# GLANROCK ESTATE (P) LTD v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU

- **Citation:** [2010] 12 S.C.R. 597
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2010-09-09
- **Case number:** Writ Petition No. 408 of 2003
- **Bench:** S.H. Kapadia, K.S. Panicker Radhakrishnan, Swatanter Kumar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/glanrock-estate-p-ltd-v-state-of-tamil-nadu-26398
- **Pages:** 47

## Headnote

Constitution of India, 1950:
Articles 368, 14, 19, 21, 300A and Ninth Schedule rlw.
A
B
c
Article 31 B - Immunity to laws inserted in Ninth Schedule -
Scope of - Constitutional validity of Janmam Act upheld in
Balmadies case* except the provisions thereof which
provided for acquisition of forest Land - Insertion of the Act 0
in the Ninth Schedule - Proceedings in respect of the land
in question, under Janmam Act - Challenged - High Court
upheld the proceedings -
On appeal, matter referred to
Constitution Bench of Supreme Court - The Constitution
Bench in l.R. Coe/ho's case*** held that Article 31B was valid
-
Plea that insertion of the Act in the Ninth Schedule
E
abrogated the basic structure of the Constitution, namely,
· judicial review, rule of law, separation of powers and principle
of equality and hence not validated under Article 31 B - Held:
Inclusion of Janmam Act in the Ninth Schedule by Thirty-
-fourth constitutional amendment did not amount to violation
F
of doctrine of basic structure - The challenge to the thirtyfourth amendment is based on the right to property in the garb
of over-arching principles like separation of powers, rule of law
and abrogation of power of judicial review - Gudalur Janmam
Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1969.
G
Article 368 - Power to amend the Constitution - Nature
and limitations of - Held: Power to amend the Constitution is
a derivative power - Therefore, it is subject to two limitations
597
H
598
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010) 12 S.C.R.
A
i.e. doctrine of basic structure and lack of legislative
competence -- The concepts like secularism, democracy,
separation of powers, power of judicial review fall outside the
scope of amendatory powers of Parliament under Article 368
- Doctrine of Basic Structure ..
B
Article 14 - It is only that breach of principle of equality
which is of the character of destroying the basic framework of
the Constitution, which will not be protected by Article 31 B and
not every breach of principle of equality - In cases of violation
of Article 14 distinction between constitutional law and ordinary
C law is required to be kept in mind -
Ordinary law can be
challenged on the touchstone of Article 14 -
Constitutional
amendment violating any over-arching principle in the
Constitution i.e. concepts like secularism, democracy.
separation of powers, power of judicial review fall outside the
D scope of amendatory powers of Parliament under Article 368
- If any of these were to be deleted, it would require changes
to be made not only in Part Ill of the Constitution but also in
Articles 245 and the three Lists of the Constitution resulting
in the change of the very structure or framework of the
E Constitution.
Seventh Schedule, List Ill Entry 42 and List II Entry 18 -
Article 31 (2) -
Enactment of Guda/ur Janmam Estates
(Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1969 - Whether
F
the enactment liable to be struck down for lack of legislative
competence - Held: The requirement of public purpose and
compensation are not legislative requirements of the
competence of Legislature to make laws under Entry 18 of List
II or Entry 42 of List Ill, but are conditions and restrictions
under Article 31 (2) -
Thus, the Act received immunity from
G Article 31 (2) with retrospective effect, when it was included in
the Ninth Sche1du/e - In pith and substance, the Act was in
respect of 'Land' and 'Land tenure" under Entry 18 of List II -
Thus. the Act not liable to be struck down for lack of legislative
competence -- Gudalur Janmam Estates (Abolition and
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Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1969.
Gudalur Janmam Estates (Abolition and Conversion into
Ryotwari) Act, 1969 - Applicability of the Act - The Act notified
A
in 1974 - Proceedings in respect of the land in question
initiated under Ceiling Act, before the date of notification of 8
the Janmam Act - After the notification, proceedings initiated
under Janmam Act in res

## Text

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[2010] 12 S.C.R. 597
GLANROCK ESTATE (P) LTD.
V.
STATE OF TAMIL NADU
(Writ Petition (Civil) No. 242 of 1988)
SEPTEMBER 9, 2010
[S.H. KAPADIA, CJI., K.S. PANICKER
RADHAKRISHNAN AND SWATANTER KUMAR, JJ.]
Constitution of India, 1950:
Articles 368, 14, 19, 21, 300A and Ninth Schedule rlw.
A
B
c
Article 31 B - Immunity to laws inserted in Ninth Schedule -
Scope of - Constitutional validity of Janmam Act upheld in
Balmadies case* except the provisions thereof which
provided for acquisition of forest Land - Insertion of the Act 0
in the Ninth Schedule - Proceedings in respect of the land
in question, under Janmam Act - Challenged - High Court
upheld the proceedings -
On appeal, matter referred to
Constitution Bench of Supreme Court - The Constitution
Bench in l.R. Coe/ho's case*** held that Article 31B was valid
-
Plea that insertion of the Act in the Ninth Schedule
E
abrogated the basic structure of the Constitution, namely,
· judicial review, rule of law, separation of powers and principle
of equality and hence not validated under Article 31 B - Held:
Inclusion of Janmam Act in the Ninth Schedule by Thirty-
-fourth constitutional amendment did not amount to violation
F
of doctrine of basic structure - The challenge to the thirtyfourth amendment is based on the right to property in the garb
of over-arching principles like separation of powers, rule of law
and abrogation of power of judicial review - Gudalur Janmam
Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1969.
