# Go pal Narain v. State of Uttar Praduh qnd Anr

- **Citation:** [1964] 4 S.C.R. 869
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1963-09-03
- **Bench:** P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. SuBBA RAo, K. N. WANCHoo, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, J. R. MuoHOLKAR
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/go-pal-narain-v-state-of-uttar-praduh-qnd-anr-3188
- **Pages:** 16

## Headnote

Constitution
of
India,
Arts. 14,
19(1)(f)-MunicipalityArbitrary power to make classification-Policy and guidanceExpress or implied-To be gathered from the statute-Geographical division of a town-Special taxes in that part-Whether discri·
minatory-Validity-Mention of
wrong clause
in
Notification
Does not affect the power-Uttar Pradesh Municipalties Act, 1916
(U.P. A.ct No. II of 1916), ss. 128(1), 13l(l)(h).
The city of Bareilly was originally composed of two parts. In
1870, the vacant area between these two parts was developed into
a new residential area by the Municipality at a considerable
cost.
Special amenities for the residents of this area were provided and house tax was imposed. After the coming into force of
Uttar Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1916, the Municipality imposed,
first, a latririe ux and later a scavenging tax in this area
from
1939. The petitioner who is a resident and house owner in this
area filed the present petition questioning the validity of the taxes
imposed by the Municipality.
The main contentions raised by the petitioner were: (i) s.
128(1) of the U.P. Municipalities Act, in so far as it authorised
the Municipal Board to impose the taxes mentioned therein
in
part of the Municipality, offended Art. 14 of the Constitution and,
therefore, was void ; (ii) even if the section did not violate
the said article, the notification issued by the Municipal
Board
imposi;ig the two taxes namely, house tax and scavenging
tax,
confining them only to the new area (civil lines) was void in as
much as such imposition could not be justified on the basis of the
doctrine of classification, (iii) the taxes were imposed in violation
of the statutory provisions of the Act and
therefore
the
imposition on him in respect of his building i~fringed his' right
under Art. 19(1)\£) of the Constitution; and (iv) s. 13l(l)(b)
of the Act also violated Art. 14 of the Constitution inasmuch as
it conferred an arbitrary power on the Municipal Board to impose
tax~s of any a1nount on any person or class of persons without
laying down any clear policy for classification.
. Held: (i) While a court should be on its guard not to enter
into. the dor:ia1n
~£ speculation with a view to cover up an
obvious
d~fic1e~c~ 1_n a legislation, it may legitimately discover
such a policy! _if it is clearly discernible on a fair reading of the
rc:Ievant prov1s1ons of the Act.
But it is neither possible nor adv1s~ble to lay down precisely how a court should cull out such
policy from an Act in the absence of an express statuto;
1963
September 3
1963
Go pal Narain
v.
State of
Uttar Praduh
qnd Anr.
870
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1%4]
declaration of policy. It would depend upon the provisions of each
Act, including the preamble. But what can be posited is that the
policy must appear clear either expressly or by necessary implication fron1 the provisions of the statute itself.
Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shl'i fustice S. R. Tendolkal', [19591
S.C.R. 279, State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, [1952]
S.C.R. 284, Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [ 1954 J S.C.R. 803, Dhil'endra K1·ishna Mondo/ v. Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, [1955]
l
S.C.R.
244, Kathi Raning Rawat v. State of Saurashtra, [ 1952] S.C.R.
435, P. Balakotaih v. Union of India, [1958] S.C.R.
1052
and
M /s. Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India [!957] S.C.R. 233, refer·
red to.
(ii) A fair reading of ss. 7, 8 and 128 of the Act makes it
clear that the amounts collected by the Municipal Board by \Vay
of taxes are mainly intended to enable the Board to discharge its
duties in the Municipal area or part of the Municipal area, as the
case n1ay be.
These duties and functions need not necessarily
be discharged or perfonned in the entire area of the municipality
at once.
If different parts of a municipality may require special
treatment in the n1atter of provisions of amenities) it \VoulJ be
reasonable to collate the power of taxation in a part of a municipality with such separate

## Text

-
-
4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
869
GOPAL NARAIN
tJ..
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR.
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. SuBBA RAo, K. N. WANCHoo,
N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND J. R. MuoHOLKAR, JJ.)
Constitution
of
India,
Arts. 14,
19(1)(f)-MunicipalityArbitrary power to make classification-Policy and guidanceExpress or implied-To be gathered from the statute-Geographical division of a town-Special taxes in that part-Whether discri·
minatory-Validity-Mention of
wrong clause
in
Notification
Does not affect the power-Uttar Pradesh Municipalties Act, 1916
(U.P. A.ct No. II of 1916), ss. 128(1), 13l(l)(h).
