# GOVIND DATTATRAY KELKAR & ORS v. CHIEF CONTROLLER OF IMPORTS & EXPOR1:S & ORS

- **Citation:** [1967] 2 S.C.R. 29
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1967
- **Case number:** Writ Petition No. 40 of 1965
- **Bench:** K. SUBBA RAo C. J, M. Hidayatullah, S. M. S!Kri, R. S. Bachawat, J. M. Shelat
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/govind-dattatray-kelkar-ors-v-chief-controller-of-imports-expor1-s-ors-3946
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

Constitution of India,
1950, Arts. 14 and 16(1)-Promotees and
direct recruits-Fixation of seniority between--Constitutional validity.
On 30th November 1955, the Assistant
Controllers in the
Import
aAd Export Organisation of the Government of India consisted of 47
officers appointed before !st January 1952 and 76 departmental promotees appointed between !st January 1952 and 30th November 1955,
all the appointments having been made on an ad /we basis.
The Union
Public Service Commission objected to the appointments. After some
correspondence the Government decided that the appointments made before !st January 1952, should be regularised and that after that
date,
there should be 75% direct recruits and 25% departmental promotees.
Pursuant to that agreement the Union Public Service Commi"ision called
for applications and 57 (75% of 76) Assistant Controllers were selected
and appointed by
direct
recruitment. The
Departmental
PrQmotion
Committee considered the cases of those who were already working as
Assistant Controllers and selected 25 officers out of whom 19 (25% of
76) were appointed.
In November 1961. a seniority list of
Assistant
Controllers was prepared in which the 19 promotees' were placed above
tb.e direct recruits, and later appointees were arranged on the principle of
rotation in the ratio 25 : 75. The effect of that list was to o1ace the
petitioners (some of whom were working as Assistant Controllers even
before the 57 direct recruits were appointed) after the aforesaid 123 (47
plus 76) appointees. They challenged the list on the following grounds:-
(I) The petitioners were promoted before the new 57 appointments
were made. subject to the condition that, they were
approved
by the
Union Public :Service Commission and that, therefore, the direct recruits
could not be placed over them; (2) the ratio of 1 : 3 was embodied in the
recruitment rules made, by the Government of India under Art. 309 of
tlle Constitution only in 1962, and as the rules were not retrospective,
the seniority list was without any authority of law and was violative of
Arts. 14 and 16; (3) the ratio was arbitrary and violative of Art. 14; (4)
prior to November 1955, there was only one source of recruitment, namely by departmental promotion, to the cadre of Assistant Controllers, and
therefore, the decision to relate back the seniority of the direct recruits to
the period between !st January 1952 and 30th November 1955, was based on reservation for those who were not then in existence, and amounted
to carrying forward of vacancies which was unconstitutional.
HELD : (I) The petitioners were promoted under orders which stated
that their appointments were made
on an ad interim
basis
pending
selection of the officers by the. Union Public Service Commission.
In
the context in which the
petitioners were
appointed, it was not
the
intention of the Government that they were to be appointed subject to
the
approval of the Union Public Service Commission. The inteb.tion
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JO
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1967] 2 S.C.R.
of the Government on the contrary was that as the. selection to the posts
A
was impending through the usual channel of the Union Public Service
Commission from all sources of recruitment, the petitioners should only
be promoted on an ad hoc basis." Therefore. the petitioners had no right
to the posts of Assistant Controllers. [35 B-E]
(2) (a) The recruitment to the 76 posts was made from two sources
with different qualifications, namely, (i) by promotion from the subordinate staff and (ii) by direct recruitment.
Since the preferential treatment
of one source was based on the differences between the two sources and
the differences have a reasonable relation to the nature of the office to
which recruitment was made. the said recruitment could legitimately be
sustained on the basis of a valid classification.
[33 H; 35 HJ
(b) Where the recruitment to a cadre was from two sources. a rotational system would not violate, the principle of equal opportunity enshri

## Text

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GOVIND DATTATRAY KELKAR & ORS.
v.
CHIEF CONTROLLER OF IMPORTS & EXPOR1:S
& ORS.
