# GnanambaZ Ammal v. 'l', Raju Ayyar and Others

- **Citation:** [1950] 1 S.C.R. 949
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1950
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. XIII of 1950
- **Bench:** Saiyid Fazl Ali, MuKHERJEA, Chandrasekhara Aiyar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/gnanambaz-ammal-v-l-raju-ayyar-and-others-163
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

Hindu law-Will-Construction-General pinciples-Presunw
tion ag iinst intestacy.
The cardinal maxim to be observea by courts in construing a
will is to endeavour to ascertain the intentions of the testi:i.tor.
This intention has to be gathered primarily from the language of
the document which is to be read as a whole without indulging in
any conjecture or speculation as to what the testator would have
done if he had been better informed or better advised.
~
The courts are however entitled and bound to bear in mind
other matters than merely the words used.
They must consider
~-,
the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his
family relationship, the probability that he would use words in a
particular sense, and many other things which are often summed
up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'the court is entitled to
put itself into the testator's armch&ir '.
But all this is solely ae an aid to arriving at a right construction of the will, and to ascertain the meaning of the language -
when used by that particular testator in that document.
As soon
as the construction is settled, the duty of the court is to carry
out the intentions as expressed. The court is in no c•se justified
in adding to testarnentary dispositions.
In all cases it musb
loyally carry out the will as properly construed, &nd thi~ duty is
1950
Dec. 21.
•
•
1950
GnanambaZ
Ammal
v.
'l', Raju Ayyar
and Others.
950
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1950)
universal, and is true alike of wills of every nationality and every
religion or ra.nk of life.
A presumption against intestacy may be ra!sed if it is justified
by the context of the document or the surrounding circumstances;
but it can be invoked only when tbe"e is undoubted ambiguity in
ascertainment of the intentions of the testator.
It cannot be that
merely with a view to avoiding intestacy you are to do otherwise
than construe plain words a.ccording to their plain mea.ning.
A Hindu died leaving
a widow, a widowed daughter N,
and a married daughter G, after he had ma.de a will giving
authority to bis widow to adopt a son of G should she beget one,
or in tbe alternative a. son of One of his nephews.
Para. 4 of the
will provided that if his widow adopted G's son all bis properties
except the village of K and the house at I and other properties
disposed of by the will shall pass to the adopted son ; and par&. 5
provided as follows: "The whole of the village of Kand tho
house al I, my daughter N shall enjoy with life interest and after
her the said properly shall pass to my daughter G and her children
on p•yment by the latter of Rs. 5,000 to A, the daughter of N."
Later on, amongst the provisions which he wished to ma.ke if a.
son of a nephew was adopted, there was a provision which ran as
follows: " Para. 13.
The village of K shall Le enjoyed by N as
stated in para. 5.''
A nephew's son was arlopted and he insti·
luted a suit against G after N's death for recovery of the village
K contending that under para. 13 of the will there was no disposition of the village after the life interest of N and on her death
the village vested in him as the testatof's heir:
Held, on a construction of the will as a whole, thal the testator did not intend that in the contingency of the adoption of a
nephew's son, \he village K should pass, on N's death, to the
adopted son; on ohe other hand, the provisions of para. 5 of the
will were intended to apply even in the case of such a contin·
gency and the village passed to G on N's death under para. 5 of
the will.
Judgment of the High Court of Madras reversed.
Venkatanarasimha v. Parthasarathy (HI.A. 51) and Re Edward;
Jones v. Jones [1906, 1 Ob. 570], referred to.

## Text

S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
949
render any assistance to them. An omission to pro1950
vide for such relief in the Constitution cannot be
d. d b
h S
C
d
·
fJanardan Reddy
reme 1e
y t e
upreme
ourt an
assumption o
d Oth
jurisdiction which is not warranted by the clear words
an
v. "'
i!O'
of articles 134, 135 or 136 will be tantamount to makTile Stat•·
ing legislation by the Supreme Court which it is never
its function to do.
Kania o. J.
The petitions, under the circumstances, are rejected.
Petitions dismissed.
Agent for the petitioners : I. N. Shroff.
Agent for the respondent: P. A. Mehta.
GNANAMBAL AMMAL
v.
T. RAJU A YYAR AND OTHERS.
[SAIYID FAZL ALI, MuKHERJEA and
CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.]
Hindu law-Will-Construction-General pinciples-Presunw
tion ag iinst intestacy.
The cardinal maxim to be observea by courts in construing a
will is to endeavour to ascertain the intentions of the testi:i.tor.