The city of Bareilly was originally composed of two parts. In
1870, the vacant area between these two parts was developed into
a new residential area by the Municipality at a considerable
cost.
Special amenities for the residents of this area were provided and house tax was imposed. After the coming into force of
Uttar Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1916, the Municipality imposed,
first, a latririe ux and later a scavenging tax in this area
from
1939. The petitioner who is a resident and house owner in this
area filed the present petition questioning the validity of the taxes
imposed by the Municipality.
The main contentions raised by the petitioner were: (i) s.
128(1) of the U.P. Municipalities Act, in so far as it authorised
the Municipal Board to impose the taxes mentioned therein
in
part of the Municipality, offended Art. 14 of the Constitution and,
therefore, was void ; (ii) even if the section did not violate
the said article, the notification issued by the Municipal
Board
imposi;ig the two taxes namely, house tax and scavenging
tax,
confining them only to the new area (civil lines) was void in as
much as such imposition could not be justified on the basis of the
doctrine of classification, (iii) the taxes were imposed in violation
of the statutory provisions of the Act and
therefore
the
imposition on him in respect of his building i~fringed his' right
under Art. 19(1)\£) of the Constitution; and (iv) s. 13l(l)(b)
of the Act also violated Art. 14 of the Constitution inasmuch as
it conferred an arbitrary power on the Municipal Board to impose
tax~s of any a1nount on any person or class of persons without
laying down any clear policy for classification.
. Held: (i) While a court should be on its guard not to enter
into. the dor:ia1n
~£ speculation with a view to cover up an
obvious
d~fic1e~c~ 1_n a legislation, it may legitimately discover
such a policy! _if it is clearly discernible on a fair reading of the
rc:Ievant prov1s1ons of the Act.
But it is neither possible nor adv1s~ble to lay down precisely how a court should cull out such
policy from an Act in the absence of an express statuto;
1963
September 3
1963
Go pal Narain
v.
State of
Uttar Praduh
qnd Anr.
870
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1%4]
declaration of policy. It would depend upon the provisions of each
Act, including the preamble. But what can be posited is that the
policy must appear clear either expressly or by necessary implication fron1 the provisions of the statute itself.
Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shl'i fustice S. R. Tendolkal', [19591
S.C.R. 279, State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, [1952]
S.C.R. 284, Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [ 1954 J S.C.R. 803, Dhil'endra K1·ishna Mondo/ v. Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, [1955]
l
S.C.R.
244, Kathi Raning Rawat v. State of Saurashtra, [ 1952] S.C.R.
435, P. Balakotaih v. Union of India, [1958] S.C.R.
1052
and
M /s. Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India [!957] S.C.R. 233, refer·
red to.
(ii) A fair reading of ss. 7, 8 and 128 of the Act makes it
clear that the amounts collected by the Municipal Board by \Vay
of taxes are mainly intended to enable the Board to discharge its
duties in the Municipal area or part of the Municipal area, as the
case n1ay be.
These duties and functions need not necessarily
be discharged or perfonned in the entire area of the municipality
at once.
If different parts of a municipality may require special
treatment in the n1atter of provisions of amenities) it \VoulJ be
reasonable to collate the power of taxation in a part of a municipality with such separate treatment. This legislative guidance is
apparent from the three sections.
(iii) Looking at the policy disclosed by ss. 7, 8 and 128 of the
Act an<l applying the liberal view a law of taxation receives
in
the application of the doctrine of classification, it is not possible
to say that the policy so disclosed infringes the rule of equality.
Khandige Sharn Bhat v. Agricultural Income-tax Officer, Kasaragod, [1963] 3 S.C.R. 809, Purshottam Govindii v. B. M. Desai,
[1955] i S.c:R. 887, K. T. Moopol Nair v. State of Kerala,
[ 1961] 3 S.C.R. 77 and Bareilly Municipality v. Kundan Lal
A.l.R. 1959 All. 562 (F.B.), referred to.
(iv) The difference between the old city and the civil
lines
area is so pronounced in the n1atter of amenities that there is a
reasonable relation between the taxes imposed and the geographical classification tnade for the purpose of taxation and, therefore,
the notification i1nposing the said taxes does not infringe Art. 14
of the Constitution.
( v) It will be seen from ss. 13 l, 132 and 133 of the Act that
the rate of tax to be levied and the persons or the class of persons
liable to pay the san1e have a reasonable relation to the subject
taxable under the Act. The said rate to be in1posed and the persons or the class of persons liable to pay the san1e are ascertained
by a quasi-judicial procedure after giving opportunity to the parties affected, subject to revision by the State Go\'ernn~ent. Therefore, it cannot be said that the po,ver conferred upon the Nfuni-
-
..,.
