# Gurbttchan Sinzh v. The State of Bomboy and Another

- **Citation:** [1952] 1 S.C.R. 744
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1949-09-13
- **Bench:** Patanjali Sastri C.J, Meher Chand Mah, Ajan, Mukherjea, Das, Chandrasekhara Aiyar Jj
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/gurbttchan-sinzh-v-the-state-of-bomboy-and-another-63
- **Pages:** 13

## Headnote

Mysore House Rent and Accommodation Control Order, 1948Va/idity-F,,ndamental right not to be deprived of property-Constitutiou of India, Arts. 31 (2), 19 (!) (!)-Order of allotment ~efore
Constit"tion came into for'l'e-Possession taken thereafter-Validity of proceedings-Writ for quashing orders-Maintainability.
'
A house belonging to the petitioner in the Bangalore City
-' 0 -<
l'cll vacant on the !st September, 1949,
and
on
the
13th
September, 1949, an order was passed by
the Rent Co"troller
•
-.. ,
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
under
the
Mysore
House
Rent and Accommodation Control Order, 1948, allotting the house to another person and
directing the petitioner to deliver possession to the latter. The
petitioner protested and took various steps to get the order
vacated but he was
unsuccessful
and forcible possession wu
taken from him under an order made on the 11th April, 1950.
He applied to the Supreme Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution for quashing the
order
allotting the
house
and
the
subsequent orders made to enforce that order, on the ground,
inter
alia,
that
these
orders
contravened
the
provisions_ of
Arts. 31
(2) and 19
(1) (£)
of the Constitution:
Held, (i) that as the order of allotment was made before the
Constitution came into force and at a time when the Control
Order provided, validly, that a house could be taken for the
occupation of a private individual, the order could not be impugned on the ground that it contravened Art. 31(2) or 19(1) (f)
of the Constitution; (ii) the fact that possession was actually
taken on! y in pursuance of an order made on the 11th April,
1950, was immaterial as the petitioner's right to possession was
lost earlier; (iii) Art. 31 (2) was inapplicable for another reason
also, namely, that there was no acquisition of the house by the
State, as taking of possession can only be from a person who is
entitled to possession and the landlord lost this right to possession by reason of the Controller's order.
Held also, that the power conferred by cl. (bb) of sub-cl. {2)
>-·
of Rule 81 of the Defence of India Rules (under which the Control Order was made) was not confined to cases where the house
was available for letting or subletting in the
sense
that the
landlord did not require the house for his own use or had
not let it to another himself.
ORIGINAL JurusDICTION : Petition No. 297 of 1951.
Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India
for enforcement of fundamental rights by quashing
the orders of the Deputy Commissioner and House
_.,.
Rent Controller, Bangalore, allotitjing \the' petitfoner's
house to the 3rd respondent and for taking forcible
possession of the same.
S. K. Venkataranga Iyengar for the petitioner.
A. R. Somanatha Iyer, Advocate-General of Mysore,
(R. Ganapathy Iyer, with him) for the respondent No. 1.
K. Ramaseshayya
Chowdhury for the respondent
~
No. 2.
1952. May 26. The Judgment of the Court w;u
delivered by
5-8 S.C. India/71
1952
D. K.
N ab!tirajiak
v.
Tke State of
Mysore
•11d Others.
1952
D. K.
N abhirajiah
v.
The State of
Mysore
and Others.
Chandrasek._hara
Aiyar /.
746
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
CHANDRASEKHARA
AIYER J.-This is an application
under article 32 of the Constitution for quashing the
orders of the Deputy ., Commission.er and House Rent
Controller, Bangalore, (2nd respondent) allotting house
No. 291, Fifth Main Road, Gandhi Nagar, Bangalore
City, for the use of Sri Aswathanarayana
Rao (3rd
respondent)
and
taking forcible
possession
of
the
same.
The State of Mysore has been impleaded as the
first respondent.
The facts are these.
The petitioner D. K. Nabhirajiah is a merchant and is the owner of the premises
aforesaid. After lengthy litigation, the
previous tenant
of the premises vacated it on 1st September, 1949. On
2nd September, 1949, the petitioner notified the vacancy
to the 2nd respondent as required by law but added
that he wanted the premises for his own use to set up
one of his grown-up sons in a business in
clectr'ical
goods.
