made clear that the parties cannot invoke the jurisdiction under Article 226 or B 227 of the Constitution or under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. so as to ensure compliance with the orders passed by this Court otherwise the very purpose and object of the order would be defeated. It was further held that the order passed only facilitates the progress of the trial by ordering that it must proceed on a day · to· day basis. It was noted that the backlog of cases is often an C incentive to the litigants to take unfair advantage of the delays and therefore, it was necessary to pass the order dated U 1h April, 2011. Taking into consideration all those. aspects, this Court felt that it is in the larger public interest that the trial of 2G Scam be not hampered. Further, when larger public interest is involved, D it is the bounden duty of all, including the accused persons, who are presumed to be innocent, until proven guilty, to cooperate with the progress of the trial. Early disposal of the trial is also to their advantage, so that their innocence could be proved, rather than remain enmeshed in criminal trial for years and unable to get on with their lives and busin~ss. In view thereof and the issue E having already been agitated before this Court and negatived (also in some other case) it is not appropriate to revisit the order of 251h July, 2014 passed by this Court nor it is appropriate to modify that order. (Para 78-821 [590-G; 591-A-D; 592-D, G-H; 593-A-BJ *Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India (2012) 3 SCC 117 ; **Shahid Balwa v. Union of India (2014) 2 sec 687 : (2013) 11 SCR 51 - relied on. Right to file a revision petition F 2.1 While the' text of sub-section (1) of Section 397 Cr.P.C. · G appears to confer very wide powers on the court in the exercise of its revision jurisdiction, this power is equally severely curtailed by sub-section (2) thereof. There is a complete prohibition in a court exercising its revision jurisdiction in respect of interlocutory orders. Therefore, what is the nature of orders in respect of which H 548 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 9 S.C.R. A a court can exercise its revision jurisdiction'? There are three categories of orders that a court can pass - final, intermediate · and interlocutory. There is no doubt that in respect of a final order, a court can exercise its revision jurisdiction - that is in respect of a final order of acquittal or conviction. There is equally no B c D E doubt that in respect of an interlocutory order, the court cannot exercise its revision jurisdiction. As far as an intermediate order is concerned, the court can exercise its revision jurisdiction since it is not an interlocutory ordcr. IParas 16 and 1711563-F-H; 564AI 2.2 In different cases, different expressions arc used for the same category of orders - sometimes it is called an intermediate order, sometimes a quasi-final order and sometimes it is called an order that is a matter of moment. The preference is for the expression 'intermediate order' since that brings out the nature of the order more explicitly. [Para 231 [566-EI 2.3 When Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. prohibits interference in respect of interlocutory orders, Section 482 Cr.P.C. cannot be availed of to achieve the same objective. In other words, since St~ction 397(2) Cr.P.C. prohibits interference with interlocutory orders, it would not be permissible to resort to Section 482 Cr.P.C. to set aside an interlocutory order. Therefore, it is quite clear that the prohibition in Section 397 Cr.P.C. will govern Section 482 thereof. This view is endorsed. [Paras 24 and 251 [566-F; 567-F) 2.4 While the appellants might have an entitlement (not a right) to file a revision petition in the High Court but that F entitlement can be taken away and in any event, the High Court is under no obligation to entertain a revision petition-such a petition can be rejected at the threshold. If the High Court is inclined to accept the revision petition it can do so only against a final order or an intermediate order, namely, an order which if set G aside would result in the culmination of the proceedings. There appear to be only two such eventualities of a revisable order and in any case only one such eventuality is before this Court. Consequently the result of