November I, 1966
(K. SUBBA RAo C. J., M. HIDAYATULLAH, S. M. S!KRI,
R. S. BACHAWAT AND J. M. SHELAT, JJ.)
Constitution of India,
1950, Arts. 14 and 16(1)-Promotees and
direct recruits-Fixation of seniority between--Constitutional validity.
On 30th November 1955, the Assistant
Controllers in the
Import
aAd Export Organisation of the Government of India consisted of 47
officers appointed before !st January 1952 and 76 departmental promotees appointed between !st January 1952 and 30th November 1955,
all the appointments having been made on an ad /we basis.
The Union
Public Service Commission objected to the appointments. After some
correspondence the Government decided that the appointments made before !st January 1952, should be regularised and that after that
date,
there should be 75% direct recruits and 25% departmental promotees.
Pursuant to that agreement the Union Public Service Commi"ision called
for applications and 57 (75% of 76) Assistant Controllers were selected
and appointed by
direct
recruitment. The
Departmental
PrQmotion
Committee considered the cases of those who were already working as
Assistant Controllers and selected 25 officers out of whom 19 (25% of
76) were appointed.
In November 1961. a seniority list of
Assistant
Controllers was prepared in which the 19 promotees' were placed above
tb.e direct recruits, and later appointees were arranged on the principle of
rotation in the ratio 25 : 75. The effect of that list was to o1ace the
petitioners (some of whom were working as Assistant Controllers even
before the 57 direct recruits were appointed) after the aforesaid 123 (47
plus 76) appointees. They challenged the list on the following grounds:-
(I) The petitioners were promoted before the new 57 appointments
were made. subject to the condition that, they were
approved
by the
Union Public :Service Commission and that, therefore, the direct recruits
could not be placed over them; (2) the ratio of 1 : 3 was embodied in the
recruitment rules made, by the Government of India under Art. 309 of
tlle Constitution only in 1962, and as the rules were not retrospective,
the seniority list was without any authority of law and was violative of
Arts. 14 and 16; (3) the ratio was arbitrary and violative of Art. 14; (4)
prior to November 1955, there was only one source of recruitment, namely by departmental promotion, to the cadre of Assistant Controllers, and
therefore, the decision to relate back the seniority of the direct recruits to
the period between !st January 1952 and 30th November 1955, was based on reservation for those who were not then in existence, and amounted
to carrying forward of vacancies which was unconstitutional.
HELD : (I) The petitioners were promoted under orders which stated
that their appointments were made
on an ad interim
basis
pending
selection of the officers by the. Union Public Service Commission.
In
the context in which the
petitioners were
appointed, it was not
the
intention of the Government that they were to be appointed subject to
the
approval of the Union Public Service Commission. The inteb.tion
•
JO
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1967] 2 S.C.R.
of the Government on the contrary was that as the. selection to the posts
A
was impending through the usual channel of the Union Public Service
Commission from all sources of recruitment, the petitioners should only
be promoted on an ad hoc basis." Therefore. the petitioners had no right
to the posts of Assistant Controllers. [35 B-E]
(2) (a) The recruitment to the 76 posts was made from two sources
with different qualifications, namely, (i) by promotion from the subordinate staff and (ii) by direct recruitment.
Since the preferential treatment
of one source was based on the differences between the two sources and
the differences have a reasonable relation to the nature of the office to
which recruitment was made. the said recruitment could legitimately be
sustained on the basis of a valid classification.
[33 H; 35 HJ
(b) Where the recruitment to a cadre was from two sources. a rotational system would not violate, the principle of equal opportunity enshrined in Art. 16(1). [36 A-BJ
Mervyn Coutinho v. Th, Collector of Customs, Bombay, [1966] 3
S.C.R. 600, followed.
c
(3) When the recruitment to certain posts is from
different sources,
what ratio would be adequate and equitable would depend upon the circumstances of each case and the requirements and needs of a particular
post.
Nothing was suggested in the present case to show that the ratio
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of 3 : 1 was flagrant or unreasonable. [36 CJ
( 4) In a case where a service is divided into two parts and there are
two sources of recruitment, one by promotion and the other by direct
recruitment, there is no question of carrying anything forward from ycs:r
to year in the matter of annual intake.
When the vacancies that arose
between 1952 and 1955 were filled up subsequently, it was not a case of
vacancies being carried forward to the subsequent year or years.