The third re

## Text

1952
Gurbttchan Sinzh
v.
The State of
Bomboy
and Another.
Muk_herjea ].
1952
May 26.
744
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
suspect. The power to initiate proceedings under the
Act has been vested in a very high and responsible
officer and he is expected to act with caution and
impartia!'ity while discharging his duties under the
Act.
This
contention
of
Mr. Umrigar
must, therefore, fail.
The last point made by Mr. Umrigar d0es not seem
to us to be tenable.
It is true that a procedure
·'-. •
different from what is laid down under the ordinary
law has been provided _for a particular class of persons
against whom proceedings could be taken under sec-
'-...
tion 27(1) of the City of Bombay Police Act, but the
discrimination if any is based upon a reasonable classi- .
fication which is within the competency of the legislature to make. Having regard to the objective which
. •
the legislation has in view and the policy underlyiag it,
a departure from the ordinary procedure can certainly'
'be justified as the best means of giving effect to the
object
of
the
legislature.
In
our
opinion,
therefore,
there is no substance in the petition and it
shall stand dismissed.
Petition dismissed.
_4·
Agent for the petitioner: P. K. Chatterjee.
Agent for the respondents : P. A. Mehta.
D. K. NABHIRAJIAH
v.
THE STATE OF MYSORE AND OTHERS.
[PATANJALI SASTRI C.J., MEHER CHAND MAH,AJAN,
MUKHERJEA, DAS and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.J
Mysore House Rent and Accommodation Control Order, 1948Va/idity-F,,ndamental right not to be deprived of property-Constitutiou of India, Arts. 31 (2), 19 (!) (!)-Order of allotment ~efore
Constit"tion came into for'l'e-Possession taken thereafter-Validity of proceedings-Writ for quashing orders-Maintainability.
'
A house belonging to the petitioner in the Bangalore City
-' 0 -<
l'cll vacant on the !st September, 1949,
and
on
the
13th
September, 1949, an order was passed by
the Rent Co"troller
•
-.. ,
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
under
the
Mysore
House
Rent and Accommodation Control Order, 1948, allotting the house to another person and
directing the petitioner to deliver possession to the latter. The
petitioner protested and took various steps to get the order
vacated but he was
unsuccessful
and forcible possession wu
taken from him under an order made on the 11th April, 1950.
He applied to the Supreme Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution for quashing the
order
allotting the
house
and
the
subsequent orders made to enforce that order, on the ground,
inter
alia,
that
these
orders
contravened
the
provisions_ of
Arts. 31
(2) and 19
(1) (£)
of the Constitution:
Held, (i) that as the order of allotment was made before the
Constitution came into force and at a time when the Control
Order provided, validly, that a house could be taken for the
occupation of a private individual, the order could not be impugned on the ground that it contravened Art. 31(2) or 19(1) (f)
of the Constitution; (ii) the fact that possession was actually
taken on! y in pursuance of an order made on the 11th April,
1950, was immaterial as the petitioner's right to possession was
lost earlier; (iii) Art. 31 (2) was inapplicable for another reason
also, namely, that there was no acquisition of the house by the
State, as taking of possession can only be from a person who is
entitled to possession and the landlord lost this right to possession by reason of the Controller's order.
Held also, that the power conferred by cl. (bb) of sub-cl. {2)
>-·
of Rule 81 of the Defence of India Rules (under which the Control Order was made) was not confined to cases where the house
was available for letting or subletting in the
sense
that the
landlord did not require the house for his own use or had
not let it to another himself.
ORIGINAL JurusDICTION : Petition No. 297 of 1951.
Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India
for enforcement of fundamental rights by quashing
the orders of the Deputy Commissioner and House
_.,.
Rent Controller, Bangalore, allotitjing \the' petitfoner's
house to the 3rd respondent and for taking forcible
possession of the same.
S. K. Venkataranga Iyengar for the petitioner.
A. R. Somanatha Iyer, Advocate-General of Mysore,
(R. Ganapathy Iyer, with him) for the respondent No. 1.