This intention has to be gathered primarily from the language of
the document which is to be read as a whole without indulging in
any conjecture or speculation as to what the testator would have
done if he had been better informed or better advised.
~
The courts are however entitled and bound to bear in mind
other matters than merely the words used.
They must consider
~-,
the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his
family relationship, the probability that he would use words in a
particular sense, and many other things which are often summed
up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'the court is entitled to
put itself into the testator's armch&ir '.
But all this is solely ae an aid to arriving at a right construction of the will, and to ascertain the meaning of the language -
when used by that particular testator in that document.
As soon
as the construction is settled, the duty of the court is to carry
out the intentions as expressed. The court is in no c•se justified
in adding to testarnentary dispositions.
In all cases it musb
loyally carry out the will as properly construed, &nd thi~ duty is
1950
Dec. 21.
•
•
1950
GnanambaZ
Ammal
v.
'l', Raju Ayyar
and Others.
950
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1950)
universal, and is true alike of wills of every nationality and every
religion or ra.nk of life.
A presumption against intestacy may be ra!sed if it is justified
by the context of the document or the surrounding circumstances;
but it can be invoked only when tbe"e is undoubted ambiguity in
ascertainment of the intentions of the testator.
It cannot be that
merely with a view to avoiding intestacy you are to do otherwise
than construe plain words a.ccording to their plain mea.ning.
A Hindu died leaving
a widow, a widowed daughter N,
and a married daughter G, after he had ma.de a will giving
authority to bis widow to adopt a son of G should she beget one,
or in tbe alternative a. son of One of his nephews.
Para. 4 of the
will provided that if his widow adopted G's son all bis properties
except the village of K and the house at I and other properties
disposed of by the will shall pass to the adopted son ; and par&. 5
provided as follows: "The whole of the village of Kand tho
house al I, my daughter N shall enjoy with life interest and after
her the said properly shall pass to my daughter G and her children
on p•yment by the latter of Rs. 5,000 to A, the daughter of N."
Later on, amongst the provisions which he wished to ma.ke if a.
son of a nephew was adopted, there was a provision which ran as
follows: " Para. 13.
The village of K shall Le enjoyed by N as
stated in para. 5.''
A nephew's son was arlopted and he insti·
luted a suit against G after N's death for recovery of the village
K contending that under para. 13 of the will there was no disposition of the village after the life interest of N and on her death
the village vested in him as the testatof's heir:
Held, on a construction of the will as a whole, thal the testator did not intend that in the contingency of the adoption of a
nephew's son, \he village K should pass, on N's death, to the
adopted son; on ohe other hand, the provisions of para. 5 of the
will were intended to apply even in the case of such a contin·
gency and the village passed to G on N's death under para. 5 of
the will.
Judgment of the High Court of Madras reversed.
Venkatanarasimha v. Parthasarathy (HI.A. 51) and Re Edward;
Jones v. Jones [1906, 1 Ob. 570], referred to.
APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. XIII of
1950.
Appeal from a judgment and decree of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court (Wadsworth and
Rajamannar JJ.) dated 27th November, 1945, in
Appeal No. 518 of 1941, reversing the judgment of the
Subordinate Judge of Mayuram dated 10th July, 1944,
in Original Suit No. 34 of 1943.
B. Somayya (R. Ramamurti, with him) for the
ap~ellant.
•
S.C.R ..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
951
K. S. Krishnaswami Aiyangar (K. Narasimha
rnso
Aiyangar, with him) for respondent No. 1.
GnanambaZ
1950. December 21. The Judgment of the Court
Ammal
was delivered by
v.
T. Raju Ayyar
M UKHERJEA J.-This appeal is directed against an
and Others.
appellate judgment of a Division Bench of the Madras
High Court dated November 27, 1945, reversing the
Muklieriea J,
decision of the Subordinate Judge of Mayuram made in
Original $uit No. 34 of 1943.
There is no dispute about the material facts of
the case which lie within a short compass and the controversy centers round one point only which turns
· upon the construction of a will left by one· Kothandarama Ayyar to whom the properties in suit admittedly
belonged. Kothandarama, who was a Hindu inhabitant of the District of Tanjore and owned considerable
properties, died on 25th April 1905, leaving behind
him as his near relations his adoptive mother Valu
Ammal, his widow Parbati and two daughters
Nagammal and Gnanambal, of whom Nagammal,
who became a widow during the testator's life time
had an infant daughter named Alamelu.