All that
E
happened was, that certain vacancies had arisen and for certain reasons
they were not permanently filled up, but some ad hoc appointments were
made in regard thereto and subsequently, they were filled up by permanent appointments. [36 H-37D]
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 40 of 1965.
Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for the
F
enforcement of fundamental rights.
H. R. Gokha/e, G. L. Sanghi and B. R. Agarwal, for the petitioners.
Niren De, Addi. Solicitor General, R. Ganapathy Tyer and R. N.
Sachthey, for respondents Nos. 1-3.
G
N. S. Bindra and K. Baldev Mehta, for respondents Nos.
11, 14 and 27.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Sobba Rao, C. J. This writ petition raises the question of tbe
constitutional validity of the appointment of respondents 4 to 74
by direct recruitment as Assistant Controllers of Imports and
Exports.
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G.D. KELKAR v. CHIEF CONTROLLER (Subba Rao, C.J.)
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The. relevant facts may briefly be stated. The Imports and
Exports organization came into existence during the Second World
War. It was expected to be a temporary organization and, therefore, appointments to the various categories in the said organization were made -en an ad hoc basis. In the year 1949 it comprised
the following posts: Chief Controller, Joint Chief Controller,
Deputy Chief Controller, Assistant Chief Controller of Imports
and Exports, Executive Officers, Licensing Officers and Junior
Licensing Officers. Of these the last 3 were Class lI posts and
the rest were Class I posts. Subsequently, the posts of Assistant
Chief Controllers were redesignated as "Controllers" and the posts
of Executive Officers, Licensing Officers and Junior Licensing
Officers were converted into one category, namely, Assistant Controllers, Class II. In the year 1949 the appointment of the said
officers and their promotions were governed by the principles
enunciated in the Memorandum No.
30/44'48-Appts. dated
June 22, 1949 ·issued by the Government of India (Ministry of
Home Affairs). But, as no rules were prescribed and the appointments were made on ad hoc basis, the Union Public Service Commission rightly raised objections; and after protracted correspondenc~ it was agreed in 1955 that the appointments made by the
Ministry during 1947-1951 should be regularized on the basis of the
record of work and that in regard to subsequent appointments
there should be a ratio of 25 % for the departmental promotees and
75% for direct recruits. Ultimately, on June 13, 1962, the said
arrangement was embodied in the recruitment rules made by the
Government of India under Art. 309 of the Constitution.
There are three main categories of employees in the said department, namely, (i) those appointed prior to January 1, .19~2; (ii)
those appointed between January I, 1952 and November 30, 1955;
and (iii) those appointed after November 30, 1955. We are now
concerned in this petition with those appointed after November 30,
1955. Assistant Controllers, ·Class II, are appointed from two
sources., namely, by promotion from the lower cadre and by direct
recruitment. Nothing need be said in this case about the first
category, for their appointments are not in question. In the second
category there were 76 posts available for recruitment. On the
agreed formula of 25 % for the department and 75 % for direct
recruitment, 19 posts would go to the departmental candidates and
57 posts to the direct recruits.
In December, 1955, pursuant to an advertisement issued by
the Union Public Service Commission, 57 Assistant Controllers
were appointed by direct recruitment. After consulting the said
Commission, the Government of India fixed the seniority of the
Assistant Controllers and prepared a seniority list dated November
30,. 1961-
.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS.
[1967] 2 S.C.R.
At this stage it may be mentioned that 76 posts to which recruitment was made were temporarily manned by departmental promotees. The effect of the new recruitment was that their position
of seniority was disturbed by reason of the application of the said
ratio of 25 % for the departmental candidates and 75 % for the
direct recruits and by reason of the fact that the direct recruits
took precedence over some of them. On November 30, 1961, the
Government of India prepared a new seniority list and the said
seniority list is given as Anne)(ure 'F' to the petition. The said list
comprises three categories of officers: the first category of 47 officers
were those that were appointed before January I, 1952, and whose
appointments had been regularized by the Union Public Service
Commission; the second category of officers are 76 in number comprising of departmental promotees and the nominees of the Union
Public Service Commission in the ratio of 25 : 75 respectively as
laid down in the recruitment rules; and the third category are
departmental promotees and the nominees of the Union Public
Service Commission arranged on the principle of rotation in the
ratio of l : 3 .. But, in the second category with which we are
now concerned, it appears that the Departmental Promotion Committee considered the cases of Assistant Controllers who
were
working on an ad hoc basis and selected, on the basis of merit, 25
officers out of whom 19 were adjusted against the said quota
of 25 % : and these 19 officers were placed above the direct recruits.
