# GULRAJ SINGH v. MOTA SINGH

- **Citation:** [1964] 7 S.C.R. 205
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1961-03-18
- **Bench:** P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR. c. J, K. N. Wanchoo, J. c. SHAH, N. Ra.Iagopala Ayyangar, S. M. Sikri
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/gulraj-singh-v-mota-singh-3105
- **Pages:** 5

## Headnote

DeCTee-Pre-emption suit by illegitimate son and daughter
of a female vendor-Whether the words "son or daughter of
such female" used in Punjab Pre-emption Act, as amended,
inc!ude an illegitimate son or daughter of such femalie-Puniab
Pre-emption Act, 1913 (1 of 1913), as amended by Act X of
1960, s. 15(2)(b).
The appellants-illegitimate son
and daughter of one
Sardarni-filed a suit to pre-empt the sale made by her of agricultural land to the respondents. Both the trial court as well
as the District Court on appeal granted to the appellants a decree for pre-emption, though to a limited extent. On second
appeal by the respondents, the High Court directed the dismissal of the suit on the ground that the appellants were not comprehended within the class of persons who were entitled to
pre-emption under s. 15(2)(b) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act
as amended by Act X of 1960. On appeal by Special Leave the
appellants contended that the provision in s. 15 of the Preemption Act must be read in conjunction with the Hindu
Succession Act, 1956 which made provision for the devolution
of property belonging to a female owner and that as under
the latter enactment illegitimate children of the Hindu female
were entitled to succeed to her property, it must be held that
when the Punjab legislature used in 1960 the expression 'son
or daughter' it meant a son or a daughter who would be entitled to succeed as an heir of a Hindu female.
Held: The normal rule of construction of the words
"child" "son" or udaughter" in a statute would include only
legitimate children. No doubt, there might be express provision iri the statute itself to give these words a more extende<'
meaning as to include also illegitimate children and s. 3(j) of tl
Hindu Succession Act (Act XXX of 1956) furnishes a goo<.
illustration of such a provision. It might even be that without
an express provision in that regard the context might indicate
lhat the words were used in a more comprehensive sense as
indicating merely a blood relationship apart from the question
of legitimacy. Section 15 contains no ""Press provision and
the context, so far as it goes, is not capable of lending any
support to such a construction. In the first place, the words
"Son or daughter" occur more than once in that section. It
was fairly conceded on behalf of the appellant that where ·the
son or daughter of a male vendor is referred to, as in s. 15(1)
the words mean only the legitimate issue of the vendor. If
so, it cannot be that in· the case of a female vendor the words
could have a different connotation. Even taking the case of
a female vendor herself, there is a reference in s. 15(2}(a)(i)
to the brother's son of such vendor. It could hardly be argued
that a brother's illegitimate son is comprehended within those
words. Therefore, it must be held that when s. 15(2)(b)(i) uses
the words "son or daughter" it meant only a legitimate son
and legitimate daughter of the female vendor.
March 18
1961
Gult-aj Singh
v.
.Mota Sin1h
A!!Y"ngar, J.
206
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
CIVIL . APPELLATE JURISDICTION-Civil Appeal No. 467
of 1963.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree
dated February 1961 of the Punjab High Court in Regular
Second Appeal No. 837 of 1960.
Bishan Narain and Naunit Lal, for the appellants.
Yashpa/ Gandhi and S. D. Goswami, for the respondents.
March 13, 1964. The judgment of the Court was delivered by
AYYANGAR,
J.-Do the
words
"son
or daughter
of such female" occurring in s., 15(2)(b) of the Punjab Preemption Act, 1913 as amended by Act X of 1960 include an
illegitimate son or illegitimate daughter of such female is
the only question that arises in this appeal by special leave.
The appellants are the illegitimate son and daughter of
one Sardarni Prem Prakash Kaur. By a registered deed of
sale dated December 1, 1956 the said lady sold 18 bighas, ·
1 biswas and 5! biswansis of agricultural land for a sum of
Rs. I 0,000 /- to the respondents. The appellants filed a suit
to pre-empt