Kothandarama executed his last will on 13th March, 1905, and
by this will, the genuineness of which is not disputed
in the present litigation, he gave an authority to his
widow to adopt unto him a son of his second daughter
Gnanambal, should she beget one before January, 1908,
or in the alternative any of the sons of his two
nephews, if the widow so chose.
The suit, out of which the appeal arises, was commenced by Raju Ayyar, who was a son of the testator's
nephews and was taken in adoption by the widow in
terms of the will; and it was for recovery of possession
of certain properties, known as Kothangudi properties
whicl;l formed part of the testator's estate on the allegation that under the will mentioned above, these
properties were given to Nagammal, the widowed
daughter of the testator for her life-time, but as there
was no disposition of the remaining interest after the
death of the life tenant, the properties vested in the
1950
Gnan.atnbai
Ammal
v.
T. Raju Ayyar
a'ld Oth1rs.
Jfukherjea J.
•
952
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1950]
plaintiff as the adopted son and heir of the deceased
on the death of Nagammal which took place on 3rd of
] anuary, 1943. Gnanambal, the second daughter of the
testator, was the first and main defendant in the suit,
and she resisted the plaintiff's claim primarily on the
ground that there was no intestacy as regards the suit
properties after the termination of the life interest of
Nagammal, and that under the terms of the will itself
she was entitled to get these properties in absolute right
after the death of Nagammal, subject to payment of a
sum of Rs. 5,000 to Alamelu, the daughter of Nagammal.
Alamelu was made the second defendant in the
suit and as she died when the snit was pending in the
trial court, her heirs were impleaded as defendants 3 to 9.
The first court accepted the contention of the defendant No. 1 and dismissed the plaintiff's suit. On appeal
to the High Court, the judgment was reversed and the
plaintiff's claim was allowed. The defendant No. 1
has now come up appeal to this court.
To appreciate the contentions that have been raised
by the parties to this appeal, it would be convenient
first of all to refer briefly to the relevant provisions of
the will: After cancelling his previous wills. the testator in the third paragraph of his will, gave his widow
authority to adopt a son. She was to adopt the son of
Gnanambal, if the latter got a son previous to January
1908, or she could adopt any of the sons of the testator's nephews. Paragraph 4 provides that if the first
course is followed, that is, if the son of Gnanambal is
adopted by the widow, then all the properties, movable
and immovable, belonging to the testator excepting
the village of Kothangudi, the house at Injigudi and
the other properties which were disposed of by the will
would go to such adopted son. Paragraph 5, which is
material for our present purposes runs as follows :-
" The whole village of Kothangudi and the house at
lnjigudi, both of Nannilam Taluk, my daughter
Nagammal, shall enjoy with life interest and after her
the said property shall pass to my daughter Gnanambal
and her children on payment by the latter of Rs. 5,000
to Alamelu, Nagammal's daughter."
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
953
,
'
By the sixth paragraph the
Nallathukudi and
1950
Pungavur villages together with certain house prot
M
·
h
,
d
Gnana~bal
per y at
ayavaram are given tot e testators a opAmmal
tive mother and wife in equal shares to be enjoyed
v.
by both of them during their life-time and after ·r. Raiu Ayyar
their death they are to pass on to the adopted son.
and Othm.
Paragraph 7 gives a small house absolutely to Nagam.
MukherJ•• J
mal for her residence and paragraph 8 makes certain
provisions for management of the properties. In para.
graph 9 direction is given to collect the money due on
the insurance policy on the life of the testator an.d
to. pay off his debts.
Paragraph IO mentions certain charities, the expense;; of which are to be defrayed
from the income of the Nallathukudi properties. Para.
graph 11 then says that in the event of the widow
adopting any of the nephew's sons of the testator, such
son shall inherit the entire property at Kokkur and also
the lands of Nallathukudi after the death of the testator's wife and mother. By paragraph 12, the village
of Maruthanthanallur is given to Gnanambal and
paragraph 13 provides that "the village of Kothangudi
shall be enjoyed by Nagammal as stated in paragraph
· 5 ". By paragraphs IS and 16 the remainder in the
house at Mayavaram situated in the east row of Vellalarkovil Street is given to Gnanambal after the death of
the testator's wife and mother. Paragraph 18 provides
for certain other charities. In paragraph 20 it is stated
that if the wife of the testator should die before
January, 1908, without making any adoption, then the
eldest or any son of Gnanarnbal would be his adopted
son without any formality and inherit all the properties
subject to the conditions mentionecj in the will. Paragraph 21, which is the penultimate paragraph in the
will, further lays down that if all the three contingencies
fail and no adoption is taken, the male chilci or children
born to Gnanambal shall inherit as grandsons all the
properties of the testator, subject to the conditions
specified in the will. These, in brief, are the dispositions
made in the will. The plaintiff founds him claim upon
paragraph 13 of. the will which, according to him,
contams the et1tlre disposition so far as the Kothangudi
U2
954
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1950)
'
1950
property is concerned.