G
Article 368 - Power to amend the Constitution - Nature
and limitations of - Held: Power to amend the Constitution is
a derivative power - Therefore, it is subject to two limitations
597
H
598
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010) 12 S.C.R.
A
i.e. doctrine of basic structure and lack of legislative
competence -- The concepts like secularism, democracy,
separation of powers, power of judicial review fall outside the
scope of amendatory powers of Parliament under Article 368
- Doctrine of Basic Structure ..
B
Article 14 - It is only that breach of principle of equality
which is of the character of destroying the basic framework of
the Constitution, which will not be protected by Article 31 B and
not every breach of principle of equality - In cases of violation
of Article 14 distinction between constitutional law and ordinary
C law is required to be kept in mind -
Ordinary law can be
challenged on the touchstone of Article 14 -
Constitutional
amendment violating any over-arching principle in the
Constitution i.e. concepts like secularism, democracy.
separation of powers, power of judicial review fall outside the
D scope of amendatory powers of Parliament under Article 368
- If any of these were to be deleted, it would require changes
to be made not only in Part Ill of the Constitution but also in
Articles 245 and the three Lists of the Constitution resulting
in the change of the very structure or framework of the
E Constitution.
Seventh Schedule, List Ill Entry 42 and List II Entry 18 -
Article 31 (2) -
Enactment of Guda/ur Janmam Estates
(Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1969 - Whether
F
the enactment liable to be struck down for lack of legislative
competence - Held: The requirement of public purpose and
compensation are not legislative requirements of the
competence of Legislature to make laws under Entry 18 of List
II or Entry 42 of List Ill, but are conditions and restrictions
under Article 31 (2) -
Thus, the Act received immunity from
G Article 31 (2) with retrospective effect, when it was included in
the Ninth Sche1du/e - In pith and substance, the Act was in
respect of 'Land' and 'Land tenure" under Entry 18 of List II -
Thus. the Act not liable to be struck down for lack of legislative
competence -- Gudalur Janmam Estates (Abolition and
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Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1969.
Gudalur Janmam Estates (Abolition and Conversion into
Ryotwari) Act, 1969 - Applicability of the Act - The Act notified
A
in 1974 - Proceedings in respect of the land in question
initiated under Ceiling Act, before the date of notification of 8
the Janmam Act - After the notification, proceedings initiated
under Janmam Act in respect of the land in question - Held:
Even if the proceedings had been initiated under the Ceiling
Act, it was open to the State to act according to provisions of
the Janmam Act -
Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of
Ceiling on Land) Act, 1961 [As amended by Tamil Nadu
C
Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Second Amendment
Act, 1972 (Act 20 of 1972).
Doctrines/Principles:
Doctrine of basic structure - Discussed. ·
Doctrine of pith and substance - Applicability of.
Over-arching principles in the Constitution of India -
0
Discussed.
E
Words & Phrases.
'Equalitarian equality', 'inter-generational equity' and
'sustainable development' - Meaning of.
F
In 1961 the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of
Ceiling on Land) Act, 1961 (Land Reforms Act, 1961) was
enacted. Thereafter, Gudalur Janmam Estates (Abolition
and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1969 (Janmam Act)
was enacted providing for acquisition of the rights of G
janmis in Janmam Estates in the Gudalur Taluk of the
Nilgiris district and for the introduction of Ryotwari
settlement in such estates. The constitutional validity of
the Janmam Act was upheld by the High Court. In appeal,
the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in
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[2010) 12 S.C.R.
A Balmadies Plantations Ltd. vs. State of Tamil Nadu held that
the Act was immune to challenge from Articles 14, 19 and
31 of the Constitution, as the same was an Act for
acquisition of an estate under Article 31A. However,
acquisition of the forest land under the Act was held
B violative of the Constitution, as the same could not be
considered as agrarian reform under Article 31A.
In the meantime, Land Reforms Act, 1961 (Principal
Act) was amended by Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation
of Ceiling o:i Land) Second Amendment Act, 1972 (Act 20
C of 1972), whereby the provisions of the principal Act were
extended. The Ceiling Act (Act 20 of 1972) was notified
and made applicable to hill areas. Proceedings were
initiated under the Ceiling Act, in respect of nonplantation lands of the petitioners. However, the
D proceedings under the Ceiling Act were temporarily
deferred.
Janmam Act was inserted in the Ninth Schedule of
the Constitution, by Constitution (Thirty Fourth
E Amendment) Act, 1974. Thereafter, proceedings were
initiated under Janmam Act in respect of the land of the
petitioners. Petitioners filed writ petitions seeking
direction to the State to complete the proceedings under
the Ceiling Act and to refrain from proceeding under the
F Janmam Act. The High Court dismissed the writ petitions.
