# GULAM MUSTAFA & ORS v. THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS

- **Citation:** [1976] 1 S.C.R. 875
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1975-09-18
- **Case number:** CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDIC'!'.ION : Civil Appeal No. 675 of 1968
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/gulam-mustafa-ors-v-the-state-of-maharashtra-ors-6685
- **Pages:** 3

## Headnote

A
B
c
875
GULAM MUSTAFA & ORS.
v.
THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS.
September 18, 1975 ,
[V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, JJ.l
. flyder?bad Lcofld Acquisition Act-Acquisition of land for a village marketlf a public purpose-Excess land. sold to o hdusing colony-If acquisition ma/a
fide.
Certain ·lands belonging to the appellants were compulsorily acquired underthe Hyderabad Land Acquisition Act for running a country fair or market
(1nDndha).
A·fter the acquisition, the municipality parcelled out the excess land
and sold it for a housing colony. The High Court dismissed the appellants'
writ petition, in li111ine.
On app-cal to this Court it wa9 contended that the acquisition was not for
a public purpose and that it was 1nala fide.
Dismissing the appeal,
HELD: (l)(a) Providingi a village market.is an obvious .public purpose.
D
[876C-Dl
E
F
G
( b) A ntondha is a country fair or village market.
Market is defined in.
s. 2(20) of the Hyderabad District Municipalities Act in wide terms and s. 72
of the said Act enumerate9 the purposes for which property may be vested in
a municipality. This includes markets. It inexorably follows from a joint
reading of Ss. 2(20) and 72(a) of the District Municipalities Act that the
purpose of providing a mark_et for the townsfolk falls within the oowers of
the municipality.
[876G-H]
(2)(a) Striking down. any Act for nwfa fide exercise of poWer is a judiciai
reser..,.'ed power exercised lethally, but rarely. The charge of mala fides agaimt
public bodies and authorities is more 'easily made than made out.
It is the
last refuge of a losing litigant.
[876D]
(b) What has to be established is nwla fide exercise of power by the State
Govemment although the beneficiary is the municipality. There is no. evidence
of 111afus ani1nus in Government.
[877B]
(c) Apart from the fact that a horn~ing colony is a public necessity, onoo
the original acquisition is valid and title has vested in the municipality how
it uses the excess land is no concern of the original owner and cannot be the
basis for invalid~ting the acquisition. There is no principle of law by which
a valid compulsory acquisition stands voided because long later the requiring
authority diverts it to a public purpose other than the one stated in the dcclaralion.
[877C]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDIC'!'.ION : Civil Appeal No. 675 of 1968.
From the judgmt\nt and order dated the 19th January, 1967 of
the Bombay High Court in S.C.A. No. 16 of 1967.
s. J. Deshpande and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the appellant.
H
M. C. Bhandare and M. N. Shroff, for respondent nos. 1. 2 and 4.
D. V. Patel, K. Laxmanrao and S. Gopalakrishnan, for respondent
no. 3
·
876
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] I s.c.R. ·