That village is given to
Nagammal for her life with no disposition of the
Gnanamba.l
b
Ammal
remaining interest. If the remain<ler has not
een
v.
disposed of, there is no doubt that the plaintiff would
T. Raju Ayyar be entitled to the property as the heir of the testator ·
and Others.
under the ordinary law of inheritance.
Mukherjea J,
The defen<lant No. l, on the other hand, relies on
paragraph 5 of the will, which gives the Kothangudi
village and the Injigudi house to Nagammal to be
enjoyed by her so long as she lives and after her death
they are to go to Gnanambal and her children. subject
to the payment of a sum of Rs. 5,000 to be paid .to
Alamelu, the daughter of Nagammal.
The High Court on a construction of the will has
found in favour of the plaintiff primarily on the ground
that in the contingency which happened in the present
case, viz., that the widow took in adoption a nephew's
,;on of the testator, paragraph 5 of the will did not
come into operation at all. The disposition as regards
Kothangudi property is, therefore, to be found exclusively in paragraph 13 of the will and the actual words
employed by the testator in that paragraph do not .
indicate that apart from Nagammal's taking a life
estate in the Kothangudi village the rest of the provisions in regard to this property as laid down in
paragraph 5 would also be incorporated into para- ·
graph 13.
An obvious difficulty, according to the
learned Judges, in accepting the construction sought to
be put upon the will by. defendant No. 1 is that
paragraph 5 speaks both of Kothangudi and Injigudi
properties, whereas paragraph 13 does not mention the
Injigudi house at all, nor does it purport to give a life
interest in the same to Nagammal. It could not be
reasonably held on a construction of the will that the
intention of the testator was that Gnanambal was to
pay Rs. 5,000 to Alamelu for the Kothangudi property
alone.
The result was that the plaintiff's claim was
allowed. It is the propriety of this decision that has
been challenged before us in this appeal.
In course of the arguments, we have been referred by
the learned Counsel on both sides to quite a large
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
955
number of decided authorities, both English and
Indian, in support of their respective contentions. It is
seldom profitable to compare the words of one will
with those of another or to attempt to find out to
which of the wills upon which decisions have been
given in reported cases, the will before us approximates
closely. Cases are helpful only in so far as they purport to lay down certain general principles of construction and at the present day these general principles seem to be fairly well settled.
The cardinal maxim to be observed by courts in construing . a will is to endeavour to ascertain the inten.
tions of the testator. This intention has to be gathered
primarily from the language of the document which is
to be read as a whole without indulging in any conjecture or speculation as to what the testator would
have done if he had been better informed or better
advised. In construing the language of the will as the
Privy Council observed in Venkata Narasimha v.
Parthasarathy (1), "the courts are entitled and bound
to bear in mind other matters than merely the words
used.
They must consider the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family
relationship, the probability that. he would use words
in a particular sense, and many other things which are
often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure
'The court is entitled to put itself into the· testator's
armchair' ...... Ent all this is solely as an aid to arriving at a right construction of the will, and to ascertain
the meaning of its language when used by that particular testator in that document.
So soon as the construction is settled, the duty of the court is to carry
out the intentions as expressed, and none other. The
court is in no case justified in adding to testamentary
dispositions ...... In all cases it must loyally carry out
the will as properly construed, and this duty is
universal, and is true alike of wills of every nationality
and every religion or rank of life."
A question is sometimes raised as to whether in
construing a will the court should lean against
\\) ~i l. 1-.. nl at~- io.
1960
Gnanatnbal
Amtnal
v.
T. Raju Ayyru·
and Othera.
kfuk1ierjea J,
956
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1950)
1950
intestacy. The desire to avoid intestacy was considered by the Privy Council in the case referred to
Gnananibal
above as a rule based on English necessity and English
Ammal
v.
habits of thought which should not necessarily bind an
T. Rniu Ayyar Indian court. It seems that a presumption against
and Others.
intestacy may be raised if it is justified by the context
of the document or the surrounding circumstances;
Muk7"'j'" J. but it can be invoked only when there is undoubted
ambiguity in acertainment of the intentions of the
testator.