the order passed by this Court is that the entitlement of the appellants to file a revision petition in the High Court is taken away and thereby the High Court is deprived H of exercising its extraordinary discretionary power available GIRISH KUMAR SUNEJA v. C.B.l. .549 under Section 397 Cr.P.C. However, this does not mean that the A appellants have no remedy available to them - the order does not proliibit the appellants from approaching this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. Therefore, all that has happened is that the forum for ventilating the grievance of the appellants has shifted from the High Court to this Court. It was submitted by one of the B counsel that this is not good enough for the appellants since this Court is not obliged to give reasons while dismissing such a petition unlike the High Court which would necessarily have to give reasons if it rejected a revision petition. The mere fact that this Court could dismiss the petition filed by the appellants under Article 136 of the Constitution without giving reasons does not C necessarily lea_d to the conclusion that reasons will not be- given or that some equitable order will not be passed. The submission has no basis and is only a presumption of what this Court might do. A submission that has its foundation on a hypothesis cannot be accepted. [Paras 27 and 28[ [568-C-H] 2.5 As held in Amar Nath that if an interlocutory order is ·not revisable due to the prohibition contained in Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. that cannot be circumvented by resort to section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is concurred with. There can hardly be any serious dispute on this propositiOn. [Para 291 [569-BI 2.6 While in some appeals the· order summoning the appellant or the order for framing charges is in question in other appeals the grievance is in respect of: admission and denial of documents under Section 294 of the Cr.P.C.; alteration of charge under Section 216 of the Cr.P.C.; joint or single trial unde.r Sections 219 and 220 of the Cr.P.C.; summoning additional accused persons. A challenge to orders of this non-substantive nature that can be agitated in a regular appeal is nothing but an abuse of the process of the court. [Para 33) [516-F-G] Pranab Kumar Mitra v. State of West Benga/. [19591 D E F Supp. 1 SCR 63; Kamlesh Kumar v. State of'Jharkhand G (2013) 15 SCC 460 : [2013) 14 SCR 263; Akalu Ahir v: Ramdeo Ram (1973) 2 SCC 583 : [1974J 1SCR130; Amar Nath v. State of Haryana (1977) 4 SCC 137; Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra (1977) 4 SCC H 550 A B SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 9 S.C.R. 551 : [1978] I SCR 749; K.K. Patel 1'. State of Gujarat (2000) 6 SCC 195 : [2000] 1 Suppl. SCR 312; State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp (l) SCC 335: 119901 3 Suppl. SCR 259; Satya Narayan Sharma v. State ol Rajasthan (2001) 8 SCC 607: [20011 3 Suppl. SCR 268; Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India (2012) 3 SCC 117 - referred to. Article 226 and Article 227 of the Constitution 3.1 There is no doubt that the power of superintendence available to the High Court under Article 227 is extremely vast c but at the same time as held in Shali11i Shyam Shetty the High Court cannot exercise that power of superintendence on the drop of a hat. In addition, in exercise of its power of superintendence the High Court cannot correct mere errors of law or fact only because another view is possible. [Para 37] [571-F-Gl D 3.2 The power under Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. and Section 482 Cr.P.C. has to be exercised only in the rarest of rare cases and not otherwise. If that is the position, and that it is so, resort to Artkks 226 and 227 of the Constitution would be permissible perhaps only in the most extraordinary case. To invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court when the Cr.P.C. E restricts it in the interest of a fair and expeditious trial for the benefit of the accused person, it is difficult to accept the proposition that since Articles 226 and 227 are available to an accused person, these provisions should be resorted to in cases that are not the rarest of rare but for trifling issues. In any event, F if such a one in a million case does arise, the appellants can certainly approach this