K. Ramaseshayya
Chowdhury for the respondent
~
No. 2.
1952. May 26. The Judgment of the Court w;u
delivered by
5-8 S.C. India/71
1952
D. K.
N ab!tirajiak
v.
Tke State of
Mysore
•11d Others.
1952
D. K.
N abhirajiah
v.
The State of
Mysore
and Others.
Chandrasek._hara
Aiyar /.
746
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
CHANDRASEKHARA
AIYER J.-This is an application
under article 32 of the Constitution for quashing the
orders of the Deputy ., Commission.er and House Rent
Controller, Bangalore, (2nd respondent) allotting house
No. 291, Fifth Main Road, Gandhi Nagar, Bangalore
City, for the use of Sri Aswathanarayana
Rao (3rd
respondent)
and
taking forcible
possession
of
the
same.
The State of Mysore has been impleaded as the
first respondent.
The facts are these.
The petitioner D. K. Nabhirajiah is a merchant and is the owner of the premises
aforesaid. After lengthy litigation, the
previous tenant
of the premises vacated it on 1st September, 1949. On
2nd September, 1949, the petitioner notified the vacancy
to the 2nd respondent as required by law but added
that he wanted the premises for his own use to set up
one of his grown-up sons in a business in
clectr'ical
goods.
The third respondent
Aswathanarayana
Rao
however wanted the house for a children's school
which he was running under the name of Bala Mandir
and so he not only applied to the Reht Controller for
allotting to him that house but also moved the Minister for Law and Labour for the same purpose.
The second respondent made an
order on
13th
September, 1949, in the following terms :
"With reference to your vacancy report in respect
of the above place you are informed under clause 3
(2) of the Mysore House Rem and Accommodation
Control Order, 1948 that the building is required for
the occupation of Balamandira Home for the children
and for residential use of the Director. You are therefore directed under clause 3 ( 4) of the Mysore House
Rent and Accommodation Control Order, 1948 to hand
over possession of the above house to the said
Sri
Aswathanarayana Rao, Director, Balarnandira."
By a.n order dated 20th September, 1949, made on
an application by. the petitioner dated 16th September, 1949, the Deputy Commissioner refused to reconsider the allotment and required the petitioner to give
effect to the same at once and deliver possession to the
allottee.
....
'
. .
'
,.... .
..
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
747
The petitioner preferred an appeal to the Commissioner of Labour who is the House Rent Control
Appellate Authority and obtained
a stay, but the
appeal was eventually dismissed and the said
order
vacated on 28th December, 1949. He filed a Revision
Petition No. 97 of 1949-50 before the Government of
Mysore but without success and the Government declined to interfere by their order dated 14th March,
1950.
He then resorted to the High Court of Mysore
by means of a petition under section 45 of the Mysore
Specific Relief Act. This again' was dismissed on the
ground that the party who seeks to obtain an order
under the said section cannot do so on the allegation
that the statute which enjoins the doing or forbearing
of the act is itself illegal or ultra vires. Applications
moved under article 226 of the Constitution in the
course of the same proceedings also failed.
This was
on 5th January, 1951.
Some intermediate steps may now be set out. The
third respondent complained that he had not been
given possession.
On this complaint, the second respondent passed an order on the 20th March, 1950, to
the following effect :-
"Sri Aswathanarayana Rao, the allottee
of the
:i.bove house, has reported that you have not handed
over possession of the house to him. You are required
to show cause immediately why you should not be
prosecuted for failure to obey the order.
Please note
that if the house is not handed over to the allottee,
2ction will be taken under clause 3 ( 6) to take forcible
possession of the house through police."
The petitioner lodged a protest against this order
pointing out that the House Rent Accommodation
Control Order did not vest the Controller with jurisdiction to allot the house, but on 23rd March, 1950,
he received the following reply :-
"Your letters under reference have been examined
carefully. It is not correct to say that allotment of a
house to any party (private) is illegal. Clause 3 of
1952
D. K.
Nabhirajiah
v.
The State of
Mysore
and Others.
Chandrasekhara
Aiyar /.