## Text

A
B
c
875
GULAM MUSTAFA & ORS.
v.
THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS.
September 18, 1975 ,
[V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, JJ.l
. flyder?bad Lcofld Acquisition Act-Acquisition of land for a village marketlf a public purpose-Excess land. sold to o hdusing colony-If acquisition ma/a
fide.
Certain ·lands belonging to the appellants were compulsorily acquired underthe Hyderabad Land Acquisition Act for running a country fair or market
(1nDndha).
A·fter the acquisition, the municipality parcelled out the excess land
and sold it for a housing colony. The High Court dismissed the appellants'
writ petition, in li111ine.
On app-cal to this Court it wa9 contended that the acquisition was not for
a public purpose and that it was 1nala fide.
Dismissing the appeal,
HELD: (l)(a) Providingi a village market.is an obvious .public purpose.
D
[876C-Dl
E
F
G
( b) A ntondha is a country fair or village market.
Market is defined in.
s. 2(20) of the Hyderabad District Municipalities Act in wide terms and s. 72
of the said Act enumerate9 the purposes for which property may be vested in
a municipality. This includes markets. It inexorably follows from a joint
reading of Ss. 2(20) and 72(a) of the District Municipalities Act that the
purpose of providing a mark_et for the townsfolk falls within the oowers of
the municipality.
[876G-H]
(2)(a) Striking down. any Act for nwfa fide exercise of poWer is a judiciai
reser..,.'ed power exercised lethally, but rarely. The charge of mala fides agaimt
public bodies and authorities is more 'easily made than made out.
It is the
last refuge of a losing litigant.
[876D]
(b) What has to be established is nwla fide exercise of power by the State
Govemment although the beneficiary is the municipality. There is no. evidence
of 111afus ani1nus in Government.
[877B]
(c) Apart from the fact that a horn~ing colony is a public necessity, onoo
the original acquisition is valid and title has vested in the municipality how
it uses the excess land is no concern of the original owner and cannot be the
basis for invalid~ting the acquisition. There is no principle of law by which
a valid compulsory acquisition stands voided because long later the requiring
authority diverts it to a public purpose other than the one stated in the dcclaralion.
[877C]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDIC'!'.ION : Civil Appeal No. 675 of 1968.
From the judgmt\nt and order dated the 19th January, 1967 of
the Bombay High Court in S.C.A. No. 16 of 1967.
s. J. Deshpande and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the appellant.
H
M. C. Bhandare and M. N. Shroff, for respondent nos. 1. 2 and 4.
D. V. Patel, K. Laxmanrao and S. Gopalakrishnan, for respondent
no. 3
·
876
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] I s.c.R. ·
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
KR1sHNA IYER, J.
Brevity will do no inequity in this
appeal
where three points were urged but only ()Ille
survives for
serious
scanning.
The subject matter is the validity of land acquisition proceedings whereby a Municipality compulsorily purchased the appellant's land for the stated public purpose of running a country
lair
A
or market (mondha) under the Hyderaba!d Land Acquisition Act (for
R
short, the Act) which is closely similar to the Land Acquisition Act,
1923 (Central Act).
The first charge is that the High Court dismissed the Writ Petition in limine.
Seven years after the 1968 event,
we cannot consider sending back the case even if there be justice in
the submission.
We have therefore heard counsel Shri Deshpande
on his substantive grievances.
The second contention is that there
is no 'public purpose' to support the acquisition which is
allegedly
C
ultra vires the Municipality's powers.
We disagree.
Providing
a
village market is an obvious public purpose and a municipal facility.
The fast plea which has been pressed strenuously is that the acquisition exercise is ba\l being ma/a fide-an uphill task to
make
out
against a public body. Was this colourable exercise of power?
Striking down any act for mala fide exercise of power. is a judicial
reserve pQwer exercised lethally, but rarely.
The charge of malafides against public bodies and authorities is more easily made than
made out. It is the last refuge of a! losing litigant.
Even so, we
will examine the merits oil' the contention here from the point of
view of the serious factors placed for our consideration.
Was .this acquisition done
colore ofjicii?
The circumstances
relied on may be examined from this standpoint.
Section 5 ( 3) of
the Act provides for declaration of the pnblic purpose, like s. 6 ( 3)
of the Central Act.
This declaration was made in 1960 and covered
at least 28 acres of land belonging to the appeUant.
His
counsel
contends that there in no public purpose mentioned in the notifica•
tion because what is stated is 'g;overnment purpose'.
There is
no
force in this terminological deviation. The purpose has been set down
as for a 'mondha' or 'country fair' which is obviously a public purpose.
So counsel shifted to another shade of the same argument and stateid
that 'mondha' is not a wor'd known to law and has not been definen
anywhere and so such a purpose cannot be· taken cognizance of by
the law.
We cannot agree to tli~ linguistic game masquerading as a
legal point.
It is plain that a 'mondha' is a countrv fair or village
market.
'Market' is defined in s. 2(20) of the Hyderabad District
Municipalities Act in Wide terms, and s. 72 of the said Act enumera•es
the purposes for which property may be vested in a municipality.
This includes 'markets'.
It inexorably follows from a ioint reading
of ss. 2(20) and 72(a) that the purpose of providing a market for
the townsfolk falls within the powers of a municipality.
Failing here, counsel finally stressed that in any case no market
for a small municipal town requires. 28 acres of land,
especially
because the Master Plan prepared for the Municipality had allotted
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GULAM MUSTAFA v. Mf\HARASHTRA (Krishna Iyer, !.)
877
only 15 acre,s for this purpose. It is not for the Court to investigate
into the are_a necessary for running a market. Moreover there is
no mala [ides emerging from this circumstance.
What has to
be
established is mala fide exercise of power by the State Governmentthe acquiring authority-although the beneficiary of the acquisitiolll is
etventually the Municipality. There is no
scintilla
of
evidence
suggestive of ma/us animus in Government.
At this stage Shri Deshpande complained
that
actually
the
Municipal Committee had sold away the excess land marking them
out intQ separate plots for a housing colony, apart from the fact that
a housing colony is a public necessity, ouce the original acquisition
is valid and title has vested in the Municipality, how it uses
the
excess lanU is no1 concern of the original owner and cannot be the
basis for invalidating the acquisition.
There is no principle of law
by which a valid compulsory acquisiton stands voided because long
later the requiring authoritr diverts it to a public purpose other than
the one stated in the s. 5(3) declaration.
There is no merit in the appeal which is
dismissed
without
costs.
P.B.R .
Appeal dismissed.