SLPs were preferred against the order. Writ petitions were
also filed before the Supreme Court. The matters were
referred to the Constitution Bench which was further
referred to larger Bench of nine Judges. The nine Judge
Constitution Bench in l.R. Coelho vs. State of Tamil Nadu
G answered the reference by holding Article 31 B to be valid
and directed the instant cases to be placed before a three
Judge Bench. The points for consideration before the
three Judge Bench were:
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(a) What was the scope of immunity to laws inserted
A
in the Ninth
Schedule of the Constitution r/w Article 31 B?
(b) Whether the Tamil Nadu State Legislature lacked
legislative
competence to enact Janmam Act? and
(c) Whether the Janmam Act could not be applied
B
because of the Ceiling Act (Act 20 of 1972)?
c
Dismissing the appeals and the writ petition, the
Court
HELD:
Per S.H. Kapadia, CJI: (For himself and .for Swatanter
Kumar, J.)
D
1.1 In a rigid Constitution, power to amend the
Constitution is a derivative power, which is an aspect of
the constituent power. Since the power to amend the
E
Constitution is a derivative power, the exercise of such
power to amend the Constitution is subject to two
limitations, namely, the doctrine of basic structure and
lack of legislative competence. The doctrine of basic
structure is brought in as a window to keep the power
F
of judicial review intact, as abrogation of such a power
would result in violation of basic structure. [Para 8] [623A-C)
. 1.2 Discrimination or arbitrary classification G
constitutes violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. In
. this connection, the distinction between constitutional
law and ordinary law in a rigid Constitution like that of
India is to be kept in mind. The said distinction proceeds
on the assumption that ordinary law can be challenged
H
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(2010] 12 S.C.R.
A on the touchstone of the Constitution. Therefore, when
an ordinary law seeks to make a classification without
any rational basis and without any nexus with the object
sought to be achieved, such ordinary law could be
chal!enged on the touchstone of Article 14 of the
B Constitution. However, when it comes to the validity of a
constitutional amendment, one has to examine the validity
of such amendment by asking the question as to
whether such an amendment violates any over-arching
principle in the Constitution. The concepts like
c secularism, aemocracy, separation of powers, power of
judicial review fall outside the scope of amendatory
powers of the Parliament under Article 368. If any of these
were to be deleted, it would require changes to be made
not only in Part Ill of the Constitution but also in Articles
0 245 and the three Lists of the Constitution resulting in the
change of the very structure or framework of the
Constitution.
When an impugned Act creates a
classification without any rational basis and having no
nexus with the objects sought to be achieved, the
E principle of equality before law is violated undoubtedly.
Such an Act can be declared to be violative of Article 14.
Such a violation does not require re-writing of the
Constitution. This would be a case of violation of ordinary
principle of equality before law. [Para 8] [623-D-H; 624-A]
F
1.3 "Egalitarian equality" is also a much wider
concept. When the Court talks about concepts of 'intergenerational equity' and 'sustainable development'
which came to be discussed in the case of T.N.
Godavarman vs. Union of India, an ordinary principle of
G equality is being elevated to the level of over-arching
principle. Equality doctrine has various facets. It is in this
sense that in l.R. Coelho case, this Court has read Article
21 with Article 14. Therefore, it is only that breach of the
principle of equality which is of the character of
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destroying the basic framework of the Constitution which
A
will not be protected by Article 31 B. If every breach of
Article 14, however, egregious, is held to be unprotected
by Article 31 B, there would be no purpose in protection
by Article 31 B. [Para 8] [624-B-H; 625-A]
1.4 Article 368 of the Constitution does not vest such
a power in Parliament whereby Parliament can increase
its amending power by amendment of Article 368, so as
B
to confer on itself the unlimited power of amendment and
destroy and damage the fundamentals of the
Constitution. It cannot lift all limitations/ restrictions
C
placed on the amending power or free the amending
power from all limitations. This is the effect of the
decision in Kesavananda Bharati** case. When
constitutional law is challenged, one has to apply the
"effect test" to find out the degree of abrogation. This is
D
the "degree test". If one finds that the constitutional
amendrr.ent seeks to abrogate core values/ over-arching
principles like secularism,· egalitarian equality, etc. and
which would warrant re-writing of the Constitution then
such constitutional law would certainly violate the basic
E
structure. In other words, such over-arching principles
would fall outside the amendatory power under Article
368 in the sense that the said power cannot be exercised
even by the Parliament to abrogate such over-arching
principles. [Para 8] [625-B-E]
F
**His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadaga/varu v.
State of Kera/a 1973 (4) SCC 225; Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi
V. Shri RajNarain 1975 (Supp.) sec 1- referred to.
1.5 Very often the expression "Rule of Law" is used
G
to convey the idea of a Government that is limited by law.
The expression "Rule of Law" describes a society in
which Government must act in accordance with law. A
society governed by law is the foundation of personal
liberty. It is also the foundation of economic development
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A since investment will not take place in a country where
rights are not respected. It is in that sense that the
expression "Rule of Law" constitutes an overarching
principle embodied in Article 21, one aspect of which is
equality. It is in that context that this Court has used the
B phrase "Article 21 read with Article 14" in the judgment
in the case of IR. Coelho.***[Para 8] [625-F-H; 626-A]
***l.R. Coelho vs. State of Tamil Nadu 2007 (2) SCC 1
- followed and explained.