Serial Nos. 48 to 66 in the list arc promotecs so selected by the
Department::) Promotion Committee, and serial :-.los. 68 to 123
in the said list arc direct recruits.
Tile first petitioner joined the office of the 3rd r~spondent, the
Joint Controller of Imports and Exports, Bombay, on April 29,
1946, as an Appraiser. He was promoted to the post of Assistant
Controller with effect from March 31, 1956; that is to say, he has
been holding the post for a period of about 9 years at the time he
filed the petition.
The second petitioner joined the said office on March 5, 1941
and in due course he was promoted to the post of Assistant Controller with effect from April I, 1956. He was also holding the said
post for a period of about 9 years at the time of filing the petition.
The third petitioner joined the said office on May 8, 1945 as a
B Grade Clerk and was promoted to the post of Assistant Controller with effect from September 4, 1956.
He bad been holding the
said post for about 8-!: years at the time of filing the petition.
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The 4th petitioner joined the said office on July 28, 1943 as a
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lower division clerk and in due course he was promoted as Assistant Controller with effect from November l, 1961. But he was
reverted to the post of Section Head on June 14, 1963.
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G. D. KELKAR v. CHIEF CONTROLLER (Subba Rao, C.J.)
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The effect of the new seniority list prepa~ed on November 30,
.1961 is that, as the said ratio was applied and as the direct recruits
were put above the petitioners and others similarly situated, the
1st petitioner, who should have been shown at No. 67 in the list
but for the new recruitment, was shown at No. 124; the 2nd petitioner, who should have been shown at No. 69, was put at No. 132;
the 3rd petitioner, who should have been above all direct recruits,
was not shown in the seniority list at all; and the 4th petitioner, who
should have been above all direct recruits appointed after November 1, 1961 and below the departmental promotees appointed prior
to November 1, 1961, was not shown in the seniority list at all.
The· petitioners allege that the said order dated November 30, 1961
fixing the seniority violated Art .. 16 of the Constitution and that they
should have been placed above the direct recruits.
Mr. Gokhale, learned counsel for the petitioners, raised before
us the following points: (i) The rules of 1962 were not retrospective
in operation and, therefore, the seniority list dated November 30,
1961 based on the decision of the 2nd respondent, Union of India,
dated July 29, 1961, was without any authority of law and was
violative of Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution; (ii) prior to November, 1955 there was only one source of recruitment to the cadre of
Assistant Controllers and, therefore, the decision to relate back
the seniority of the direct recruits to the period between January
1, 1952 and November 30, 1955 being based on reservations to
those who were then not in existence amounted to carrying forward
of vacancies which was held by this Conrt to be unconstitutional; (iii}
the ratio of 75 % : 25 % between direct recruits and promotees
was violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution and (iv) the appointment of the officers of the Ministry of Rehabilitation to the posts.
reserved for direct recruits through the Union Public Service Commission violated Art. 14 of the Constitution.
The relevant law on the subject is well settled. and does not
require further elucidation. Under Art. 16 bf. the Constitution,
there shall be equality of opportunity for'.all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State or
to promotion from one office to a higher office thereunder. Art. 16
of the Constitution is only an incident of the application of the concept of equality enshrined in Art. 14 thereof. It gives effect to the
doctrine of equality in the matter of appointment and promotion.
It follows that there can be a reasonable classification of the employees for the purpose of appointment or promotion. The concept
of equality in the matter of promotion can be predicated only when
the pr9motees are drawn from the same source. If the preferentiaf
treatment of one source in relation to the other is based on the
differences between the said two sources, and the said differences.
have a reasonable relation to the nature of the office or offices to
34
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1967] 2 S.C.R.
which recruitment is made, the said recruitment can legitimately
be sustained on the basis of a valid classification. There can be
cases where the differences between the two groups of recruits may
not be sufficient to give any preferential treatment to one against
the ntlwr in the matter of promotions, and, in that event, a court
may hold that there is no reasonable nexus hetween the differences
and the recruitment.
