# Gorn Proaucts Refi11ing Oo v. Bhangrila Fooii ProiiucllJ

- **Citation:** [1963] 2 S.C.R. 484
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1963
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/gorn-proaucts-refi11ing-oo-v-bhangrila-fooii-proiiucllj-2508
- **Pages:** 15

## Headnote

1962
April 27,
/
- ~ >---;--
484
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963)-
AMRITDHARA · PHARMACY
\
!),
SATYADEO GUPTA
-(S. K. DAS, Jl.1~ HmAYATULLAH and J.C. SHAH, JJ.)
Trade Marlc--Likel!f to
Recefre or
Approach to determint-Acquiescence-E!fect
· Act, 1940 (V. of 1940), ss.8, 10.
cause conjusionoj-Trat!e Marks
The respondent applied for registration of the trade
name ''Lakshmandhara'' in relation to the medicinal preparation manufactured by him at Kanpur since 1923. It was.
admitted that the respondent's product was mainly sold in the
,State of Uttar Pradesh .. The appellant opposed the regis-
. tration on the ground that it had. an exclusive proprietary
iriterest in the trade mark "Amritdhara ,,_in relation to a similar
medicinal. preparation which had acquired considerable reputation since 1903 and that the respondent's trade· name
"Lakshmandhara "- was likely to deceive and cause confusion
and therefore the registration was prohibited by s; 8 ·of the
Trade Marks Act.
·
The Registrar of Trade Marks held that there was suffi-
. cient similarity between
"Amritdhara' .and "L~shaman·
dhara" so as to cause cOnfusion and it was likely to deceiv~the
public; but the acquiescence of the appellant in the use of the
trade name "Lakshmandhara" by the respondent in the rela-
- tion to his product for a long period to the knowledge of the
appellant was special circumstance under s. 10(2) entitling the
respondent to have his name registered along with the appellant's trade name~ He, however, confined the registration to
sales with the State of Uttar Pradesh.
·
Both the appellant and the respondent . appealed to the
High Court which allowed the respondent's appeal holding that
the words ''Amrit" and "dhara'' were common words in the
Hindi language as also the wordS ''Lakshman" and "dhara"
· and that there was no possibility of any Indian confusing the
two ideas. The High Court further held there had been
honest concmrent user by the respondent. o.n the question
of acquiescence it held against the .respondent .. On appeal by
special leave.
Held, that the question whether a trade name is likely todeceive or cause confusioi;i by its resemblance to another af ..
ready registered is a matter of first iII?pres~ion and one for ,
decision in each case and has to be decided by taking an over-
. all view of all the circumstances. The standard of comparison
to be adopted in judgivg the resemblance is from the point of
.. ,r-'.
....
' ,
-·
2 s.o.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
485
\
view of a man of average Intelligence and imperfect recollection.
Pianoti8t Oo.'s Application, (1906) 23 R. P. C. 774,
referred to.
"
·
Gorn Proaucts Refi11ing Oo., v. Bhangrila Fooii ProiiucllJ
.Lta., (1960] 1 S .. c. R. 968, referred to.
·
Bela, further, that the two names as a whole should be
considered for comparison and not merely the component
'ci,
words thereof separately.
William Bailey (Birmingham) Ltd.'s application, '(1935)
52 R. P. C. 137, referred to.
Bei4, •also, that in the present case the similarity in the
two name in respect of the same description of goods was
·likely to deceive or cause confusion; but the fact. found by the
Registrar established the plea of acquiescence so a to bring the
case within sub-s.(2) of s. IO, and the Registrar was right in
imposing the limitation which he imposed.
Crvn. APPELLATE JUBISDioTION: Civil Appeal
No. 22 of 1960.
Appeal by .special leave from the judgment
and order dated March 19, 1958, of the Allahabad
High Court in F. A. No. 62 of 1954.
· S. N. .Andley, Rameskwar Nath and P. L.
Vohra, ·for the appellant.
·
G. 8. Pathak, 8. K. Kapur, B. N. Kirpal
a.nd Ganpat Rai, for the respondent.