Court for relief under Article 136 of the Constitution. While there can be no doubt that the jurisdiction of a High Court under Articles 226 and 227 cannot be curtailed, yet extraordinary situations could arise where it would be advisable for a High Court to decline to interfere. There is therefore nothing G extraordinary if this Court were to pass an order that in a certain identified category of cases, the High Court ought not to interfere and leave it to this Court to take a decision in the matter in larger public interest, which this Court has already seen and explained. [Paras 38, 39, 40, 41) [572-C-G; 574-El H GIRISH KUMAR SUNEJA v. C.B.l. 551 L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (l 997) 3 SCC A 261 : [ 1997] 2 SCR 1186 ; Shalini Shyam She tty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil (2010) 8 SCC 329 : [2010[ 8 SCR 836 ; Karfar Singh v. State of Punjab (1994) 3 SCC 569 : [1994[ 2 SCR 375 - referred to. Violation of Article 14 of the Constitution B 4;1 The coal block allocation cases form one identifiable category of cases that are distinct from other cases since they have had a massive impact on public interest and there have been large scale illegalities associated with the allocation of coal blocks. It is therefore necessary to treat these cases differentially since C they form a unique identifiable category. The treatment of these cases is certainly not arbitrary-on the contrary, the classification is in public interest and for the public good with a view to bring persons who have allegedly committed corrupt activities, withfo the rille of law. It is hence not possible to accept the submission that by treating the entire batch of coal block allocation cases iii. D a particular manner different from the usual cases that flood the Courts, there is a violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. (Para 43) (574-H; 575-A-C] 4.2 The cases fall in a class apart, arising as they do out of the illegal and unlaw'ful allocation of coal blocks. It is only in E respect of these cases that this Court monitored the investigations and it is only in respect of these cases that the order was passed by this Court on 25'h July, 2014. The cases arc concerned with large scale corruption that polluted the allocation of coal blocks and they form a clear and distinct class that need F to be treated in a manner different from the cases that our .i ustice delivery system usually deals with. The classification being identifiable and clear, there is no violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. Further, the order passed by this Court docs not amount to legislating in the classical mould but according special treatment to a class of' cases for good and clear reason and in G larger public interest as well as in the interest of the accused. (Para 45, 46[ [576-H; 577-A-B, DI State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar [1952] SCR 284; A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak (1988) 2 SCC 602 : H 552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 9 S.C.R. A [19881 1 Suppl. SCR 1 ; Kedar Nath Bajoriu v. State of West Bengal [19541 SCR 30 - referred to. B c Violation of Article 21 of the Constitution 5. No procedural safeguard has been denied to the appellants and it is a complete misnomer to say that any statutory right has been restricted or constricted by a judicial order. The remedies available to the appellants continue to be available to them except that the forum has been shifted from the High Court to this Court in larger public interest. It must not be forgotten that the cases arising out of the coal block allocations arc not ordinary cases b'ut fall under a special or distinct category which requires special attention given the magnitude of the illegalities allegedly committed including souw with criminal intent. lt is in this view of the matter that this Court had no option but to hand over the investigations to the CBI and to monitor the investigations so that they reach their logical conclusion, without D any interference from any quarter. It can hardly be said with any degree of seriousness that the procedure adopted by this Court, in the facts and circumstances of the case, violate any right to the life and liberty of the appellants or any other persons allegedly involved in the criminality associated with the