C
1.6 In the instant case, the Court is concerned with
the validity of the Constitution (Thirty-fourth Amendment)
Act, 1974. It is true that all lands including forests falling
in the janmam estate vest in the State u/s. 3 of the
Janmam Act. Under that Act, the State gave pattas for
D cultivable lands though such pattas were not given for
forests wl')ich vested in the State. It is also true that after
Act 20 of 1972 forests which earlier stood exempted from
the provisions of the Land Reforms Act, 1961 (principal
Act) got included in the Ceiling Act (Act 20 of 1972).
E Therefore, on and after 1.3.1972, the holder was entitled
to hold the lands subject to ceiling including forests
under the Ceiling Act (Act 20 of 1972) whereas forests
falling in Janmam estate vested in the State. It is the case
of the petitioners that by reason of the forests vesting in
F the State under the Janmam Act "the rule of equality in
law" stood violated which violation amounted to
abrogation of Article 14. [Para 9] [626-E-H]
1.7 The doctrine of classification under Article 14 has
several facets and none of those facets have been
G abrogated by the Constitution (Thirty-fourth Amendment)
Act, 1974. Equality is a comparative concept. A person
is treated unequally only if that person is treated worse
than others, and those others (the comparison group)
must be those who are "similarly situated" to the
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complainant. The "similarly situated test" is not attracted
A
in the instant case for the simple reason that the two Acts,
namely, the Janmam Act, which seeks to abolish a tenure,
is distinct and separate from the Ceiling Act (Act 20 of
1972). Therefore, in the present case, not even an
ordinary principle of equality under Article 14, leave aside
B
the egalitarian equality as an over-arching principle, is
violated. Even assuming for the sake of argument that
Article 14 stood violated, even then the Janmam Act in
any event stood validated by its insertion in the Ninth
Schedule vide Constitution (Thirty-fourth Amendment)
C
Act, 1974. [Para 9] [627-C-E]
1.8 In the instant case, the essence of the challenge
to the Constitution (Thirty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1974,
is in the context of "right to property". By the
Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, "right D
to property" has ceased to be a fundamental right under
Article 19(1 )(f). The Constitution first, seventeenth,
twenty-fifth, twenty-sixth, twenty-ninth amendments were
all in the context of "right to property". The challenge to
the Constitution twenty-fourth amendment on the ground
E
of unlimited power to amend the Constitution was also
in the context of right to property. The challenges to all
these Constitutional amendments have been negatived.
In the instant case, in the garb of "rule of law" and
"separation of powers", the challenge is laid against the
F
Constitution (Thirty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1974, which,
in essence, is the challenge in the context of "right to
property". [Paras 6] [619-F-H; 620-A-C]
1.9 One of the reasons for deletion of the "right to
property" from Part Ill of the Constitution vide the
G
Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978 was
that the economic liberties of freedom of property came
in direct conflict with egalitarian values including intergenerational equity. This aspect needs to be kept in
---·--
·----
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(2010] 12 S.C.R.
A mind, as in the instant case the substantive challenge to
the Constitution (Thirty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1974 is
based on the right to property in the garb of over-arching
principles like separation of powers, rule of law and
abrogation of the power of judicial review. [Para 9] [627B A-8]
c
1.10 It is not correct to say that inclusion of the
Janmam Act in the Ninth Schedule amounted to direct
negation and abrogation of judicial review as the
impugned Constitution (Thirty-fourth Amendment) Act,
197 4 confers naked power on the Parliament to obliterate
the judicial decision in Balmadies case* which became
final, without changing the basis of the decision or the
law and, thernfore, the said impugned Constitutional
Amendment Act destroys the basic feature of the
D Constitution, namely, judicial review. The amending
power under Article 368 of the Constitution is a derivative
power. The doctrine of basic structure provides a
touchstone on which the validity of the Constitutional
Amendment Act could be judged. While applying this
E doctrine, one need not go by the content of a "right" but
by the test of justifiability under which one has to see the
scope and the object of the Constitutional Amendment.
[Para 9] [626-B-0]
F
*Balmadies Plantations Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu 1972
(2) sec 133 -· relied on and explained.
1.11 It cannot be said that the Parliament has
obliterated the judicial decision of this Court in Balmadies
case without changing its basis. On reading the judgment
G of the Constitution Bench in Balmadies case, in its
entirety, it is found that although the Janmam Act was
challenged on the ground nf the Act being violative of
Articles 14, 19 and 31, this Court in Balmadies case struck
down Section 3 to the extent of acquisition of forests in
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the Janmam estate only on the ground that there was
A
nothing in the Janmam Act (Act 24 of 1969) to show the
purpose for which the forest lands stood acquired and,
therefore, this Court gave a declaration that in the
absence of anything in the Act to show the purpose for
which forest lands stood acquired, protection under
B
Article 31A was not available. From this it cannot be said
that this Court in Balmadies case has held that Section
3, insofar as forests are concerned, violated Articles 14,
19 and 31 of the Constitution. The judgment of the
Constitution Bench in Balmadies case was delivered on c
19.4.1972. Even assuming for the sake of argument that
the Janmam Act so far as the forests are concerned, was
held to be violative of Articles 14 and 19 of the
Constitution in Balmadies case, still it cannot be said that
the Constitution (Thirty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1974
0
conferred naked power on the Parliament to obliterate the
judicial decision in Balmadies case without changing the
basis of the decision because it is pursuant to such
declaration by the Constitution Bench of this Court in
Balmadies case that the Parliament inserted the Janmam
E
Act into the Ninth Schedule by invoking Article 31A. [Para
7] [621-F-H; 622-A-D]
Balmadies Plantations Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu 1972
(2) sec 133 - relied on and explained.
Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Shri Raj Narain 1975
(Supp.) SCC 1 - distinguished.
F
2. There is no merit in the plea that the Tamil Nadu
Legislature had no legislative competence to enact the
Janmam Act. The legislative competence of the Tamil
G
Nadu Legislature to enact the Janmam Act was not in
issue in Balmadies case. Further, Balmadies case did not
hold that there was no public purpose in acquisition of
forests. It only held that there was nothing in the Act to
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[2010] 12 S.C.R.
A show that acquisition of forests would be for agrarian
reform. Consequently, it was held in Balmadies case that
acquisition could not get protected under Article 31A. It
is correct to say that the Janmam Act is a piece of
legislation for abolishing feudal tenure and is a measure
B of land reform in pursuance of Directive Principles of
State Policy. Even assuming that there was no public
purpose in the acquisition of forests, the requirement of
public purpose and compensation are not legislative
requirements of the competence of Legislature to make
c laws under Entry 18 of List II or Entry 42 of List 111, but
are conditions or restrictions under Article 31 (2) of the
Constitution as the said Article stood in 1969. 8reach of
such conditions would attract only Part Ill challenge.
Therefore, when the Janmam Act was put in the Ninth
0 Schedule in 1974, the Act received immunity from Article
31(2) with retrospective effect. Lastly, in pith and
substance, the Janmam Act was in respect of "land" and
"land tenure" under Entry 18, List II of the Constitution.
[Para 13] [629-8-C; 630-A-C]
E
Balmadies Plantations Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu 1972
(2) sec 133 - relied on and explained.
State of Kera/a v. The Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturing
(WVG.) Co. Ltd. Etc. (1973) 2 SCC 713; The State of Bihar
F
v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga and
Ors. 1952 SCR 889 - relied on.
3. There is no merit in the plea that both the Acts,
namely, the Jammam Act and Act 20of1972 (Ceiling Act),
operated in the same field and, consequently, it was not
G open to the State Government to act according to the
provisions of the Janmam Act. Firstly, because the
Janmam Act was enacted to provide for acquisition of the
rights of janmis in Janmam estate in the Gudalur taluk of
the Nilgiris district and for introduction of ryotwari
H settlement in such estates. The scope of the Janmam Act
GLANROCK ESTATE (P) LTD. v. STATE OF TAMIL 609
NADU
was entirely different from the Ceiling Act for the simple A
reason that the Janmam Act was enacted to acquire the
rights of janmis in Janmam estates in Gudalur taluk and
to introduce ryotwari settlement, whereas the object
behind enactment of the Ceiling Act was to fix a ceiling
on the land holdings and to distribute the excess lands B
to the landless and agricultural population. Therefore, the
scope and ambit of the two Acts are completely different
and they operate in different spheres. Secondly, because
the Ceiling Act came into force from 1.3.1972. Prior to that
date, forests stood exempted from the provisions of the c
1961 Act (principal Act). It is only on and after 1.3.1972
that forests stood included in the 1961 Act by virtue of
the Ceiling Act. Before ceiling could be determined and
before compensation could be paid for excess lands
which vested in the State under the Ceiling Act, the 0
Janmam Act came into force on 27.11.1974 under which
the forests vested in the State. The main focus of the
Ceiling Act was to fix a ceiling of agricultural land holding
and to distribute the excess lands to the landless and
other agricultural population. The scope of the Ceiling Act E
was made wide enough to cover the lands in the hilly
areas. Thus before the excess lands could be determined
for vesting in the State under the Ceiling Act, the Janmam
Act came into force, which operated in a different sphere
vis-a-vis the Ceiling Act. [Para 14] [630-E-H; 631-A-E]
Per K.S. Panicker Radhakrishnan, J. (Concurring) :
HELD:
F
1. Fundamental rights enshrined in Part Ill of the
Constitution of India can be extinguished by G
constitutional amendments and if it abrogates or abridges
such rights, would not as such, abrogate or abridge the
basic structure. The test is whether it has the effect of
nullifying the over-arching principles of equality,
secularism, liberty and so on, especially when such a law H
•
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[2010] 12 S.C.R.
A
is placed in the 9th Schedule. [Para 15] [643-D-E]
2. Right to Equality before law, Right to Equality of
Opportunity in matters of public employment, Right to
Protection of life and personal liberty, Right against
B Exploitation, Right to Freedom of Religion etc. are all
fundamental rights guaranteed under Part Ill of the
Constitution and a common thread running through all
the Articles in Part Ill of the Constitution have a common
identity committed to an over-arching principle which is
the basic structure of the Constitution. Rule of law is
c often said as closely inter-related principle and when
interpreted as a principle of law, it envisager separation
of powers, judicial review, restriction on the absolute and
arbitrary powers, equality, liberty etc. Separation of
powers is integral part of rule of law which guarantees
D independence of judiciary which is a fundamental
principle viewed as a safeguard against arbitrary exercise
of powers, legislative and constitutional. Doctrine of
absolute or unqualified parliamentary sovereignty is
antithesis to rule of law. Doctrine of parliamentary
E sovereignty may, at times, make rule of law and
separation of powers subservient to the wish of the
majority in parliament. Parliamentary supremacy cannot
be held unqualified so as to undo the basic structure.