.,...
..
-
4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
871
cipal Board i• an arbitrary power offending Art. H of the Constitution.
(vi) Though no tax could be levied or collected except. in
accordance with law, in the present case, it has not been established that the impugned taxes have been imposed in viol~tion of any
of the provisions of s. 131 and other relevant !Cct1ons of the
Act.
The question of the validity of the tax depends upon the existence of power to tax in respect of a subject. In the present case,
the Muncipal Board had certainly power to impo!<: scavenging tax.
The mention of cl. (xii) of s. 128 of the Act in the notification
appears to be a mistake for cl. (xi) and that does not atfect the
power of the Board to impose the tax.
ORIGINAL JuR1smcnoN : Petition No. 12 of 1962.
Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India
for the enforcement of fundamental rights.
/. P. Goyal, for the petitioner.
C. B. Agarwala and C. P. Lal, for respondent no. 1.
G. S. Pathak and C. P. Lal, for respondent no 2.
September 3, 1963. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
1963
Gopal Narain
v.
State of
Uttar Pradesh
and Anr.
SnRBA RAo J.-This petition fined under Art. 32 of the
Subba Rao, f.
Constitution raises the question of the constitutional validity of s. 128(1) of the Uttar Pradesh Municipalities Act,
1916 (U.P. Act No. II of 1916), hereinafter called the Act,
insofar as it authorizes a Municipal Board to impose all or
any of the taxes mentioned therein in any part of the municipality.
Bareilly is an old City in the State of Uttar Pradesh.
In the middle of the 19th century it consisted of small
houses situated in congested localities with narrow lanes.
At some distance away from the said City area there existed even then a cantonment area.
Between the City
area and the Cantonment area there was a tract of uneven
and undeveloped land. The Municipal Board of Bareilly acquired a part of the said land and, together with
some nasul land, developed it at a considerable cost. The
newly developed area came to be known as the Civil Lines.
The Municipal Board has provided special amenities
for the residents of that area. The said facts and the particulars of the amenities provided are given in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the Municipal Board and
1963
Gopal Narain
v.
State of
U ttar Pradesh
and Anl'.
Subba Rao, f.
872
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
a map of the Bareilly City and the Cantonment area is
also annexed thereto. A glance at the map discloses that
the City of Bareilly is divided into three separate blocksthe old City, the Cantonment and the Civil Lines.
The Civil Lines area is situated between the old City and
the Cantonment. We have no reason not to accept the
said facts given in the counter-affidavit as representing the
division of the City of Bareilly based on its geographical
features and strata of development.
In the Civil Lines area, which the Municipal Board
acquired and developed, the said Board imposed house
tax from January 31, 1870. In the year 1916 the Act was
passed in order to consolidate and amend the laws relating to municipalities in the State of Uttar Pradesh. The
Act came into force on July 1, 1916. After the Act came
into force, the old tax was abolished and a new house
tax was imposed by the Municipal Board of Bareilly in
the Civil Lines area with effect from January l, 1918. A
latrine tax was also imposed with effect from May
25,
1918, but it was replaced by scavenging tax with effect
from April 1, 1939. The petitioner, a resident of the Civil
Lines area, who owns a house bearing door No. 43 therein, filed this writ petition in this Court for a declara:
ti on that s. 128 ( 1) of the Act, insofar as it authorizes the
Municipal Board to impose a tax in any part of the municipal area, is void and for the issue of a writ of mandamus against the Municipal Board, Bareilly, directing
it not to realize the said house tax and scavenging tax
from him. To the said petition, the State of Uttar Pradesh and the Municipal Board, Bareilly, are made respondents 1 and 2 respectively.
Mr. Goyal, learned counsel for the petitioner, raised
before us six contentions, but they may be broadly classified under the following four heads: ( 1) Section 128 ( 1)
of the Act, insofar as it authorizes the Municipal Board
to impose the taxes mentioned therein in any part. of
the municipality, offends Art. 14
of
the Constitution
and, therefore, is void. (2) Even if the section does not
violate the said article, the notification issued by
the
Municipal Board imposing the said two taxes,
namely,
house tax and scavenging tax, confining them only to the
Civil Lines area was void inasmuch as the taxes could not
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•
4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
873
be justified on the basis of the doctrine of classification.
(3) The said taxes were imposed in violation of
the statutory provisions of the Act and, therefore, the said
imposition on him in respect of his building infringes his
fundamental right under Art. 19 ( 1) ( f) of the Constitution.
And (4) section 131(1)(b) of the Act also .violates Art. 14
of the Constitution in as much as it confers an arbitrary
power on the Municipal Board to impose taxes of any
amount on any person or class of persons without laying
down any clear policy for classification.