_,
1962. April 27. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
·
S. K. D.A.s, J.-This is
an appeal by
special
leave
granted
by · this
Court
on
December 8, 1958.
On July 19, 1950, Satya Deo
Gupta, respondent before us; made an applioation
under s. 14 of the Trade Marks Act, 1940 (Act V of
1 1940) (h~reinafter referred to as the Act) for registration of the tr

## Text

1962
April 27,
/
- ~ >---;--
484
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963)-
AMRITDHARA · PHARMACY
\
!),
SATYADEO GUPTA
-(S. K. DAS, Jl.1~ HmAYATULLAH and J.C. SHAH, JJ.)
Trade Marlc--Likel!f to
Recefre or
Approach to determint-Acquiescence-E!fect
· Act, 1940 (V. of 1940), ss.8, 10.
cause conjusionoj-Trat!e Marks
The respondent applied for registration of the trade
name ''Lakshmandhara'' in relation to the medicinal preparation manufactured by him at Kanpur since 1923. It was.
admitted that the respondent's product was mainly sold in the
,State of Uttar Pradesh .. The appellant opposed the regis-
. tration on the ground that it had. an exclusive proprietary
iriterest in the trade mark "Amritdhara ,,_in relation to a similar
medicinal. preparation which had acquired considerable reputation since 1903 and that the respondent's trade· name
"Lakshmandhara "- was likely to deceive and cause confusion
and therefore the registration was prohibited by s; 8 ·of the
Trade Marks Act.
·
The Registrar of Trade Marks held that there was suffi-
. cient similarity between
"Amritdhara' .and "L~shaman·
dhara" so as to cause cOnfusion and it was likely to deceiv~the
public; but the acquiescence of the appellant in the use of the
trade name "Lakshmandhara" by the respondent in the rela-
- tion to his product for a long period to the knowledge of the
appellant was special circumstance under s. 10(2) entitling the
respondent to have his name registered along with the appellant's trade name~ He, however, confined the registration to
sales with the State of Uttar Pradesh.
·
Both the appellant and the respondent . appealed to the
High Court which allowed the respondent's appeal holding that
the words ''Amrit" and "dhara'' were common words in the
Hindi language as also the wordS ''Lakshman" and "dhara"
· and that there was no possibility of any Indian confusing the
two ideas. The High Court further held there had been
honest concmrent user by the respondent. o.n the question
of acquiescence it held against the .respondent .. On appeal by
special leave.
Held, that the question whether a trade name is likely todeceive or cause confusioi;i by its resemblance to another af ..
ready registered is a matter of first iII?pres~ion and one for ,
decision in each case and has to be decided by taking an over-
. all view of all the circumstances. The standard of comparison
to be adopted in judgivg the resemblance is from the point of
.. ,r-'.
....
' ,
-·
2 s.o.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
485
\
view of a man of average Intelligence and imperfect recollection.
Pianoti8t Oo.'s Application, (1906) 23 R. P. C. 774,
referred to.
"
·
Gorn Proaucts Refi11ing Oo., v. Bhangrila Fooii ProiiucllJ
.Lta., (1960] 1 S .. c. R. 968, referred to.
·
Bela, further, that the two names as a whole should be
considered for comparison and not merely the component
'ci,
words thereof separately.
William Bailey (Birmingham) Ltd.'s application, '(1935)
52 R. P. C. 137, referred to.
Bei4, •also, that in the present case the similarity in the
two name in respect of the same description of goods was
·likely to deceive or cause confusion; but the fact. found by the
Registrar established the plea of acquiescence so a to bring the
case within sub-s.(2) of s. IO, and the Registrar was right in
imposing the limitation which he imposed.
Crvn. APPELLATE JUBISDioTION: Civil Appeal
No. 22 of 1960.
Appeal by .special leave from the judgment
and order dated March 19, 1958, of the Allahabad
High Court in F. A. No. 62 of 1954.
· S. N. .Andley, Rameskwar Nath and P. L.
Vohra, ·for the appellant.
·
G. 8. Pathak, 8. K. Kapur, B. N. Kirpal
a.nd Ganpat Rai, for the respondent.