F
Basic structure doctrine is, in effect, a constitutional
limitation against parliamentary autocracy. The principles
of equality inherent in the rule of law is not averse to the
imposition of special burdens, grant special benefits and
privileges to secure to all citizens justice, social and
economic and for implementing the directive principles
G of state policy for establishing an egalitarian society.
Thus, the over-arching principles would fall outside the
amendatory power under Article 368 and the petitioner in
the case has not succeeded in establishing that any of
those principles have been violated. [Paras 12 and 13]
H [641-D-H; 642-A-Cl
GLANROCK ESTATE (P) LTD. v. STATE OF TAMIL
611
NADU
I. R. Coelho (Dead) by L. Rs. v. State of Tamil Nadu A
(2007) 2 sec 1 - followed.
Ashok Kumar Thakur v. Union of India and Ors. (2008)
6 SCC 1; State of West Bengal and Ors. v. Committee for
Protection of DemocraticRights, West Bengal and Ors. 2010
8
. (3) sec 571 - relied on.
3. Right not to be deprived of property, save by
authority of law is no longer a fundamental right, but only
a constitutional right which has never been treated as
part of the basic structure of the Constitution. Hence it C
is not correct to say that Section 3 of Janmam Act
violates Articles 14 and 300A of the Constitution.
Petitioner has not succeeded in establishing that the Act
or its provisions have violated any of the fundamental
rights guaranteed to them and, therefore, the petitioner D
has failed to satisfy the first test laid down in Coelho's
case. i.e. Article 21 rlw Articles 14, 15 and 19, if abrogated
would result in nullification of the basic structure
doctrine and the laws included in the Ninth Schedule after
24.4.1973, would not have absolute immunity and, thus,
E
validity of such laws could be challenged on the
touchstone of basic structure. Consequently, the
question whether the Janmam Act and its provisions
have violated the basic structure of the Constitution does
not call for examination. [Para 11) [640-G-H; 641-A]
F
4. The plea raised alleging violation of Articles 14 and
300A cannot stand, since the petitioner is holding private
forest by way of janmam, which are rights of hereditary
proprietorship and those rights are like the rights created
by grant of jagir or inam relating to land. The object and
G
purpose of Janmam Act is to do away with such
hereditaryship. Janmam estate which takes in forests,
mines and minerals, quarries, rivers and streams, tanks
and irrigation work, fisheries and so on, stood vested in
the State, free from all encumbrances. Janmies are also
H
612
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2010] 12 S.C.R.
A
entitled to get ryotwari patta in respect of all lands, if they
establish that they have been cultivating lands for a
continuous period of three agricultural years immediately
before the 1st day of June, 1969. Provision for payment
of compensation has also been provided under the Act.
B
[Para 1 O] [640-D-F]
Manjushree Plantation Ltd. and Ors. v. State of Tamil
Nadu and Ors 1989 (3) SCC 282; Waman Rao and Ors. etc.
v. Union of India and Ors. 1981 (2) SCC 362; His Holiness
C
Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru etc. v. State of Kera/a
and Anr (1973) 4 SCC 225; M. Nagraj and Ors. v. Union of
India and Ors. (2006) 8 SCC 212; Sri Sankari Prasad Singh
Dea v. Union of India and State of Bihar (1952) SCR 89;
Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975) Supp SCC 1;
Balmadies Plantations Ltd. and Anr etc. v.
State of Tamil
0
Nadu (1972) 2 Sec 133; State of Kera/a and Anr. v. The
Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturing (Wvg.) Co. Ltd. etc. (1973)
2 SCC 713; Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochuni and Ors. vs.
State of Madras and Ors. (1960) 3 SCR 887; State of UP.
v. Raja Anand Brahma Shah (1967) 1 SCR 362 - referred
E
to.
Case Law Reference:
In the Judgment of S.H. Ka12adia 1 eJI.
F
1975 (Supp.) sec 1 distinguished
Para 7
2001 (2) sec 1
followed and
explained
Para 8
1973 (4) sec 225
referred to
Para 8
G
1975 (Supp.) sec 1 distinguished
Para 8
(1973) 2 sec 713
relied on
Para 13
1952 SeR 889
relied on
Para 13
1912 (2) sec 133
relied on and
H
explained
Para 13
GLANROCK ESTATE (P) LTD. v. STATE OF TAMIL 613
NADU
In the Judgment of K.S. Panicker Radhakrishnan, J.
A
1989 (3) sec 282
Referred to
Para 1
1981 (2) sec 362
Referred to
Para 1
(1973) 4 sec 225
Referred to
Para 1
B
(2006) 8 sec 212
Referred to
Para 1
(1952) SCR 89
Referred to
Para 1
(1975) Supp sec 1
Referred to.