## Text

7 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
205
GULRAJ SINGH
v.
MOTA SINGH
[P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR. c. J., K. N. WANCHOO, J. c. SHAH,
N. RA.IAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND S. M. SIKRI, JJ.J
DeCTee-Pre-emption suit by illegitimate son and daughter
of a female vendor-Whether the words "son or daughter of
such female" used in Punjab Pre-emption Act, as amended,
inc!ude an illegitimate son or daughter of such femalie-Puniab
Pre-emption Act, 1913 (1 of 1913), as amended by Act X of
1960, s. 15(2)(b).
The appellants-illegitimate son
and daughter of one
Sardarni-filed a suit to pre-empt the sale made by her of agricultural land to the respondents. Both the trial court as well
as the District Court on appeal granted to the appellants a decree for pre-emption, though to a limited extent. On second
appeal by the respondents, the High Court directed the dismissal of the suit on the ground that the appellants were not comprehended within the class of persons who were entitled to
pre-emption under s. 15(2)(b) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act
as amended by Act X of 1960. On appeal by Special Leave the
appellants contended that the provision in s. 15 of the Preemption Act must be read in conjunction with the Hindu
Succession Act, 1956 which made provision for the devolution
of property belonging to a female owner and that as under
the latter enactment illegitimate children of the Hindu female
were entitled to succeed to her property, it must be held that
when the Punjab legislature used in 1960 the expression 'son
or daughter' it meant a son or a daughter who would be entitled to succeed as an heir of a Hindu female.
Held: The normal rule of construction of the words
"child" "son" or udaughter" in a statute would include only
legitimate children. No doubt, there might be express provision iri the statute itself to give these words a more extende<'
meaning as to include also illegitimate children and s. 3(j) of tl
Hindu Succession Act (Act XXX of 1956) furnishes a goo<.
illustration of such a provision. It might even be that without
an express provision in that regard the context might indicate
lhat the words were used in a more comprehensive sense as
indicating merely a blood relationship apart from the question
of legitimacy. Section 15 contains no ""Press provision and
the context, so far as it goes, is not capable of lending any
support to such a construction. In the first place, the words
"Son or daughter" occur more than once in that section. It
was fairly conceded on behalf of the appellant that where ·the
son or daughter of a male vendor is referred to, as in s. 15(1)
the words mean only the legitimate issue of the vendor. If
so, it cannot be that in· the case of a female vendor the words
could have a different connotation. Even taking the case of
a female vendor herself, there is a reference in s. 15(2}(a)(i)
to the brother's son of such vendor. It could hardly be argued
that a brother's illegitimate son is comprehended within those
words. Therefore, it must be held that when s. 15(2)(b)(i) uses
the words "son or daughter" it meant only a legitimate son
and legitimate daughter of the female vendor.
March 18
1961
Gult-aj Singh
v.
.Mota Sin1h
A!!Y"ngar, J.
206
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
CIVIL . APPELLATE JURISDICTION-Civil Appeal No. 467
of 1963.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree
dated February 1961 of the Punjab High Court in Regular
Second Appeal No. 837 of 1960.
Bishan Narain and Naunit Lal, for the appellants.
Yashpa/ Gandhi and S. D. Goswami, for the respondents.
March 13, 1964. The judgment of the Court was delivered by
AYYANGAR,
J.-Do the
words
"son
or daughter
of such female" occurring in s., 15(2)(b) of the Punjab Preemption Act, 1913 as amended by Act X of 1960 include an
illegitimate son or illegitimate daughter of such female is
the only question that arises in this appeal by special leave.
The appellants are the illegitimate son and daughter of
one Sardarni Prem Prakash Kaur. By a registered deed of
sale dated December 1, 1956 the said lady sold 18 bighas, ·
1 biswas and 5! biswansis of agricultural land for a sum of
Rs. I 0,000 /- to the respondents. The appellants filed a suit
to pre-empt this sale. There was some dispute about the consideration actually paid but we are not now concerned with
it. Both the trial court as well as the District Court on appeal
granted to the appellants a decree for pre-emption, though
to a limited extent. The respondents filed a second appeal to
the High Court and the learned Judges, by the judgment
now under appeal, directed the dismissal of the suit on the
ground that the appellants were not comprehended within
the class of persons who were entitled to pre-emption under
s. 15(2)(b) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act as it now stands
under the amendment effected by Act X of 1960. It is from
this judgment that, by special leave, the present appeal has
been brought.
Mr. Bishan Narain~learned Cmmsel for the appellants
submitted to us that the provision in s. 15 of the Pre-emption
Act must be read in conjunction with the Hindu Succession
Act, 1956 which made provision for the devolution of property belonging to a female owner and that as under the
latter enactment illegitimate children of a Hindu female were
entitled to succeed to her property, it must be held that when
the Punjab legislature used in 1960 the expression 'son or
daughter' it meant a son or a daughter who would be entitled to sucteed as an heir of a Hindu female. We are unable
to accept this submission of learned Counsel.
Section 15
whose construction calls for consideration reads as follows:
"15. Persons in whom right of pre-emption vests in
respect of sales of agricultural land and village
I
'1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
207
immovable property.-(1) The right of pre-emption in respect of agricultural land and village
immovable property shall vest-
(a) where the sale is by a sole owner: -
First, in the son or daughter or son's son or
daughter's son of the vendor;
Secondly, in the brother or brother's son of the
vendor;
Thirdly, in the father's brother or father's brother's
son of the vendor;
Fourthly, in the tenant who holds under tenancy