Tn short, whether there is a reasonable classification or not depends upon the facts of each case and the circumstances obtaining at the time the recruitment is made.
Further,
when a State makes :i classification between two sources of recruitment, unless the classification is unjust on the face of it, the onu'
lies upon the party attacking the classification to show by placing
the necessary material before the court that the said classification
is unreasonable and violative of Ari. 16 of the Constitution: see
Banarsidas v. 1/1e Stare of Uttar Pradesh('). All India Station
M(1sters' and Assistant Station Masters' Association '" General
Manager, Ccmral Railways(2); and The General Mmwr;er, Sowhem
Railway '" Ram;adwri(').
Let us ,1pply the said principles to the facts of the case. The
sheet-anchor of the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioners was that the petitioners. along with others, were promoted
before the new aprointments were made as Assistant Controllers,
subject to the condition that they were approved by rhe Cnion Public Service Commission and that. therefore, the direct recruits could
not be placed over them either on the principlt of aforesaid ratio
or on the principle of rotation and that in doing so the Government violated the doctrine of equality. The placing of the direct
recruits over the petitioners and others who had had long c.xpcrience
as Assistant c,rntrollcrs, the argument proceeded, was violative of
the doctrine of equality. There would be much force in this argument had the premises been correct.
But the documents filed demonstrate that it has no foundation. The promotion of two of
the petitioners, Kelkar and Deshmukh, were made by the Government by Order dated March 31, 1956; and the other two petitioners
were also, it is not disputed, promoted under similar Orders dated
September 4, 1956 and November l, 1961. Paragraph 5 of Order
dated March 3 I, 1956 reads:
"I am to add that the appointments of the Officers
mentioned above have been made on an ad interim basis
pending selection of the officers by the Union Public
Service Commission".
By that time in November, 1955, the Union Public Service Com-
:mission had advertised for the posts of Assistant Controllers.
(I) [1956] S.C.R. 357.
(2) [1960] 2 S.C.R. 3t t.
,(J) 11962) 2 S.C.R. 586.
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G.D. KELKAR v. CHIEF CONTROLLER (Subba Rao, C.J.)
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There was ahlo admittedly correspondence between the Government and the Union Public Service Commission indicating that the
Union Public Service Commission was questioning the regularity
of the appointments made earlier without framing rules and without
consulting them. With the said background if the said order is
looked into, there cannot be any doubt that the order in terms as
well as in intent made only ad hoc appointments pending the filling
up of the posts through the Union Public Service Commission.
The order says in terms that the appointment of the officers mentioned therein were made on an ad interim basis pending selection
of the officers by the Union Public Service Commission. If the
intention of the Government was that the officers mentioned therein
were appointed subject to the approval of the Union Public Service
Commission, the phraseology used would have been
different.
k would have run: "the appointments of the officers mentioned
above have been made, subject to the approval by the Union Public
Service Commission". On the other hand, the word "selection"
indicates that the appointments were only pending selection of the
officers to the posts. To state it differently, as the selection to the
said posts was impending through the usual channel of the Union
Public Service Commission from all the sources of recruitment, the
said officers were promoted on :m ad hoc basis. If that was the
intention-we have no doubt that it was so-it follows that the
petitioners and others similarly situated had no right to the posts
of Assistant Controllers.
If that be so, the factual position was that there were 76 vacancies and that the petitioners and others who were temporarily in
charge of some of the said posts were to be treated as occupying
their substantive posts of inferior grade. The result was that there
were two sources of recruitment to the 76 posts advertised, namely.
(i) by promotion from non-gazetted posts in the department, and
(ii) by direct recruitment. The qualifications for both are different.
For direct recruitment as Assistant Controllers the following are
the qualifications: (i) degree of a recognised university; and (ii)
about 5 years experience in responsible supervisory .capacity in
Government service or business concerns. The qualification was
relaxable at the discretion of the Union Public Service Commission;
and experience of work connected with imports and exports was
made desirable. For promotion, the qualification prescribed was
that the candidate should be a Section Head with a minimum of
three years service in that grade. It will, therefore, be seen that the
recruitment was made from two sources with different qualifications,
namely, (i) by promotion from the subordinate staff; and (ii) by
direct recruitment. It follows that they belonged to two different
categories.