1952
D. K.
N abhiraji'ah
v.
The Stat• of
Mysor•·
and Oth.,,.s.
Chandmsekharu
Aiyar /.
7•f8
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
the Mysore House Rent Control Order, 1948, is amended to include any person also. I do not find any
other
reason
except that you are
evading to give
possession
to the
allottee.
You are hereby finally
warned that if possession is not given to the allottee action will be taken to prosecute you and take
forcible possession of the house."
On 11th April, 1950, the second respondent made
the following order :-
"Whereas premises No. 291, Fifth Main Road,
Gandhi Nagar was allotted to Sri Aswathanarayana
Rao of Balamandira.
The owner's appeal before
the
Labour Commissioner and Government having been
rejected, the owner filed a petition before the High
Court of Mysore who passed an interim order and
which was vacated by the order referred to above. A
subsequent appeal
before
the
Labour Commissioner
has
also been rejected and stay vacated in Endorsement in H.R.C. 1/1949-50 dated 10th April, 1950.
I
therefore direct the owner Sri D. K. Nabhirajiah to
hand over possession of the said house to Sri Aswathanarayana Rao at once, failing which, I authorise the
Superintendent of Police, Bangalore City or any other
officer empowered by him in his behalf to take possession of the house and hand over to the allottee, Sn
Aswathanarayana Rao."
As this order was not obeyed by the petitioner, forcible possession was taken of the house with police
help and the third respondent was given possession.
The petitioner seeks to quash the above-mentioned
orders of the second respondent dated 20th September,
1949, 20th March,
1950, 23rd March, 1950, and
11th
April,
1950.
The prayer in the petition is thus
worded:-
"for quashing the orders of the second respondent
No. 522-Acc.
(b )-49 dated 20th September, 1949,
confirmed by Appellate Authority 'in H.R.C. Appeal
No. 117 of 1949-1950 dated 28th December, 1949, and
by the Government of Mysore in H.R.C. Revision
Petition No.
97 of
1949-1950
dated
14th
March,
• 4.
' ,_
'
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
749
1950,
and
also
the
subsequent
orders
of
the
second
respondent
No.
562
Acc.
(b )-50
dated
20th
March,
1950,
23rd
March, 1950,
and
11th
April,
1950,
respecti:vely
a.Hotting
and
taking
over forcible possession of the property No. 291, Fifth
Main Road, Gandhi Nagar, Bangalore City, for the
use of a private individual, the thlrd respondent,
and
for costs."
·The contention of the petitioner is a threefold one,
namely:-
(1) The order allotting the premises to the third
respondent contravenes the provisions of article
31,
sub-clause (2) and article 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution.
~. ·
(2) The order is discriminatory and offends article
14 of the Constitution,.
(3) Under the Defence of India Rub under which
the Accommodation Control Order was made, the
:1llotment can only be of houses available for letting.
It will be convenient here to set out the relevant
legislative provision's.
The Mysore House Rent and
Accommodation
Control
Order,
1948,
(hereinafter
referred to for the sake of convenience as the Control
Order) was made in exercise of the powers conferred
by clause (bb) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 81 of the Defence
of India Rules as applied to Mysore, and it came into
force with effect from 1st July, 1948.
Clause 3 of the
Control Order provides, subject to two exceptions, for
notice being given by the landlord to the Controller
within seven days after a house becomes vacant. Subclause (2), as it originally stood, was in the following
terms:-
"(2) If within ten days of the receipt by the Controller of a notice under sub-clause (1), the Controller
does not intimate the landlord in writing that the
house is required for the purposes of the Government
of Mysore, or of the Central Government, or of the
Government of an Indian Province or State, or of any
local authority or public body, or of any educational
or other public institution for the occupation of any
1952
D. K.
Nabhirajiah
v.
Tise State of
Mysore
.ntl Othet'S.
Chandra·
sekhara
Aiyar /.
1952
D. K.
Nabhirajiah
v.
The Stat• of
Mys01e
and Otiiers.
Chand:•asekhai·a
Aiyar /.