Mr. Pathak, learned counsel for the Municipal Board,
controverts the said arguments of the petitioner. We shall
deal with his contentions in appropriate places.
To appreciate the first contention it would be convenient to read at the outset the relevant part of s. 128 of
the Act. It reads :
Section 128. (!) Subject to any general rules or
special orders of the State Government in this behalf,
the taxes which a board may impose in the whole or
any part of a municipality are-
(i) a tax on the annual value of buildings or lands
or both;
*
*
*
*
*
•
(xi) a scavenging tax ;
*
*
*
*
..
No general rules were made or special orders issued by
the State Government in the matter of imposition of a tax
in any part of a municipality. It is argued that the
power conferred on the Municipal Board to impose a tax
on any part of the municipality is a naked and arbitrary
power, that the Act does not disclose any policy or give
any guidance for making a valid classification and that,
therefore, the section, to the said extent, violates the provisions of Art. 14 of the Constitution. The law on the
subject is well settled. Das C.J., in Ram Krishna Dalmia
v. Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar('), after a consideration
of the earlier decisions, pointed out that a statute which
may come up for consideration on a question of validity
under Art. 14 of the Constitution might be placed in one
of the five classes mentioned therein. Classes (iii)
and
(iv), which are relevant to the present enquiry, reads:
( 1) [1959] S.C.R. 279 .
56-2 S. C. India/64
1963
Gopal Nflf'ain
v.
State of
U ttar Pradesk
and Anr.
Subba Rao, /-
. Gopal Narain
y.
State of
Uttar Pradesh
and Anr.
Subba Rao,/.
87'1
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
"(iii) A statute may not make any classification
of the persons or things for the purpose of applying
iu provisions but may leave it to the discretion of
the Government to select and classify persons or things
to whom its provisions are to apply.
In determining the question of the validity or otherwise of
such a statute the court will not strike down the law
out of· hand only because no classification appears on
its face or because a discretion is given to the Government to make the
selection or
classific~tion but
will go on to examine and ascertain if the statute has
laid down any principle or policy for the guidance
of the exercise of discretion by the Government in
the matter of selection or classification, on the ground
that the statute provides for the delegation of arbitrary and uncontrolled power to the Government so
as to enable it to discriminate between persons or
things similar! y situate and that, therefore, the discrimination is inherent in the statute itself. In such a case
the court will strike down both the law as well as
the execUtive action taken under such law, as ir did
in State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar(').,
Dwarka Prasad Laxmi N¥train v. The State of Uttar
Pradesh(') and Dhirendra Krishna Manda/, v. The
Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs(')."
"(iv) A statute may not make a classification of
the persons or things for the purpose of applying its
provi~ions and may leave it to the discretion of the
Government to select and classify the
persons
or
things to whom its provisions are to apply but may
at the same time lay down a policy or principle for
the guidance of the exercise of discretion by the Government in the matter of such selection or classification, the court will uphold the law as constitutional as it did in Kathi Raning Rawat v. The State
of Saurashtra(')."
The question, therefore, to be considered is whether the
Act has laid down a policy for the guidance of the Muni ..
cipal Board in the matter of selection of any part of the
( 1 ) [1952] S.C.R. 284.
(2) [1954] S.C.R. 803.
( 3) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 224.
(') [1952] S.C.R. 435.
-
-
-
"I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
875
municipality for the purpose of imposition of any of the
taxes mentioned in s. 128 of the Act.
In this context, because of a Legislature's reluctance
or inadvertence to express itself clearly of its policy, a
heavy and difficult burden is often placed on courts to discover it, if possible, on a fair reading of the provisions of the Act. Some Acts expressly lay down the policy to guide the exercise of discretion of an authority on
whom a power to classify is conferred. Some Acts, though
they do not expressly say so, through their provisions
may indicate clearly, by necessary
implication,
their
policy affording a real guidance for the exercise of discretion conferred on an authority thereunder. While a
court should be on its guard not to enter into the domain
of speculation with a view to cover up an obvious dificiency in a legislation, it may legitimately discover such a
policy, if it is clearly discernible on a fair reading of
the relevant provisions of the Act. This Court, in Kathi
Raning Rawat v. The State of Saurashtra('), found the
clear policy of the Legislature on the basis of the premable of the Act taken along with the surrounding circumstances; in P. Balakotaish v .. Union of India('), on an
examination of the Act read as a whole ; and in M / !.
Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India('), from the preamble itself.
This view was accepted in later decisions.
But it is neither possible nor advisable to lay down precise-
! y how a court should cull out such a policy from an Act
in the absence of an express statutory declaration of. policy.