_,
1962. April 27. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
·
S. K. D.A.s, J.-This is
an appeal by
special
leave
granted
by · this
Court
on
December 8, 1958.
On July 19, 1950, Satya Deo
Gupta, respondent before us; made an applioation
under s. 14 of the Trade Marks Act, 1940 (Act V of
1 1940) (h~reinafter referred to as the Act) for registration of the trade name of a biochemioal medicinal preparation, commonly known as 'Lakshmandhara', iri Class 5 of the Fourth Sohedule to the Trade
1961
--·
~
Phart1J<U7
••
Sai,ad10 Gupla
AmritdMra
Pha,..."'11
..
.>a~'° Gllf'l•
DasJ.
486
SUPn.EME OOURT REPORTS [1963)
Marks Rules, 1942. The applioation wae made by
the respondent as the sole proprietor of Rup Bilu
Company situate at Dhankutti in Kanpur. The
averments ma.de in the application were that the
&&id medicinal preparation had been in use by the
name of 'Lakshma.ndhara' since 1923 and was sold
throughout the length and breadth of India ae also
in some
foreign
markets; the mark or name
'Lakshmandha.ra' wae said to be distinctive to the
article, and it was stated that the approximate
B11Dual turnover was Rs. 40,000/-. Notice of the
application was given by the Registrar of Trade
Marks, Bombay, and the Amritdbara Pharmacy, a
limited liability company and appellant before us,
filed an application in opposition. In this application the appellant stated that the word 'Amritdhara' was already registered as a trade name for
the medicinal preparation · of the appellant, and
that medicinal preparation was introduced in the
market so far back &11 in the year 1901; on aocount
of its great popularity many people advertised
similar medicines with alight variations of name
to pass off their goodB ae 'Amritdbara'. It was
averred that the composite word 'Lakshmandhara'
was used to denote the same medicine as 'Amritr
dhara'; and the single word "dhara', it was stated,
was first used in conjunction with •Amritdhara' to
denote tho medicine of the appellant and the
medicine 'Lakshmandhara' being of the 88.llle nature
and to quality could be easily (>M8ed off' as 'Anirit-
,
dhara' to. the ultimate purchaser. The appellant
oontended that as • Amritdhara' was already regilr
tered and 'Lakahmandhara' being a aimilar name
was likely to reoeive the public, registration .ahould
be reflll6d.
On behalf of the respondent a counter-affidavit
was ma.de in which it was stated that 'Amritdhara' '
·
and •l.alrahmandhara' were two diatmot.ly different
DAmeB ud no one eould pue off one for the other.
l
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
487
It was further stated that during.the long period of
°"
introduction and sale of 'Lakshmandhara' since
1923, no objection was ·ever raised from any
quarter, from the appellant or anybody else, to the
use of the name •Lakshmaudha.ra'. It was denied
by the respondent that the
composite word
'La.kshmandhara' was likely to deceive the public
or could by any stretch of imagination be taken or
mistaken for 'Amritdhara'. The respondent further
.J..
al1
1
ege~ t~fiat the. sing
1
le :wordt 'dhthara' had~ ~o particu a.r s1gm cance m re at10n o · e me 1cmc, nor
.did that word mean or convey any special or exclusive meaning or effect in relation to the medicine.
It. was also stated that apart from the difference in
name, the phial, label and packing of 'La.kshmandhara.' had exclusive designs of their own and were
not likely to be confused with any other medicine
of similar nature, least of all with 'Arnritdhara'
whose packing was distinctly r!ifforcnt in colour,
design and layout.
·
"
The Registrar of Trade Marks deaU with the
>-
application, and th£1 opposition thereto by his order
dated September I 0, l!l53. It appears that apart
from the affidavits filed, no ether evidence was led
on behalf of either party; but certified copies of
certain decisions in earlier cases (to which the
respondent was not, however, a party) given in
favour of the appellant in support. of its claim
of infringement of its rPgistered trade mark • Amrit-
~ dhara' were fikd. A list 'of surh cases has been
printed as annexure 'A': These cases showed that
a number of medicines with the word •Amrit' or
'dhara' as part of their names had bet'n introduced
in the market since l!l47; and the appellant
successfully took action against them for infringement of its trade mark.
~ven in the Trado Marks
_ '1. Registry the appellant successfully opposed the
introduction of names which contained the word
•dbara' as pa.rt of the trade name. A question bu.
1961
Amrild/1ara
Pliarm«e.;1
v.
Saf,Jtdto Gupta
D41J,
11161
Amrilrih11 •
P,,.f"mOC)
v.
Se&,..,.. Gu71'1
Dis .T.
488
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1963]
been rallied before us whether the Registrar of
.,
Trade Marks was justified in ta.king into considtJre.·
tion tl1e decisions in those cases.
To that question
we
aha.II
advert later. Tbe
Registrar
found
that in
1901
Pandit Thakur Datta Sharma
commenced to do
business at Lahore in a
particular
a.yurvedio
medicine
which
was
meant for a.lloviation for of hea.daches, diarrohea,
constipatfon and other complaints. This medicine
was first sold undor the
mark 'Amrit Ki Dhara',
~
but in 1903 the name was changetl to •Amritdhara.',
Pandit Thakur Datta Sharma formed a. limited lia·
bility company in 1942 and the name •Amritdhara.'
became a well-known popular namo for the medicine.
The sale of the medicine went up to about
Re. 4 lacs a year. The busine88 waR done in La.bore
but when partition came in 1947, the appellant established its business in Debra.dun. Tho Registrar
exprcBBed tho view the.t if the matt.er had rested on
a. 8 ands. lO(l) ()f the Act, he wo·~ld have no hesi·
tation in allowing the opposition antl dismissing the
application. This could only moan that the Regist·
,
ra.r was of the view that the name •Lakshmandhara'
ao nearly resombled the trade mark 'Amritdhara'
tha.t it .wa.s likely to deceive the public or ca.use con·
fusion to the trade. Wc are saying this because the
High Court through that the Rogistrar did not ex·
presij his own opinion whether the nam1i 'Lakshman·
dha.ra' was likely to ca.use deception to the public
or confusion to the trade.
The rcsp(Jnd<'nt, how·
ever, relied also on two other circumstances, viz. •
(a) honest concurrent Uder o[ the name •Lakshme.n·
dhe.ra.' since 1923, and (b) e.cquit•scenco on the part
of the a.ppella.nt in the user of the name 'La.kshman·
dha.ra.'.
The respondent contend~d that these two
circumstances brought the ca8c with in the meaning
of 'SpC'cial circumstances' in H.' 10(2) of the Act,
which permitted the registra.tion by more than one "
·~
proprietot- of trade !Qarke which 're identiC!Fol or
2 s.c.R.
SUPREME OOURT REl?OR.Ts
489
nearly resemble each other, subject to such oondi·
tion and limitations, if any, as the Registrar might
'I think fit to impose.
On the point of honest concurrent user the Regi~trar found in favour of the
appellant.
As to acquiescence he, however, ·found in
favour of the respondent and expressed his finding
in these words.
•
"In the case before me it is not disputed
that t.he applicant commenced his user in a
small way in 1923 and it may even be said
that up to about 1942 the applicant's u11er was
insignificant. In paragraph 12 of the applicant's affidavit dated the 30th March, 1953 he
has given details of advertisements in directories, pamphlets, newspapers etc. in which both
the applicant's and the opponents' marks were
advertised. The facts given in the affidavit
go to show that from 1938 right up to the date
of the applications by the applicant he has
been advertising through mediums which were
common to both the applicant and tbe opponents. Here we have a case in which Pandit
Thakur Datta Sharma states that. he had no
notice of the applicant's mark. He has, how- ·
ever, admitted that he had about 12 persona
in his factory which constituted the clerical
staff and amongst them were persons who
were in charge of advertising the opponents'
mark. It seems to me that the opponents and
their agents were well aware of the advertisem!"Jts by the applicant and did not raise any
protest till the applicant's mark was adverti&
ed in the Trade Mark Journal. In other
words the opponents stood by and. allowed
the applicant to develop his business and, as I
have shown, from small heginning be began to ·
sell these medicines to the extent of about
Rs. 43,000/- in 1949. In my opinion, th.is is
1911
-. -
"""''""-
Plu~r111ecy
y,
Sti.lyatleo Gupta
,,., J,
--
Amtikih~a
Plurmac.1
••
8 ":l'.Jro Cupid
V"J J,
490
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1963]
acquiescence which would come under the
phrase 'or other special circumstances' in
section 10(2) of the Trade Marks Act, and that
appears to me to Ix> fatal to the case of the
opponents."
Btfore the RegiHtrar it was admitted on behalf of
the respondent that hiR goodR were sold mainly in
Uttar Pradrsh and there were, at the most, only
sporadic sales in ot.hcr States. Taking that circumstance into consiclera.tion the R.ogistrar p1111sed an
order allowing regi~tra.tion of 'Lakshmandhara' for
sale in the State of l!ttar Prade~h only.
From the decision uf t.h" Registrar two appeals were referred to the High Court of Judicature
at Allahabad under s. i6 of the Act: one appeal
wBB referred by the respondent and the other by the
appellant. The respondent complained of the registration being limited to Uttar Pradesh only and
the appellant pleaded that rcgis' ration should have
been refused altogether. The learned Judges of the
High Court held that the wordd 'Amrit' and 'dhara'
were common words in the Hindi langua.go and the
combined word •Amrit<lhua' meant 'current of
nectar' or 'the flow of nectar'; the two words
'La.kshman' and «Ibara' were also well-known common words and combined togct.her they meant
'ourrent or flow of La.k1hman'.
The lea.med
Judges then ea.id:
''There is no possibility of any Indian
con(using the two ideas.
Even phonetica.I
differences a re wide enough not to confuse
anybody. 'l'he cll\im
of the Amritdhara
pharmacy that both the wordR • Amrit and
dhara' have become so
associated
with
their goods that the Ude of ea.ch
part
separately or in any combination is likely
to
mislead
is an untenable claim.
The
whole
phrase
'Amritdhara'
ha.d
been
registered and the monopoly ha8
to be
••
~·· ...
2 s.C.:R.
SUPREMI!: COURT REPORTS
491
confined only to the use of the whole word.
The words of common language lil,!;e 'Amrit'
and 'dhara' cannot be made the monopoly of
any individual. We, therefore, see no reason
to disallow registration of the trade mark
"Lakshmandhara'. "
As to honest concurrent user from 1923 to 1942 the
learned Judges again held in favour of the respon·
dent. But on the point acquiescence they held
against .the respondent and found in favour of the
appellant. They said that from.the fact that b.oth
the medicines were being advertised in the same
journals .or periodicals it ·did not follow that the
attention of the appellant was drawn to the use of
the word 'Lakshmandhara' by the respondent, In
view, however, of their finding that the two names
were not likely to cause any confusion and that the
respondent had been an honest concurrent user
from 1923 onwards, they held that there was no
justification fot; refusing registration to the trade
mark 'Lakshmandhara' for the whole of India.
They accordingly allowed the appeal of the resp.on·
dent and dismissed that of the appellant by their
judgment dated March 19, 1958. The appellant
then obtained special lea;ve from this Court and the
present appeal has been filed in pursuance of the
leave granted by this court.
Two points have been agitated before us. The
first point is whether the name 'Lakshmandhara'
was likely to deceive the public or cause confusion
to trade within the m~aning of s. 8 and s. 10 ( 1) of
the Act. The second point is whether there was
such acquiescence on behalf of the appellant in the
use of the name 'Lakshmandhara' in the State of
Uttar Pradesh as to bring it within 'the· expression
'special circumstances' mentioned in sub.a. IO of
the Act.
We shall deal with these two points in
the order in which we have stated them.
·
1968
.4.mritd~
Pharma&.1
v.
SalJ>o<ko Gupla
--
DasJ.
IllU
Armltt//i.,e
Pharnwt.:i·
••
S<dyadeo <JufJt11
DtuJ.
492
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963]
We mav first read the relevant Rections of the
Act, viz. s. s· and IO,
8. Prohibition of registration of certain maUer.-
No trade mark nor part of a trade mark shall
be registered which consists of, or contains, any
scandalous design, or any matter the use of whioh
would.-
(a)
(b)
by reason of its being likely t0 deceive
or to cause confusion or otherwise, be
dieentitled to protection in a Court of
justice ; or
be likely to hurt the religious susceptibilities of any class of the citizen uf India ;
or
(c) be contrary to any law for the time being
in force, or to morality.
10. Prohibition of registration of identical or
similar trade mark.-(1) &Te ae provided in sub-section (2), no trade mark shall be registered in res-
~t of any goods or description of goods which ie
mdeutical with a trade mark belonging to a different proprietor and already ,on the ragistn in respect
of the eame goods or description of goods or which
so nearly resembles such trade mark as to be likely
to deceive or cause confusion.
(2) In case of honest concurrent use or
of other special circumstances which, in the
opinion of the Registrar, make it proper eo to
do he may permit the registration by more
than one proprietor of trade marks which are
identical or nearly resemble ea.eh other in re&-
peot of the ea.me goods or dC110ription of goods,
1Ubjeet to such conditions and limitations, if
any, ae the Registrar may think fit to impoee.
(3)
l[
l[
l[
I
•
---(,
~=.
·-,,:
2 s.o.R. SUPREME OOURT REPOR'rS
493
It will be noticed that the words used in the
sections and relevant for our purpose are "likely to
deceive or ca.use confusion.'' The Act does not lay
down any criteria. for determining what is likely to
deceive or ca.use confusion. Therefore, every oa.se
must depend on its own particular fa.eta, and the
value of authorities lies not so much in the actual
decision a.s in the tests applied for determining
what is likely to deceive or cause confusion. On an
application to register, the Registrar or an oppo·
nent may object that the· trade mark is not registera.ble by reason of cl. (a.) of s. 8, or sub-a. {I) of s. IO,
as in this case. In such a case the onus is on the
applicant to satisfy the Registrar that the trade
mark applie::l for is not likely to deceive or cause
•Jonfusion. In cases in which the tribunal considers
that there is doubt as to whether deception is likely,
the application should be refused.
A trade mark
fs likely to deceive or cause confusion by the resemblance to anot,her already on the Reeister if it is
likely to do so in the course of its legitimate use in
a. market where the two marks are assumed to be
in use by traders in that market. In considering
the matter, all the oircumstanclll! of the case must
be considered. As was observed by Parker, J. in
Pianotist
Oo. 'B
Application
(1),
which
was
also a. case of the comparison of two words-
"You must take the two words. You must
Judge them, both by their look and by their
.. sound. You must consider the goods to which
they are to be applied. You must consider the
nature and kind of customer who would be
likely to buy those goods. In fa.ct you must
consider. a.II the surrounding oircumstancea
and you must further consider what is likely
to happ•:m if each of those trade marks is need
. in a normal way as a trade mark for the
goods of the respective owners. of the ...arb.
(I) (1906) 2S a. P. c. ?7•· m.
1961
Amrildhara
Piia"'""
••
Sa,,.U. Gut>I•
--
DtuJ.
1951
AntritdluJr•
Pltartn«7
v.
S.t:1atho Gitf>ta
494 SUPREME COURT REPORTs [llH!3]
For deoeptive resemblance two important questions
are: ( 1) who are the persons whom the resemblanoe
must be likely to deceive or confuse, and (2) what
rules of comparison are to be adopted in judging
whether such resemblance exists.
As to confusion,
it is perhaps an appropriate description of the state
of mind of a customer who, on seeing a mark
thinks that it differs from the mark on goods whioh
he has previously bought, but is doubtful whether
that impreBllion is not due to imperfect recollt,ction.
(See Kerly on 'frade Marks, 8th edition, p. 400.)
Let us apply theee tests to the facts of the
case under our consideration. It iR not disputed
beforo us that the two names 'Amritdha.ra.' and
•L:i.kshmandhara.' a.re in uee in respect of the ea.me
description of goods, namely, a medicinal preparation for the alleviation of various ailments. Suoh
medicinal preparation will be purchased mostly b~
people wh~ instead of going to a doctor wish to
purchase a medicine for the quick alleviation of
their suffering,
both villagers and townsfolk,
literate as well as illiterate. As we said in Corn
Products ReJining Co. v. Shangril,a Food Products
Ltd. (1), the question bas to be approached from
the point of view of a man of average intelligence
and imperfoot recollection. To such a man the
overall structural and phonetic gimilarity of the
two names • Amritdhara' and •Lakshmandhara' is, in
our opinion, likely to deceive or cause confusion.
We must consider the overall similarity of the two
composite words 'Amritdhara' and 'Laksbman.
dhara'. We do not think that the learned Judges
of the High Court were right in saying that no
Indian would mistake one
fo~ the other.
Ao
unwary purchaser of average intelligence and imperfect recollection would not, as the High Court
supposed, split the name into its component parts
and OOll8ider the et.ymological JQeaning thel'llo( ot
( l).lUliO] I &C.R. 9(8.
, I
-.
..
'
\
·-,.;(_
----
2 S.C.R.
_SUPREME COURT REPORTS
495
even consider the mep.nings of the _composite words
.as ~current .of nectar' or-'current of Lakshman'.
He. would g~ more by_ the overall structural · and
phonetic similarity and_ the na.ture-of the medicine
be ha.a previously
purcha.s~d . or ha.'S been told
.about, or about whioh ha.s
othc•r .d8~ learnt, and.
which he wanti. to purcha.sei.
Whe.re ·the trade
·relates to gt>0cls lar~ely sold to. illiterate or badly
-educA.ted persons, it is np answer to S\l.Y that a.
person educated in the Hindi language would go
by 'the entymological or ideological meaning and,
-see ' the difference between 'current of nectar'
and 'current of Lak~hma.n'. 'Current of Lakshma.n
in a literal sense has no meaning to ~ive it mea.n·
ing one must further make the inference that the
•current or stream' is as . pure and strona as
La.kshman of the .Ramayana. An ordinary Indian
villa(?er or townsmen will perhaps· know haksb·
man, the story of the R'l.maya.na being familiar to
him, but we rloubt if he would etymologine to the
-extent of seeiAg the so called ideoJogioal difference
between 'Amritdha.ra' and •La.kshma.odhara'. He
would go more by the similarity of the two names
in the context of the widely known ·medicinal
preparation which he wants for his ailm~nts.
·
We agree that the use of th~ word 'dhara'
-which literally means 'c·1rrent or stream' is not by
itself· decisive of the .matter. What we have to
.consider here· is the overall similarity of the comp0 •
-site ~ords, having regard to the ciroumstanoe that
the goods bearing the two nan:ies_ ate. medioinar
preparations of the same descr1pt1on:
We ar
.aware that the admission of a mark is not to J
refused, -because unu~ually stup~d. people, "f?o1s h....
idiots", may be deceived. A cr1t1cal oomparISon ~("
the two names may disclose some points of differen•
-ce; but an unwary pnrcbas.,r of average iotelligenoo
and imperfect recollection wou~d be deceived by the
.overall similarity of the two names having regard
1962
.dniritdhaM
Phatmae.,
' v.
'
'(' abculeo 011Jfa
Dasi.
An.,iJJ•ara
/>h""""<J
••
Sar,adu Gvpta
D 1J.
496 SUPREME COURT RltPORTS [11163]
to the natur1> of the medicine he is looking for with
a ROmewhat vague recollection that he had purrhaeed a similar medicine on a previous occasion with
a similar name. The trade mark is the whole
thing-the whole word has to be conaidered. Jn
the case of the application to register 'Ereotiks'
(opposed by the proprietol'8 of the trade mark.
•Erector') Far\\ ell, J. said in William Bailey (Birmingham) Ltd.'s Application (1) :
"I do not think it is right to take a part
of the word and compare it with a part oi theother word; one word must be considered
as a whole and compared with the other word
as a whole, ......••.••.... 1 think it is a dangerous method to adopt to divide the word up
and seek to distinguish a portion of it from a
portion of the other word".
Nor do we think that the High Court was
right in thinking that the appellant was claiminll a
monopoly in the common Hindi word 'dhara'. We
do not think that
is quite the position here.