It was then suggested that the ratio of 75 % for direct recruits
and 25 % for promotion from departmental candidates was discri-
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SUPREME COURT llEPOllTS
(1967) 2 S.CJt.
minatory. This point directly arose for consideration in Mervyn
Coutinho v. The Collector of Customs, &mbay.(1). Therein, this
Court accepted the validity of rotational system where the recruitment to a cadre was from two sources and held that such a system
did not violate the principle of equal opportunity enshrined in Art.
16( 1) of the Constitution.
But, it is saiu that if the sysrem of rotation was necessary, the
Government should have applied the ratio of 50:50 and not 7S:2S.
When the recruitment to certain posts is from different sources,
what ratio would be adequate and equitable would depend upon
the circumstances of each case and the requirements and needs
of a particular post. Unless the ratio is so unreasonable as to
amount to discrimination, it is not po5sible for this Court to strike
it down or suggest a different ratio. Nothing has been placed before us to show that the ratio of 3 : I is so flagrant and unreasonable
as to compel us to interfere with the order of the Government.
The next argument is that the Government, in effect and substance, accepted the principle of "carry forward" which was struck
down by this Court in T. Devadasan v. The Union of India.(2) There
certain reservations were made for recruitment to certain posts for
the members of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes; and if the
vacancies reserved for the said Castes and Tribes were not filled up
·in a particular year, the Government Order provided for carrying
forward the said vacancies to the subsequent year, and if in the
subsequent year also the said vacancies were not filled up, they would
he carried forward to the next year and so on. That rule was
struck down hy this Court on the ground that the guarantee given
under Art. 16(1) was for each individual citizen and, therefore
every citizen who was seeking employment or office under the State
was entitled to be afforded an opportunity for seeking such employment or appointment which was intended to be filled up and that the
principle of "carry forward" peprived him of such a right. This
decision has no bearing on the question raised before us. When a
similar argument was advanced in Mervyn Coutinho v. The Collector
of Customs, Bombay('), Wanchoo. J., observed thus:
"Nor do we think that this system (the system of
rotation) is on a par with the carry-forward rule which
was struck down by this Court' in T. De1·adasan v. The
Union of India(2) and on which strong reliance is placed
on behalf of the petitioners. In the case of the carryforward rule certain quota is fixed annually for a certain
· class of persons and it is carried forward from year to
year. This is very different from a case where a service
(I) [196613 S.C.R. 600.
(~) (1964) 4 S.C.R. 680.
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is divided into two parts and there are two sources of
recruitment, one of promotion .and the other by direct
recruitment. In such a case the whole cadre of a particular service is divided into two parts and there is no question of carrying anything forward from
year to year
in the matter of annual intake. The basis on which the
carry-forward rule was struck down by this Court does
not, therefore. apply to a case where the whole cadre of a
service is divided in certain fixed proportions between promotees and direct recruits''.
These observations directly apply to the present case. But it is
said that there is a difference between that case and the present one.
It is argued that the vacancies in the cadre of Assistant Controllers
that arose between 1952-55 were filled up subsequently and, therefore, in effect and substance, those vacancies were carried forward
to the subsequent year or years. This argument, if we may say so,
is fallacious. The vacancies were not reserved to be filled up in
any year nor were they ~arried forward to subsequent years. Certain vacancies arose and for certain reasons they were not permanently filled up, but some ad hoc appointments were made in regard
thereto and they were subsequently filled up by permanent appointees. We, therefore, reject this contention.
In this view the other points raised by learned counset for the
petitioners need not be considered.
As regards costs, we do not think that this is a fit ease for
awarding .costs to 1he State, for, as no rules under Art. 309 of the
Constitution were made in time and as appointments we~e made
on an ad hoc basis without consulting the Union Public Service
Commission, a lot of confusion was introduced in the administrative set up, with the result that persons who acted as Assistant Controllers for a number of years had to be superseded by direct recruits.
Whether another formula could have been more equitably evolved is
not for us to say, but the fact remains that the petitioners cannot be
blamed for coming to court for getting their rights settled one
way or other. The petition is, therefore, dismissed without costs.
V.P.S.
Petition dismissed.