As Lord Justice Romer observed in Re
Edwards; Jones v. Jones (1), "it cannot be that merely
with a view to avoiding intestacy you are to do otherwise than construe plain words according to their plain
meaning". It is in the light of the above principles
that we should proceed to examine the contents of the
will before us.
The present will, which is the last of four testamentary document executed by the testator, appears to
have been prepared with a great deal of care and
circumspection. The testator had clearly in mind the
different situations that might arise in case his widow
adopted either Gnanambal's son or a son of one of the
nephews of the testator.
He envisaged also the
possibility of the widow dying without making any
adoption at all. Besides the son to be adopted, the
only other relations who had natural claims upon
the affection and bounty of the te,;tator and for whom
he desired to make provisions were his wife,
his
adoptive mother, the two daughters and the infant
grand-daughter. The interests given to his wife, the
adoptive mother and the eldest daughter, who were all
widows, were for their life-time, except a small house
\..-
property which was given absolutely for the residence
of the eldest daughter. On the other hand, the bequests
in favour of Gnanambal, who was a married daughter,
and the adopted son of the testator, were absolute in
their character. Besides these dispositions, there were
certain gifts for charity which were to be met out of
the income of the properties given to the wife and the
adoptive mother for their lives.
One singular feature
(II [1906] 1 Ch. 570 at p. 574.
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
957
in the will is that the testator took scrupulous care to
1950
include in it every item of property that he owned.
Gnanambal
There are two provisions in the wiJI relating to
Ammal
Kothangudi property to which the dispute in the prev.
sent suit relates. One is in paragraph 5 which gives T. Raju Ayyar
this property along with the house at Injigudi to
and Othe ....
Nagammal, the remainder being given to the appellant
Mu,;;:erjea J,
subject to the payment of a sum of Rs. 5,000 to
Alamelu, the daughter of Nagammal. The other is in
paragraph 13, which merely says that Nagammal was
to get it for life as stated in paragraph 5. The view
taken by the High Court and which has been pressed
for our acceptance here by the learned Counsel for the
respondents is that paragraph 5 was meant to be
operative only if Gnanarnbal's son was adopted by the
widow.
As that was not done, paragraphs 4 to 8 of
the will, it is urged, will go out of the picture altogether
and it is not permissible to refer to them except to the
extent that they were impliedly incorporated in the
subsequent paragraphs of the will. We do not think
that this is the correct way of reading the document.
The testator undoubtedly contemplated different
contingencies; but a reading of
the whole will
d<;>es not show that he wanted to make separate
and self-contained provisions with regard to each
of the .contingencies that might arise and that
each
set
of
provisions were . to
be
read
as
exclusive of the other set or sets. That does not appear
to be the scheme of the will. The testator's main
desire undoubtedly was that his widow should adopt
the son of his daugllter Gnanam bal, and in the first part
of his will after making provisions for his two daughters, his wife and adoptive mother and also for certain
charities, he left the rest of his properties to the son of
Gnanambal that was to be adopted by his widow. ln
the second part of the will, which is comprised in
paragraphs II to 16, the testator sets out the modifications which he desires to make in the earlier dispositions in case a son of one of his nephews was adopted
by the widow. It was not the intention of the testator
that on the happening of the second contingency, all
1950
Gnanambal
Ammal
v.
T. RaJu Ayyar
and Others.
M11,kherjea J.
958
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1950]
the earlier provisions of the will would stand cancelled
and the entire dispositions of the testator's property
would have to be found within the four corners of
paragraphs 11 to 16 of the will.
In our opinion, the
provisions made for the two daughters, the widow and
the adoptive mother as made in paragraphs 5, 6 and 7
of the will and also the provisions for charities and
payment of debts contained in paragraphs 9 and 10
were meant to be applicable under all the three contingencies referred to above.
This is clear from the fact
that provisions of paragraphs 7, 9 and 10 have not been
repeated or incorporated in paragraphs 11 to 16,
although it cannot be suggested that they were not to
take effect on the happening of the second contingency.
Again in the third contiugency contemplated by the
testator, which is described in paragraph 20, it is
expressly stated that if no adoption is made, the
eldest or any son
of Gnanambal would inherit
the properties and he shall take the properties
subject to the conditions mentioned in the will.
The conditions spoken of here undoubtedly refer
to the
provisions made for the mother,
wife
and the two daughters of the testator as well as in
respect to payment of debts and carrying out of the
charities specified in paragraph 10.