Para 1
c
(1972) 2 sec 133
Referred to
Para 4
(1973) 2 sec 113
Referred to
Para 5
(1960) 3 SCR 887
Referred to
Para 5
(1967) 1 SCR 362
Referred to
Para 5
D
(2008) 6 sec 1
Relied on
Para 14
201 o (3) sec 571
Relied on
Para 14
(2001) 2 sec 1
followed
Para 14
E
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition (Civil) No.
242 of 1988.
With
F
Writ Petition No. 408 of 2003, C.A. No. 1344-1345 of 1976.
K.V. Viswanathan, A.S. Nambiar, P.H. Parekh, T.R.
Andhyarujina, A. Mariarputham, Joseph Pookkatt, Anurag
Sharma, Prashant Kumar, P.K. Manohar, Sewa Ram, R.K.
Bachchan, Sameer Parekh, E.R. Kumar, Ranjeeta Rohtagi, G
Shakun Sharma, Nitin Thukral, Rukhmini Bobde (for Parekh &
Co.), S.C. Paul, Roopa Paul, Saurabh Yadava, Kusum
Chaudhary, R. Nedumaran, Soumik Ghosal, Vimal Dubey for
the appearing parties.
H
614
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2010] 12 S.C.R.
A
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B
S. H. KAPADIA, CJI 1. Some doctrines die hard. That
certainly is true of the doctrine of basic structure of the
Constitution.
2. Against this backdrop, we need to examine the
constitutional validity of the Constitution (Thirty-fourth
Amendment) Act, 1974. By the said Amendment Act, the
Gudalur Janmam Estates (Abolition and Conversion into
Ryotwari) Act, 1969 [for short "the Janmam Act (Act 24 of
C
1969)"] stood inserted in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution
as Item No. 80.
Facts
--
3. In 1961, the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of
D Ceiling on Land) Act, 1961 (for short "the 1961 Act"] was
enacted. However, by virtue of Section 73(v), the said Act was
made inapplicable to Hill Areas. On 6.12.1969, the Janmam
Act (Act 24 of 1969) was enacted but not notified till
27.11.1974. Thei Janmam Act (Act 24 of 1969) was enacted
E
inter alia to provide for acquisition of the rights of janmis in
Janmam estates in the Gudalur taluk of the Nilgiris district and
for the introduction of ryotwari settlement in such estates. On
26.10.1970, the~ Madras High Court dismissed nine writ
petitions filed by the janmis challenging the constitutional validity
F
of the Janmam Act (Act 24 of 1969). By a judgment dated
19.4.1972 delivered by a Constitution Bench of this Court in
the case of Balmadies Plantations Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu
[(1972) 2 SCC 133], it was held that the Janmam Act (Act 24
of 1969) was immune to challenge from Articles 14, 19 and 31
G as it was an Act for acquisition of an estate under Article 31A
with one exception of acquisition of forest lands which could
not be considered as agrarian reforms under Article 31A in the
absence of anything in the Act to show the purpose for which
the forest land stood acquired (see para 18). Consequently,
H acquisition of forest lands was held to be violative of the
GLANROCK ESTATE (P) LTD. v. STATE OF TAMIL 615
NADU [S.H. KAPADIA, CJI.]
Constitution. Meanwhile on 29.6.1972, the Tamil Nadu Land
A
Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Second Amendment Act,
1972 (Act 20 of 1972) [for short "the Ceiling Act (Act 20 of
1972)"] was passed so as to extend the provisions of the
principal Act. Proceedings were initiated under the Ceiling Act
(Act 20 of 1972) in regard to non-plantation lands of the
B
petitioner(s) (plantations being exempted from the purview of
the Ceiling Act (Act 20 of 1972)). Under the Ceiling Act (Act
20 of 1972), a family was not entitled to hold lands in excess
of the ceiling area, i.e., 15 standard acres [see Section 5 read
with Section 7 of the Ceiling Act (Act 20 of 1972)]. Hence,
C
under the Ceiling Act (Act 20 of 1972), the petitioner(s) was
entitled to hold 15 standard acres per family. On 1. 7.1972, the
Ceiling Act (Act 20 of 1972) was notified and made applicable
to Hill Areas. Thus, 1.7.1972 became the notified date under
Section 3(31) of the Ceiling Act (Act 20 of 1972). By the Ceiling
D
Act (Act 20 of 1972), it was inter alia provided that if by virtue
of the Ceiling Act (Act 20 of 1972) the total extent of the land
held by any person exceeded the ceiling area then in relation
to such person the date of commencement of the Ceiling Act
(Act 20 of1972) will mean 1.3.1972. On 20.11.1972, the
petitioner(s) herein submitted their returns under the Ceiling Act
E
(Act 20 of 1972). On 24. 7.1973, the authorized officer wrote
to the petitioner(s) that he would inspect their estates on
4.8.1973. On 24.4.1973 came the decision of this Court in His
Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadaga/varu v. State of
Kera/a [(1973) 4 SCC 225]. This date, namely, 24.4.1973 is
F
crucial as it is the cut-off date under the judgment of this Court
in Waman Rao v. Union of India [(1981) 2 SCC 362]. It was
held in Waman Rao (supra) that all amendments to the
Constitution made on or after 24.4.1973 and by which the Ninth
Schedule to the Constitution stood amended from time to time G
by inclusion of various Acts and Regulations therein were open
to challenge on the ground that they, or anyone or more of them,
are beyond the constituent power of the Parliament since they
damage the basic or essential features of the Constitution or
its basic structure. Consequently, all such amendments to the
H
616
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2010] 12 S.C.R.