allocation of coal E F blocks. [Para 48 and 491 [577-G-H; 578-A-CI Article 32 and Article 142 of the Constitution 6.1 lt is no doubt true that the words 'complete justice' appearing in Article 142 of the Constitution enable this Court to exercis1i extremely wide powers but there is also no doubt that the power is ancillary and can be made use of only when it is not in conflict with the substantive provisions of any law. (Para 51)(578-EJ 6.2 While it is true that the fundamental rights of a citizen cannot be taken away even by an order of the court except where a restriction is placed by the statute such as remanding an accused G to judicial custody. No right of the appellants has been curtailed by this Court by the order under consideration. It is only the forum in which the right to seek relief has been varied, and not denied, It cannot be seen how this is impermissible or contrary to any law or any fundamental right of the appellants. (Para 52( H (578-GJ GIRISH KUMAR SUNEJA v. C.B.l. 553 6.3 This Court is undoubtedly obliged to protecf the A fundamental rights of the people in the country in accordance with the Constitution, but it is equally true that while doing so public interest cannot be flung out of the window. It is i10w time for all including the courts to balance the right of an accused person vis7ii-vis the rights and interests of individual victims of a B crime and society. Very often, public interest is lost sight of while dealing with an accused person and the rights of an accused person are given far greater importance than societal interests and more often than not greater importance than the rights of individual victims. This is a delicate balance to be struck and no curtailment of any fundamental right of the appellants or any violation of any substantive Jaw is seen if there is a change in the forum in the exercise of the rights of the appellants given the nature of the allegations against them and the wide impact on society. It is not c as if the appellants have bee11 denuded of their rights. 1t is only .that their rights have been placed in the proper perspective and . D they have been enabled to exercise their rights before another forum. [Para 531 [579-A-D] Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar & Ors v. State of tfaharashtra 119661 3 SCR 744 ; A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak (1988) 2 SCC 602 : [19881 l Suppl. SCR 1 ; Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India (1998) 4 SCC 409 : [19981 2 SCR 795; State ol Punjab 1'. Rafiq Masih (2014) 8 SCC 883 : [20141 8 SCR 228 - referred to. Stay of proceedings 7.1 This Court is not in any manner monitoring the progress of the trial in the coal block allocation cases nor is it supervising the trial. Conducting the trial is entirely the business of the Special Judge. The order only results in· the removal of any impediment in the progress of the trial. To ensure that the trial is concluded at the earliest not only in the interest of the accused persons but also in public interest, any application intended to stay or impede the trial will be subject to orders of this Court. This out of the ordinary step has been taken given the serious. nature of allegations made against those believed to be involved E F G in the illegal allocation of coal blocks and in the interest of the · H 554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 9 S.C.R. A accused as well as in larger public interest. There is a need for maintaining a balance between the rights of an accused and the rights of an individual victim and society. [Para 571 [580-E-GI 7.2 The emphasis given by counsel on the right of the appellants to apply for a stay of proceedings gives the impression B that the appellants are primarily concerned with an interim order of stay and not in the conclusion of the trial. It should be clear that a stay of proceedings is not the most important part of a trial and should not be the main or the sole objective of an accused. There is a need to think beyond a stay of criminal proceedings which has played havoc with the criminal justice delivery. !Para C 58) 1581-B-CJ 7.3 The submission that the order passed b~ this Court fetters the discretion of the High Court in granting a stay of proceedings proceeds on the assumption that the High Court has an unfettered discretion to stay a trial. This