The changes that are to take effect on the happening
of the second event are in regard to the beq nests in
favour of the adopted son.
Under paragraph 4 of the
will, the adopted son was to get all the properties of
the testator with the exception of those given to the
two daughters, the mother and the wife.
Under para.
graph 11, if the adoption is of a nephew's son of the
testator, the adopted son gets only the Kokkur properties and the reversionary interest in Nallatlmkudi
village after the death of the testator's wife and mother.
The village Maruthanthanallur which would go to the
adopted son under paragraph 4 is taken away under
paragraph 11 and is given to Gnanambal.
She is also
given the remaining interest in the Mayavaram house
which was given to the adopted son under paragraph
6.
Subject to the changes thus made, the provisions
-,..
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
959
of paragraphs 5. 6 and 7 would, in our opinion, still
remain operative even if the person adopted was a
nephew's son of the testator. No change is made in
paragraphs 11 to 16 with regard to the provision in
paragraph 5 of the will.
In paragraph 13 it is only
stated that the village Kothangudi shall be enjoyed by
Nagammal as stated in paragraph 5. It may be conceded that this statement by itself does not let in the
entire provision of paragraph. 5, but that is not material
for our present purpose. It is enough that paragraph
5 has not been changed .or altered in any way. The
statement in paragraph 13 may, after all, be a loose
expression which the testator used only for the purpose
of emphasising that the Kothangudi village would be
enjoyed by Nagammal even if Gnanambal's son was
not adopted. This is not by way of making any new
disposition, but only to affirm what has been already
done.
The affirmation of a portion of the provision
which is perfectly superfluous cannot exclude the rest.
It is somewhat difficult to say why the rest of the provisions in paragraph 5, particularly the benefit that
was meant to be given to Alamelu, was not repeated in
paragraph 13. It may be that the testator did not
consider it necessary or it may be that it was due to
inadvertance. It is to be noted here that the testator
did not mention anywhere in paragraphs 11 to 16
the small house that was given absolutely to Nagammal under paragraph 7. It was certainly not the
intention of the testator that Nagammal would not
have that house on the happening of the second contingency. If paragraph 5 itself is held to be a pp Ji.
cable-and in our opinion it should be so held-there
is no question of adding to or altering any ofthe words
made use of by the testator. It is not a question of
making a new will for the testator or inventing a
bequest for certain persons simply because the will
shows that they were the objects of the testator's
affection.
The provision is in the will itself and it is
only a. question of interpretation as to whether it is
applicable in the circumstances which have happened
in the present case. The position, therefOie, seems
1950 .
Gnanambal
Animal
v.
1'. Raju Ayyar
and Others.
Mukherjea J,
' 1950
960
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1950]
to be that the disposition made in paragraphs 5, 6 and
7, which were in favour of the mother, the wife and the
Gnanamb:tl
Ammal
two daughters of the testator were meant to take effect
v.
immediately on the testator's death. They were not
T. Raju Ayyar contingent gifts in the sense of being made dependent
and Othors
upon the adoption of Gnanambal's son by the wife
of the testator. Only the reversionary interest in the
Mukherjea J. Mayavaram house, which was to vest in the adopted
son under the provision of paragraph 6 after the death
of the widow and the mother was taken away from
the adopted son and given to Gnanambal in case the
person adopted was not her own son. If the whole of
paragraph 5 remains operative the Injigudi house must
also be deemed to have been given to Nagammal for
her life and in fact the evidence is that she enjoyed it
so long as she was alive.
No difficulty also arises
regarding the payment of Rs. 5,000 to Alamelu as has
been stated by the High Court in its judgment.
Having regard to the meticulous care with which the
testator seems to have attempted to provide for the
different contingencies that might arise and the anxiety
displayed by him in making an effective disposition
of all the properties he owned, it is not probable that he
would omit to make any provision regarding the future
devolution of the Kothangudi village if he really
thought that such direction had to be repeated in the
latter part of the will. The omission of the gift of
Rs. 5,000 to Alame\u also cannot be explained on any
other hypothesis. It is not necessary for the purpose of
the present case to invoke any rule of . presumption
against intestacy, but if the presumption exists at all,
it certainly fortifies the conclusion which we have
arrived at..
The result is that the appeal is allowed, the judgment
and decree of the of the High Court are set aside and
those of the Subordinate Judge restored.
The appellant will have costs of all the courts.
Appeal allowed.
Agent for the appellant :
M. S. K. Aiyangar.
M. S. Krishnamoorthi
Sastri,.
Agent for respondent No. I: