# Goverdhan & Anr v. State of Chhattisgarh

- **Citation:** 2025 INSC 47
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2025-01-09
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 116 of 2011
- **Bench:** B.R. Gavai, K.V. Viswanathan, Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/goverdhan-anr-v-state-of-chhattisgarh-38183
- **Pages:** 61

## Headnote

The two accused-appellants and their father-the third accused, were
convicted by the trial court u/s.302 r/w s.34 IPC for assaulting a
person with deadly weapons causing his death. High Court upheld
the conviction of the appellants while setting aside the conviction of
their father. The complainant (PW-6) who filed the FIR was initially
projected as the eye witness but later turned hostile during the trial
and it was only PW-10 (mother of the deceased) who claimed to
be the eye witness. The conviction of appellants was challenged
in the instant appeal as being illegal causing grave miscarriage
of justice to them.
Headnotes†
Penal Code, 1860 - s.304, Part I - Armed assault leading to
death - Testimony of deceased's mother (a rustic illiterate
woman) trustworthy and reliable - Corroboration from other
evidence - Prosecution case proved beyond reasonable
doubt - However, motive not clearly established, though
appellants fully knew that the bodily injuries caused by them
were likely to cause death - Conviction accordingly converted
from s.302 (by Courts below) to Part I of s.304:
Held: 1. Merely because statement of PW-10, mother of the
deceased, under Section 161 CrPC was recorded belatedly i.e. after
five days which have been duly considered by the High Court and
there are some inconsistencies and embellishments in her testimony
before the trial court, one is not persuaded to take the view that
PW-10 cannot be an eye-witness and her testimony not credible -
No material contradiction between the statement made by her
before the court and the previous statement recorded under Section
161 CrPC could be shown by the defence under Section 162(1)
* Author
658
[2025] 1 S.C.R.
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and Explanation thereto as to render her testimony doubtful - A
careful perusal of the testimony of PW-10 shows that her narration
of the incident was natural, and trustworthy - PW-10, the mother
of the deceased, though was related to the victim, cannot by any
stretch of imagination be said to be an interested witness - As also
observed by the High Court, there is no reason why the mother
of the victim should falsely implicate the appellants without any
rhyme or reason more so when apparently there was no previous
animosity of PW-10 with any of the appellants - The trial court
after recording the testimony of the PW-10 and on consideration of
the same found her evidence trustworthy and credible - There is
no reason to question the assessment about the credibility of the
witness by the Trial Court which had the advantage of seeing and
hearing above the witness and all other witnesses - Even if there
are certain embellishments and improvements and contradictions
which are of minor nature, the evidence of PW-10 on the whole
does appear to be consistent and there is no cogent reason to
disbelieve her claim that she had witnessed the incident - Thus,
there appears to be no patent illegality in the view taken by the
trial court and the High Court. [Paras 79, 80, 81, 83, 84]
2.1. The evidence which has emerged is that the father PW-5
came to the scene after the assailants appellants had fled - As
far as the mother PW-10 is concerned, on seeing the assault she
ran inside to wake up her husband and when they came out, the
assailants had fled - It cannot be considered to be highly unnatural
for a woman not rushing to intervene and instead seek the help
of a male member (her husband) when there were two persons
with deadly weapons assaulting her. [Para 86]
2.2. The evidence of PW-10, the sole eye witness, a hapless
rustic illiterate woman visited with the vicissitude and tragedy of
her son being fatally assaulted by co-villagers before her own
eyes, has withstood intensive cross examination and judicial
scrutiny - She has answered the questions put to her during her
cross examination with spontaneity without any jitteriness and her
response was natural and not elusive and prevaricating, which all
are signs of truthfulness of the witness - Therefore, h

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[2025] 1 S.C.R. 657 : 2025 INSC 47
Goverdhan & Anr.
v.
State of Chhattisgarh
(Criminal Appeal No. 116 of 2011)
09 January 2025
[B.R. Gavai, K.V. Viswanathan and
Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh,* JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
The two accused-appellants and their father-the third accused, were
convicted by the trial court u/s.302 r/w s.34 IPC for assaulting a
person with deadly weapons causing his death. High Court upheld
the conviction of the appellants while setting aside the conviction of
their father. The complainant (PW-6) who filed the FIR was initially
projected as the eye witness but later turned hostile during the trial
and it was only PW-10 (mother of the deceased) who claimed to
be the eye witness. The conviction of appellants was challenged
in the instant appeal as being illegal causing grave miscarriage
of justice to them.
Headnotes†
Penal Code, 1860 - s.304, Part I - Armed assault leading to
death - Testimony of deceased's mother (a rustic illiterate
woman) trustworthy and reliable - Corroboration from other
evidence - Prosecution case proved beyond reasonable
doubt - However, motive not clearly established, though
appellants fully knew that the bodily injuries caused by them
were likely to cause death - Conviction accordingly converted
from s.302 (by Courts below) to Part I of s.304:
Held: 1. Merely because statement of PW-10, mother of the
deceased, under Section 161 CrPC was recorded belatedly i.e. after
five days which have been duly considered by the High Court and
there are some inconsistencies and embellishments in her testimony
before the trial court, one is not persuaded to take the view that
PW-10 cannot be an eye-witness and her testimony not credible -
No material contradiction between the statement made by her
before the court and the previous statement recorded under Section
161 CrPC could be shown by the defence under Section 162(1)
* Author
658
[2025] 1 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
and Explanation thereto as to render her testimony doubtful - A
careful perusal of the testimony of PW-10 shows that her narration
of the incident was natural, and trustworthy - PW-10, the mother
of the deceased, though was related to the victim, cannot by any
stretch of imagination be said to be an interested witness - As also
observed by the High Court, there is no reason why the mother
of the victim should falsely implicate the appellants without any
rhyme or reason more so when apparently there was no previous
animosity of PW-10 with any of the appellants - The trial court
after recording the testimony of the PW-10 and on consideration of
the same found her evidence trustworthy and credible - There is
no reason to question the assessment about the credibility of the
witness by the Trial Court which had the advantage of seeing and
hearing above the witness and all other witnesses - Even if there
are certain embellishments and improvements and contradictions
which are of minor nature, the evidence of PW-10 on the whole
does appear to be consistent and there is no cogent reason to
disbelieve her claim that she had witnessed the incident - Thus,
there appears to be no patent illegality in the view taken by the
trial court and the High Court. [Paras 79, 80, 81, 83, 84]
2.1. The evidence which has emerged is that the father PW-5
came to the scene after the assailants appellants had fled - As
far as the mother PW-10 is concerned, on seeing the assault she
ran inside to wake up her husband and when they came out, the
assailants had fled - It cannot be considered to be highly unnatural
for a woman not rushing to intervene and instead seek the help
of a male member (her husband) when there were two persons
with deadly weapons assaulting her. [Para 86]
2.2. The evidence of PW-10, the sole eye witness, a hapless
rustic illiterate woman visited with the vicissitude and tragedy of
her son being fatally assaulted by co-villagers before her own
eyes, has withstood intensive cross examination and judicial
scrutiny - She has answered the questions put to her during her
cross examination with spontaneity without any jitteriness and her
response was natural and not elusive and prevaricating, which all
are signs of truthfulness of the witness - Therefore, her testimony
is trustworthy and reliable - Her evidence finds corroboration from
the admissible part of the evidence of the complainant (PW-6), and
her husband (PW-5) even though they had turned hostile, and the
medical evidence, evidence of the Investigating Officer and other
official witnesses. [Para 87]
[2025] 1 S.C.R.
659
Goverdhan & Anr. v. State of Chhattisgarh
3. The Prosecution has been able to establish beyond reasonable
doubt that the appellants were responsible for the death of the
deceased, for which they were convicted by the trial court under
Section 302 IPC - There is no glaring illegality or perversity in
the findings arrived at the trial court and the High Court causing
any grave miscarriage of justice to the appellants. [Paras 88, 89]
4. The motive for committing the crime has not been clearly
established and proved - However, it is established beyond
reasonable doubt that the appellants had caused the death
of the deceased fully knowing that the bodily injuries caused
by the appellants were likely to cause death as the appellants
were armed with deadly weapons, therefore, the appellants are
convicted under Part I of Section 304 IPC - Appellants have
already undergone 10 years 3 months of incarceration - Under
the facts and circumstances, interest of justice will be served if
the appellants are sentenced to the period already undergone by
them. [Paras 90, 91, 93 and 94]
Evidence - Standard of proof in a criminal case is not
proof beyond all doubts but only beyond reasonable
doubt - Contradistinction to requirement of proof based on
preponderance of probabilities as in case of civil proceedings.
[Para 20]
Evidence - FIR - Appreciation of:
Held: Though the FIR is not a piece of substantive evidence,
especially, when the Complainant, i.e., PW-6 did not fully support
the contents of the FIR, yet, it cannot be totally ignored and is to
be treated as a relevant circumstance if the same is proved by
other prosecution witness, in this case by PW-14, the SHO who
recorded the report in the form of FIR as stated to him by the
complainant. [Para 30]
Evidence - Armed assault leading to death - Noting made by
the doctor on the medical record - Appreciation of:
Held: Though the medical report was not made immediately after
the incident, it was made without much time gap and it was made
almost contemporaneously with the incident - Further, the medical
record was in conformity with the FIR filed by the complainant, PW-6,
thus corroborating the contents of the FIR in which the appellants
were named as the assailants - Since the FIR was filed soon after
the incident occurred and the names of the appellants were again
660
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mentioned in the medical record as the assailants within a very
short span of time, there was hardly any scope for fabrication of
evidence and falsely implicating the appellants in the case, as they
were already named in the FIR. [Para 65]
Evidence - Armed assault leading to death - Hostile witness -
Seizure witnesses turning hostile - Effect:
Held: The seizure witnesses have not denied their signatures on
the seizure memo and admitted putting their signatures - Though
both the witnesses have denied having any knowledge of the
actual recovery of the weapons at the instance of the appellants,
their denials do not appear convincing - However, since the IO of
the case, PW-15 had proved the said seizure memos, there is no
reason to hold that there was no seizure that was affected merely
because the two seizure witnesses had turned hostile. [Paras 68, 71]
Evidence - In a trial, the assessment of evidence cannot be
made in a technical manner - Realities of life must be kept
in mind for arriving at the truth. [Para 66]
Evidence - Non recovery of the weapon of crime - Is not fatal
to the prosecution case and is not sine qua non for conviction,
if there are direct reliable witnesses. [Para 70]
Evidence - Testimony of police personnel involved in recovery
of articles - Appreciation of. [Para 71]
Evidence - Armed assault leading to death - Untruthful and
evasive testimony of the neighbours:
Held: The testimonies of some neighbours were highly unnatural and
untruthful and they appear to be reluctant to come up with the truth
in order to protect the appellants - Because of the unnaturalness
of the testimonies of these neighbours before the court, which
defy human behaviour, the reasonable inference one can draw is
that these witnesses have been won over - The fact that all these
witnesses had close association with the acquitted father of the two
appellants on account of consumption of ganja also clearly indicates
the influence the latter may have on these witnesses. [Paras 73, 75]
Evidence - Hostile witness - Merely because the witnesses
turn hostile does not necessarily mean that their evidence
has to be thrown out entirely. [Para 76]
Evidence - Armed assault leading to death - Role of acquitted
accused not coming out clearly - Appellants-convicts cannot
be placed at par with the case of acquitted accused:
[2025] 1 S.C.R.
661
Goverdhan & Anr. v. State of Chhattisgarh
Held: Just because the father of the Appellants was acquitted will
not warrant their acquittal as there is sufficient and cogent material
evidence against them to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt
whereas the case against the acquitted father of the appellants is
doubtful. [Para 85]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.280 - Demeanour of
witness while under examination - Assessment by trial court -
Ought not be ignored by the Appellate Court. [Para 82]
Words and Phrases - "reasonable doubt" - Meaning of
reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or a merely
possible doubt, but a fair doubt based upon reason and
common sense. [Paras 21, 22]
Case Law Cited
Ramakant Rai v. Madan Rai [2003] Supp. 4 SCR 17 : (2003) 12
SCC 395; State of Haryana v. Bhagirath [1999] 3 SCR 529 : (1999)
5 SCC 96; Shivaji Sahebrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra [1974]
1 SCR 489 : (1973) 2 SCC 793; Bable v. State of Chhattisgarh
[2012] 6 SCR 517 : (2012) 11 SCC 181; Leela Ram (Dead)
through Duli Chand v. State of Haryana [1999] Supp. 3 SCR
435 : (1999) 9 SCC 525; Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State
of Gujarat [1983] 3 SCR 280 : (1983) 3 SCC 217; Appabhai v.
State of Gujarat (1988) Supp. SCC 241; Prabhu Dayal v. State
of Rajasthan (2018) 8 SCC 127; State of H.P. v. Lekh Raj [1999]
Supp. 4 SCR 286 : (2000) 1 SCC 247; Rakesh v. State of U.P.
[2021] 6 SCR 874 : (2021) 7 SCC 188; Karamjit Singh v. State
(Delhi Admn.) [2003] 3 SCR 25 : (2003) 5 SCC 291; Gangadhar
Behera v. State of Orissa [2002] Supp. 3 SCR 183 : (2002) 8 SCC
381; Raja v. State of Karnataka [2016] 9 SCR 615 : (2016) 10
SCC 506; Mohd. Rojali Ali v. The State of Assam (2019) 9 SCC
567; Jagdish Singh v. Madhuri Devi [2008] 6 SCR 1176 : (2008)
10 SCC 497; Mekala Sivaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh [2022]
6 SCR 989 : (2022) 8 SCC 253 - relied on.
State of Orissa v. Brahmananda Nanda (1976) 4 SCC 288; State
of Punjab v. Sucha Singh (2003) 3 SCC 153 - held inapplicable.
State of U.P. v. Satish [2005] 1 SCR 1132 : (2005) 3 SCC 114 -
referred to.
Miller v. Miller of Pensions (1947) 2 All ER 372, 373 - referred to.
662
[2025] 1 S.C.R.
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List of Acts
Penal Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
List of Keywords
s.304, Part I of IPC; Section 161 CrPC; Evidence; Assault with
deadly weapons; Eye witness; Miscarriage of justice; Rustic illiterate
woman; Motive; Bodily injuries likely to cause death; Conviction
converted; Standard of proof in a criminal case; Proof based on
preponderance of probabilities; FIR; Medical record; Hostile witness;
Seizure witness; Assessment of evidence; Non-recovery of weapon
of crime; Testimony of neighbour; Acquitted accused; Demeanour
of witness while under examination; "Reasonable doubt".
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
116 of 2011
From the Judgment and Order dated 30.11.2009 of the High Court
of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in CRLA No. 290 of 2002
Appearances for Parties
Dr. Rajesh Pandey, Sr. Adv., Chandrika Prasad Mishra, Mahesh
Pandey, Rahil Kochar, Ms. Nishi Prabha Singh, Ms. Prashasti
Singh, Mrs. Swati Surbhi, U.N. Mishra, Ms. Aswathi M.K., Advs.
for the Appellants.
Ravi Sharma, D.A.G., Mrs. Prerna Dhall, Piyush Yadav, Alok Sahay,
Advs. for the Respondent.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, J.
1.
The present appeal has been preferred against judgement and order
dated 30.11.2009 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court
of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in the Criminal Appeal No. 290/2002
whereby the High Court upheld the conviction and sentence
imposed upon the present two appellants under Section 302 read
with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred as
[2025] 1 S.C.R.
663
Goverdhan & Anr. v. State of Chhattisgarh
'IPC') while setting aside the conviction of the third accused and
thus, acquitting him.
2.
As the two appellants are seeking reversal of the concurrent findings
by two courts, the Sessions Court and the High Court, this Court
has to tread very cautiously as observed by this Court on numerous
occasions including in Mekala Sivaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh,
(2022) 8 SCC 253 wherein it has been held that unless the findings
are perverse and rendered in ignorance of material evidence, this
Court should be slow in interfering with concurring findings. Thus it
was, observed in Mekala Sivaiah (supra) as follows:
"15. It is well settled by judicial pronouncement that Article
136 is worded in wide terms and powers conferred under
the said Article are not hedged by any technical hurdles.
This overriding and exceptional power is, however, to be
exercised sparingly and only in furtherance of cause of
justice. Thus, when the judgment under appeal has resulted
in grave miscarriage of justice by some misapprehension
or misreading of evidence or by ignoring material evidence
then this Court is not only empowered but is well expected
to interfere to promote the cause of justice.
16. It is not the practice of this Court to re-appreciate
the evidence for the purpose of examining whether the
findings of fact concurrently arrived at by the trial court
and the High Court are correct or not. It is only in rare and
exceptional cases where there is some manifest illegality
or grave and serious miscarriage of justice on account of
misreading or ignoring material evidence, that this Court
would interfere with such finding of fact."
In the above case, this Court, while dealing with a criminal appeal
against an order of the High Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh
upheld the conviction of the accused by the Sessions Court, and
declined to interfere with the conviction.
3.
Keeping the aforesaid principle in mind, this Court would proceed
to decide the appeal at hand to examine whether there is some
manifest error or illegality and if any grave and serious miscarriage
of justice on account of misreading or ignoring material evidence has
occurred in the present case. This invariably would require a proper
664
[2025] 1 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
examination of the facts and context of the case, for which we must
revisit the background facts of the case and evidence adduced.
4.
It may be noted that since the State has not preferred any appeal
against the acquittal of the third accused, Chintaram, the father
of the two appellants, we may not burden ourselves in detail with
the evidence relating to the initial conviction and the subsequent
acquittal of the third accused Chintaram except those as may have
ramifications for the present two appellants.
5.
The case of the prosecution in brief is that on 23.09.2001, at about
7.00 am, the complainant, Santosh Kumar Mandle (PW-6), who
was employed by the parents of the deceased, namely Shatrughan
Sharma (PW5) and Lata Bai (PW-10), while washing utensils at
the house of the deceased Suraj, heard a cry for help from Suraj.
Upon hearing, he came out of the house and saw the three accused
Goverdhan, Rajendra and Chintaram assaulting Suraj with an axe
(tangiya) and iron pipe. Chintaram was also hitting the deceased with
fists and kicks and urging his two sons, Goverdhan and Rajendra,
the present appellants to kill Suraj. Santosh (PW-6) immediately
informed Shatrughan Sharma (PW-5) and Smt. Lata Bai (PW-10)
about the incident. Santosh also mentioned about the altercation
between Chintaram and Suraj the previous night about ganja.
6.
Soon, thereafter, an FIR was lodged by Santosh which was registered
u/s 307 IPC vide Ex. P/12 at around 7.30 am on the same day i.e.
23.09.2001.
7.
The injured Suraj was immediately rushed to the local hospital and
was examined by the doctor, Dr. G.R. Agarwal (PW-1) who found
as many as nine injuries on the deceased, which were as follows :
i)
One contusion of 6 cm x 5 cm with active bleeding, and fracture
of under beneath bone over right temporal region
ii)
One incised wound of 1⁄2 cm x 1⁄2 cm x screen deep just above
right ear.
iii)
One incised wound over occipital region of 5 cm x 1 cm x skin
deep.
iv)
One incised wound over frontal region of 4 cm x 1 cm x skin
deep.
v)
One incised wound of 4 cm x 1 cm x skin deep 10 cm from
injury No.3.
[2025] 1 S.C.R.
665
Goverdhan & Anr. v. State of Chhattisgarh
vi)
One lacerated wound over right hand of 7 cm x 3 cm x skin deep.
vii) One incised wound over left hand of 2 cm x 1⁄2 cm x skin deep.
viii) One lacerated wound over right hand of 3 cm x 2 cm x skin deep.
ix)
One lacerated wound over right elbow of 3 cm x 2 cm x skin
Deep. Active bleeding was present over the injury.
In view of the seriousness of the injuries, the victim was referred to
the Medical College Hospital, Raipur and thereafter, shifted to MMI
Hospital where he succumbed to his injuries on 25.09.2001 at about
9.22 pm. The cause of death was mentioned as coma as a result of
injuries received and death was opined to be homicidal in nature.
Subsequently, charge under Section 302 IPC was added to the FIR.
Necessary investigation was carried out by the Investigating Officer.
8.
Based on the disclosure statement made by Goverdhan, Appellant
No. 1 on the same day on 23.9.2001, two blood-stained axes were
recovered at his instance from his father's room vide Ex.P/6. Appellant
No. 2 Rajendra also made a disclosure statement on 23.9.2001 at
about 3.45 p.m. relating to iron pipe vide Ex.P/4, and the same was
recovered from his father's room vide Ex.P/5. Blood-stained soil and
plain soil were recovered from the place of incident vide Ex.P/7.
Blood-stained clothes were seized from Shatrughan Sharma (PW-5)
vide Ex.P/10. Spot map was prepared by the Patwari (PW-8) vide
Ex.P/16 as witnessed by Santosh (PW-6), Kanhaiya (PW-11) and
Shailu (PW-2). Goverdhan and Rajendra were arrested on 23.9.2001
vide Exs. P/23 and P/24. Seized articles were examined by Dr.
G.R. Agrawal (PW-1) vide Ex.P/2. The seized articles were sent for
medical analysis. The presence of blood over two axes recovered at
the instance of Goverdhan and iron pipe recovered at the instance of
Rajendra, was confirmed vide Ex.P/30. The Investigating Officer (IO)
recorded the statements of the witnesses under Section 161 CrPC.
9.
To prove the guilt of the accused, the Prosecution examined as
many as 15 witnesses. Statements of the accused were also
recorded under Section 313 of the Code, where they denied the
circumstances appearing against them and claimed innocence by
pleading false implication in the crime in question. The accused had
also produced two defence witnesses, Ramlal Yadav (DW-1) and
Lakhan Lal Sahu (DW-2) to prove that the police pressurised the
mother of the deceased Suraj, Lata Bai (PW-10) to give evidence
against the accused persons.
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10. The Court of the Second Additional Sessions Judge, Raipur, on
appreciation of the evidence before it and after hearing the parties,
convicted all the three accused persons under Section 302 read
with Section 34 of the IPC, and sentenced them to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for life along with a fine of ₹10,000, and in default
of payment of such fine, each accused was directed to undergo
additional rigorous imprisonment for 3 years in terms of the judgment
dated 06.03.2002.
11. In the statutory appeal preferred by the three accused persons, the
High Court affirmed the conviction of the present two appellants while
acquitting the third accused, Chintaram, by the impugned judgment
dated 30.11.2009.
12. Before the High Court, the appellants had taken various pleas,
including that the convictions were not based on cogent evidence, the
sole eye witness account of Lata Bai (PW-10) was uncorroborated
and wholly unreliable as her initial statement under Section 161
CrPC, was recorded belatedly after 5 days of the incident and that
all the remaining non-official witnesses had turned hostile, including
the Complainant (PW-10) and the father of the deceased (PW-5)
who were cited to be eye-witnesses by the Prosecution, and seizure
witnesses.
13. On the other hand, it was contended on behalf of the Prosecution
before the High Court that there was no reason to disbelieve the
testimony of the mother of the deceased, Lata Bai (PW-10) merely
because her statement was recorded belatedly as her name finds
place in the FIR filed by Santosh (PW-6) which was filed within half
an hour of the incident and the filing of the FIR was proved by the
evidence of the hostile witness Santosh (PW-6), and there were
other corroborating evidence. The Prosecution also relied on the
decision of this Court in State of U.P. v. Satish, (2005) 3 SCC 114
in submitting that mere delay in examination of witnesses would not
be fatal if plausible and acceptable explanations are offered.
14. The High Court, after a detailed analysis of the evidence on record,
repelled the contentions of the appellants and convicted them while
acquitting Accused No. 3, their father, Chintaram, giving him benefit
of doubt about his participation in the crime.
15. Thus, the two appellants before us are impugning the judgment
passed by the High Court upholding their conviction.
[2025] 1 S.C.R.
667
Goverdhan & Anr. v. State of Chhattisgarh
16. The pleas of the appellants before us summarized as below:
(i)
Since the third accused namely Chintaram, who is the father
of the two appellants had been acquitted by the High Court on
the same set of evidence on which the two appellants had been
convicted, the two appellants should have also been acquitted
on the ground of parity since there is no material difference in
the nature and quality of evidence qua all the three accused.
(ii)
That otherwise also, conviction could not have been sustained
on the basis of the uncorroborated testimony of a sole eye
witness, who is also an interested witness namely, Lata Bai
(PW10), the mother of the deceased.
(iii) The Sessions Court had convicted the appellants primarily on
the testimony of the Lata Bai (PW-10), the alleged eyewitness,
though she could not have been an eye witness, as Santosh
(PW-6), in his FIR mentioned that he informed about the
incident to the mother and father of Suraj, which shows that
Lata Bai (PW-10) only after being informed of the incident after
the incident had occurred, came to know of the incident and
hence, could not have seen the incident.
(iv) Further, the statement of Lata Bai (PW-10) was recorded after
5 days of the incident and the Prosecution has not explained
the delay in recording her statement under Section 161 of the
Code and in absence of a proper explanation, her statement is
not reliable in connection with which the defence relied upon on
the decision of this Court in State of Orissa v. Brahmananda
Nanda, (1976) 4 SCC 288 wherein this Court held that failure to
mention the names of the accused for one and half days is fatal.
(v)
It was also contended that according to the Prosecution, the
mother (PW-10) and father (PW-5) of the deceased were
present but they made no attempt to intervene or try to rescue
the victim which shows that, they did not witness the incident
and hence the statement of Lata Bai is highly doubtful. In this
regard, the defence had cited the decision of this Court in
State of Punjab v. Sucha Singh, (2003) 3 SCC 153 wherein,
it was observed by this Court that any father, worth the name,
who was claiming to be present at the place of incident would
not remain a mute spectator when his son is being inflicted as
many as twenty-four injuries under his very nose.
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(vi) It was also contended that there have been improvements,
and embellishments in the testimony of Lata Bai (PW-10), thus
rendering her evidence unreliable and not credible.
(vii) The appellants also have contended that almost all the nonofficial prosecution witnesses, except the mother, had turned
hostile and had not supported the prosecution case including
the informant Santosh (PW-6) and seizure witnesses, PW-2
and PW-12.
17. On the other hand, before us also, it has been contended on behalf
of the Prosecution that as far as the two appellants are concerned,
it can be said that the conclusion drawn by the Trial Court as well
as the High Court is based on admissible and relevant evidence
and as such their conviction cannot be said to be suffering from
any illegality, and since there is no perversity in the finding arrived
at by the two courts below, this Court ought not interfere with the
judgment of the High Court.
ANALYSIS BY THIS COURT
18. In case of a crime committed, upon completion of investigation by
the investigation agency, the accused are brought before the court
to face trial. Under our criminal jurisprudence, the court ordinarily is
not privy to the evidence collected during the investigation by the
investigation agency. After completion of the investigation, what is
brought before the trial court is an array of evidence, both documentary
and oral, collected by the investigating agency against the accused
which are required to be marshalled and analyzed by the court to
arrive at appropriate conclusions. The prosecution seeks to recreate
the incident of crime before the court in sequence, based on the
evidence so collected, linking the accused with the commission of
crime. Such recreation of crime by the prosecution before the court is
akin to putting the evidence together as in a jigsaw puzzle whereby
all the relevant pieces of evidence are put together to complete
the picture of the crime. The prime responsibility of the court is to
see whether this jigsaw puzzle has been properly placed by the
prosecution from which a clear picture emerges as to the happening
of the incident with the assigned role of the accused as part of the
aforesaid jigsaw puzzle. Only, thereafter, the role of the accused in
perpetrating the offence can be properly ascribed and proved and
accordingly, criminal liability fastened on the accused.
[2025] 1 S.C.R.
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Goverdhan & Anr. v. State of Chhattisgarh
19. As per Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, a fact can be
said to have been proved when, after considering the matters before
it, the court either believes it to exist or considers its existence so
probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the
particular case, to act up on the supposition that it exists. The court
undertakes this exercise of examining whether the facts alleged
including the particular criminal acts attributed to the accused are
proved or not.
20. It is also to be noted that the law does not contemplate stitching the
pieces of evidence in a watertight manner, for the standard of proof
in a criminal case is not proof beyond all doubts but only beyond
reasonable doubt. In other words, if a clear picture emerges on
piecing together all evidence which indicates beyond reasonable
doubt of the role played by the accused in the perpetration of the
crime, the court holds the accused criminally liable and punishes
them under the provisions of the penal code, in contradistinction to
the requirement of proof based on the preponderance of probabilities
as in case of civil proceedings.
21. It will be relevant to discuss, at this juncture, what is meant by
"reasonable doubt". It means that such doubt must be free from
suppositional speculation. It must not be the result of minute
emotional detailing, and the doubt must be actual and substantial
and not merely vague apprehension. A reasonable doubt is not an
imaginary, trivial or a merely possible doubt, but a fair doubt based
upon reason and common sense as observed in Ramakant Rai v.
Madan Rai, (2003) 12 SCC 395 wherein it was observed as under :
"24. Doubts would be called reasonable if they are free
from a zest for abstract speculation. Law cannot afford
any favourite other than the truth. To constitute reasonable
doubt, it must be free from an overly emotional response.
Doubts must be actual and substantial doubts as to the guilt
of the accused persons arising from the evidence, or from
the lack of it, as opposed to mere vague apprehensions.
A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or a merely
possible doubt; but a fair doubt based upon reason and
common sense. It must grow out of the evidence in the
case."
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22. While applying this principle of proof beyond reasonable doubt the
Court has to undertake a candid consideration of all the evidence
in a fair and reasonable manner as observed by this Court in State
of Haryana v. Bhagirath (1999) 5 SCC 96 as follows:
"8. It is nearly impossible in any criminal trial to prove all
the elements with a scientific precision. A criminal court
could be convinced of the guilt only beyond the range of a
reasonable doubt. Of course, the expression 'reasonable
doubt' is incapable of definition. Modern thinking is in favour
of the view that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the
same as proof which affords moral certainty to the Judge.
9. Francis Wharton, a celebrated writer on criminal law in
the United States has quoted from judicial pronouncements
in his book Wharton's Criminal Evidence (at p. 31, Vol. 1
of the 12th Edn.) as follows:
'It is difficult to define the phrase "reasonable doubt".
However, in all criminal cases a careful explanation of the
term ought to be given. A definition often quoted or followed
is that given by Chief Justice Shaw in the Webster case
[Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush 295 : 59 Mass 295
(1850)] . He says: "It is not mere possible doubt, because
everything relating to human affairs and depending upon
moral evidence is open to some possible or imaginary
doubt. It is that state of the case which, after the entire
comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves
the minds of the jurors in that consideration that they cannot
say they feel an abiding conviction to a moral certainty of
the truth of the charge." '
10. In the treatise The Law of Criminal Evidence authored
by H.C. Underhill it is stated (at p. 34, Vol. 1 of the 5th
Edn.) thus:
'The doubt to be reasonable must be such a one as
an honest, sensible and fair-minded man might, with
reason, entertain consistent with a conscientious desire to
ascertain the truth. An honestly entertained doubt of guilt
is a reasonable doubt. A vague conjecture or an inference
of the possibility of the innocence of the accused is not
a reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is one which
[2025] 1 S.C.R.
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Goverdhan & Anr. v. State of Chhattisgarh
arises from a consideration of all the evidence in a fair and
reasonable way. There must be a candid consideration of
all the evidence and if, after this candid consideration is
had by the jurors, there remains in the minds a conviction
of the guilt of the accused, then there is no room for a
reasonable doubt.'
23. The concept of reasonable doubt has to be also understood in the
Indian context, keeping in mind the social reality and this principle
cannot be stretched beyond a reasonable limit to avoid generating a
cynical view of law as observed by this Court in Shivaji Sahebrao
Bobade v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793 as follows:
"6. Even at this stage we may remind ourselves of a
necessary social perspective in criminal cases which
suffers from insufficient forensic appreciation. The dangers
of exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt at the
expense of social defence and to the soothing sentiment
that all acquittals are always good regardless of justice to
the victim and the community, demand especial emphasis in
the contemporary context of escalating crime and escape.