It would depend upon the provisions of each Act, including the preamble. But what can be posited is that the
policy must appear clearly either expressly or by necessary
implication from the provisions of the statute itself.
Now, does the Act provide any real guide to the Municipal Board to exercise its discretion under s. 128(1) of
the Act? The Act is a consolidating and amending Act
relating to muncipalities in the State of Uttar Pradesh.
Section 7 of the Act narrates the duties of a municipal
hoard. It directs the municipal hoard to discharge duties
connected inter alia with sanitation, drainage, laying of
roads, schools, health, water supply, hospitals, maternity
(1) [1952] S.C.R. 435.
(2 ) [1958] S.C.R. 1052.
(3) [1957] S.C.R. 233.
196'3
Gopal Narain
v.
Swe of
U tt.r Pradesh
and Anr.
Subba Rao/.
1963
Gopal Narain
v.
State of
Uttar Pradesh
and Anr.
Subba Rao, f.
876
'SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
centres and similar others. Section 8 enables a municipal
board to provide, in its discretion, special amenities and
undertake other duties mentioned therein, which involve
heavy expenditure.
The duties cannot be discharged and the discretionary
functions cannot be performed unless the municipality
has power to collect money by way of taxes. Section 128
of the Act confers such a power on the Municipal Board.
It says that the Municipal Board may impose in the
whole or any part of the municipality the taxes mentioned therein. A fair reading of these three provisions makes
it clear _that the amounts cqllected by the Municipal
Board by way of taxes are mainly intended to enable the
Board to discharge its duties in the municipal area or a
part of the municipal area, as the case may be.
It is
contended that while no doubt a combined reading of
the said provisions may indicate the purpose of taxation,
it does not disclose any policy how and under what
·circumstances the Municipal Board can select a part of
the municipal area for the imposition of a tax or taxes.
We do not agree. Sections 7 and 8 enumerate the obligatory duties and discretionary functions of a municipality. These duties and functions need
not necessarily
be discharged or performed in the entire area
of
the
municipality at once. ·They may have to be introduced
gradually, starting from one part of the area in the municipality with a view to cover the entire area in due
course. It may also be that the amenities required in
one part of the municipal area may be different from
those required in another part of the municipality.
It
·may also be that a part of the area, because of the nature of the soil, distance from the well-developed part
of the city or for historical reasons, calls for a larger investment for development compared to other parts of
the municipality. If so much is conceded, that is, different parts of a municipality may require special treatment
in the matter of provisions of amenities, it would be reasonable to collate the power of taxation in a part of
a municipality with such separate treatment. While the
'former two sections, by necessary implication, enable a
municipality to provide special amenities in a part of the
municipality, the latter. section empowers it to impose tax-
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4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
877
es in that part. If so understood the legislative guidance is apparent from the said three 11rovisions ; that is
to say, a municipality can impose a tax in a part of a
city, if that part, because of its peculiar situation or otherwise, has to be provided with special amenities throwing
a heavy financial burden on the municipality.
The next question is, whether the said policy offends
Art. 14 of the Constitution. It is said that all the citizens
of a city would directly or indirectly partake in the amenities provided in any part of the city and, therefore,
the classification underlying the policy has no reasonable
nexus with the object sought to be achieved. It is argued that amenities, such as good roads, extensive parks,
electrification, water supply etc., provided in one part of
the city could equally be taken advantage of by residents
of other parts of the city and, therefore, the expenditure
on such amenities should be met from the general revenues. It may be so ; but the indirect benefit cannot be
equated with the direct benefit conferred upon a part
of the city treated as a separate unit for the purpose of
taxation. This Court, in K handige Sham Bhat v. Agricultural Income-tax Officer, Kasaragod ('), in dealing with
a law of taxation in the context of the doctrine of classification observed :
"Taxation law is not an exception to this doctrine : vidc Purslzottam Govindji v. B. M. Desai(') and
K. T. Moopol Nair v. State of Kerala(' 0 ). But in
the application of the principles, the courts, in view
of the inherent complexity of fiscal
adjustment of
-
diverse elements, permit a larger discretion to
the
Legislature in the matter of classification,
so
long
it adheres to the fundamental principles underlying
the said doctrine. The power of the Legislature to
classify is of "wide range and flexibility" so that it
can adjust its system of taxation in all proper and
reasonable ways."
Looking at the policy disclosed by ss. 7 and 8 and
s. 128 of the Act an<l applying the liberal view a law
of taxation receives in the application of the doctrine of
(') f1963] 3 S.C.R. 809.
(3) [ 1961] 3 S.C.R. 77.