750
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
officer of any such government authority, body or
institution, the landlord shall be at liberty to let the
house to any tenant, or if the Controller, on application made by the landlord permits the landlord to do
so, to occupy the house himself."
By a notification dated 4th May, 1949, the words :
"or for the occupation of any individual" were added
after the words "body or institution" in the said
sub-section.
The sub-clause as amended runs thus :
"(2) If within ten days of the receipt by the
Controller of a notice under sub-clause (1), the Controller does not intimate the landlord in writing that
the house is required for the purposes of the Government of Mysore, or of the Central Government, or of
tlie Government of an Indian Province or State, or of
any local authority or public body, or of any educational or other public institution, or for the occupation
of any officer of any such Government authority, body
or institution or for the occupation of any
individual,
the landlord shall be at liberty to let the house to any
tenant, or if the Controller on application made by the
landlord, permits the landlord to do
~o, to occupy the
house himself."
Sub-clause (3) says :-
"The landlord shall not let the house to a tenant or
occupy it himself, before the expiry of the period of tea
days specified in sub-clause (2), unless he has received
intimation that the house is not required for the purposes referred to in that sub-clause or the permission
referred to therein, earlier."
To this sub-clause, a proviso was added by a notification to the following effect :
"Provided that the Controller, before requiring the
house for any of the purposes stated above, shall take
into consideration such l:epresentati;on, if any, as may.
be made by the owner regarding his bona fide requirements for personal occupation."
Then comes sub-clause ( 4) which reads as follows :-
"( 4) If the house is required for any of the purposes or for the
occupati~n by any of the officers
....
-
-;
..,-
...
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
751
specified in .sub-clause (2) the landlord shall deliver
possession of the house to the Government authority,
body or institution concerned and such
Government
authority or body or institution shall be deemed to be
the tenant of the landlord, with retrospective
effect
from the date on which the Controller received notice
under sub-clause (1), the terms of the tenancy being·
such as may be agreed upon between the landlord and
the tenant:
Provided that the rent payable shall not exceed
the fair rent which may be payable for the house
under the provisions-of this Order."
The Mysore House Rent and Accommodation Control Order of 1948 was repealed by the Mysore House
Rent and Accommodation Control Act XXX of 1951.
But what is relevant and material for disposal of this
petition is the earl'ier Control Order as all the proceedings now in question were taken under it.
If the allotment had been made under the Control
Order prior to the date of its amendment on 4th May,
1949, the petitioner would have had a good case to
urge. Sub-clause (2) as it then stood spoke of the
house being required for certain specified purposes or
for any educational or other public institution, or for the
occupation of an officer of any Government authority,
body or institution ; and the house could not liave
been
required
for
the
occupation
of a private
individual. But the amendment has
enlarged
the
scope of the power of the Controller by providing that
the requirement may also be for the occupation of any
ind
11vidual.
·
The answer to the first contention based on article
31 (2) or article 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution is a short
one. The · Constitution came into force on the 26th
January, 1950, after the impugned orders were made
and at a time when there was nothing like a chapter of
Fundamental Rights.
The argument that the requisition in the present case was not for any public purpose
and the restriction on the respondent to hold property
must be in the interest of the general public presupposes that the Constitution governs the case. This
1952
D. K.
N abhirajiall
v.
The State of
Mysore
attd 0 then.
Chandrasekhara
Aiyar /.
19~2
D. K.
N abhirajiah
v.
The State of
My_sore
Qnd Others.
Chandrasekhara
Aiyar /.
752
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
assumption, however, is not well-founded. The order
of allotment was made before the Constitution came
into force and at a time when the Control Order provided, validly, that a house could be taken for the
occupation of a private 'individual.
During the period
of 10 days specified in sub-clause (2), the landlord could
not let the house or occupy it himself, and on allotment he was bound to deliver up possession to the
allottee. His rights as landlord were thus at an end so
far as possession was concerned.
Whether retrospective effect could
be given to
article 13 ( l) of the Constitution arose for decision in
Keshavan Madhava Menon v. The State of Bombay(').
Dealing
with the argument
that
the
said
article
rendered void ab initio and for all purposes an earlier
law which was inconsistent with fundamental rights, it
was laid down by this Court in that case "that such
laws existed for all past transactions and for enforcing
all rights and tiabilities accrued before the date of the
Constitution." (Per Das J., at page 234).