of the vendor the land or property, sold or a part
thereof;
(b) where the sale is of a share out of joint land
or property and is not made by all the cosharers jointly: -
First, in the sons or daughters or son's sons or
daughter's sons of the vendor or vendors;
Secondly, in the brothers or brother's sons of the
vendor or vendors;
Thirdly, in the father's brothers or. father's brother's sons of the vendor or vendors;
Fourthly, in the other co-sharers;
Fifthly, in the tenants who hold under tenancy _
of the vendor or vendors the land or property
sold or a part thereof;
(c) where the sale is of land or property owned
jointly and is made by all the co-sharers jointly: -
First, in the sons or daughters or son's sons or
daughter's sons of the vendors;
Secondly, in the brothers or brother's sons of the
vendors;
Thirdly, in the father's brothers or father's brother's sons of the vendors;
Fourthly, in the tenants who hold under tenancy
·of the vendors or any one of them the land or
property sold or a part thereof.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-seotion (1)-
(a) where the· sale is by a female of land or property to which she has succeeded through her
father or brother or the sale in respect of such
1964
Gulraj Sin.gh
v.
Mota Singh
_,,
Ayyongar, J,
•
1964
Gtdraj Singh
v.
Mota Singh
Awangar,J.
•
208
SuPREME COURT REPORTS
[196!l]
land or property is by the son or daughter of
such female after inheritance, the right of preemption shall vest: -
(j) if the sale is by such female, in her brother
or brother's son;
(ii) if the sale is by the son or daughter of
such female, in the mother's brothers or the
mother's brother's sons of the vendor or vendors;
{bl where the sale is by a female of land or property to which she has succeeded through her
husband, or through her son in case the son
has inherited the land or property sold from
his father, the right of pre-emption shall
vest:-
First, in the son or daughter of such female;
Secondly, in the husband's brother or husband's brother's son of such female."
The submission of learned Counsel virtually amounts to
this that in order to construe the words used .in s. 15 one
;should travel beyond the enactment and ascertain the class
of persons who are entitled under the Hindu Succession Act
to succeed as heirs of the intestate vendor. Even a. cursory
·examination would show that this construction is untenable
and that the framers of the Act did not proceed on any such
theory. Take, for instance, the case where a female succeeds
to property through her father or brother dealt with in
s. 15(2)(a) of the Pre-emption Act Her heirs under the Hindu
Succession Act would be, if the property was inherited from
her father; her son or daughter (including the children of
any predeceased son or daughter) and in their absencethe heirs of the father. If, however, the property was inherit-
·ed from her brother, the devolution is different (vide s. 15(1)
and (2)). The devolution provided by s. 15(2)(a)(i) of the
Pre-emption Act is different and confers the right to pre-emot
on her brother or her brother's son. The theory, therefore,
that we should resort to the line of heirs as in an intestate
succession under the Hindu Succession Act or, for the matter
of that, to any other system of Common Law or statute
applicable to the vendor is obviously untenable. Pursuing
this line of reasoning a little, it was not disputed that if the
female vendor were a Christian by religion, only her legitimate issue would be denoted by these words. As it is common ground that the statutory right.of pre-emption conferred
by s. 15 is as much applicable to a Christian owner of property as to a Hindu, it would be seen that the construction
-of the words of this statute of general application would be
· 7 S.O.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
209
made to depend on the religion to which the vendor belonged, and in fact would vary with any change made by statute
in the law of intestate succession as applicable to different
communities. The .position that would arise on a conversion
of the vendor to a different faith, with a different personal
law as to succession would bring out in bold relief the unsustainability of the submission based on the peculiarities of
the personal law as to intestate succession applicable to the
vendor.
We have, therefore, to ascertain whether by the expression 'son or daughter' only the legitimate issue of such
female is comprehended or whether the words are wide
enough to include illegitimate children also. That the normal
rule of construction of the words "child'', "son" or
"daughter" occurring in a statute would include only legitimate children ·i.e., born in wedlock, is too elementary to
require authority. No doubt, there might be express provision in the statute itself to give these ·words a more extend·
ed meaning as to include also illegitimate children and s. 3(j)
of the Hindu Succession Act (Act XXX of 1956) furnishes
a good illustration of such a provision. It might even be
that without an express provision in that regard the context
might indicate that the words were used in a more comprehensive sense as indicating merely a blood relationship apart
from the question of legitimacy .. Section 15 wit1J which we
are concerned contains no· express provision and the coritext,
so far as it goes, is not capable of lending any support to
such a construction. In the first place, the words "son or
daughter" occur more than . once in that section. It was
fairly conceded by Mr. Bishan Narain that where the son
or daughter of a male vendor is referred to, as in s. 15(1),
the words mean only the legitimate issue of the vendor. If
so, it cannot be that in the case of a female vendor the words
could have a different connotation. Even taking the case of
a female vendor herself, there is a reference in s. 15(2)(a)(i)
to the brother's son of such vendor. It could hardly be open
to argument that a brother's illegitimate son is comprehended
within those words. The matter appears to us to be too clear
for argument that when s. 15(2)(b)(i) uses the words "son or
daughter" it meant only a legitimate son and a legitimate
daughter of the female vendor.
The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
1954
Golraj 8ing1'
v.
Mota Singh
Ayyangar, J.