The judicial instrument has a public accountability. The
cherished principles or golden thread of proof beyond
reasonable doubt which runs through the web of our
law should not be stretched morbidly to embrace every
hunch, hesitancy and degree of doubt. The excessive
solicitude reflected in the attitude that a thousand guilty
men may go but one innocent martyr shall not suffer is
a false dilemma. Only reasonable doubts belong to the
accused. Otherwise any practical system of justice will
then break down and lose credibility with the community.
The evil of acquitting a guilty person light heartedly as
a learned Author [ Glanville Williams in 'Proof of Guilt'.]
has sapiently observed, goes much beyond the simple
fact that just one guilty person has gone unpunished. If
unmerited acquittals become general, they tend to lead
to a cynical disregard of the law, and this in turn leads to
a public demand for harsher legal presumptions against
indicted "persons" and more severe punishment of those
who are found guilty. Thus, too frequent acquittals of
the guilty may lead to a ferocious penal law, eventually
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eroding the judicial protection of the guiltless. For all
these reasons it is true to say, with Viscount Simon, that
"a miscarriage of justice may arise from the acquittal of
the guilty no less than from the conviction of the innocent
...." In short, our jurisprudential enthusiasm for presumed
innocence must be moderated by the pragmatic need to
make criminal justice potent and realistic. A balance has
to be struck between chasing chance possibilities as good
enough to set the delinquent free and chopping the logic
of preponderant probability to punish marginal innocents.
We have adopted these cautions in analysing the evidence
and appraising the soundness of the contrary conclusions
reached by the courts below. Certainly, in the last analysis
reasonable doubts must operate to the advantage of the
appellant. In India the law has been laid down on these
lines long ago."
24. Further, what would be the standard degree of "proof" which would be
required in any particular case was also discussed in the aforesaid
case of Ramakant Rai (supra) in the following words:
"23. A person has, no doubt, a profound right not to be
convicted of an offence which is not established by the
evidential standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Though this standard is a higher standard, there is,
however, no absolute standard. What degree of probability
amounts to "proof" is an exercise particular to each case.
Referring to (sic) of probability amounts to "proof" is
an exercise, the interdependence of evidence and the
confirmation of one piece of evidence by another, as
learned author says : [see The Mathematics of Proof II :
Glanville Williams, Criminal Law Review, 1979, by Sweet
and Maxwell, p. 340 (342)]
"The simple multiplication rule does not apply if
the separate pieces of evidence are dependent.
Two events are dependent when they tend
to occur together, and the evidence of such
events may also be said to be dependent. In
a criminal case, different pieces of evidence
directed to establishing that the defendant did
the prohibited act with the specified state of
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Goverdhan & Anr. v. State of Chhattisgarh
mind are generally dependent. A juror may feel
doubt whether to credit an alleged confession,
and doubt whether to infer guilt from the fact
that the defendant fled from justice. But since
it is generally guilty rather than innocent people
who make confessions, and guilty rather than
innocent people who run away, the two doubts
are not to be multiplied together. The one piece
of evidence may confirm the other."
24. ....................
....................
25. The concepts of probability, and the degrees of it,
cannot obviously be expressed in terms of units to be
mathematically enumerated as to how many of such
units constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. There
is an unmistakable subjective element in the evaluation
of the degrees of probability and the quantum of proof.
Forensic probability must, in the last analysis, rest on
a robust common sense and, ultimately, on the trained
intuitions of the judge. While the protection given by the
criminal process to the accused persons is not to be
eroded, at the same time, uninformed legitimisation of
trivialities would make a mockery of the administration of
criminal justice. This position was illuminatingly stated by
Venkatachaliah, J. (as His Lordship then was) in State
of U.P. v. Krishna Gopal [(1988) 4 SCC 302 : 1988 SCC
(Cri) 928 : AIR 1988 SC 2154] ."
25. At this point, it may be also relevant to mention an observation
made by Lord Denning, J. in Miller v. Miller of Pensions (1947) 2
All ER 372, 373 H:
"That degree is well settled. It need not reach certainty,
but it must carry a high degree of probability. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond the shadow
of a doubt. The law would fail to protect the community if it
admitted fanciful possibilities to deflect the court of justice...."
26. Thus, the requirement of law in criminal trials is not to prove the case
beyond all doubt but beyond reasonable doubt and such doubt cannot
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be imaginary, fanciful, trivial or merely a possible doubt but a fair
doubt based on reason and common sense. Hence, in the present
case, if the allegations against the appellants are held proved beyond
reasonable doubt, certainly conviction cannot be said to be illegal.
27. In the present case, as far as the death of the deceased is concerned,
there is no dispute about the same. The appellants have not contested
the case of the Prosecution that the deceased died on account of
grievous injuries caused by sharp weapons. Their plea is that of
ignorance of the death and also alibi, that they were in another
village.