is simply not soD the stay of a trial is a rather extraordinary step and cannot he given for the asking. The concern is not with any ordinary criminal trial, but a trial for an offence punishable under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. It is stated in the statement and object and reasons of the Act that "in order to E expedite the proceedings, provisions for day-to-day trial of cases and prohibitory provisions with regard to grant of stay and exercise of powers of revision on interlocutory orders have also been included." Both these objectives have been incorporated in the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 through Section 19 and Section 4 thereof. It is clear that the intention of F Parliament, which ought to be respected, is the expeditious conclusion of a trial on a day-to-day basis without any impediment and certainly not an impediment through a stay of proceedings granted for the asking as ifit were an ordinary criminal trial. (Para 59 and 601 [581-D-F~ H; 582-Al G Income Tax O.fficer v. MK. Mohammed Kunhi AIR 1969 SC 430 : [ 1969( SCR 65; Satish Mehra v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2012) 13 SCC 614 : 12012111 SCR 1 ; Vineet Narain v. Union a,/ India (1998) 1 SCC 226 : I I 9971 6 Suppl. SCR 595 - referred to. H - GIRlSH KUMAR SUNEJA v. C.B.l. Prevention of Corruption Act 8.1 The submission that the prohibition against granting a stay of proceedings is not absolute insofar as Section 19(3)(c) of 555 A the PC Act is concerned; and that if there is a failure of justice, a stay of proceedings could certainly be granted by the High Court, cannot be accepted. A conjoint reading of sub-clause (b) and subB clause (c) of Section 19(3) makes it is clear that a stay of proceedings could be granted only and only if there is an error, omission or irregularity in the sanction granted for a prosecution and that error, omission or irregularity has resulted in a failure of justice. There is no other situation that is contemplated for the grant of a stay of proceedings under the PC Act on any other C ground whatsoever, even if there is a failure of justice. Clause (c) additionally mandates a prohibition on the exercise of revision jurisdiction in respect of any interlocutory order passed in any trial. The provisions of clauses (b) and (c) of Section 19(3) of the PC Act read together are quite clear and do not admit of any D ambiguity or the need for any further interpretation. [Para 62, 65J [583-F; 584-C-EJ 8.2 In enacting Section 19 in the manner which it did, Parliament has made it abundantly clear that it is extremely concerned about ensuring that trials under the PC Act are E concluded expeditiously not only in the interest of the accused but also in public interest. This concern of Parliament must be respected. To doubly ensure that there is no 'indirect' stay of proceedings by calling for the records of the Special Judge while dealing with a revision petition filed by an accused person, Section 22 of the PC Act has been enacted with reference to Section F 397(1) Cr.P.C. By virtue of Section 22(d), a proviso has- been added to Section 397(1) Cr.P.C. which makes it clear that the court exercising revision jurisdiction shall not ordinarily call for the record of the proceedings unless certain conditions are fulfilled. [Paras 68 and 691 [586-C-DJ G Central Bureau of Investigation v. V.K. Sehgal (1999) 8 SCC 501 : [1999] 3 Suppl. SCR 570 - referred to. 8.3 An allegation of 'failure of justice' is a very strong allegation and use of an equally strong expression and cannot be H 556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 9 S.C.R. A equated with a miscarriage of justice or a violation of law or an irregularity in procedure-it is much more. If the expression is to be understood as in common parlance, the result would be that seldom would a trial reach a conclusion since an irregularity could take place at any stage, inadmissible evidence could be B erroneously admitted, an adjournment wrongly declined etc. Thus, Section 19(3)(c) must be given a very restricted interpretation and not the over-broad interpretation. [Para 771 1590-E-FI c D E F G H Shamnsaheb M. Multani v. State of Karnataka (2001) 2 SCC 577 : [200111 SCR 514; State of MP v. Bhooraji (2001) 7 SCC 679 : 120011 2 Suppl. SCR 128 ; Rattiram v. State of M.P. (2012) 4 SCC 516 : [20121 