Mr. Justice Mahajan observed at pages 249 and
250 :-
"It is admitted that after the 26th January,
1950,
there has been no infringement of the appellant's right
of freedom of speech or expression. In September,
1949,
he
did
not
enjoy either complete
freedom
of
speech
or full
freedom
of
expression.
It
is
in relation
to
the
freedom
guaranteed
in article
19 ( l) of the Constitution to the citizen that the
provisions
of article
13 (1)
come
into play. The
article does not declare any law void independently
of
the
existence
of
the
freedom
guaranteed
by
Part III. A citizen must be possessed of a fundamental
right before he can ask the court to declare a law
which is inconsistent with it void; but if a citizen is
not possessed of the right, he cannot claim this relief."
These remarks have application here.
\- •
·-
..
'
The learned Advocate for the petitioner sought to
'>-•
get over this
difficulty
by pointing out that the
( 1)
[1951] S.C:R. 228.
-
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
753
dispossess
1ion took
place on
11-4-1950.
This,
however, is no answer. The dispossession was a mere consequence which followed under clause 3, sub-clause ( 6),
of the Control Order.
The right to possession was
lost earlier and the landlord merely held on to the
property.
Article 31 (2) does not apply for another reason.
There was no acquisition by the State of the house.
The taking of possession can only be from a person
who is entitled to possession. The petitioner landlord
lost
his
right
to
possession
by
reason of
the
Controller's order.
As
soon as the allotment
Is made, the allottee becomes a tenant and the owner
becomes the landlord by reason of sub-clause ( 4) of
the Control Order and the learned Advocate-General
of
the
Mysore
State
contended that a statutory
tenancy was thereby created. It is no doubt true that
it is provided by sub-clause ( 4) that the terms of the
tenancy may be such as may be agreed upon between
the landlord and the tenant, and there is no provision,
as found in the later Act, as to what is to happen in
the event of there being no agreement. If it is correct
that a tenancy is brought into existence by the operation of the statute, it is possible that in case the terms
are not the subject of any agreement between the landlord and the tenant, the ordinary law of landlord and
tenant will apply in the absence of any provision for
the fixation of · terms by the Controller. But the point
does not arise for decision in this case and nothing
further need be said about it.
The applicability of sub-clause ( 4) of the Control
Order was sought to be avoided in another manner.
It was pointed out that sub-clause (2) referred in Its
first part "to the purposes of the Government of
Mysore" etc., and in its later part "for the occupation
of any officer or any
such Government authority,
body or corporation, or for the occupation of an individual", but that when we come to sub-clause ( 4)
the
two categaries are kept distinct or separate and in referring to the second category the Control Order
1952
D. K.
Nabhirajiah
v.
The State of
Mysore
and Others.
Chandrasekhara
Aiyar /,
1952
D. K.
Nabhirajiah
v.
The State of
Mysore
and Others.
Chandrasekhara
Aiyar /.
754
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19521
speaks only of the requirement of the house for
the occupation by any of the officers and nothing
is
said
about
the occupation
of
any
individual.
The
amending
Act did not introduce the words
"or
for
the
occupation
of
any
individual"
into
sub-clause ( 4). Therefore, it was urged that the whole
basis of the Advocate-General's contention
about
a
statutory tenancy being created fell to the ground. At
first sight, there seems to be something in the point.
But if sub-clause
(2) is read ·as a whole, having in
view the object sought to be achieved by the legislation, it is fairly clear that there is no such necessary
antithesis between the two categories or clauses
and
that the words "for the purposes" can be so read as to
include "occupation" also.
The omission of the words.
"for the purposes" in the latter part of sub-clause (2)
was perhaps to avoid inartistic phraseology. "For the
occupation" certainly reads better than "for the
purposes of the occupation".
Ground No. 2 regarding discrimination was not
pressed.