A
Constitution made on or before 24.4.1973, by which the Ninth
Schedule stood amended from time to time, were held to be
valid and constitutional. On 17.8.1973, the authorized officer
under the Ceiling Act (Act 20 of 1972) informed the petitioner(s)
that the action under the Ceiling Act (Act 20 of 1972) stood
B
temporarily deferred. Soon thereafter on 7.9.1974, the
Janmam Act (Act 24 of 1969) was inserted as Item No. 80 in
the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution by the Constitution (Thirtyfourth Amendment) Act, 1974. On 25.11.1974, the Collector
of Nilgiris issued a notice to the petitioner(s) herein asking them
c to hand over the possession of their lands under the Janmam
Act (Act 24 of 1969). On 27.11.1974, as stated above, the
Janmam Act (Act 24 of 1969) stood notified. Till this date, no
proceedings were taken under the Ceiling Act (Act 20 of 1972).
Hence, ceiling was not determined till that date. In fact on
0
16.12.1974, writ petitions were filed by the petitioner{s) herein
seeking a direction to the State to complete proceedings under
the Ceiling Act (Act 20 of 1972) and to refrain from proceeding
under the Janmam Act (Act 24 of 1969). On 23.9.1976, the
writ petitions were dismissed by the Madras High Court against
E
which Special LeavH Petition No. 8994 of 1976 was filed in this
Court; leave was granted by this Court as Civil Appeal No.
1345 of 1976. In 1988, writ petition No. 242 of 1988 was also
filed by the petitioner(s) under Article 32 of the Constitution in
which vide order dated 17.2.1989, a Division Bench of this
F
Court referred the case to the Constitution Bench [see (1989)
3 SCC 282]. On 14.9.1999, a Constitution Bench of this Court
referred the matters to a larger Bench of 9-Judges [see (1999)
7 SCC 580]. Finally, by a judgment of 9-Judge Constitution
Bench dated 11.1.2007 in Civil Appeal Nos. 1344-45 of 1976
etc. etc. reported as l.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu [(2007)
~
..:i
2 sec 1], this Court answered the reference by holding Article
31 Bas introduced by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act,
1951 to be valid. Applying the tests laid down in l.R. Coelho's
case, tMe 9-Judge Constitution Bench directed the Civil Appeal
Nos. 1344-45 of 1976 with Writ Petition Nos. 242 of 1988 and
H 408 of 2003 to be placed for hearing before a 3-Judge Bench
•
GLANROCK ESTATE (P) LTD. v. STATE OF TAMIL
617
1NADU [S.H. KAPADIA, CJI.]
for decision in accordance with the principles laid down therein.
A
Accordingly, these matters have now come before us. In these
matters, we are required to apply the principles laid down in
l.R. Coelho's case in the matter of challenge to the Janmam
Act (Act 24 of 1969) on the ground that the said Act is beyond
the constituent power of the Parliament since the Janmam Act
B
(Act 24 of 1969) damages the basic or essential features of
the Constitution.
Points for Consideration
4. (A)What is the scope of immunity to laws
C
inserted in the Ninth Schedule of the
Constitution read with Article 31 B?
(B)
Whether the Tamil Nadu State Legislature
lacked legislative competence to enact
D
Janmam Act (Act 24 of 1969)?
(C)
Whether the Janmam Act (Act 24 of 1969)
could not be applied because of the Ceiling
Act (Act 20 of 1972)?
Scope of immunity to laws inserted in the Ninth Schedule
read with Article 31 B
E
5. Shri K.V. Viswanathan, learned senior counsel
appearing on behalf of the petitioner(s), submitted that
F
"separation of powers" and "rule of law" are basic features of
the Constitution of India. In the context of separation of powers,
learned counsel submitted that on 19.4.1972 the Constitution
Bench of this Court in Balmadies case held that Section 3 of
the Janmam Act (Act 24 of 1969) insofar as it related to transfer
of forests in Janmam estate was unconstitutional as it was not
G
a measure of agrarian reform protected by Article 31A of the
Constitution. According to the learned counsel, inclusion of the
Janmam Act (Act 24of1969) on 7.9.1974 by the Constitution
(Thirty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1974 in the Ninth Schedule (Item
H
618
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 12 S.C.R
A No. 80) amounted to direct negation and abrogation of judicial
review as the impugned Constitution (Thirty-fourth Amendment)
Act, 197 4 confers naked power on the Parliament to obliterate
the judicial decision in Balmadies case which became final,
without changing the basis of the decision or the law and,
B therefore, the said impugned Constitutional Amendment Act
destroys the basic feature of the Constitution, namely, judicial
review.
Similarly, according to the learned counsel, the
Constitution (Thirty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1974 violated the
basic structure of rule of law and equality. In this connection, it
c was submitted that in Tamil Nadu in respect of lands held in
excess of the ceiling limits there is an Act called the Tamil Nadu
Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act, 1961 which
came into force on 6.4.1960. The said Act stands inserted in
the Ninth Schedule as Item No. 46 on 20.6.1964.