3 SCR 496 ; Manohar Lal Sharma v. Principal Secretary (2014) 9 SCC 516 : [20141 8 SCR 446 Manohar Lal Sharma v. Principle Secretary & Ors (2014) 9 SCC 614 : [2014) 12 SCR 110 - referred to. Case Law Reference [2014] 8 SCR 446 referred to Para 1 [20141 12 SCR 110 referred to Para 1 [19591 Supp. 1 SCR 63 referred to Para 12 [2013) 14 SCR 263 referred to Para 13 [1974] 1 SCR 130 referred to Para 14 [1988) 1 Suppl. SCR 1 referred to Para 14 [1978) 1 SCR 222 referred to Para 18 [19781 1 SCR 749 referred to Para 21 .120001 l Suppl. SCR 312 referred to Para 22 [19901 3 Suppl. SCR 259 referred to Para 31 [20011 3 Suppl. SCR 268 referred to Para 32 [1997] 2 SCR 1186 referred to Para 35 [2010] 8 SCR 836 referred to Para 36 [19941 2 SCR 375 referred to Para 40 GIRISH KUMAR SUNEJA v. C.B.l. 557 "[1952] SCR 284 referred to Para 42 A [1954) SCR 30 referred to Para 44 [19661 3 SCR 744 referred to Para 50 (1998) 2 SCR 795 referred to Para 51 [2014) 8 SCR 228 referred to · Para 54 B (19691 SCR 65 referred to Para 55 [2012) 11 ~CR 1 referred to Para 55 (1997) 6 Suppl. SCR 595 referred to Para 56 [1999) 3 Suppl. SCR 570 referred to Para 67 c [2001) 1 SCR 514 referred to Para 71 [2001) 2 Suppl. SCR 128 referred to Para 72, 73 [2012) 3 SCR 496 referred to Para 72 (2012) 3 sec 111 relied on D Para 78 [2013) 11 SCR 51 relied on Para 79 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal - No. 1137 of2017. From the Judgment and Order dated 27.10.2q 16 of the High Court E of Delhi at New Delhi in Cr!. M. C. No. 3847 of2016 WITH. \ Crimina!Appea!Nos.1151-1152, 1149-1150, 1141, 1146, 1143, 11471148, 1144, 1139, 1140; 1153-1154, 1145, 1142and1138 of2017.. F SLP (Crl.)A. No. 1441 of2017. Gopal Subramanium, K. V. Vishwartathan, Shyam Divan, A. Sharan, R. S. Cheema, Sr. Advs., Madhurima, Yashir, Ashwarya·Sinha,Atul Shanker Mathur, Ms. Priya Singh, Gurpreet Singh Parwanda, Rajeev . G_oel, Vivek Mathur, Ms. Shradha Karol, Ankur Kashyap, Utkarsh G Shrivastav (for Mis. Khaitan & Co.), A. V. Rangam, Vijay Aggarwal, Yash Varma, Mudit Jain, Suresh Antil,Amit Krishna, Mukesh Kumar Sinha, Ms. Barkha Rastogi, Md. Shahid Anwar, Vishwa Pal Singh,B.S. Mathur, Rajat Mathur, Shri Singh, Yogesh Raavi, A. MukUnda Rao, H 558 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2017] 9 S.C.R. A Dhananj;ty Ray, Vijay Kumar, Siddharth Agga1wal, Arshdeep Singh, Paraz Maqbool, Akshat Gupta, Senthil Jagadeesan, Abhisth Kumar, Dr. Kailash Chand, Amit Anand Tiwari, Sanchit Gum, Ms. Tarannum Cheema, Ms. Vishakha, Ms. Hirai Gupta, Manvendra Singh, Advs. for the appearing parties. B The Judgment of the Court was delivered by MADAN B. LOKUR, J. 1. On 251h August, 2014, this Court delivered judgment in Ma11ohar Lal Sharma i'. Principal Secretary.' Subsequently, further orders were passed in the case on 24'" September, 2014.2 These decisions are commonly referred to as having been rendered c in the Coal Block Allocation cases. D E F G 2. Much earlier, on 25 111 July,2014 the following order was passed by this Court in the Coal Block Allocation cases (the relevant extract is reproduced): "4. In pursuance of our order dated 18.7.2014, the Registrar General, Delhi High Court has intimated to the Secretary General of this Court that the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court has been pleased to nominate Mr. Bharat Prashar, an officer of Delhi Higher Judicial Service for being posted as Special Judge to deal and exclusively try the offences pertaining to coal block allocation matters under the Indian Penal Code, 1860, Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, Prevention of MoneyLaunderingAct, 2002 and other allied offences. 5. We, accordingly, direct the competent authorities to issue requisite notifications appointing Mr. Bharat Prashar, an officer of Delhi Higher Judicial Service as Special Judge for the above purpose. The notifications shall be issued within two weeks from the date ·of communication of copy of this order. 6. We also order that Mr. R.S. Cheema, senior advocate shall be appointed as Special Public Prosecutor by the Government of India to conduct the prosecution of the offences pertaining to coal block allocation matters on behalf of CBI and Enforcement Directorate. On such appointment, Mr. R.S. Cheema may choose two other advocates, who, in his opinion, will be of assistance in '(2014) 9 sec s16 H '(2014)