Then, we come to ground No. 3. Clause (bb ). of
sub-clause (2) of Rule 81 of the Defence of India Rules
is in these terms :-
" (bb) for regulating the letting and sub-letting of
any accommodation or class of accommodation, whether residential or non-residential, whether furnished
or unfurnished and whether with or without board,
and in particular,-
( i) for controlling the rents for such accommodation (either generally or when let to specified
persons or classes of persons or in specified circumstances) ;
( (ii) for preventing the eviction of tenants and
sub-tenants
from
such_ accommodation in specified
circumstances and) ;
(iii) for requiring such accommodation
l'<> be
let either generally, or to specified persons or classes
of persons, or in specified circumstances; ...... "
-
...
..
~-'
... -
.. '
\. .
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
755
It was urged that the power conferred under this
sub-clause applied only to those cases where the house
was available for letting or sub-letting and not to
cases where a house was not so available, in other
words, if the landlord of any premises said that they
were required for his own occupation, the Government
had no power to requisition the same. Emphasis was
laid on the word "regulating".
This, however, is an
obviously unsound interpretation to be placed upon
the words.
They mean that the Government might
provide for and regulate the letting and sub-letting
etc., and that such is the scope is clear from the words
in sub-clause (2) "may by order provide".
The argument for the petitioner, if accepted, would render the
powers entirely nugatory, as it would then be open to
every landlord to say that the premises are required
for self-occupation, or even that he has already let it
out to another and that therefore it is not available
for being let.
There was no requisition of property in this case
under section 75 (A) of the Defence of India Rules.
The Control Order was promulgated under rule 81 (2)
(bb) which provides for the regulation of letting and
sub-letting houses. It is rather the exercise of a police
power of regulation in public interest than anything
done in the exercise of a power of eminent domain, in
which case alone questions relating to compensation
and public purpose will arise.
In the course of the arguments, it was suggested
that the amendment notification of 4th
May,
1949,
introducing the words "or for the occupation of any
individual" was
invalid
because
the regulation of
letting and sub-letting under clause (bb) could only be
for the Defence of British India or for the efficient
prosecution of the war, or for maintaining supplies
and services essential to the life of the community,
and that the taking of property for the occupation of
a private individual was outside the scope of the
power. Apart from the fact that no such ground has
been taken in the petition, it has also to be noted that
195!
D. K.
N abhirajiilh
v.
The State of
Uysore
attd Others.
Chattdrasekhara
Aiyar /.
1952
D. X..
N abhirajiah
v.
The State of
Mysore
"1Jd Others.
Chondr•·
sek_horo
Aiyor /.
1951
756
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19521
the Control Order purports to have been made not
only under clause (bb) of sub-rule (2) of rule 81 of the
Defence of India Rules, hut also under the Supplies,
SefV!Ccs
and
Miscellaneous
Provisions
(Temporary
Powers) Act of 1947. We have not got this Act before us and it was not even referred to in the course
of the arguments.
Hence, no decision is called for
on this point.
The petition fails and is dismissed without
any
order as to costs.
Petition ditmiued.
Agent for the petitioner: K. R. Kri1hnaswamy.
Agent for the respondents : P. A. Mehta.
UJAGAR SINGH
II.
THE STATE OF THE PUNJAB
and
JAGJIT SINGH
II.
THE STATE OF THE PUNJAB
[SAtYID FAZL ALI, PATANJ ALI SAsTR1, Mu1rnEi.JEA,
DAS and CHANDRASEKHARA AtYAi., JJ. J
Preventive Detention Act (IV of 1950), SJ. 3, 12-Detention
order-Non-specification of period of detention-Ground supplied
vague and same as in earlier order-Particulars supplied after
'1months-Legality of deteiJtion-Duty to supply particulars
~lls
soon as may he'-Form of detention order-Order signed by Home
Secretary-Validity.
Non-specification of any
d~finitc period in a detcntioa order
made under s. 3 of the PrcventiVc Detention Act, IV of 1950,
is not a material omission rendering the order invalid in view of
the provisions contained in clauses (4) (a) and (7) (a) of Ar~ 22
of the Constitution and •· 12 of the Act.
An
order of
detention
which
expressly
states
that
the
Go•ernor of the State concerned was satisfied of the neCCMity of
'_,.
. .
••