( 2) [1955] 2 S.C.R. 887.
•
1963
Go pal Narain
v.
State of
U ttar Pradesh
and Anr.
Subba Rao /.
1963
Gopal Narain
v.
State of
Uttar Pradesh
and Anr.
Subba Rao·./.
878
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
classification, it is not possible to say that the policy so
disclosed infringes-the rule of equality. This Court in
more than one decision held that equality clause does not
forbid geographical classification, provided the difference
between the geographical units has a reasonable relation
to the object sought to be achieved. This principle has
been applied to a taxation law in Khandige Sham Bhat's
Case(').
In that case, this Court also accepted the
principle that the legislative power to classify is of wide
range and flexibility so that it can adjust its system of
taxation in all proper and reasonable ways. It is indicated in "Willis, Constitutional Lau/', at p. 590, that a
State can make a territory within a city a unit for
the
purpose of taxation. So, the impugned section in permitting in the matter of taxation geographical classification,
which has reasonable relation to the object of the statute, namely, for providing special amenities for a particular unit the peculiar circumstances
whereof
demand
them, does not in any way impinge upon the equality
clause.
The very question that we are now called upon to
decide received the attention of a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Bareilly Municipality v. Kundan
Lal (2)_.
The Full Bench, by a majority, held on a construction of the provisions of the Act that the power vested in the Board to select part of the municipality within
which to levy a tax was not an arbitrary power but
one which is controlled by the purpose which was intende? to be achieved by the Act itself. We agree with this
view.
The next question is whether the notification issued
by the Municipal Board imposing the said taxes in the area
of the Civil Lines offends Art. 14 of the Constitution.
It is clear from the affidavit filed on behalf of the Municipal Board and the map annexed thereto that the area
covered by the Civil Lines has been treated as a separate
unit in . the matter of development from the year 1870.
The Municipal Board acquired the land in that area, laid
out roads, carved out good sized building plots, and provided special amenities for the residents by way
of
broad roads, open and bigger plots for construction of
--.
(1) [1963] 3 S.C.R. 809.
(2 ) -A.LR. 1959 All. 562.
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4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
879
houses, parks and gardens, special lighting arrangementi,
foot-path with cement benches, water booths with waterman for giving water to the public and special sanitary
arrangements ; whereas the old city area of Bareilly consisted of small plots of land with small houses thereon situated in congested localities with narrow lanes. The
Municipal Board imposed house tax in the Civil Lines
area from as early as January 31, 1870 and, after the Act
came into force, reimposed the impugned tax in accordance with the provisions of the Act. In the case
of scavenging tax, there appears to be different methods
adopted in the two areas. In the Civil Lines area nightsoil and rubbish are collected by the Municipal
Board
from each bungalow, while in the City area they are collected from one common place in each ward. The former certainly involves higher expenditure than the latter.
l t will, therefore be seen that for about 90 years the Civil
Lines area has bc-&n treated as a separate geographical unit for the purpose of taxation, having regard to historical reasons and the extra amenities provided for the
residents of that locality and the heavy expenditure incurred by the Municipal Board in doing so. The differences between the old city and the Civil Lines area are
so pronounced in the matter of amenities that there is a
reasonable relation between the taxes imposed and the
geographical classification made for the purpose of taxation. We, therefore, hold that the notification
impming
the said tues does not infringe Art. 14 of the Constitution.
The next question is whether s. 131 ilf the Act violates Art. H of the Constitution. Section 131 of the Act
reads :
" ( i) When a board desires to impose a tax, it shall
by special resolution frame proposals specifying-
( a) the tax, being one of the taxec, described in sub-
~ection ( 1) of section 128, which it desires to
impose;
(b) the persons or class of persons to be made liable,
and the description of property or other taxable
thing or circumstances in respect of which they
are to be made liable, except where and in so far
as any such class or description is already sufli1963
Copa/ Narain
v.
State of
Utt<r Pradesh
and Anr.
Subba Rao /.
Glfllli maroin
w.
:iiraite. of
lllaa- J.IlmiJeih
amiJ .Anr.
880
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
ciently defined under clause (a) or by this Act ;
(c) the amount or rate leviable from each such person or class of persons ; ·
\ d) any other matter referred to in section 153, which
the State Government requires by rule to be specified."
The argument is that this section enables the Board to
impose a tax of any amount and against any persons or
class of persons without giving any guide in regard to
the fixation of rate of tax or the persons or class of persons liable to pay the tax.