What the appellant is claiming is its right under
s. 21 of the Act, the exclusive right to the use of
its trade mark, and to oppose the registration of a
trade mark which ao nearly resembles its trade
mark that it is likely to deceive or cause
confusion.
A large number of decision& relating to thfl
nee of composite words, such as Night Cap and Red
Cap, Limit and Summit, Rito and Lito, Notrate
and Filtrate, etc. were cited in the High Court.
Some more have been cited before us. Such decisions, examples of deceptive resemblance arising
oui of contrasted words, have been summarised at
pag& 429 to 434 in Karly on Trade Marks, 8th Edition. No useful purpose will be served by referring
to them all. As we have said earlier, each caae
must be decided or its o-WU fact. What degree of
(I) (1935) 52 R.P.C. 137.
•
•
2 $.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
497
resemblance iii necesl!&ry to dll<ieive or cause oonfu·
sion must the nature of things be incapable of
definition a priori.
As to the decisions in annexure 'A', it has been
argued before us that they were not at all admissible by reason of ss. 40 to 43 of the Indian Evidence
Act, 1872. On behalf of the appE'llant it has been
contended that· they were admissible under s. 13 of
the Evidenoi> Act
as showing the particular
instances in which the appellant claimed its ri1tht
under 8. 21 of the Act. We consider it unneoeBSary
to decide this question for the purposes of this case
because those decisions even if they are admiBBible
under s. ~3 do not throw any light on the question
whether· •Amritdhara' a.nd 'Lakshmandhara' so
nearly resemble each oth~r as to cause deception
or confusion. That is a question which we must
determine
as a case of first impression and
irrespective of the earlier decisions.
On a consideration of all the circumstances,
we have come to the conclusion that the overall
similarity between the two names in respect of the
same description of goods was likely to cause
deception
or confusion within the meaning of
e. 10(1) of the Act and Registrar was right in the
view be expressed. The High Court was in . error
taking a contrary view.
We now go the second question, that of
acquiescence. Here again we are in Bgreem11nt
with thti Registrar of Trade 'Marks, who in a
paragraph of hie order quoted earlier iri this judgment has summarised the facts and circu111stances
on which the plea ofacquiescen~e was based. The
matter bas been put thus in Halabury's Lawe of
England, Vol. 32 (second edition) pages 659-657,
paragraph 966.
·
" H a trader allows another person who
is acting in good faith to build up a reputa·
i'6i
.d""'-
PAo....Qo
..
S•IJ•ln a.."'
--.-.
DalJ.
1962
A11.ri·d~ata
P.\orm .. cy
v.
Sci/,Jotko G"'p:a
f'.QJ J.
498
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (1963)
tion under a trade name or mark to which
he has rights, he may lose his right to comp·
lain, and may even be debarred from him·
,..
self using su<'h name or work. But even long
user
by another, if fratidulant, does not
affect the plaintiff's right to a. final injunction;
on the other hand prompt warning or action
before the defendant has built up any goodwill may materially assist the plaintiff's case".
We do not think that there was any fraudulent user
by the respnndent of his trade name •La.kshman·
dha.ra'. The name was first used in 1923 in a. small
way in Utta.r Pradesh. Later it was more exten·
sively
used
and in
the same journals the
two trade murks were public-ised.
Tht- finding
..
of the Registrar
is that the
appellant and
it1< a!!ent were well aware of the advertisemt>nta
(of the respondent, and tho appellant stood by and
allowed the respondent to develop his busine88 till
it grew from a ~ma.II beF,inning in 1923 to an annual
turnover of RI!. 43,000/· in 1946. 'T'hese circumHtances establish the plea of acquiescence and bring
the ca.s" within sub-a. (2) of s. 10, and in yiew of
the a.dmi•Bion made on bebalf of the respondent
that his goods were sold ma.inly in Utta.r Pradesh,
the Registrar WM right in imposing the limitation
which he imposed.
For these reasons, we would allow the appeal,
set aside the
Judgment and order of the High
Court, and restore those of the Rt-gistra.r of Trade
Marks, Bombay, dated Septemoor 10. 1953. In the
<'ircumstances of this case, there will be no order
for costs.
Appeal allowed.
..
•
•