It is said that the said
power conferred upon the Municipal Board is an unguided and naked power. Section 131 does not confer any
power on the Board to impose a tax. Section 128 confers
such a power and that section with meticulous care enumerates the subjects of taxation. Section 131 provides a
machinery for imposing the said taxes. The said taxes
cannot be imposed in vacuum. There, should be some machinery for acsertaining the rate of taxation and the
persons or the class of persons liable to pay the same. If
s. 131 stood alone, there may be some justification for the coment, but if it is read along with s. 128, it posits a reasonable
nexus between the tax in respect of a subject and the
rate payable and the person or class of persons liable to
pay the same. To illustrate : s. 128 empowers the Municipal Board to. levy a tax on the annual value of a building and to make a person, who should obviously be a
person connected with the building, liable to pay the same.
For deciding those questions a quasi-judicial procedure
is prescribed under s. 131 and the succeeding sections
of the Act. Under s. 131 the Municipal Board makes the
proposals specifying the tax, the rate and the persons or
the class of persons liable to pay the tax and such other
details prescribed thereunder. The Board thereupon publishes
ih the manner ·prescribed the said details. Under s. 132
any inhabitant of the municipality may
within a fortnight from the publication of the said notification, submit
his objections thereto.
Thereupon the Board shall take
any objection so submitted into consideration and pass
orders thereon by special resolution. If the Board decides to modify its proposals, it shall publish the modified
proposals and the modified proposals may also be objected
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4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
881
to. After the final orders are made by the Board, it shall
submit the proposals along with the objections, if any, to the
prescribed
authority.
Under
s.
133
the prescribed
authority shall then submit the proposals and the objecttions to the State Government, which will make the final
orders. When the proposals are sanctioned by the prescribed authority, or the State Government, the State Government shall make rules having regard to the draft rules submitted by the Board ; when the rules are sanctioned by the State Government, they will be sent to the Board
and thereupon the Board by special resolution
shall
direct the imposition of the tax with effect from a date
specified in the resolution. Thereafter the said resolution will he notified by the State Government in the
Gazette. It will be seen from the aforesaid provisions that
the rate of tax to be levied and the persons or the class
of persons liable to pay the same have a reasonable relation to the subjects taxable under the Act. The said rate
to be imposed and the persons or the class of persons liable
to pay the same are ascertained by a quasi-judicial procedure after giving opportunity to the parties affected, subject
to revision
by
the State Government.
We cannot
therefore, say that the power conferred upon the Municipal Board is an arbitrary power offending Art. 14 of the
Constitution.
The next question of learned counsel is that the said
taxes were imposed in violation of the procedure prescribed by the Act. At the outset it may be noticed
that
the house tax was imposed with effect from January 31,
1870 and the latrine tax was imposed with effect from
May 23, 1918 and the latter tax was replaced by scavenging tax with effect from April 1, 1939. Though decades
have passed by, no one has questioned till now the validity of those taxes on the ground that the procedure
was not strictly followed. There is a presumption, when
a statutory authority makes an order, that it has followed
the prescribed procedure.
The said presumption is not
in any way weakened by the long acquiescence in the imposition by the residents of the Civil Lines. Nonetheless
no tax shall be levied or collected except in accordance
with law. If it is not imposed in accordance with law,
it would infringe the fundamental rights guaranteed un1%3
Go pal Na rain
v.
State of
I/! ttar Pradesh
and Anr.
iubba Rao/.
1963
Gop•I Narain
v.
State of
Uttar Pradesh
Nnd Anr.
882
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964}
der Art. 19(1)(£) of the Constitution. While the long
period of time that lapses between the imposition of the
tax and the attack on it may permit raising of certain
presumptions where the evidence is lost by affiux of time,
it cannot exonerate the statutory authority if it imposes a
tax in derogation of the statutory provisions. We will,
therefore, proceed with the specific objections raised by the
petitioner.
Sections 131 to 136 give the procedural steps to be
followed for imposing a tax. We have already given a
gist of those sections in a different context. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the Municipal Board
violated the provisions of s. 131(1) of the Act inasmuch
as, ( i) it did not give all the necessary details in the
proposals made under s. 131(1) of the Act, and (ii) the
Government did not make the ruks after the Act came
into force in accordance with the procedure prescribed
under s. 131 and the succeeding sections of the Act. In
regard to the first objection, there is an allegation in the
affidavit filed by the petitioner, but there is none in respect
of the second objection.
In a matter like this, we
are not prepared to permit the petitioner to question the
validity of the tax on the second ground in the absence
of any specific allegation in regard to the same in the
affidavit. There is a specific allegation in regard to the
first ground, but it is denied in the counter-affidavit filed
by the Municipal Board.
On April 5, 1917, the Municipal Board passed the following special resolutious :
"Draft proposals under Section 128(1) (i) for revising the Government Notification No. 135
dated
13-1-1870 levying tax on the buildings and lands in
the Civil Lines Station of the -Bareilly Municipality.
Resolution : Resolved that Draft Proposals be notified."
Ex faci~ this resolution shows that there were draft proposals ; those draft proposals are not before us and taey
must have contained all the details required by the section.
We reject this contention.
We,
therefore,
hold
that is has not been established that the impugned
taxes have been imposed in violation of any of the
provmons of s. 131 and other relevant sections of the
Act.
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4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
883
The last argument relates to the scavenging tax.
Section 128(1)(xi) empowers the Municipal Board to impose a scavenging tax. Clause (xii) of that section may .
also be noticed.
It reads : "a tax for the cleaning of
latrines and privies". The relevant notification imposing
the tax reads :
"It is hereby notified under sub-section
(2)
of
Section 135 read with section 136 of the United Provinces Municipalities Act, 1916 (II of 1916) that the
Municipal Board of Bareilly, in exercise of the powers
conferred by section 128 ( 1) (xii) of the said Act, has
imposed the following scavenging tax in the Bareilly
Municipality
published
with notification No.
3298/XI-18 H, dated the 20th September 1933, in super-
~ession of notification No. 628/XI-18H, dated the
24th January, 1923, with effect from lst April 1939.
Description of the tax.
A tax for the removal of nightsoil and rubbi~h at
the rate mentioned below to be realized from the occupier or the owner of the buildings (bungalows)
situated within the Civil Lines ward of the municipality."
*
*
*
*
*
*
In accordarice with the said notification, nightsoil and
rubbish are collected by the Municipal Board from each
bungalow in the Ci vii Lines area. The contention is that
the Municipal Board had no power to impose a scavenging tax under cl. (xii) of s. 128 ( 1) of the Act and, therefore, the imposition of the tax is illegal. The Municipal
Board says in iti, counter-affidavit that cl. (xii) mentioned
in the notification is a mistake for cl. (xi). The question
is whether the Municipal Board has power to
impose
scavenging tax. There must be some distinction between
scavenging tax and a tax for
cleaning of latrines and
privies. Presumably cl. (xi) is more comprehensive than
cl. (xii). In the counter-affidavit it is stated that nightsoil and rubbish are collected by the Municipal
Board
from the bungalows in the Civil Lines. Though a part
of that function is covered by cl. (xii), the combined
function is covered by cl. (xi) of s. 128 of the Act. The
question of the validity of the tax depends upon the
existence of power to tax in respect of a subject. The
1963
Gopol_...,
w.
StMe ·ti
Uttin' ft
I
I
anti Anr.
Subba RMI, f.
1963 .
Gopal Narain
v.
State of
Uttar Pradesh
aftd Anr.
Subba Rao, l·
1963
September, 4
884
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[l%4]
Municipal Board had certainly power to impose the scavenging tax. The mention of cl. (xii) in the notification
appears to be a mistake for cl. (xi) and that does
not
effect the power of the Municipal Board to impose the
tax. There are no merits in this contention either.
In the result, the petition is dismissed with costs.
Petition dismissed.
SMT. KAUSHALYA DEVI
ti,
SHRI MOOL RAJ AND OTHERS
(P. B.
GAJENDRAGADKAR, K.
SuBBA RAo, K. N. WANCHoo,
N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND ). R. MunHOLKAR, Jj.)
Practice-Application by accused for transfer-.-'! ffidavit by
trying 1'fagistrate opposing application-Propriety.
Criminal proceedings \Vere started against the petitioner and
three others on an complaint made by the first respondent alleging
that the four accused persons had committed offences under s. 420
read with s. 120B of the lodian Penal Code. Originally the Magistrate had dispensed with the personal appearance of the petitioner
in court, but on application made by the complainant, the Magistrate
n1ade an order directing the petitioner to be present in court in
order to give an opportunity to the co1nplainant's witness to identify her. Apprehending that this order would lead to her, prejudice,
she made an application in the Supreme Court for transfer of the
case to some other couft, on the grounds, inter alia, that the facts
alleged by the complainant nlight perhaps constitute a civil dispute
but the said facts had been deliberately twisted and a criminal
complaint had been made to harass the petitioner. After the petitition was ad1nitted and interim stay granted to the petitioner pending the hearing and final disposal of the main petition, an
affidavit \Vas- filed on behalf of the Delhi Administration, by the
Magistrate hi1n!:elf, opposipg the application and stating, inter alia,
that the clause inde1nnifying the purchaser contained in the sale
deed on which the petitioner relied on \Vould not absolve the petitioner from criminal liability. Thus it was clear that the deponent Magistrate had adopted the argument which might probably
be urged by the complainant at the trial.
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